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MAKING SENSE OF THE LIONEL TATE CASE
MICHAEL J. DALE*
INTRODUCTION
Lionel Tate was released from the Broward County Jail in Fort Lauder-
dale, Florida on January 27, 2004 after serving three years in the State's adult
prison system. Two days later, on January 29, the youngster, just two days
short of his seventeenth birthday, pled guilty in a Broward courtroom to sec-
ond-degree murder in the death of a six-year old playmate, Tiffany Eunick.
In exchange for that plea and the three years he already served in Florida's
adult correctional system, Tate was placed on house arrest for one year, and
then obligated to complete ten years of probation.1 The plea agreement was
identical to the one initially offered to Tate some three years earlier when he
was twelve years of age. His initial failure to take that plea resulted in his
removal from juvenile court jurisdiction, indictment by a grand jury, a crimi-
nal trial and a conviction as an adult for first degree murder, resulting in life
imprisonment without parole. The media reported his conviction as the
youngest child ever sentenced to life in prison in the United States.2
Tate's release came as a result of an appellate ruling by Florida's Fourth
District Court of Appeal on December 10, 2003, in which the court held that
a competency hearing should have been ordered by the trial court when Tate
initially rejected the plea offer, as well as, at a post-trial hearing.
The youngster's pro-wrestling defense, his incarceration for life without
parole, and the subsequent appellate reversal, all generated national and even
international attention.4 More significantly, and together with other notori-
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
1. Paula McMahon & Jon Burnstein, State Offers Tate Same Deal He Rejected Before,
SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Dec. 26, 2003, http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/
news/nation/7577352.htm.
2. Id.; Manuel Roig-Franzia, Deal Would Free Youth Who Killed 6-Year-Old,
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 30, 2003 at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/
wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentld=A397672003Dec29&notFound=true; Jill Barton, Teen
in 'Wrestling Death' Ordered Free, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 26, 2004,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uslatest/story/0, 1282,-3671841,00.htmi.
3. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
4. See Teen offered plea bargain; Florida boy tried as an adult for murder at age 12
could be out ofprison next month, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 27, 2003, at A 17; Nicholas Wapshott,
Youngest 'Lifer' Wins Freedom," LONDON TIMES, Jan. 2, 2004, http://www.heraldsun.news.
com.au/common/story_page/0,5478,8308508^401,00.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004); Dun-
can Campbell, Parole for Youth Given Life Jail Sentence at 13, GUARDIAN, Jan. 27, 2004, at
19, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,1132050,00.html; Juvenile
4
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ous cases involving young teenagers charged with serious offenses,5 the Tate
case has generated discussion about a series of issues arising from the prac-
tice in the United States of charging young juveniles in adult criminal
courts.6
The issues the case raises are varied and complex. For example, at what
age should teenagers be charged as adults? Does conviction of young teen-
agers in adult criminal court serve any deterrent purpose? Do juveniles in-
carcerated in the adult criminal justice system recidivate at a higher rate than
similar youth in the juvenile justice system? What are conditions and ser-
vices like in the adult prison system? Why are minority children dispropor-
tionately represented in the adult criminal justice system? Are juveniles
competent to stand trial in the adult court and/or aid in their defense? Is the
juvenile court effective in rehabilitating juveniles? Should rehabilitation be
an issue when a juvenile is charged with a very serious offense? What role
should retribution play in a case where a juvenile is adjudicated to have
committed a very serious criminal offense? Should prosecutors have unfet-
tered discretion in charging young defendants as adults? Should the felony
murder doctrine apply to juvenile defendants? At whose direction does a
defense lawyer representing a very young defendant, act-the child client or
the parents?
This edition of the Nova Law Review contains articles focusing on sev-
eral of the major issues raised by the Tate case. In the first article, Abolish-
killer freed, AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 28, 2004, at 8; Teen who killed friend is released from prison,
INT'L HERALD-TRIBUNE, Jan. 28, 2004, at 5; Killer teen set free, OTrAWA SUN, Jan. 30, 2004
at 22.
5. See Steven A. Drizin & Allison McGowen Keegan, Abolishing the Use of the Felony-
Murder Rule When the Defendant is a Teenager, 28 NOVA L. REv. 507 (2004) (discussing the
Florida cases of Tate and Brazill; and also discussing the case of fifteen-year-old Jonathan
Miller from Georgia convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life in prison with the possi-
bility of parole in Fourteen years); see also Jason Cato, What Does Teenager's Release Mean
for Chester Case?, ROCKY HILL HERALD, Jan. 28, 2004, http://www.heraldonline.com/local/
story/328 12 17p-29 3 16 0 1 c.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) (comparing Tate to the case of
Fourteen-year-old South Carolina boy charged with killing his grandparents).
6. See Deborah Sharp, Neither Family Happy with Teen's Plea Deal, USA TODAY, Jan.
6, 2004, http://www.keepmedia.com/ShowltemDetails.do?item-id=371500&extlD=10026
(last visited Mar. 27, 2004); Noah Bierman, Freedom No Free ass for Tate, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 25, 2004, http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/7783801.
htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). The public outrage with youth crime is not new. In 1978
fifteen-year-old Willie Basket was convicted for three subway murders and sentenced to the
State Division for Youth until his twenty-first birthday. New York Governor Hugh Carey
exploded and sought new legislation to allow children as young as thirteen to be tried as
adults. Fox BUTTERFIELD, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN: THE BOSKET FAMILY AND THE AMERICAN
TRADITION OF VIOLENCE 226-27 (Alfred A. Knopf 1st ed., 1995); PAUL A. STRASBURG,
VIOLENT DELINQUENTS 1-2 (1978).
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MAKING SENSE OF THE TATE CASE
ing the Use of the Felony-Murder Rule When the Defendant is a Teenager,
Northwestern University Clinical Professor Steven A. Drizin and Northwest-
ern University School of Law graduate Alison McGowen Keegan argue
forcefully that, in light of the child's lack of ability or incapacity to form the
requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying crime in the child abuse
felony murder case-the murder-the prosecutor ought not be allowed to
avoid proving the underlying intent in order to get a conviction. In the sec-
ond article, A Child and A Choice, Lionel Tate's trial counsel, James Lewis,
discusses the ethical question he faced-how a lawyer may go about repre-
senting a young client whose competence may be questioned; how that law-
yer deals with the child's parent; and, as a result, from whom does the lawyer
takes his guidance in making the decision to accept or reject a plea offer.7
The third article, Child's Play No Longer: Children Charged and Tried
as Adults in Florida-Ending up in Prison for Life Without Parole, authored
by Lionel Tate's appellate counsel, Richard Rosenbaum, is enlightening in
two respects. First, he adds more information about what actually occurred
in the Tate case. Second, together with commentary on competence and
separation of powers, he expands upon the various constitutional arguments,
including due process, equal protection and privacy, which were unsuccess-
ful before the District Court of Appeal. In the fourth article, Tate v. State:
Highlighting the Need for a Mandatory Competency Hearing, Nova law stu-
dent Steven Bell argues that mandatory competency hearings are needed for
children under the age of sixteen who are charged with felonies in either ju-
venile or adult court.
In order to put all of these articles in perspective, it is first important to
understand just what happened in the Tate case and what the Florida Inter-
mediate Appellate Court decided. This introduction will summarize the
holding in the case and describe the various issues raised by the case and
those left unresolved by the opinion, including the subjects dealt with in the
Drizin/ Keegan, Lewis, Rosenbaum, and Bell articles.
THE TATE CASE
Twelve-year old Lionel Tate was indicted by a grand jury and convicted
of the first degree murder of six-year old Tiffany Eunick, in a six day trial
between January 16 and 19, 1999.8 The verdict included charges of both
7. See Jim Lewis, A Child and a Choice, 28 NOVA L. R. 479 (2004).
8. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Added to the oddities
of the case is the fact that Kenneth Padowitz, the prosecutor who made the plea offer to Tate
in his initial murder trial, represented the victim's mother, Deweese Eunick-Paul, after going
into private practice. After the first appeal, Tate's mother, Kathleen Grossett-Tate, was repre-
2004]
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felony murder predicated upon the commission of aggravated child abuse
and premeditated murder.9 The appellate court found that the evidence
clearly showed that the child had been brutally slain and that she had "as
many as thirty-five injuries, including a fractured skull, brain contusions,
twenty plus bruises, a rib fracture, injuries to her kidneys and pancreas, and a
portion of her liver detached." The appellate court also explained that none
of the experts believed that the injuries resulted from "play fighting," a prob-
able reference to the wrestling defense presented by the defendant." Al-
though Tate raised many issues before the appellate court in his appellate
brief,2 the court ruled solely in Tate's favor on the issue of competence-
that the denial of the defense lawyer's post-trial request to have the boy
evaluated, as well as the court's failure to sua sponte order a pre-trial compe-
tency evaluation when Tate rejected the original juvenile court plea, consti-
tuted a violation of Tate's due process rights.'3
At the post-trial stage, Tate was represented by separate counsel, Rich-
ard Rosenbaum, the lawyer who also ultimately represented Tate on his suc-
cessful appeal. 4 In the post-trial hearing, in addition to moving for a new
trial, Rosenbaum sought an evidentiary hearing to challenge whether the pre-
trial plea negotiations were adequately explained to the child. Rosenbaum
sought a competency evaluation and hearing on the grounds that the child
neither knew nor understood the consequences preceding the trial and that he
was unable to assist his counsel before and during trial. 5 In addition,
Rosenbaum argued to the court that the child was, at the time of the post-trial
hearing, not competent to understand the implications of why he needed to
waive the attorney-client privilege. 16 In fact, James Lewis wished to testify
in support of the request for a post-trial competency hearing but was faced
with the inability to do so without waiver of the attorney-client privilege by
Tate.'7 According to the appellate court, after Tate conferred with his
sented by her own counsel, Henry Hunter from Tallahassee. John Thor-Dahlburg, Boy who
received life without Parole to be freed soon, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004, at 8, available at
http://www.contracostatimes.com/mld/cctimes/news/7798061 .htm.
9. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 50.
14. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 46; see Richard L. Rosenbaum, Child's Play No Longer: Chil-
dren Charged and Tried as Adults in Florida-Ending up in Prison for Life Without Parole,
28 NOVA L. REV. 485 (2004).
15. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
16. Id. at 48.
17. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 48 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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MAKING SENSE OF THE TATE CASE
mother, he did not agree to the proposed waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege. 8 The court noted that the child apparently simply followed his
mother's instructions not to waive the privilege despite both lawyers' view
that it was in the child's best interest. 9 Lewis wanted to tell the court "what
led him to believe that Tate was not competent during trial. 20 Subsequently,
the trial court denied the post-trial motion for a post-trial evaluation and
hearing.2' Ironically, prior to ruling against the child, the trial court com-
mented that "I am also convinced that if I deny your hearing at this particular
point, that I would get ordered by the Fourth District Court of Appeals [sic]
to have such a hearing. '"22
The appellate court posed the question before it this way:
whether, due to his extremely young age and lack of previous ex-
posure to the judicial system, a competency evaluation was consti-
tutionally mandated to determine whether Tate had sufficient pre-
sent ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding and whether he had a rational, as well as
factual, understanding of the proceedings against him.23
The appellate court found that "[t]he record reflects that questions re-
garding Tate's competency were not lurking subtly in the background, but
were readily apparent .... ,2' The court noted that the child had an IQ of 90
or 91, placing him in the lower twenty-five percent of children of his age,
and that he had significant mental delays. Thus, the appeals court concluded
that the trial court committed error by failing to sua sponte order a compe-
tency hearing pre-trial and, nonetheless, to deny the post-trial request for the
competency hearing. In coming to its conclusion, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal relied upon the United States Supreme Court opinion in Dusky v.
United States, which established the test for the determination of compe-
tency: "whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him., 26
Finding that a competency hearing should have been ordered, the court then
18. Id.
19. Id. at 48-49.
20. Id. at 49.
21. Id. at 48,49.
22. Tate, 864 So. 2d. at 47.
23. Id. at 48.
24. Id. at 50.
25. Id.
26. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); see also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966).
2004]
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remanded, indicating the child was entitled to a new trial because conducting
a hearing at the appellate stage, to determine the present competency of the
maturing adolescent, failed to adequately retroactively protect Tate's rights.27
The court rejected all other appellate arguments made by Tate's lawyer.
In response to the argument that the Legislature did not mean to prosecute
children as caretakers for the crime of aggravated child abuse, the appellate
court found that the statute was not void for vagueness, and that a clear read-
ing of the statute allowed it to be applied to the conduct of a non-caretaker
child against another child.28 The court noted that it is up to the Legislature
to reexamine the language of the statute and determine whether it intended
such a result. The court went on to find that there was no equal protection or
due process violation because the child was being treated more harshly than
older adolescents, premised upon the notion that there is no absolute right for
juveniles to be treated in a separate system for juvenile offenders, a concept
recognized by a number of jurisdictions.29 The court also rejected the equal
protection argument that some juveniles are charged and convicted as adults
while others are dealt with in the juvenile system on the basis of prosecuto-
rial discretion.3" In making its ruling, the court relied upon its earlier rejec-
tion of the same argument in the notorious Florida criminal matter, the Na-
thaniel Brazill case.3' Brazill, thirteen, had been convicted of shooting and
killing his middle school teacher, Barry Grunow, on May 26, 2000.32
In addition, the court in the Tate case rejected a separation of powers
argument made by Tate, who claimed that the State had unlawfully delegated
its powers by allowing the prosecutor to define the crimes and the fix penal-
ties by seeking indictment for children under fourteen.33 The court rejected
an argument that Tate had a right to a transfer hearing under Kent v. United
States,34 which had also rejected by the court in Brazill.35 The court rejected
the argument in the amicus brief, whose authors were from the Juvenile Law
Center, that a child of his age did not have the adult capacity to form crimi-
nal intent, concluding that the Legislature had rejected the common law de-
27. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 51 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
28. Id. at 50-51.
29. Id. at 52-53.
30. Id. at 52.
31. Id. at 52-53 (citing Brazill v. State, 845 So. 2d 282, 289 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003)).
32. Brazill, 845 So. 2d at 285.
33. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 53.
34. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
35. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 53 (citing Brazill, 845 So. 2d at 288-89).
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MAKING SENSE OF THE TATE CASE
fense of infancy with a statutory scheme.36 The court rejected Tate's argu-
ment about the right to privacy and confidentiality, which he would have had
in the juvenile court. The court recognized that in the Brazill case there had
been a similar argument regarding the right to the rehabilitative aspect of the
juvenile court.37 The court in Tate rejected this argument on the same ground
that there is no statutory or constitutional right to access to the juvenile court
system." Finally, the court rejected "the argument that a life sentence with-
out the possibility of parole is cruel and unusual punishment on a twelve-
year-old child" under the Florida Constitution and the Federal Constitu-
tion."
PUTTING THE CASE INTO CONTEXT
It is hardly surprising that a case like that of Tate would eventually take
place in the State of Florida, involving a very young child convicted of a
very serious offense, resulting in incarceration for life. In 2000, Florida led
the nation in transfers of juveniles to criminal court.40 In the fiscal year,
1994-1995, almost 5,000 juveniles involved in more than 7,000 cases were
transferred to the criminal court in Florida.4' This number constitutes more
than ten percent of all juvenile offenders handled through the court system in
Florida.4 z In fact, the figure came close to the total number of residential
placement dispositions for juvenile offenders in the Florida programs run by
the Department of Juvenile Justice.43 There is evidence that children trans-
ferred to the adult criminal court system in Florida were more likely to re-
offend than those kept in the juvenile court system for similar offenses and
36. Id. Organizations and law school professors working in the juvenile justice field filed
two amicus curiae briefs. The attorneys from the Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia who
prepared the competence-related brief were Robert G. Schwartz, Marsha L. Levick and
Lourdes M. Rosado.
37. Brazill, 825 So. 2d at 288.
38. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 53-54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
39. Id. at 54.
40. FLA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, BUREAU OF DATA AND RESEARCH, A DJJ SUCCESS
STORY: TRENDS IN TRANSFER OF JUVENILES TO ADULT CRIMINAL COURT 5 (Jan. 8, 2002) [here-
inafter A DJJ Success Story] (describing Florida as "widely recognized as the leader of the
transfer experiment").
41. DONNA BISHOP, ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
A STUDY OF JUVENILE TRANSFERS TO CRIMINAL COURT IN FLORIDA, (Aug. 1999),
http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfilesl/fs99113.txt.
42. Id.
43. Id.
2004]
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based upon material race, sex and gender.44 Ironically, Florida's Department
of Justice has recently said that there is mounting evidence of greater effec-
tiveness of treatment programs for serious offenders in the juvenile justice
system.45
Florida also possesses a variety of statutory routes for adjudication of
juveniles in the adult court, including discretionary judicial waiver, discre-
tionary prosecutorial waiver, known as direct file in Florida, and grand jury
indictment for juveniles who have been charged with capital or life felo-
nies. 46 Whether prosecutorial discretion to try children in adult court in Flor-
ida is applied fairly has been the subject of studies, which suggest a lack of
regularity in the process.
The expansion of the use of adult court in Florida, including 1994
changes allowing additional discretionary direct file criteria for fourteen and
fifteen year olds,48 is not all that dissimilar to the practices of other states. In
the 1990s, many states changed their juvenile justice statutes to expand the
circumstances under which juveniles could be transferred to or filed directly
against in adult court. 49 The causes for the change in legislation are multiple,
including perceived increase in juvenile access to drugs, the gun culture,
gangs, media perceptions, political advantageousness, and an increase in the
44. DONNA BISHOP & CHARLES FRAZIER, THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAIVER, IN THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURT (Jeffrey Fagan& Franklin Zimring eds., 2000); DONNA M. BISHOP ET AL., OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE TRANSFERS TO CRIMINAL COURT
STUDY: PHASE I FINAL REPORT, (1998); Donna Bishop, The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal
Court: Reexamining Recidivism Over the Long Term, 43 CRIME & DELINQUENCY, 548, 558
(1997); Donna Bishop, The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does it make a differ-
ence?, 42 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 171 (1996).
45. A DJJ Success Story, supra note 40, at 6.
46. Id.
47. Vincent Schianaldi & Jason Ziedenberg, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, The
Florida Experiment: An analysis of the Impact of Granting Prosecutors Discretion to Tax
Juveniles as Adults 3-4 (2000) (finding that 28% of youth transferred to adult criminal court
were charged with violent crimes, and more than half were charged with non-violent property
crimes).
48. Id.
49. PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, TRYING JUVENILES
AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS (1998); Marisa
Slaten, Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 55 RUTGERS L.
REV. 821, 822 (2003); see also CHARLES M. PUZZANCHEAR, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DELINQUENCY CASES WAIVED TO CRIMINAL COURT, 1990-1999,
(Sept. 2002) (finding that since 1994, cases waived to adult court declined 38%, and repre-
sented less than 1% of formally processed delinquency cases); Guillory v. Superior Court, 72
P.3d 815, 817 (Cal. 2003) (upholding Proposition 21 providing discretion to prosecutors simi-
lar to that available to the prosecutors in the Tate case).
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youth population. Perhaps the most significant cause of change in legislation
is fear of youth crime, combined with a belief that juvenile courts do not
work.5" As may be imagined, the perceptions about the effectiveness of the
adult criminal justice system in responding to the perceptions about youth
crime vary dramatically.5 According to William J. Bennett and his co-
authors in their book Body Count in 1996, in which they coined the phrase
"super predators" to refer to certain juveniles, the authors said that "despite
many legislative efforts aimed at trying more juvenile criminals as adults, not
much has happened."52 The authors explained that Americans have been
calling for change in the juvenile justice system that would allow law en-
forcement officials to get a firm grasp on youth criminals. On the other
hand, the Sentencing Project, in an article in 2002, made the following
statement about the deterrent effect of incarceration of juveniles in adult cor-
rectional institutions:
The imposition of adult punishments, far from deterring crime, ac-
tually seems to produce an increase in criminal activity in com-
parison to the result obtained for children retained in the juvenile
system. Reliance upon criminal courts and punishment ignores
evidence that more effective responses to the problems of crime
and violence exist outside the criminal justice system in therapeu-
tic programs. Because there is considerable racial disparity in the
assignment of children to adult prosecution, the harshness, ineffec-
tiveness and punishing aspects of transfer from juvenile to adult
court is doubly visited on children of color.53
The Sentencing Project article suggests there is evidence of dramatic ra-
cial disparity in the transfer and placement of children in the adult criminal
justice system. In Florida, African-American youngsters in 2000 constituted
about forty percent of the youth population. Yet state-wide they constituted
50. A DJJ Success Story, supra note 40, at 5.
51. See JUVENILE JUSTICE: A CENTURY OF CHANGE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (Dec. 1999) (supporting the juvenile justice system as a
comprehensive and balanced approach to justice).
52. WILLIAM J. BENNETT, ET AL., THE BODY COUNT 118 (Simon & Schuster ed., 1996).
53. PATRICIA ALLARD & MALCOM YOUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT COMMENTARY:
PROSECUTING JUVENILES IN ADULT COURT: PROSPECTIVE FOR POLICY MAKERS AND
PRACTITIONERS (2002); see also Simon 1. Singer & David McDonald, Criminalizing Delin-
quency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV.
521 (1988); Eric Jensen & Linda Metzger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect of Legislative Waiver
on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 96 (1994).
2004]
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fifty-six of the referrals transferred to adult court.54 In fact, in Miami-Dade
County during the same time period, eighty-five percent of the cases filed in
adult courts related to minority youth.5 Both the Tate and Brazill case in-
volved children of color. Nothing in either appellate opinion touches on the
issue of over-representation of minority children in the adult criminal justice
cases.
The issue of competency of juveniles to assist in the defense, of course,
was the subject of the ruling by the appellate court in the Tate case and raises
another significant issue in terms of transferring and trying children in the
adult criminal justice system. It is significant that the issue of competence
was the subject of one of the two amicus curiae briefs filed in the case, in
part a Brandeis-like memorandum containing substantial supporting litera-
ture.56 Competence of young children in the adult criminal court is the sub-
ject of important recent articles. The work of Thomas Grisso, Jeffrey Fagan,
Elizabeth Scott and Lawrence Steinberg, among others, has raised the con-
sciousness of both the prosecution and defense regarding the capacity of ju-
venile defendants to aid in their defense. 7
However, the appellate opinion in Tate did not settle the question of
whether young children are competent to aid in their defense in adult crimi-
54. Building Blocks for Youth for a Fair and Effective Youth Justice System, State by
State Information: Florida, at http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/statebystate/
florida.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2004) (showing Florida's disproportionate minority confine-
ment). See generally DONNA HAMPARIAN & MICHAEL J. LEIBER, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DISPROPORTIONATE CONFINEMENT OF MINORITY STUDENTS IN
SECURE FACILITIES (1997).
55. Id.
56. Brief for Amici Curiae Center on Children & the Law et al., Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d
44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 4D01-1306).
57. See Thomas Grisso & Laurence Steinberg, Juvenile Competence: Can Immaturity
Alone Make an Adolescent Incompetent to Stand Trial? 9 JUv. JUST. UPDATE 2 (2003); Jeffrey
Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical Exemp-
tion for Juveniles From Capital Punishment, 33 NEW MEXICO L. REV. 207 (2003) (analyzing
immaturity and culpability of juveniles); Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity
Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles From Capital Punishment,
33 N.M. L. REV. 207 (2003); Elizabeth S. Scott and Lawrence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81
TEX. L. REV. 799 (2002); RICHARD J. BONNIE & THOMAS GRISSO, ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE
AND YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS, IN YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE 73, 75 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); THOMAS GRISSO,
FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES 101-05 (1998); Thomas Grisso, The Competence of
Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 23 (1997); Thomas Grisso,
The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 137, 141-42 (1997); Lawrence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman,
Maturity of Judgment in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW AND HUM. BEHAVIOR 249
(1996).
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nal cases. The appellate opinion simply advised trial judges hearing adult
criminal cases involving very young defendants that they should be alert to
issues of competence, and that they may request sua sponte expert advice on
the question of the child's competence. What should alert the judge is not
described in any doctrine in the opinion. The judge, arguably, is the least
likely of the players in a criminal case to have knowledge of the child's com-
petence. Obviously defense counsel should know a great deal about the cli-
ent's competence. But, so too, should the prosecutor.
THE DRIZIN/KEEGAN, ROSENBAUM, LEWIS, AND BELL ARTICLES
The amicus curiae brief filed in the Tate appeal on behalf of the appel-
lant, authored by Professor Stephen Drizin and others dealt with the question
of felony murder and its application to children and is the subject of the
Drizin/Keegan article in this law journal. The article, which urges rejection
of felony murder charges as appropriate for young child defendants raises the
important question of why the State should be able to convict children of
serious criminal charges involving deaths without proving the child intended
to kill the victim. Jim Lewis's article focuses on a very serious issue-the
relationship among a lawyer, the child client, and the client's parents. While
at first glance it would seem obvious that the lawyer's obligation to the client
is simple and straightforward, the Rules of Professional Conduct recognize
that the duty is to the client regardless of who is paying the bills. The Rules
also suggest that when a client is disabled, including children, the lawyer
should do what he or she can to represent the client as any other fully capable
client. The reality of representation, as Lewis's article demonstrates, is not
always so clear. When one is faced with a twelve-year-old client whose
competence may be suspect may the lawyer rely upon the judgment of the
parent?
Rosenbaum's article both provides the reader with great insight into
how the Tate case was handled post trial, particularly with regard to the issue
of competency, and fleshes out the various constitutional arguments that
failed in the appellate court. In order to understand what the future holds for
children charged in adult court for serious crimes, it is vital to understand
what legal challenges have failed. Bell argues that competency hearings
should be mandatory for felonies committed by youths less than sixteen-
years-old, in both juvenile and adult court. Mandatory competency hearings
should be conducted despite the fact that failure to raise the issue of compe-
tence can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel and despite the court's
power to order a competency hearing. Rather, because of the evidence that
2004]
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/1
NOVA LA W REVIEW
children less than sixteen lack the "essential characteristics '5 8 to be compe-
tent to stand trial, a competency hearing should be required.
CONCLUSION
These four articles start a discussion both in terms of Florida's applica-
tion of adult criminal charges and the adult criminal justice process to chil-
dren who commit very serious offenses and the role of judges, prosecutors
and defense counsel in these cases. There has been extensive public outcry
concerning the Florida law that allows a twelve-year-old to be sentenced to
prison for life without the possibility of parole. Whether or not there will be
any response by the Florida Legislature, or other state legislatures, to the
increased use of the adult criminal justice system to hold young children
accountable, or to the severity of sentences for juveniles, remains to be
seen.5 9 Likewise, because the appellate opinion in the Tate case obligates
judges to inquire as to a juvenile defendant's competence, but sets no precise
age standards, it is unclear how judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers will
handle these problems. Although the Tate opinion resolves one child's case,
the larger questions of whether children like Tate should be held accountable
in adult court and, if so, how we determine whether they are competent to aid
in their own defense, remain unanswered.
58. Steven Bell, Tate v. State: Highlighting the Need for a Mandatory Competency
Hearing, 28 NOVA L. R. 575 (2004).
59. In the Winter of 2004 after Tate's release, Florida State Senator Steve Geller intro-
duced Senate Bill 530 ("SB 530") amending the Florida juvenile delinquency statute, Chapter
985 to provide that children fifteen years of age or younger, who have not committed other
listed offenses, be eligible for parole in capital offense cases. S. 530, 2004 Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2004), http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?BIMode=ViewBilllnfo&
Mode=Bills&SubMenu=l&Year=2004&billnum=530. However, SB 530 was not enacted.
See Beth Reinhard, Parole denied for kids who get life, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 1, 2004, at
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/state/8326125.htm%20on%2OApril%201 ,%20
2004 (last visited Apr. 8, 2004). Senator Walter Campbell filed Senate Bill 1346, a more
extensive plan, which would limit the age at which a minor could be sentenced to death, man-
dates Department of Juvenile Justice commitment of juveniles, who are convicted of offenses
punished by death in the adult system. S. 1346, 2004 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004),
http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?BIMode=ViewBilllnfo&Mode=Bills&SubMenu
=1 &Year-2004&billnum= 1346.
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A CHILD AND A CHOICE
JIM LEWIS*
Your client is twelve-years-old and charged with first degree murder as
an adult. It is alleged that, without a weapon, he beat a six-year-old female
playmate to death for no apparent reason. When examined by a neuro-
psychologist, the twelve-year-old defendant tested as immature for his age
with a below average I.Q. The state makes what appears to be a lenient plea
offer for a second degree murder conviction-three years of prison to be
served in a juvenile facility, followed by a period of one year community
control (house arrest) and ten years of probation.
The defendant's mother is a police officer and an army veteran who
served in Desert Storm. The defendant's father lives out of state and, for all
practical purposes, is out of the decision-making loop. The defendant's
mother seems to be intelligent, concerned, and totally preoccupied with the
best interests of her son.
Who should make the decision as to whether this twelve-year-old de-
fendant should take the plea offer or risk a trial with a possible sentence of
life in prison without parole? This article is written making the dangerous
assumption that no issues of competency as to the child client exist, or that it
has already been determined by the court that the child is competent.
Who makes the decision to roll the dice of a trial or accept a plea bar-
gain? In the adult world the answer is simple-the defendant, the person
accused makes the decision, with the benefit of advice from hopefully com-
petent counsel. The issue is not so simple when the defendant is twelve-
years-old, intellectually and socially immature for his age, and charged in
adult court with the most serious crime known to man-the killing of a child.
Logic would seem to dictate that the parent would be calling the shots
on what would probably be the most important decision to be made during
the child's lifetime. Would the child be better off if a court-appointed guard-
ian helped make the decision? What if the independent guardian's advice is
different than that of the parent? Should the lawyer interject himself more
into the decision-making process if he represents a child instead of an adult?
Should the lawyer insist a plea be taken in the face of overwhelming physical
* Jim Lewis is a criminal defense attorney practicing in Fort Lauderdale and was
Lionel Tate's trial attorney. Adjunct Professor of Law at Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova
Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida since 1990. J.D. Stetson University College
of Law 1980, B.A. University of Central Florida 1978. Former Assistant Statewide Prosecu-
tor and Special Prosecutor to Statewide Grand Jury of Florida.
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evidence, such as an autopsy detailing the victim's injuries as multiple and
severe, even if the parent and child insist his acts were not intentional?
Should the lawyer back up this insistence by withdrawing as attorney of re-
cord if the parent and child refuse to enter a plea?
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and more specifically,
rule 4-1.4(b) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, require an attorney to
explain matters to a client to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding representation.' However, when
the client is a child, this standard can become impracticable. Furthermore,
when the child is twelve-years-old and immature for his age with a below
average I.Q., the standard may become impossible. Does the parent then
become the decision-maker by default? Parents in our society make nearly
every important decision in a twelve-year-old's life. However, it is probably
a parent's natural instinct to hide terrible consequences from his or her
twelve-year-old in a situation where the child may face a sentence of life in
prison. It is analogous to a mother deciding not to inform her terminally ill
son that he has brain cancer and may die within a matter of months. It is also
a parent's natural instinct to believe that his child is incapable of murder and
therefore, not deserving of being locked up for any significant period of time.
Rule 4-1. 14(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar provides that
"the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-
lawyer relationship with the client," even if the normal client-lawyer rela-
tionship is impaired because of minority or a mental disability of the client.2
Theoretically, a lawyer must place himself between the child and the parent
to ensure the decision is the true will of the child, not the parent. It is also
important for an attorney representing a child client charged with a serious
crime not to blur the professional attorney-client relationship with paternalis-
tic feelings towards the client. It is a natural reaction for an attorney to as-
sume the role of the "protector," grimacing at the thought of his child client
serving even one minute locked up in a penal institution. If the attorney al-
lows himself to think "what would I do if this was my child," his advice will
likely be clouded by emotion instead of professional judgment.
The rules of professional responsibility do not seem to address the
rights of parents to direct representation on behalf of their children, espe-
cially in an adult criminal proceeding.3 Generally, it is improper to allow a
third party to direct or influence the attorney's exercise of independent
judgment or to share confidential information with such person except with
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2003); R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.4(b).
2. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.14(a) cmt.
3. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.14.
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the consent of the client.' The factors to be considered in accepting a plea
bargain in a murder case can be very complex. Evaluating the strength of the
government's case and understanding legal standards of intentional homi-
cide, felony murder, and accidental or excusable homicide are difficult for
educated adults to understand, let alone a twelve-year-old child.
Where a parent consults a lawyer on behalf of a young child, it is incon-
ceivable that a lawyer would not defer to the parent for guidance, or that the
parent would not reasonably expect the lawyer to do so.' Further, when a
child is incapable of comprehending the situation which requires him to
make a life-altering decision, the lawyer is arguably compelled "[t]o consult
[with the child client's] parent to determine what course of action might be in
the child's best interests, even if the parent is not actually directing the
course of the representation. '"6
Despite the absence of authority, an argument can be made that "[i]f
parents have the right to direct or influence the lawyer representing their
child... [it is because of their status] as parents,"7 the child's "natural
guardians."
Conflicts may arise between the interests of the parents and the child in
the course of representing a child charged with a crime in adult court. Par-
ents may make unwise decisions out of personal feelings of guilt or out of
devotion to the child, clouding the judgment that may be necessary to weigh
the consequences of an adverse verdict in adult court. If an actual conflict
does exist with the parent, a guardian-ad-litem should be requested by coun-
sel, with the courts appointing a lawyer or non-lawyer to serve in that capac-
ity.8 Guardians cannot enter pleas in criminal court on behalf of a child. If
the guardian's opinions differ from those of the natural parent, logic dictates
that the child would choose the natural parent's opinion. If the conflict be-
tween the guardian ad-litem and the parent escalates, a guardian may petition
the court to limit access of a parent to a child client, fearing undue influence.
Ultimately, the child must choose the advice he will rely upon in making
decisions relating to his case. Rule 1.14(b) of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility provides that a lawyer may seek the appointment of a
guardian or take other protective action with respect to a client only "when
the lawyer reasonable believes that a client ... cannot adequately act in the
4. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6.
5. Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1846 (1996).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1847, 1849.
8. Id. at 1840-41.
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client's own interest."9 Does that rule call for the appointment of a guardian
simply because the child's decision to proceed to trial, refusing a lenient plea
offer, seems unwise? Should a lawyer threaten to withdraw as counsel if his
client does not agree with the lawyer's advice? The answer to these ques-
tions is clearly, no.
The role of the lawyer representing a child in a criminal proceeding is
the same as if the lawyer were representing an adult in a criminal proceed-
ing.' o Lawyers are "[e]thically obligated to seek the objectives of the case as
defined by their clients, whether or not the lawyers think those objectives are
sound for the client or for society.""
A lawyer should not seek the appointment of a guardian simply because
the lawyer is unhappy with a client's decision.12 Likewise a threat to with-
draw or actually withdrawing as counsel of record on these grounds is itself
repugnant. Our entire criminal justice system is based on the presumption of
innocence and the client's right to maintain his innocence until proven guilty
in a court of law. Instead of seeking the appointment of a guardian, the at-
torney may choose to have an experienced psychologist to consult with both
the child and the parent about plea decisions. But it is the lawyer's ultimate
responsibility to make sure the child understands all of the options and to
have the child make a voluntary choice, free from any undue pressure from
any third party.
The normal objective of representing a criminal client, whether the cli-
ent is a child or an adult, is to avoid the adverse consequences of a convic-
tion (i.e. prison, criminal record, or other restrictions of the client's life).
Some clients however proceed to trial seeking vindication or a finding by a
jury or the court that their conduct was not criminal. Some clients place
principle, which usually means their belief in their own innocence, over the
risk of conviction and punishment. While this may seem unwise, counsel's
role is to advise a client, not to make his decision. It is the client who deter-
mines the objectives of the representation. 3 Children's attorneys face a sig-
nificant dilemma when their view of the child's best interest conflicts with
the child's expressed wishes concerning the objectives of representation. 4
Generally, a lawyer is an advocate for his client's preferences in a court pro-
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (2003).
10. Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children,
64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1399, 1424 (1996).
11. Id.
12. Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights and Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Client
Relationship, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 281 (1995).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003).
14. Ventrell, supra note 12, at 280-81.
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ceeding, and not what the lawyer believes to be in the child's best interests. 5
When counseling a child client about choices in a criminal proceeding, the
child must get the benefit of counsel's independent professional judgment as
to the risks of trial, consequences of an adverse verdict, and opportunities for
a plea bargain.16
A parent is often necessary in the attorney-child relationship to bring
the child back to reality in making important decisions. It has been my ex-
perience that children in the twelve to fifteen age group not only always
gravitate toward a choice that has no consequences, but also believe they will
win the trial and get to go home immediately. A twelve to fifteen-year-old
has limited ability to weigh risks and often believes that destiny or luck is
always on his side. The experiences and common sense of the parent may be
the only reality check the child can understand. A child client who relates
well with his lawyer is apt to think "my lawyer can't lose, he's a great guy."
Twelve-year-old children simply do not have enough experience and insight
to make rational choices in an adult court setting. No court appointed guard-
ian or team of psychologists can give him that experience or insight.
Marvin R. Ventrell in his 1995 article, Loyola University of Chicago
Law Review writes:
[i]f the attorney's view of the child's best interests conflicts with the
child's wishes, the lawyer should both consider whether the child's wishes
are reasonable and whether the attorney truly knows what is best. Simply
disagreeing with a client's directive should not, by itself, cause a dilemma.
Attorneys may need to compromise their positions as well and must al-
ways remain mindful of their role in the system---a role which requires
them to advocate a position, and not to determine the outcome.17
No client, child or not, should ever be pressured by his lawyer to accept a
plea bargain against his will. The court cannot accept a pressured plea even
if it's the client's own lawyer who is doing the pressuring.
My twenty-three years as a criminal trial attorney have taught me two
important lessons. First, you should never predict the outcome of a criminal
trial. The best any lawyer can do is to suggest to his client what he thinks
might happen at trial and the likely verdicts. A criminal trial is a dynamic
event full of fortune and misfortune. A verdict is often determined by the
make up of a jury-and a jury of strangers can do strange things. Second, if
you exert too much influence convincing a criminal client to accept a plea
bargain you will regret it. The client will blame you when he ultimately vio-
15. Id. at 279.
16. Id. at 260.
17. Id. at 279.
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lates probation and goes to prison for a crime he believes he did not commit.
You, the lawyer, have ruined his life because you convinced him to take a
plea when he believes the case should have gone to trial. On the other hand,
if you go to trial in the face of a lenient plea bargain and lose, your client and
the world may look at you and ask, "What were you thinking?"
As the Lionel Tate case illustrates, the role of the criminal attorney in
representing a young teenager in adult court, charged with a serious crime, is
complex. The ultimate decisions must be made by the child client. How-
ever, the system is naive if it believes children in this position will not be
influenced, or even defer these decisions to the parent. All a lawyer can do is
give good advice to the child client and the parent and hope the right deci-
sion will become apparent to all.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A Child of any age may be tried as an adult under Florida law.' When
charged as an adult, a child is required to be treated "in all respects as an
* Richard L. Rosenbaum, of the Law Offices of Richard L. Rosenbaum, Fort Lauder-
dale, Florida. Rosenbaum received his J.D. from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center, in 1983. Rosenbaum is licensed to practice law in the United States Su-
preme Court, the Third, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuit courts of appeal, and throughout
the state of Florida in all state and federal courts. Rosenbaum became Lionel Tate's attorney
after Tate was convicted, but prior to Tate being sentenced. Special thanks are given to
Cheryl Zickler, Esq., appellate co-counsel on behalf of Lionel Tate for her assistance in help-
ing formulate and articulate the arguments lodged on Lionel tate's appeal.
1. Section 985.225 of the Florida Statutes states:
(1) A child of any age who is charged with a violation of state law punishable by death or by
life imprisonment is subject to the jurisdiction of the court as set forth in s. 985.219(8) unless
and until an indictment on the charge is returned by the grand jury. When such indictment is
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adult.",2 What this means in reality is that children who are unable to drive,
vote, consume alcohol, hold public office, or even fight for our country, face
up to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. Immature "ba-
bies" can become embroiled in Florida's adult criminal justice system; and as
the law stands now, judges lack the necessary discretion in certain cases to
impose a sentence other than life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, no matter how young the accused. This article addresses how un-
fairly Florida treats children prosecuted as adults; the prosecution and con-
viction of twelve-year-old Lionel Tate and the subsequent appellate reversal
of the conviction; pending legislative bills regarding the prosecution of juve-
niles; and a suggestion as to how Florida can rehabilitate children accused or
convicted of committing "adult crimes" through treatment and counseling,
instead of incarcerating them.
Counsel for children charged or convicted as adults, and juvenile justice
organizations throughout Florida and the world have argued that Florida's
"juvenile transfer statutes" are unconstitutional on their face and as applied
on numerous levels.3 Unfortunately, thus far the courts have been less than
receptive to these arguments. For example, in Brazill v. State, the court
noted that child defendants have unsuccessfully argued that section 985.225
of the Florida Statutes is unconstitutional as a violation of due process, equal
protection, and separation of powers.4
The jurisdiction of the court attaches to the child, and the case, upon
service of a summons on the child and a parent, a legal or actual custodian,
or guardian of the child.5 If a child is taken into custody, jurisdiction at-
returned, the petition for delinquency, if any, must be dismissed and the child must be tried
and handled in every respect as an adult:
(a) On the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment; and
(b) On all other felonies or misdemeanors charged in the indictment which are based on the
same act or transaction as the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment or on one or
more acts or transactions connected with the offense punishable by death or by life imprison-
ment.
(3) If the child is found to have committed the offense punishable by death or by life impris-
onment, the child shall be sentenced as an adult. If the juvenile is not found to have committed
the indictable offense but is found to have committed a lesser included offense or any other of-
fense for which he or she was indicted as a part of the criminal episode, the court may sentence
pursuant to s. 985.233.
FLA. STAT. § 985.225 (2003) (emphasis added).
2. See id.
3. See Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Brazill v. State, 845
So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Phillips v. State, 861 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
4. Brazill, 845 So. 2d at 286.
5. § 985.219(7).
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taches before or after the filing of a petition, whichever occurs first, regard-
less of whether a summons was served.6 Thereafter the court controls the
prosecution of the child.' Appellate tribunals have sloughed off claims that
section 985.225 violates the law citing "easy affirmance" language:
[t]he constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo.8 There is a strong
presumption that a statute is constitutionally valid.9 It is well established
that where reasonably possible and consistent with constitutional rights, a
statute will be interpreted by the courts in a manner that resolves all doubt
in favor of its validity.
10
It is based upon Chapter 985 that unintended results occur. Even prosecutors
may deem a life sentence without parole unjust when imposed on a child
Defendant who has never before been charged with any criminal offense. In
Tate's case, not only the prosecutor but the victim's family, and a warden
from the Department of Juvenile Justice Level X facility joined in his quest
for a non-mandatory sentence. Luckily, in Tate's case, he was spared from
serving a mandatory life imprisonment sentence without the possibility of
parole." However, until legislative changes are enacted, children will con-
tinue facing the possibility of life in prison without parole upon conviction.
II. FLORIDA'S TRANSFER STATUTES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL: YOUNG
CHILDREN PROSECUTED UNDER FLORIDA LAW ARE TREATED MORE
HARSHLY THAN OTHERS PROSECUTED IN VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHTS TO
EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Child advocates assert that children's rights to equal protection and due
process of law, under both the United States and Florida Constitution, are
violated when they are transferred to adult court pursuant to section 985.225
of the Florida Statutes, and are sentenced to life imprisonment without pa-
role for a first degree felony offense. 12 This is the "younger generation,"
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 2002); Dickerson v. State, 783 So.
2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 1199,
1203 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
9. See McGrath, 824 So. 2d at 146; In re Estate of Caldwell v. Caldwell, 247 So. 2d 1, 3
(Fla. 1971); Dickerson, 783 So. 2d at 1146.
10. Brazill, 845 So. 2d at 287 (citing DuFresne v. State, 826 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. 2002));
see also State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997); McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So. 2d 48,
51 (Fla. 1974).
11. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
2004]
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/1
NOVA LA WREVIEW
many of whom are not yet competent to be treated as adults and not yet ma-
ture enough to understand that when adults say "life"-they mean LIFE.
Furthermore, in Florida, a juvenile's competency to stand trial or be sen-
tenced is assessed by adult standards. 3 Slightly older juveniles, who are
convicted as adults for crimes punishable by life imprisonment, crimes
committed with actual premeditation or malice, are entitled to a pre-
sentencing hearing to determine whether they will be sentenced as juveniles
or as adults. A child's transfer to adult court from juvenile court constitutes
a fundamental error, which "reaches down to the validity of the trial itself,"
and it is this type of error where the interests of justice present a compelling
demand for its application. "
Section 985.225 fails to comport with minimal due process require-
ments for children under fourteen years of age, and is unconstitutional as
applied to children. 5 The Florida and United States Constitutions each pro-
vide that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."' 6 Substantive due process protects the full panoply of
individual rights from unwarranted encroachment by the government; and
procedural due process serves as a vehicle to ensure fair treatment through
the proper administration of justice where substantive rights are at issue. 7
When basic rights are at stake, the means by which the State can protect its
interest must be narrowly tailored to achieve it's objectives through the least
restrictive means.'
8
Under the Florida Constitution, the Legislature may restrict or qualify
the right to juvenile treatment, and may conclude that certain juveniles are
not entitled to juvenile procedure and sanctions.' 9 This is not, however, a
license to deny the basic requirements of due process of law once in adult
court.2 °
Florida's transfer statutes offer three charging options to a prosecutor
when a juvenile is fourteen or fifteen years of age, has no prior violent of-
13. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210.
14. FLA. STAT. § 985.225 (2003); Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d. 89, 96 (Fla. 2000).
15. See Dep't of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991) (providing a
framework for determining whether due process has been violated when substantive rights are
at issue, and restating the proper balancing tests under the Florida Constitution).
16. FLA. CONST. art. 1 § 9; U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
17. Dep "t of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 959.
18. Id. at 964 (citing FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9).
19. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 15(b); Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.
1977).
20. See State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 1978) (holding the Legislature may
have the right to create offenses, but the court has the right to dictate procedures that comply
with due process).
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fenses, and is alleged to have committed an offense punishable by life im-
prisonment: 21 1) the juvenile court retains jurisdiction; 2) the prosecutors
may seek an indictment; 22 or 3) the State can prosecute the juvenile as an
adult by the direct filing of an information.23 If, however, the juvenile is
under fourteen years of age, only options one and two are available. 24 Sec-
tion 985.225 is the only statute, which allows for the transfer of children un-
der fourteen years of age to adult court.
From that moment on, the child faces a mandatory life sentence, and the
child's circumstances-the child's capacity to form criminal intent, the
child's age, the lack of specific intent to harm, and the likelihood of rehabili-
tation-are all deemed irrelevant.
Compounding the problem is the more lenient treatment afforded older
juveniles. Those juveniles are entitled to a hearing to determine the propriety
of juvenile versus adult sanctions. The only way to charge a thirteen-year-
old child or younger as an adult is by indictment; and therefore, the youngest
offenders receive the harshest treatment.25
The inequity is that juveniles who are indicted pursuant to section
985.225 must be sentenced as adults; while older juveniles, which the court
obtains jurisdiction via the filing of an information,26 may be sentenced as an
adult or as a juvenile.27 When determining whether juvenile sanctions
should be imposed, the court is required to consider eight factors, including
the sophistication and maturity of the offender, prior adjudications, and pros-
pects for rehabilitation.28
Adults must account for their criminal actions even when their life cir-
cumstances and childhoods were exceptionally difficult. Section 985.225
holds children of any age to this same ideal, without inquiring into any pre-
dispositions or environmental challenges, without any standards for mental
capacity or ability to form criminal intent, and without a finding of inten-
tional wrongdoing. In addition, section 985.225 is too broad as it does not
21. Section 985.225 states that children who are charged with a violation of state law
punishable by death or by life imprisonment may be transferred to adult court once an indict-
ment is returned. See Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1999) (stating death sentences
for children under seventeen years of age constitute cruel or unusual punishment).
22. FLA. STAT. § 985.225 (2003).
23. § 985.227(l)(a). The state may prosecute a child of fourteen or fifteen by the discre-
tionary direct filing of an information for murder, robbery, kidnapping, and sexual battery. Id.
24. See § 985.225.
25. Id.
26. § 985.227(1).
27. § 985.233(4)(2).
28. § 985.233(1)(b).
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distinguish between those who commit premeditated murder with a capacity
to form criminal intent, and those who commit less culpable life felonies.
While the State may have a compelling interest in promoting public
safety, treating children of any age as adults in every way, and punishing the
children for punishment sake is inconsistent with public policy. 29 Section
985.225 does not reflect the State's parens patriae interest-promoting the
welfare of children involved in criminal activity.30 "Reprehensible acts by
juveniles are not deemed the consequence of mature and malevolent choice
but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond
their control."'"
Equal protection provides that all persons similarly situated be treated
alike. 32 Applying the equal protection clause to state action, the question is
whether some rational explanation justifies the disparate treatment of simi-
larly situated children.33 When an age restriction is attacked on due process
or equal protection grounds, it must be shown that: 1) the restriction is rea-
sonable, and 2) the restriction is not discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppres-
sive.34
Prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding whether to charge or file
a decision. The concern is the arbitrary and oppressive treatment of children
convicted of crimes punishable by life imprisonment, who committed a
crime that did not require the showing of intentional wrongdoing. Compare
this to the treatment of older juveniles who were convicted of life felonies,
but were initially charged by the direct filing of an information.
A statutory scheme that mandates adult sanctions for our youngest ju-
venile offenders simply because they were indicted; and permits juvenile
sanctions for older offenders who committed crimes with malice or premedi-
tation because the law does not require an indictment, cannot be rationally
justified. "[T]he requirement of a grand jury indictment only ensures that
29. It is also at odds with a parents' right to the care and custody of their children, and the
children's concomitant rights. Certainly at some point, a child is very young the inquiry into
culpability, capacity, and competency so minimal, and the period of incarceration so long, that
the parent's rights must also be weighed. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982);
see also Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991).
30. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); P.W.G. v. State, 702 So. 2d 488, 491
(Fla. 1977).
31. McKeiverv. Penn., 403 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1971).
32. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446
(1972); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
33. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446; State v. Walborn, 729 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
34. Walborn, 729 So. 2d at 505.
[Vol. 28:3:485
27
: Nova Law Review 28, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
CHILD'S PLA YNO LONGER
there is probable cause for the charge it does not determine the propriety of
prosecuting a juvenile as an adult."35
In State v. Cain, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the argument
that the transfer statutes violated due process and equal protection rights by
giving prosecutors unbridled discretion to prosecute juveniles as adults with-
out a hearing. 36 However, the statutory scheme has changed since Cain. In
1980, the transfer statutes gave equal treatment to all juveniles, regardless of
age or indictment, by requiring a disposition hearing to determine whether
juvenile or adult sanctions were appropriate, and to determine whether to
offer the juvenile the benefits of the Youthful Offender Act.37 The court rea-
soned that because juveniles, who are amenable to rehabilitation, will be
considered for juvenile sanctions, the transfer statutes did not violate the
juvenile's due process rights. 38 In Goodson, the court reasoned that the Flor-
ida Legislature did not intend to treat younger juvenile offenders more
harshly than older juvenile offenders; and therefore, juveniles who were in-
dicted and those who waived into adult court were also entitled to the bene-
fits of the Youthful Offender Act.39 Such sentencing disparity, based on the
discretionary charging authority of a prosecutor, causes disparate results
when based solely upon age, because the younger, presumably less culpable
offenders, are subject to receive the harshest penalties.
1II. FLORIDA TRANSFER STATUTES VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FLORIDA'S NON-
DELEGATION DOCTRINE
Defense counsel for children similarly advocate that Florida's transfer
statutes, offend due process and State and Federal law by violating the Sepa-
ration of Powers and Non-Delegation Doctrines of the United States and
Florida Constitution.4" The Legislature has unlawfully delegated its author-
ity to define crimes and structure penalties by allowing a state attorney to
35. State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1i61, 1365 (Fla. 1980).
36. Id.
37. See chapter 958 of the Florida Statutes; see also Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1366; Goodson
v. State, 392 So. 2d 1335, 1337 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980), decision Approved by State v.
Goodson, 403 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1981) (establishing that all juveniles tried as adults are con-
sidered for juvenile sanctions, whether jurisdiction was pursuant to an indictment or the filing
of an information).
38. Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1366.
39. Goodson, 392 So. 2d at 1337.
40. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3. Florida's Constitution "requires a strict separation of pow-
ers" analysis on the issue of non-delegation, and therefore this argument will focuses Florida
law. See B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 991 (Fla. 1985).
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seek an indictment for children under fourteen, thereby delegating the deci-
sion to charge children "of any age" of a crime punishable by death or life
imprisonment.4 The Florida Legislature has delegated this authority without
implementing any guidelines to ensure the executive branch is carrying out
the legislature's intent.
The prosecuting attorney has the discretion to bring charges in juvenile
court, or seek an indictment pursuant to section 985.225. If a prosecutor
chooses to present a case to a Grand Jury, the Grand Jury will most likely
indict the accused because a Grand Jury "would indict a ham sandwich.1 2 In
Tate's case, at the age of twelve, he was indicted for premeditated murder in
the first degree. 43 Because he was indicted by a Grand Jury, the only avail-
able penalties for Tate were either 1) life imprisonment without the possibil-
ity of parole, or 2) death. The age of twelve was too young for our society to
accept that he should be executed by the State. However, he was also too
young to be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, but he was sen-
tenced to life without parole nonetheless. The court rejected the sentencing
argument, instead overturning Tate's conviction on the competency issue.
44
Section 985.227 allows a state attorney to charge fourteen or fifteen-
year-old children accused of a life felony by the direct filing of an informa-
tion.45 The state attorney is only authorized to do this "when in the state at-
torney's judgment and discretion the public interest requires that adult sanc-
tions be considered or imposed."' 6 The statute also requires the state attor-
ney to develop written policies and guidelines that will govern the determina-
tions for filing an information against a juvenile, and to submit those guide-
lines to the Governor and State Legislature."7 Finally, upon conviction, the
court has the discretion to impose either juvenile or adult sanctions based on
the consideration of eight statutory criteria. 48  However, unlike section
985.227, section 985.225 provides no similar guidelines or requirements on
the state attorney's office, and fails to provide the Grand Jury with proce-
dures for determining the propriety of adult sanctions for an accused child
under the age of fourteen. Once charged by the Grand Jury for a life felony,
adult sanctions are mandatory. 49 Open-ended authority is thereby granted to
41. See FLA. STAT. § 985.225 (2003).
42. Kearns v. Wolverton, 381 S.E.2d 258, 262 (W. Va 1989).
43. § 784.02.
44. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
45. § 985.227(1)(a).
46. § 985.227(l)(a).
47. § 985.227(4).
48. § 985.233(4)(b).
49. § 985.233(4)(a).
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the executive branch to seek an indictment of a child of any age, and treat the
child "in every respect as an adult."5° The requirement that a Grand Jury
must indict "only ensures that there is probable cause for the charge; it does
not determine the propriety of prosecuting a juvenile as an adult.'
When the juvenile court is vested with original jurisdiction of a child,
that jurisdiction confers special rights and immunities by the juvenile code
and a transfer or waiver of that jurisdiction must satisfy the basic require-
ments of due process and fairness." The Supreme Court described the criti-
cal importance of the transfer decision: "[t]here is no place in our system of
law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without cere-
mony... Prior to Kent, challenges to Florida's juvenile transfer statutes
have not been successful; however, critical changes in the statutes illuminate
the need to revisit the constitutionality of section 985.225.
It is well established that the Legislature may not delegate the power to
exercise unbridled discretion in applying the law. 4 While the Supreme
Court of Florida rejected the assertion that Florida law amounted to an
unlawful delegation of authority,55 the statutory scheme has changed drasti-
cally since 1980. Most significantly, children of any age, who are indicted
for life felonies, are no longer entitled to a hearing to determine whether ju-
venile or adult sanctions will be imposed. Further, Cain addressed the
prosecutor's discretion to charge a sixteen or seventeen-year-old repeat of-
fender as an adult, where that teenager would receive a hearing to determine
the propriety of juvenile or adult sanctions upon conviction.56
A child's rights to due process of law is violated under both the Florida
and United States Constitutions when the child is transferred to adult court
for criminal prosecution at age twelve, and treated "in every respect like an
adult."57 A statute that treats a child of any age as an adult in every way,
50. See § 985.225.
51. State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1365 (Fla. 1980).
52. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 552 (1966) (stating due process required a hearing and
representation of competent counsel before transfer where statute required a "full investiga-
tion" prior to transfer).
53. Id.
54. Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1367.
55. Id. at 1368.
56. Id.
57. § 985.225. Section 985.225, provides:
A child of any age who is charged with a violation of state law punishable by death or life im-
prisonment is subject to the jurisdiction of the court as set fourth in Section 985.219(7) unless
and until an indictment on the charge is returned by the grand jury. When such indictment is
returned, the petition for delinquency, if any, must be dismissed and the child must be tried and
handled in every respect as an adult.
Id. (emphasis added).
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without procedural protections, triggers numerous process concerns, includ-
ing the intrusion into a child's right to privacy, where principles of funda-
mental fairness and Constitutional scrutiny must be reapplied to the facts of
each case and the law.
Due process "is not a technical conception with a fixed content unre-
lated to time, place, and circumstance. Rather the phrase expresses the
requirement of 'fundamental fairness,' a requirement whose meaning can be
as opaque as its importance lofty. '58 Courts have determined that a child's
due process rights are not violated when the child is denied the
"rehabilitative aspect of juvenile court solely because the state decided to
procure an indictment."59 Unfortunately, there is no absolute right conferred
by common law, constitution, or otherwise, requiring children to be treated
in a special system for juvenile offenders. 60  The Florida Constitution a
"child" as defined by law may be charged "with a violation of law as an act
of delinquency instead of [a] crime.,,6' The Supreme Court of Florida has
interpreted this provision to mean that "a child has the right to be treated as a
juvenile delinquent only to the extent provided by our legislature. ' '62 Only
the legislature has the power to determine who, if anyone, is entitled to
treatment as a juvenile.63
Subjecting children under fourteen years of age to the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent defies the common law doctrine of incapacity, contemporary
scientific research on child and adolescent organic brain structure, and public
policy concerning juvenile delinquency. Due process should require that a
child have the capacity to form criminal intent for murder before he can be
sentenced to life without parole for murder. For example, the State failed to
establish Tate's capacity to form criminal intent. The State did not need to
58. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
59. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Brazill v.
State, 845 So. 2d 282, 287 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
60. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573, 576 (Fla.
1975) (noting that it was within legislative authority pursuant to Article I, Section 15(b) of the
Florida Constitution, to create an exception where children would be treated as adults); State
v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1363 (Fla. 1980).
61. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 15(b).
62. Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1363.
63. Id.; see also Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that
"treatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, there-
fore the legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or
discriminatory classification is involved").
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prove premeditation or malice to kill, and therefore it was never clear
whether Tate had the capacity to form criminal intent.' 4
Secondly, the court lacked jurisdiction prohibiting the State from prose-
cuting Tate for felony murder when he could not be held criminally respon-
sible for the underlying felony. In Florida, the law and legislative intent is
that children under fourteen are not criminally responsible in adult court for
aggravated child abuse, because it is not a "life felony," and thus section
985.225 is not implicated. The clear inference is that the Legislature did not
intend to prosecute children under fourteen for felony murder when the un-
derlying felony is not also a "life felony" in adult court. While section
985.225, unconstitutionally permits a child of any age to be indicted for a
"life felony," and treated like an adult in every way, it is inconsistent with
public policy and legislative intent to include felony murder among the quali-
fying life felonies.65
Lastly, a child's right to due process is violated when a child is sen-
tenced as an adult to life without parole for felony murder where the underly-
ing felony did not contain an element of intentional wrongdoing. Tate was
never shown to have had any intent to harm. Sentencing a twelve-year-old,
whose moral guilt was not established, is at odds with traditional concepts of
ordered liberty: "American criminal law has long considered a defendant's
intention--and therefore his moral guilt--to be critical to the 'degree of [his]
criminal culpability.' ' 66 Tate was entitled to a reversal of his life sentence on
this ground alone.
IV. SO MUCH FOR A CHILD'S RIGHTS TO PRIVACY WHEN THE CHILD IS
TREATED AS AN ADULT
The Florida Constitution expressly provides for a strong right to privacy
not found in the United States Constitution.67 Florida's strong right to pri-
vacy is set forth in Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution. When a
child is charged as an adult and the child is treated "in every aspect" as an
adult, the child's right to privacy is violated. Children, even juvenile offend-
ers, have unique privacy rights and the adult court does not provide for the
64. Older juveniles may be presumed to have capacity to form criminal intent, and there-
fore a felony murder conviction may stand with a mere showing of an intent to commit the
underlying felony.
65. See People v. Cruz, 225 A.D.2d 790 (1996) (holding a fifteen-year-old could not be
held criminally responsible for felony murder when the underlying felony was one for which
there was no adult criminal responsibility and therefore no "felonious intent" to transfer).
66. Emmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 698 (1975)).
67. Winfield v. Dep't. of Bus. Reg., 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
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protection of these rights; however, the juvenile system does. When a child
has a legitimate expectation of privacy, the compelling state interest standard
of review must be met when assessing a claim of governmental intrusion.68
Whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy is determined
by considering all the circumstances, including subjective and objective
manifestations of that expectation and the values society seeks to foster.69
The juvenile code is evidence that society seeks to foster the privacy rights of
children by keeping their school records and court records confidential.7"
Children have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the confidentiality
of their elementary education records. 7' The Legislature has passed laws that
make school records inadmissible in juvenile proceedings prior to a disposi-
tion hearing.712 However, once transferred to adult court, there are no eviden-
tiary rules in place to protect these rights.
Unless and until the Florida Legislature passes laws that protect a
child's right to privacy in adult court, or makes a compelling showing to treat
children as adults in every way, treating our youngest offenders as adults
violates this constitutionally protected right. While older juveniles may not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy because their status as adults is
uncontested, the privacy rights of children under fourteen should be pro-
tected at least until a final judgment is rendered. Treating children as adults
in this respect is unnecessary because keeping the record confidential would
not impair the state's interest in public safety.
V. REVERSAL OF TATE'S CONVICTION AND MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE
BECAUSE OF A FAILURE TO ESTABLISH COMPETENCY
The appellate decision reversing Tate's conviction and sentence was
based upon the trial court's failure to establish that Tate was competent to
proceed to trial as an adult.73 Tate contended on appeal that his conviction
68. Id.
69. Bd. of County Cmm'rs of Palm Beach County v. D.B., 784 So. 2d 585, 588-89 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
70. FLA. STAT. § 228.093(l)(d) (2003).
71. See id. ("[e]very pupil or student shall have a right of privacy with respect to the
education records kept on him or her"); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2000); Owasso Ind.
School Dist. No. 1-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 428 (2002) ("sensitive information about stu-
dents may not be released without parental consent" and schools that violate this law may lose
federal funding).
72. See FLA. STAT § 228.093(12) (2003); F.A.T. v. State, 690 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (vacating judgment because school attendance records were inadmissible).
73. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). In analyzing the
facts, the appellate court determined that this could not have been accidental. Id. Under-
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and resultant life sentence without parole violated due process because: 1) it
was unfair to apply the felony murder rule to Tate and all children under
fourteen without proving capacity to form criminal intent;74 2) felony murder
should not apply to children under fourteen in adult court when the court
lacks jurisdiction over the predicate felony;75 and 3) even if the felony mur-
der rule applied, the jury failed to find that Tate intended to harm anyone.76
Shortly after Tate's conviction, yet prior to sentencing, appellate counsel
was brought in to "clean up the mess." When undersigned first met with
Tate, it was evident that the child was unable to appropriately assist in his
defense, and was not capable of understanding important principles of law
relevant to the post-trial proceedings. Counsel immediately requested com-
petency evaluations, and questioned Tate's pre-trial decisions based upon his
lack of competency at the time.77 This was done, knowing all along that
should the court find Tate incompetent only for sentencing, re-sentencing
would result in the same sentence-life imprisonment without parole, despite
the fact that Lionel Tate was twelve at the time of the incident. Therefore,
counsel continually argued that Lionel Tate was incompetent post-trial, pre-
trial, and during trial, requiring a re-trial.
First, the court needed to grapple with the question of whether a retroac-
tive competency evaluation was appropriate." The court determined that
because of the vast amount of time which had elapsed, a retroactive compe-
tency hearing would not be beneficial.79 Accordingly, the court reversed and
remanded for a new trial.8°
The question of whether an accused can proceed to trial while a minor
is easily distinguishable from the question of whether anyone is competent to
be tried. Based upon Tate's young age, twelve-years-old at the time of the
offense, his low IQ of 90, his developmental immaturity, his lack of prior
exposure to the criminal justice system, and the overall facts and circum-
signed respectfully points out the fact that all of the facts were not presented to the appellate
tribunal. Based upon the facts presented, the appellate decision is accurate in determining that
the cause of death appears to be intentional rather than accidental. However, based upon
evidence established and ascertained after undersigned counsel was brought in to assist, strong
evidence supports Tate's assertions of innocence based upon a lack of any criminal intent, and
strong evidence, buttressed by expert medical testimony, supports Tate's claims that Tiffany
Eunick's death was accidental.
74. Id. at 53.
75. Id. at 51.
76. Id. at 53.
77. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
78. Id. at 51.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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stances, the appellate tribunal correctly determined that Tate was not proven
to be competent to proceed to trial or to be sentenced.8' Accordingly, the
result in his case was eminently fair.
VI. CHILDREN TRIED As ADULTS: A PRESUMPTION OF
INHERENT INCOMPETENCY
Tate asserted that his State and Federal constitutional rights to due
process of law and his rights to a fair trial were violated by the trial court's
failure to order competency evaluations, to conduct a competency hearing on
its own initiative or at the repeated requests by the defense.8" Tate main-
tained that bona fide evidence of his incompetence entitled him to be evalu-
ated for competency and for the court to conduct a competency hearing prior
to trial and sentencing, because he was facing a mandatory life sentence if
convicted. Tate maintained on appeal that the court's failure to make any
inquiry into his competence deprived him of his right to a fair trial and to due
process of law.83
In light of Lionel Tate's extremely young age and his lack of previous
exposure to the judicial system, competency evaluations were warranted.
Exacerbating the situation was the complexity of the legal proceedings. In
light of the testimony elicited by both parties regarding Tate's developmental
immaturity, and the submission of affidavits from lawyers and a neuropsy-
chologist that Tate lacked the necessary competency to proceed, ample evi-
dence existed to appoint psychologists to evaluate Tate and to require a com-
petency hearing."
A defendant is considered competent to stand trial if he "has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understand-
ing of the proceedings against him."85 The trial court was well aware of the
fact that Tate was only thirteen at the time of the trial, and twelve at the time
of arrest-when crucial defense decisions were made. The Supreme Court
has, in many contexts, commented on the reduced capacities of juveniles,
81. Jd. at 50.
82. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 50.
83. Id. at 46-47; see Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Hill v. State, 473 So. 2d
1253, 1257 (Fla. 1985).
84. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 48-49 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Prior to trial, the
court conducted a brief plea colloquy with then thirteen-year-old Tate, which was profoundly
inadequate to determine his competence for a decision of such tremendous consequence, given
his age, immaturity, and nine or ten-year-old mental age. Id. at 50.
85. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
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including their inability "to think in long-range terms" and inability to under-
stand the costs and benefits of certain decisions. s6
The Appellant's age is even more significant when analyzing the com-
plexity of the proceedings against him. The "level of capacity sufficient to
understand simple charges, such as driving without a license, may be grossly
insufficient when a more complicated offense is involved. 87 Here, the of-
fense was among the most serious of chargeable offenses. Nevertheless,
without any court ordered competency evaluations, Tate was asked to make
profound decisions throughout the trial process regarding defense strategy,
make relevant factual disclosures, intelligently analyze plea offers, and con-
sider waiving important State and Federal constitutional rights.
Tate's immaturity and developmental delays were very much at the
heart of the permitted defense at trial.88 Testimony revealed that this particu-
lar child was at an even greater intellectual and emotional disadvantage than
the average thirteen-year-old. His I.Q. was 90 or 91, meaning that seventy-
five percent of children his age scored higher. 89 Further, the doctors opined
Tate had significant mental delays. 90 Even the State forensic psychologists
agreed that Tate was immature, although one state witness did not agree with
the concept of using a mental age.9'
Appellate counsel requested competency evaluations post-trial, prior to
sentencing, both orally and in writing. The evidence presented to the trial
court clearly suggested that a competency evaluation was needed due to
Tate's youth and immaturity.92 The trial court abused its discretion in deny-
ing defense requests for a competency evaluation. 93
Appellate counsel requested a competency evaluation during a hearing
on Defendant's Motion for New Trial, stating that Tate "has no clue what we
86. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825, 834 (1988); see Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (CFC 15-18).
87. Melton et. al., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, (1997). For example, the Appellant maintains that the
felony-murder rule was never intended as a vehicle to prosecute children under fourteen years
of age for first degree murder (CFC 4).
88. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 50. While the defense attempted a "wrestling intoxication de-
fense," because of the trial court's pretrial rulings on state motions in limine, Tate's defense at
trial centered around his lack of knowledge and lack of intent to harm.
89. Id. at 50.
90. Id. at 48.
91. Id. at 49 n.2.
92. Id. at 46-47.
93. See Kelly v. State, 797 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing the
conviction applying abuse of discretion as the proper standard of review in denying request
for competency hearing).
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are talking about."'94 The judge asked Tate if he understood, and Tate shook
his head "no."95 At that time, the court correctly determined that "at a mini-
mum Tate should be evaluated by mental health experts." 96 The court based
its ruling on Rule 3.210 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, stating:
I'm also convinced that if I denied your hearing at this particular point,
that I would get ordered by the Fourth District Court of Appeals [sic] to
have such a hearing. And I'd rather do that while testimony is fresh,
rather than trying to recall what happened three or four or five or six
months down the road.
97
Minutes later, the judge "changed his mind" and denied Tate's oral mo-
tion for a competency hearing, improperly denying leave for the defense to
file a written motion.9" The judge inappropriately based his decision solely
on Tate's demeanor in court.99 A written motion and affidavits were filed
nonetheless, maintaining that the Defendant was not competent to proceed. 1°°
The trial court denied Tate's written Motion to Determine Competency, in
large part, because it was incomprehensible to the judge that none of the nu-
merous professionals, who had been in contact with Tate, had previously
requested a competency hearing.''
Although the court's frustration that competency was not raised pretrial
or during trial might be justified,0 2 the cited reasons for denial of the motion
are irrelevant.103  Defense counsel's affidavit specifically stated that "he
94. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 47 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 48.
99. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48. Dr. Borg-Cater later testified for the state that she adminis-
tered a twenty minute "competency interview" during her risk assessment evaluation and
believed Tate to be competent. Id. at 47 n.2. The psychologist's testimony was over a defense
objection and an uncontroverted Record that the competency interview was not authorized by
a court order. Id. The defense maintained any competency evaluation was not permissible
under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and violated the Specialty Guidelines for
Forensic Psychology. Id. Even state forensic expert Dr. Brannon admitted that with children
you must "go deeper" to test their insights to see if they really understand. Id.
100. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
101. Id. at 48.
102. ld. at 49. Tate's trial counsel did not question Tate's competency and learned during
discovery that one of the state's experts, Dr. Bourg-Carter claimed to have had the verbal
consent of Tate, his mother, and a defense expert to perform a competency evaluation Id. at
49 n.2.
103. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1965); (stating failure
of defense to raise competency, mental alertness displayed during "colloquies" with judge and
demeanor at trial cannot be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on competency).
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[Tate] is unable to communicate with me... and he did not and still does not
possess an ability to appreciate the gravity of the charges ... " Neuropsy-
chologist Dr. Mittenberg's affidavit stated: "Tate has not been able to follow
along with the legal proceedings I have been involved with."' °5 In addition,
the court's order ("R 764") did not apply the proper standard for determining
the motions: "the proper inquiry is whether the defendant may be incompe-
tent, not whether he is incompetent."' 0 6 Therefore, the trial court not only
failed to initiate a competency hearing under Pate and Hill, it abused its dis-
cretion by denying oral and written motions to determine Tate's compe-
tency.
07
The written motion requested, inter alia, appointment of experts and a
hearing to determine whether Tate was competent to reject the plea offer, and
whether he had the ability to appreciate the range and nature of the possible
penalties that could be imposed. 0 8 This motion was denied as untimely, and
the court refused to consider the merits of the motion.'0 9 The trial court erred
because a competency hearing is required at any material stage of a criminal
proceeding or "when necessary for a just resolution of the issues being con-
sidered.""0 Further, Tate's motion served as yet another reminder to the
court of its obligation pursuant to Pate and Rules 3.210 and 3.211 of the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure to determine Tate's competence when
reasonable grounds exist to believe an accused may be incompetent.'
Despite the well-founded professional doubts concerning Tate's compe-
tency, the judge denied all defense requests for Tate to be evaluated by ap-
propriate mental health practitioners." 2 The court refused to conduct a hear-
ing, which would have allowed the balancing of factors, an evaluation of the
situation, and for the court to make a competency determination based upon
the opinions of experts. The court stated that the Defendant's demeanor and
disinterest did not mean that he did not understand the proceedings." 3 More
104. Defense Counsel's Affidavit in Support of Motion to Determine Competency, Tate v.
State, 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 4D01-1306).
105. Dr. Mittenberg's Affidavit in Support of Motion to Determine Competency, Tate
(No. 4D01-1306).
106. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 51 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see Tingle v. State,
536 So. 2d 202, 203 (Fla. 1988).
107. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
108. Id. at51;seeFLA. R.CRM. P. 3.211.
109. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
110. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Ill. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47, n.2.
112. ld. at 48.
113. Id. at 50.
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importantly, the judge relied heavily upon the fact that incompetency was
never previously raised by the defense or forensic psychologists.' 14
The facts focused on by the trial judge are irrelevant." 5 As in Pate,
there is no justification for ignoring the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Mit-
tenberg regarding the defendant's reduced mental functioning and his opin-
ion that a competency hearing was necessary." 6 There was no reason not to
give some weight to the sworn affidavits of experienced counsel and a neu-
ropsychologist who each opined that Tate "did not and still does not possess
an ability to appreciate the gravity of the charges" and the possible penal-
ties. 17
In Hill v. State,"8 applying the United States Supreme Court prece-
dents," 9 the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the state's contention that
"there was no evidence before the court that was sufficient to raise a bona
fide doubt as to Hill's competency to stand trial.' 20 Indeed, the situation at
bar is easily distinguishable from those where competency evaluations were
authorized by the court and conducted by appropriate professionals, or where
a full competency hearing was conducted.'
Further, Tate's trial counsel, an officer of the court, offered to directly
reveal to the judge Tate's comments that led him to believe that Tate was not
competent. 22 However, the court refused to receive the information. 23
Without question, reasonable grounds existed to believe that Tate was not
mentally competent to proceed, and that he required an evaluation, constitut-
ing reversible error. 124 The foregoing established a bona fide doubt as to
Tate's competency, and no logical reason supports the trial court's failure to
order evaluations or to initiate a competency hearing. The trial court's fail-
ure to order a competency hearing violated Tate's State and Federal constitu-
114. Id. at 48.
115. Pate, 383 U.S. at 384-85.
116. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 48 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375, 385 (1965) (stating appropriate demeanor at trial cannot be relied upon to dis-
pense with a hearing on competency).
117. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 46-47, 48.
118. 473 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1985),
119. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate, 383 U.S. at 375; Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956).
120. Hill, 473 So. 2d at 1259.
121. See e.g. Mora v. State, 814 So.2d 322 (Fla. 2002).
122. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
123. Id.
124. See Johnson v. State, 756 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Finkelstein v.
State, 574 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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tional rights to due process of law and right to a fair trial, requiring reversal
of the conviction and a remand for a new trial. '25
In a courageous ruling, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed
Tate's conviction and sentence imposed for first degree murder as an adult,
and remanding the cause for re-trial following a determination of compe-
tency. 1
26
When judges, prosecutors, victims' families, and juvenile justice or-
ganizations throughout the world vocally pronounce the inequity of Florida's
juvenile transfer statutes, the way we treat our kids must be addressed and
the laws changed.
Presently, two bills are pending before the Florida Senate addressing
sentencing of juveniles. Each Bill is sponsored by Democratic Florida Sena-
tors. Senator Walter "Skip" Campbell has introduced Senate Bill 1346 ("SB
1346"), which limits the age at which a minor convicted of an offense pun-
ishable by death or life imprisonment may be sentenced as an adult. 127 SB
1346 would amend sections 985.226 and 985.227 of the Florida Statutes and
revise the requirements of the State Attorney with respect to prosecuting a
minor as an adult for violent felonies and for offenses punishable by death or
life imprisonment.2 8 SB 1346 would require that the courts commit a child
seventeen or younger at the time of the offense to the Department of Juvenile
or to a maximum-risk facility following the child's conviction of an offense
that, if committed by an adult, would be punishable by death or life impris-
onment. The court would be required to conduct a hearing after the child
reaches the age of twenty-one to determine whether the child was rehabili-
tated. If so, the child would be placed on conditional release, if not, the child
would be moved to adult prison with the eligibility for parole as an adult
offender.
125. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 51 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
126. Id. at 54. Tate, the State of Florida, and the decedent's family all agreed that a nego-
tiated plea was in everyone's best interest. A guilty-best interest plea was negotiated wherein
Tate entered a guilty-best interest plea to the reduced charged of murder in the second degree,
as an adult, and as a result thereof was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to three (3) years
Department of Juvenile Justice, followed by one (1) year of community control, followed by
ten (10) years probation, with special conditions that he perform 1000 hours of community
service and receive psychological counseling and follow-up treatment if deemed necessary.
Susan Candiotti, Teen's mom agrees to deal for son: Plea bargain would reduce Lionel
Tate's sentence to three years, CNN.com, Dec. 31, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW
/12/3 l/wrestling.death/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
127. S. 1346, 2004 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/
index.cfm?B IMode=ViewBillInfo&Mode=Bills&SubMenu= 1 &Year=2004&bilinum= 1346.
128. Id.
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The most "kid friendly" Bill pending is Senate Bill 2104 ("SB 2104"),
lodged by Senator Frederica Wilson, Democrat from Miami. 29  SB 2104
would enable kids to receive scrutiny and potential early release when the
child reaches "the ripe old age" of twenty-one. 3 All offenders under the age
of eighteen would be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice rather
than be warehoused in the Florida State Prison system.'3' SB 2104 calls for
"blended" or "mixed" sentencing, wherein the court has discretion to impose
juvenile sanctions, or a combination of juvenile and adult sanctions.132
Finally, Senator Steve Geller recently proposed Senate Bill 530 ("SB
530"), which was not passed.'3 3 In essence, SB 530 would have provided
that a child fifteen or younger, who was found to have committed an offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment, would have been eligible for pa-
role if he or she had not previously been adjudicated for certain offenses.'34
SB 530 would have required that the child be incarcerated in a youthful of-
fender facility for a minimum period.'35 Lastly, SB 530 would have required
the Parole Commission to consult with the child to consider release under
section 947.16, by interviewing the child within eight months after confine-
ment. 36 Thereafter, the child's case would have been eligible for review
every two years to consider possible release. If the child was not granted
parole by the time the child reached twenty-five years of age, the child would
then be transferred from a youthful offender facility to an adult state prison.
VII. CONCLUSION
The best changes in the law should encompass all three aforementioned
Bills; kids should not be tried as adults until they are older and more mature;
prosecutors should not enjoy such broad discretion in prosecuting minors;
129. S. 2104, 2004 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004), http://www.flsenate.gov/cgibin/view_page.pl?
Tab=session&Submenu=1 &FT=D&File=sb214.html&Directory=session/2004/Senate/bills/
billtext/html/.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Beth Reinhard, Parole denied for kids who get life, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 1, 2004,
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiheraid/news/state/8326125.htm%20on 2OApril / %201
2004 (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
134. S. 530, 2004 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004), http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?BI-
Mode=ViewBilllnfo&Mode=Bills&SubMenu-1l&Year=2004&billnum=530; see Associated
Press, Bill would give youthful killers chance at parole, ST. PETERSBURG TiMES, JAN. 8, 2004,
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/01/08/State/Billwould-give
youth.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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and if children under eighteen years of age are convicted they should be sent
to the Department of Juvenile Justice to be rehabilitated. As a society, we
must not lock children up and throw away the key. Every child is redeem-
able.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In several recent, highly publicized murder cases involving pre-teens
and teenagers, prosecutors have used the felony-murder rule to ensure con-
viction of these young defendants.' The felony-murder rule makes it easier
* Steven A. Drizin is a Clinical Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of
Law in Chicago; he played a role as amicus in the Lionel Tate case, discussed infra at
Part II.A.
** Allison McGowen Keegan is an associate at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati in
San Francisco, California.
1. Nathaniel Brazill, age thirteen; Lionel Tate, age twelve; Jonathan Miller, age fifteen;
Jon R. Morgan, age fourteen. Jon Morgan was tried and convicted in adult court for the mur-
der of his grandparents, Keith and Lila Cearlocks. People v. Morgan, 718 N.E.2d 206 (11.
App. Ct. 1999). The jury was instructed that Jon could be convicted of both know-
ing/intentional murder and felony-murder. Id. at 210. The predicate felonies were aggravated
battery and discharge of a firearm. Id. at 211. On appeal, the court found that it was an error
to instruct the jury that Morgan could be convicted under felony-murder theory because the
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for prosecutors to gain convictions because it relieves them of the often on-
erous burden of proving that the teenage defendant intended to kill the vic-
tim. Instead, prosecutors need only prove that the defendant intended to
commit the underlying predicate felony, and need not offer any proof that
death was an intended or even a foreseeable consequence.
An examination of the history of the felony-murder rule, the tension be-
tween the felony-murder rule and the common law infancy defense, and the
policies underlying each rule demonstrates that the felony-murder rule was
never intended to be applied to children under the age of fourteen. First, the
common law doctrine of incapacity is more firmly rooted in history than the
felony-murder rule and predates the felony-murder rule by centuries. More-
over, criminal capacity is a necessary prerequisite to criminal mens rea. Be-
fore one can apply the felony-murder rule, which dispenses with the mens
rea requirement of murder, courts must first find that the child-defendant is
capable of forming criminal intent. The infancy defense is based on the pre-
sumption that a child-defendant between the ages of seven and fourteen is
incapable of forming criminal intent. When these two common law creations
clash, as they have in several recent cases, the infancy defense should super-
sede the felony-murder rule.
Longstanding developmental psychological' research into the cognitive
capacity of teenagers also buttresses the argument that the felony-murder
rule should not be applied to children under fourteen, and perhaps not to
older adolescents either.3 This research reveals that many pre-adolescents
and adolescents 4 are not competent to stand trial, i.e., incapable of under-
standing the legal proceedings against them, and unable to meaningfully as-
sist in their own defense.5 More recent social science research suggests that
juveniles, particularly those under age fifteen, as a class, make decisions
differently than adults, and are more susceptible to influence, more impul-
sive, less risk-adverse, and less capable of seeing the long-term conse-
quences of their actions. 6 Finally, emerging research from the field of neuro-
predicate felonies did not involve conduct with a felonious purpose other than the killing
itself Id. at 212.
2. Developmental psychology is "the scientific study of changes in physical, intellec-
tual, emotional, and social development over the life cycle." Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth
Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication
of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'v & L. 389, 391 (1999).
3. Id. at 401-04.
4. Pre-adolescents are those children under the age of twelve; adolescents are those
between the ages of twelve and seventeen; those ages eighteen to twenty-four are often called
young adults. See generally id.
5. Id.
6. See id.
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science, using MRIs and other technologies which scan the brain, suggests
that differences in the organic structure and function of the teenage brain
extend these disabilities in impulse control and decision-making into the late
teens and early twenties.7
This article will begin with case studies of juveniles charged with first-
degree murder under the felony-murder doctrine. Next, the article will re-
view the historical underpinnings of the felony-murder rule and the common
law defense of infancy, and argue that as an historical matter, the felony-
murder rule was never intended to apply to juvenile offenders under the age
of fourteen. In addition, we will argue that none of the philosophical justifi-
cations for the felony-murder rule make strong sense when applied to these
juveniles and older adolescents. In Part IV, we will review the recent social
science and brain development research which supports limiting the felony-
murder rule to adult defendants. In the concluding section, we will suggest
some policy changes that could reduce the impact the felony-murder rule has
on teenage defendants.
II. CASE STUDIES
A. Lionel Tate
Six-year-old Tiffany Eunick died on July 28, 1999, after playing much
of the day with twelve-year-old Lionel Tate, a 166-pound-boy who claimed
that he had been practicing professional wrestling moves on the girl as they
played in his Pembroke Park, Florida home.8 The medical examiner's find-
ings did not support Lionel's claims that he and Tiffany were involved in
innocuous roughhousing.9 Lionel's story that he had picked up Tiffany in a
bear hug while they were playing tag and accidentally hit her head on a cof-
fee table did not square with the evidence of her extensive injuries, including
head trauma, lacerations to her liver, and several broken ribs. 10 Broward
County prosecutors brought Lionel's case before a grand jury on August 11,
1999, seeking charges of murder in adult court." Since Lionel was origi-
nally charged with an open count of murder, the grand jury could have re-
turned with an indictment for first or second-degree murder, or decided that
7. See Paul Thompson, Editorial, Brain Research Shows a Child Is Not an Adult, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 25, 2001, at 31A, available at 2001 WL 2680069.
8. Jodie Needle, Boy Charged with Murder in Death of Playmate, 6, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Aug. 12, 1999, at 1B, available at 1999 WL 20275653.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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there was not sufficient evidence to indict.'2 After listening to medical testi-
mony and other witnesses, the grand jury indicted Lionel for first-degree
murder, making him among the youngest children in the country to face such
charges in adult court.' 3 Under Florida's statutory scheme, if Lionel were
convicted of first-degree murder, the judge would have no choice but to sen-
tence him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 4
On February 15, 2000, Broward County prosecutors reportedly offered
to let Lionel plead guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for a sentence
of three years in a juvenile center, one year of house arrest, ten years of psy-
chological testing and counseling, and 1,000 hours of community service. 5
However, Lionel, his mother, and his attorney, Jim Lewis, rejected the of-
fer. 6 The case took a bizarre twist when Lewis announced that he planned to
argue that his client was imitating the moves he had learned from watching
professional wrestlers on television. 7 When Lewis sought to subpoena sev-
eral pro-wrestling stars to testify at trial, including The Rock, Sting, and
Hulk Hogan, the move prompted a backlash from attorneys representing the
wrestlers. 8 Lionel's defense is an .'I saw it on tv so I go free' excuse," ex-
claimed Jerry McDevitt, a Pittsburgh attorney who represents Dwayne "The
Rock" Johnson. 9 He "is a 12-year old punk who didn't learn that you don't
beat up little girls. 2 0  The World Wrestling Entertainment, the largest or-
ganization of professional wrestling promotions, sued Lewis for libel. 2'
It was not until a hearing on May 4, 2000, on the issue of whether the
use of the wrestling defense was acceptable that Ken Padowitz, Assistant
State Attorney, first argued that Lionel committed aggravated child abuse
and was guilty of felony-murder.2  Prior to that day, Padowitz had argued
12. Id.
13. Needle, supra note 8.
14. FLA. STAT. § 775.082 (1) (2003).
15. Paula McMahon, Prosecutor Favors Lighter Sentence Leniency Pleas Ahead in
Conviction of Tate, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 27, 2001, at IA, available at 2001
WL 2655604.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Paula McMahon, Judge Excuses Wrestlers from Testifying in Slaying Defense Says
Suspect Was Mimicking Pros, SUN-SENTNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Apr. 12, 2000, at IA, available
at 2000 WL 5652142.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Brad Bennett, Attorney Second-Guesses Strategy, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 26, 2001, at
8A, available at 2001 WL 11643548.
22. See Paula McMahon, Boy Re-enacts Final Moments of Girl's Life 6-Year-Old Died
After Suffering Severe Injuries Prosecution Says Videotape Tainted, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), May 5, 2000, at I B, available at 2000 WL 5657578 [hereinafter McMahon I].
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that Lionel had intentionally killed Tiffany Eunick.2 3 Two weeks before the
trial was to begin, on January 5, 2001, prosecutors again offered Lionel the
same plea deal.24  He rejected it a second time. 5  It was a decision that
Lionel, his mother, and his attorney would come to regret. After deliberating
just over three hours, jurors returned a verdict convicting the boy of first-
degree felony-murder.26 Under Florida law, the judge had no choice but to
sentence Lionel to a term of life without the possibility of parole.2 7  The
prosecution used aggravated child abuse as the predicate offense for the fel-
ony-murder conviction of Lionel Tate, 2 a questionable move given that
Lionel was too young to be tried as an adult for aggravated child abuse. In
Florida, aggravated child abuse is a specific intent crime.29 In convicting
Lionel, the jury concluded that he had intended to abuse Tiffany and that the
abuse resulted in her death.3" Tate's case seems to be an instance where the
23. See id.
24. Teen Rejects Deal, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 6, 2001, at 3B, available at
2001 WL 2652031.
25. Id. Can a twelve or thirteen-year-old child like Lionel Tate be expected to appreciate
the consequences of pleading guilty to murder in adult court? Can he or she truly understand
the jeopardy faced by rejecting a plea? Can a present-oriented, impulsive adolescent possibly
fathom a sentence of life without the possibility of parole? These are just a few of the ques-
tions of "adjudicative competence" posed by the Lionel Tate case and others. Such questions,
which raise concerns about the fundamental fairness of trying children as adults, were ignored
by policymakers in their rush to pass punitive laws. The answers to these and other questions
have been studied by the Research Network on Adolescent Development, an initiative funded
by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the results were recently pub-
lished. See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 333-63
(2003) (finding juveniles aged fifteen and younger were less likely to recognize the risks
inherent in different choices and less likely to think about the long-term consequences of their
choices, indicating that, compared to adults, juvenile offenders are probably not competent to
stand trial in a criminal proceeding).
26. Paula McMahon, Boy Convicted in Girl's Death, Verdict: First Degree Murder,
SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 26, 2001, at IA, available at 2001 WL 2655383 [herein-
after McMahon II]. It is possible that a sentence of life without parole for a twelve-year-old
convicted of felony-murder may be unconstitutionally "cruel and unusual" punishment under
state constitutional law. See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 727 (Cal. 1983) (holding that
application of felony-murder rule to seventeen-year-old defendant is unconstitutional). Al-
though, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that argument is unlikely to prevail in light of
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003)
(upholding California's application of three strikes law in a case involving two consecutive
twenty-five to life sentences for petty theft).
27. See § 775.082 (1).
28. McMahon 1, supra note 22.
29. See § 827.03(2).
30. See McMahon II, supra note 26.
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prosecution used felony-murder as a means to ease its burden of proof yet
still get a first-degree murder conviction.
On appeal, Lionel Tate challenged his conviction on several grounds,
including that the felony-murder rule should not apply to children, who at
common law, were protected by the infancy defense, and that it was "cruel
and unusual" punishment to sentence a twelve-year-old convicted of felony
murder to life without the possibility of parole.3 On December 10, 2003,
after this article had been finished, the Florida Court of Appeals reversed
Tate's conviction, holding that the trial court had erred when it failed to hold
a post-trial hearing to determine if Tate was competent before sentencing
Tate.32
Although the Florida Court of Appeals reversed Tate's conviction, it
neither rejected nor directly resolved the issues raised by this article. With
regard to the propriety of applying the felony-murder doctrine to a twelve-
year-old, the Court held that the legislature had supplanted the common law
infancy defense when it created laws allowing for juveniles to be prosecuted
as adults.33 Twelve-year-olds in Florida, at least those eligible to be tried as
adults, are no longer presumed to be incapable of forming criminal intent.34
The court also held that a life without parole sentence for a twelve-year-old
child convicted of first-degree murder is not "cruel or unusual punishment"
under the Florida Constitution or "cruel and unusual punishment" under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.35 The court declined
to address the specific question of whether life without parole for a twelve-
year-old convicted of felony murder was unconstitutional, finding that the
jury returned a "general verdict" of first degree murder.36
Lionel Tate's case was quickly resolved once the case was remanded to
the trial court after the victorious appeal. Prosecutors offered Tate the same
31. Professor Drizin wrote parts of two amicus briefs filed before the Florida Court of
Appeals in the Tate case. Copies of both of these briefs are available on-line on the website of
the Juvenile Law Center at http://www.jlc.org/.
32. Tate v. Florida, 864 So. 2d 44, 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
33. id. at 53.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 54.
36. Id. at 54-55. At the time of Tate's conviction, Article I, Section 17, of the Florida
Constitution prohibited "cruel or unusual punishment." The constitution was later amended in
2002 to prohibit "cruel and unusual punishment," mirroring the language of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In 1999, the Supreme Court of Florida, in
Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1 (1999), ruled that the death penalty was unconstitutional when
applied to sixteen-year-olds because such a punishment was "unusual" in the history of Flor-
ida. As both the attorneys for Tate and amicus argued in Tate's appeal, a life without parole
sentence for a twelve-year-old was not only unusual in Florida but unprecedented in both
Florida and the entire United States.
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plea bargain that they had offered him on the eve of his earlier trial. This
time Tate accepted the deal. Because he had already served nearly three
years in prison, Tate was eligible for release. On January 29, 2004, Tate
pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was released. He was fitted with
an electronic bracelet which he will have to wear for one year while under
house arrest, will remain on probation for ten years, is required to perform
1,000 hours of community service, and will receive regular psychological
counseling.37
B. Nathaniel Brazill
On May 26, 2000, the last day of school at Lake Worth Middle School,
an assistant principal sent thirteen-year-old Nathaniel Brazill home for
throwing water balloons. 38 Less than two hours later, just minutes before
students were to go home for the summer, Brazill returned to the school with
a small gun he had stolen from the residence of a family friend.39 When
thirty-five-year-old Barry Grunow, a language-arts teacher, refused to allow
Brazill into his classroom to speak to two students, Brazill pulled out the gun
and shot Grunow in the head.4' These events were dramatically captured on
a school video camera.4 After firing the single shot, Brazill turned to leave
the school and pointed the weapon at another teacher who had come out of
his classroom.42 Nathaniel left the school and was just blocks from the scene
when he surrendered to a police officer.4 3 He saw a police patrol car, raised
his arms and kneeled." He told the officer, "I shot somebody," and that he
had a gun in his pocket.45 Back at the police station, Brazill was interrogated
by police officers and readily admitted shooting Mr. Grunow." In a telling
moment caught on videotape when the cameras were still rolling and while
37. See Paula McMahon, Tate Enters Guilty Plea. Both Sides in Case Say Judges Should
Have More Discretion in Sentencing Juveniles, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 30, 2004
at lB, available at 2004 WL 67630226.
38. See Mitch Lipka, Teacher Slain; Student Charged; Boy, 13, Faces First-Degree
Murder Count; Shooting Occurs on Last Day of School, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May
27, 2000, at IA, available at 2000 WL 22175569.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Lipka, supra note 38.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id.
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the officers were out of the room, Brazill put his head in his hands and cried,
"What was I thinking?
4 7
Prosecutors brought the case before a special grand jury, seeking
charges of first-degree murder.48 State Attorney Barry Krischer vowed to try
Nathaniel as an adult from the beginning, wanting the young boy to serve
"adult time for an adult crime., 49 As Krischer saw it, "juvenile court was
never designed for 13-year-olds that pick up a gun and kill a teacher in cold
blood., 50 At a meeting with spiritual and political leaders, just days after the
shooting, Krischer stated that he did not feel he could try Nathaniel as a ju-
venile given the evidence of premeditation. 1 Krischer felt he had little
choice but to try Nathaniel as an adult because the evidence warranted a first-
degree murder indictment.52 From the very beginning, in Krischer's mind,
Nathaniel was guilty of "cold-blooded" or premeditated murder.5 3 Charges
of felony-murder were never discussed by Krischer or other prosecutors
early on in the case. Instead, they insisted that Brazill intended to kill
Grunow1
4
Before the grand jury issued the indictment, Nathaniel's parents im-
plored prosecutors to try their son as a juvenile rather than an adult.5
"We're not saying he shouldn't be punished for what he's done," said Na-
thaniel's father, "[b]ut as a child, not an adult. 5 6 On June 12, 2000, after
hearing testimony and watching a video surveillance tape of the incident,
twenty-one grand jurors indicted Brazill on first-degree murder and aggra-
vated assault. 7 Days later, Nathaniel's attorneys formally entered a not
47. Susan Spencer-Wendel, Brazill's Fate in Jury's Hands; Closing Arguments Take
Nearly All Day, PALM BEACH POST, May 15,2001, at IA, available at 2001 WL 18209138.
48. See Nicole Sterghos Brochu, Boy Will Be Tried as Adult in Slaying; a Grand Jury
Indicted the 13-Year-Old Student in Death of Teacher in Lake; Worth, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), June 13, 2000, at 1A, available at 2000 WL 22179009.
49. Id.
50. Nightline: Crime and Punishment, Should Children Who Commit Crimes Be Tried as
Adults (ABC television broadcast, May 31, 2000), LEXIS-NEXIS, Newsgroup File, Beyond
Two Years [hereinafter Nightline].
51. See Nancy L. Othon, Clerics, Political Leaders Fail to Sway Prosecutor, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 9, 2000, at 22A, available at 2000 WL 22178191.
52. See id.
53. See Nightline, supra note 50.
54. See id.
55. See Mel Melendez, Spare Child Adult Penalty, Dad Implores Father in Teacher
Slaying Case Calls for Punishment, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jun. 2, 2000, at IA,
available at 2000 WL 22176796.
56. Id.
57. Brochu, supra note 48.
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guilty plea for their client, claiming that the shooting was an accident and
that he did not intend to kill Barry Grunow.58
The consequences of trying Nathaniel as an adult were severe. If con-
victed as an adult, he would face life in prison without parole.59 Nathaniel
would spend the years, up to his eighteenth birthday, in a juvenile branch of
the adult prison system.6' Upon reaching age eighteen, he would be trans-
ferred to an adult prison where he would remain without hope of parole. 6
However, if Nathaniel was tried as a juvenile, he would spend his time in a
juvenile detention center focusing on therapy and rehabilitation.6 2 He would
be released on or before his twenty-first birthday.63
The actions of Nathaniel Brazill shocked family, friends, and even
school officials. The thirteen-year-old boy was an honor student at Lake
Worth Middle School.' Teachers, including Barry Grunow, had recom-
mended Nathaniel for the position of peer counselor for the following school
year to help his classmates resolve their problems.65 One neighbor recalled
how Nathaniel would play the flute outside his mother's home. School offi-
cials noted that the boy had perfect attendance.66 In addition, police were
unable to find any evidence that Brazil had planned the school shooting in
advance.67
58. Slaying Suspect Pleads Not Guilty, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 20, 2000, at
3B, available at 2000 WL 22180292; see Jon Burnstein, Grunow's Widow at Hearing She Sat
Near Parents of Boy Facing Trial, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 25, 2000, at 5B,
available at 2000 WL 22192927.
59. Spencer-Wendel, supra note 47.
60. Prior to the Tate case, juveniles convicted as adults for murder served their sentences
in adult prisons. See Brochu, supra note 48. The outcry following the Tate verdict led the
Florida General Assembly to change the law, enabling teenager defendants to start their prison
sentences in juvenile facilities. Amazingly, in the Brazill case, Palm Beach County State
Attorney Barry Kricher did not even know that Brazill would be serving time in adult prison
when he pressed for the indictment. See Nightline, supra note 50. In an interview with Ted
Koppel on ABC's Nightline, Krischer insisted that "there is no facility in the state of Florida
that mixes fifteen-year-olds with adult population." Id.; see also William Raspberry, Rush to
Judgment, WASH. POST, June 15, 2000, at A33, available at 2000 WL 19614572.
61. Adults, Children, Crime, Punishment, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 2000, 2000 WL 3675627.
62. Id.
63. Boy Charged in Teacher's Slaying Protestor's Decry 13-year-old's Indictment as an
Adult, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3674090.
64. Deborah Sharp, Honor Student Might Be Tried for Murder as Adult 13-Year-Old
Could Face Life in Prison in Slaying of Teacher at Florida School, USA TODAY, May 30,
2000, at 6A, available at 2000 WL 5779538.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Jon Nordheimer, Seventh-Grade Boy Held in Killing of a Teacher, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2000, at A8, available at 2000 WL 21821469.
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The .25 caliber Raven Arms pistol that Nathaniel Brazill used to shoot
Barry Grunow belonged to a man characterized as Brazill's surrogate grand-
father, Elmore McCray.68 Just days before the shooting, Brazill spent the
night at the man's home, took the unloaded gun and ammunition from a tin
cookie box in McCray's desk, loaded it, engaged the safety, and hid it in his
overnight bag.69 On the day of the shooting, Brazill took the gun from his
clothes drawer in his room and returned to the school with it.70
Nathaniel Brazill's contention that he did not intend to shoot Barry
Grunow was unwavering. 7' Videotapes of Brazill's interrogation and confes-
sion show that Brazill consistently maintained that the shooting was an acci-
dent.72 This led defense attorney Robert Udell to recommend to the boy and
his family that they reject the plea deal offered by the state about two weeks
before the trial. 73 Under the offer, Brazill would serve twenty-five years in
prison with a possibility of parole after serving twenty-one years.74 He could
have been released by the age of thirty-five.75 The family agreed that reject-
ing the offer was in Nathaniel's best interests. 76
Nathaniel Brazill's trial began on May 2, 2001, a little less than one
year after he shot Barry Grunow on the last day of seventh grade.77 The de-
fense made the decision to have Nathaniel testify on his behalf.78 When
questioned by prosecutors at trial, Nathaniel insisted that he had not meant to
fire the gun, but that the shooting was an accident. 79 "I pulled the trigger, but
68. Nancy L. Othon, Owner Hid Gun in Cookie Box "Gran'Says He Didn't Know It Was
Missing-No Charges Filed Against McCray, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 30, 2000,
at 24A, available at 2000 WL 22182355 [hereinafter Othon I]; See generally PrimeTime:
Fatal Attraction; Hidden Camera Experiment Showing How Children and Teens are Irresisti-
ble (sic) Drawn to Guns, Even When They Should Know Better (ABC television broadcast,
Aug. 9, 2001) (showing that children are fascinated by guns and will play with them if they
find them, even if warned just minutes before about the dangers of guns).
69. Othon I, supra note 68.
70. Id.
71. Jon Burstein, Jury Must Decide Brazill's Intent in Teacher's Slaying, SUN-SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale), April 29, 2001, at IA, available at 2001 WL 2674507 [hereinafter Jury Must
Decide].
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Jury Must Decide, supra note 71.
77. Jon Burstein, -jury Seated in Teen 's Murder Case Opening Arguments Begin Today
as Nathaniel Brazill Is Tried in the Death of a Lake Worth Teacher, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), May 2, 2001, at lB, available at 2001 WL 2675063.
78. Jury Must Decide, supra note 71.
79. Teen on Trial: 'I Didn't Try'to Shoot Gun, NEWSDAY, May 10, 2001, at A06, avail-
able at 2001 WL 9230836.
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I didn't try to. That was an accident. Mr. Grunow was one of my friends,"
were the words spoken by Nathaniel at trial.80 Although the teen showed
little emotion during much of his testimony, when asked what Mr. Grunow
did when he collapsed to the ground, Nathaniel replied, "What do you think
he did?" and then began to cry.8'
After less than a two-week trial, the two sides presented their closing
arguments. The prosecution maintained that the killing was intentional, but
added felony-murder to the list of possibilities, presumably to ensure a con-
viction. So when Judge Wennet addressed the jury, his instructions for
first-degree murder included both premeditated murder as well as felony-
murder, as requested by the prosecution. 3 Prior to closing arguments, the
prosecution had made no mention of felony-murder.8 4 A conviction for fel-
ony-murder would have mandated the same life sentence for Brazill as a
conviction for intentionally killing Grunow. 85 For felony-murder, the death
of Grunow had to occur as a consequence of and while Brazill was engaged
in the commission of a burglary.86 Section 810.02 of the Florida Statutes
states that burglary "means entering or remaining in a dwelling, [or] a struc-
ture.., with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are
at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter
or remain.'8" On the charge of burglary, "proof of the entering of such struc-
ture... at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner... is prima
facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense. 8  The main
issue for the burglary charge was whether Lake Worth Middle School was
open to the public at the time Brazill entered. If it was open to the public,
Brazill would have a complete defense to the charge of burglary. 89 If it was
80. Id.
81. Jon Burstein, Prosecutor: Show How You Held the Gun Brazill Contradicts Testi-
mony, Says Some Witnesses Lied, Then Breaks Down Briefly, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale),
May 10, 2001, at IA, available at 2001 WL 2676788.
82. See Jon Burstein, Brazill's Mother: He's Still a Child-Mom of Teacher's Killer Says
Her Son, 14, Deserves Another Chance in Life, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 24,
2001, at I B, available at 2001 WL 2679781.
83. Jon Burstein, Brazill Judge Grants Request of Prosecutors-Brazill Judge Grants
Request of Prosecutors, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 11, 2001, at 28A, available at
2001 WL 2676965 [hereinafter Brazill Judge].
84. Jeff Shields, Felony Murder: A Thorny Legal Issue-Jurors Face Point of Law in
Decision, SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE), May 15, 2001, at 13A, available at 2001 WL
2677716.
85. Brazill Judge, supra note 83.
86. Id.
87. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(i)(a) (2001).
88. § 810.07(i).
89. Brazill Judge, supra note 83.
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not open to the public, then the jury had to find that Brazill intended to
commit aggravated assault with a firearm for him to be guilty of burglary and
therefore felony-murder.9°
After fourteen hours of deliberation, the jury convicted Nathaniel Bra-
zill of second-degree murder and aggravated assault with a firearm.9 One
juror "didn't think the evidence showed [Brazill] had intent to kill Mr.
Grunow. ' 92 Another saw the boy's actions as characteristic of a teenager, not
a cold-blooded killer. 93 According to the juror, the boy just did not see the
consequences of his actions.94
Initially, there was speculation about the sentence that Brazill could re-
ceive, but Judge Wennet found that Florida law did not offer him any leeway
in deciding Brazill's sentence. 95 Florida's "10-20-Life" gun violence law
mandates that anyone convicted of killing someone with a gun be sentenced
to no less than twenty-five years in prison.96 Wennet did not agree with the
defense that the law did not apply to children under sixteen.97 Instead, the
judge decided that since Brazill was tried as an adult, he had to be sentenced
as one.98 Prosecutor Marc Shiner asked for life without parole, stating,
90. Jury Instructions at 4-6, Florida v. Brazill, No. 00-6385CF A02 (Fla. 2001).
91. Mitch Lipka & Stella M. Chavez, Brazill Guilty, 14-Year-Old Convicted of Second-
Degree Murder, Jurors Weren 't Convinced of Intent to Kill, Jurors Initially Leaned 7-5 To-
ward First-Degree Verdict, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 17, 2001, at 1 A, available at
2001 WL 2678206. Even though the jury found Brazill guilty of aggravated assault with a
firearm, that offense is not one of the specifically enumerated felonies for which a defendant
can be guilty of felony-murder in Florida. See § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(a)(p).
92. Lipka & Chavez, supra note 91.
93. Id.
94. Id. One commentator, Paul Thompson, a neurologist at UCLA, believes that Bra-
zill's verdict of second-degree murder is consistent with scientific research. Paul Thompson,
Editorial, Brain Research Shows a Child Is Not an Adult, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale),
May 25, 2001, at 31A, available at 2001 WL 2680069. Thompson cites his own research that
has revealed that the teenage brain is not equipped to deal with risky impulses, which may
explain why Brazill claimed he made a mistake in shooting Grunow. Id. According to
Thompson, the verdict is in line with scientific research in that Brazill's actions were not
accidental but they were not completely thought-out either. See also Marty Beyer, Immatur-
ity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 15 SUM. CRIM. JUST. 26
(2000) (adolescents often view the consequences of their actions as "accidental" when adults
would have foreseen the consequences).
95. Jon Burstein & Shana Gruskin, Judge Backs Off Life Term for Teen, Nathaniel Bra-
zill Received 28 Years in Prison for Killing Barry Grunow, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 28,
2001, at C 1, available at 2001 WL 9199512.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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"[t]hat's the only way we can be sure [Brazill] won't hurt someone again." 99
On July 27, 2001, Judge Wennet sentenced Nathaniel Brazill to twenty-eight
years in prison without parole.' ° Nathaniel Brazill is currently housed in a
youthful offender prison, and he will remain there until he is at least eight-
een, at which point he will enter the adult prison system."'
Although both the Brazill and Tate trials are over and both defendants
have begun serving their sentences, the debate over whether either should
ever have been in an adult courtroom still rages. After the verdict was an-
nounced, Governor Jeb Bush expressed his dismay that Brazill was tried as
an adult. "There is a different standard for children," the Florida governor
said. "There should be a sensitivity to the fact that a 14-year-old is not a
little adult."' 2 One juror also felt that the young boy's case should not have
come before an adult court. "Knowing what I know now," said one juror, "I
would say he should have been tried as a juvenile. He was a juvenile."'0 3
Although the debate still rages concerning the appropriateness of trying and
sentencing teenagers as adults, there is little or no debate about the prosecu-
torial practice, as in the Tate and Brazill cases, of using the felony-murder
doctrine to make it easier to convict juveniles as adults."° The use of the
felony-murder rule in the Brazill case was a stretch. It is hard to imagine that
thirteen-year-old Brazill thought his public school was "private property,"
especially during school hours. Nor is it likely that Florida legislators envi-
sioned that the burglary statute would apply to Brazill's actions. 0 5
A Florida appellate court affirmed Brazill's conviction and sentence,
finding that the broad discretion accorded to the prosecutor under the Florida
legal system to seek indictment for a felony or allow a case to go to juvenile
court did not violate the Constitution.0 6 Describing a prosecutor's discretion
in deciding whether and how to prosecute as "absolute," the court noted the
99. Amanda Riddle, Fourteen-year-old Boy in Florida Gets 28 Years in Prison for Kill-
ing His Teacher, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, July, 28, 2001, http://www.savannahnow.com/
stories/072801/LOCkillerap.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
100. Glenda Cooper, Florida Teen Gets 28 Years in Teacher's Shooting Death, WASH.
POST, July 28, 2001, at A03, available at 2001 WL 23183295.
101. Burstein & Gruskin, supra note 95.
102. Boy is Guilty of Second-Degree Murder in the Shooting of a Teacher in Florida, 14-
year-old Says He Meant Only to Scare Victim, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 17, 2001, at
A2, available at 2001 WL 4462045.
103. Lipka & Chavez, supra note 91.
104. An extensive review of newspaper articles and law review articles reveals that very
little has been written about the appropriateness of applying the felony-murder doctrine to
children.
105. See Steven A. Drizin, Rule Should Not Apply to Children, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauder-
dale), May 14, 2001, at 19A, available at 2001 WL 2677645.
106. Brazill v. State, 845 So. 2d 282, 289 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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requirement that children thirteen and under may be prosecuted in adult court
only by indictment of a grand jury actually serves to protect children against
abuses of prosecutorial discretion because it requires grand jurors to concur
with prosecutorial charging decisions.10 7 Accordingly, the court held that
Florida's statutory scheme for prosecuting juveniles as adults did not violate
Brazill's equal protection or due process fights, or the separation of pow-
ers." 8 Although the court was not faced with an attack on the prosecutor's
decision to use the felony-murder rule to obtain a conviction against Brazill,
its ringing endorsement of prosecutorial discretion does not bode well for
such future challenges.
C. Jonathan Miller
Thirteen-year-old Josh Belluardo died on November 4, 1998, after
spending nearly forty-eight hours in a coma."' 9 The parents of the middle-
schooler made the difficult choice of taking their brain dead son off of life
support."' Josh ended up in the hospital after he was hit in the back of the
head, kicked in the stomach, and hit in the face by fifteen-year-old Jonathan
Miller."' On the afternoon of November 2, 1998, Josh spent the bus ride
home from school being taunted and bullied by Jonathan." 2 He had pencils
and paper wads thrown at him as the two rode home from their respective
schools. 13 Josh was in the eighth grade at E.T. Booth Middle School and
Jonathan was in high school." 4 When Josh got off the bus and began to walk
toward his home in a quiet, middle-class town in Cherokee County, Georgia,
Jonathan followed and laid the would be fatal blows on Josh." 5 Josh's sister
ran to him and held him in her arms.' 16 A neighbor raced over to help and
saw that Josh was unresponsive and called the paramedics. 17 Jonathan ran
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Mark Bixler & Glenn Hannigan, Cherokee Residents Mourn Loss of Teen, Student
Accused of Beating 13-Year-Old After School May Be Charged with Murder Today, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Nov. 5, 1998, at F01, available at 1998 WL 3724745; see Mark Bixler, Teen
faces adult trial in death, 15-year-old suspect held without bail after comatose beating victim,
13, dies, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 6, 1998, at IC, available at 1998 WL 3724863 [herein-
after Teen Faces Adult Trial].
110. Teen Faces Adult Trial, supra note 109.
111. Bixler & Hannigan, supra note 109.
112. See id.
113. Id.; Teen Faces Adult Trial, supra note 109.
114. Teen Faces Adult Trial, supra note 109.
115. Bixler & Hannigan, supra note 109.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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with a friend to his home a few yards from the incident. 18 Jonathan and Josh
had been neighbors for years. Jonathan lived across a cul-de-sac from
Josh."19
Initially, police charged Jonathan as a juvenile for aggravated battery.'2 °
Upon Josh's death, however, Jonathan was charged with murder, and Chero-
kee County prosecutors sought to transfer him from juvenile to adult court.'2'
On November 5, 1998, Jonathan appeared before Superior Court Judge
Frank C. Mills, III, and was formally charged with murder as an adult.
121
The judge ordered Jonathan held without bail, but Jonathan's lawyer, Mi-
chael B. Syrop, filed a motion asking that bond be set so that Jonathan could
be out of custody until the case is resolved. 23 That issue was not immedi-
ately resolved. 124 In addition, the judge granted the lawyer's request that
video cameras be removed from the courtroom because there had been
threats on the teenager's life and this constituted a special situation under the
Georgia law.
2 5
From the beginning, classmates, their parents, and the media character-
ized Jonathan as a bully, saying that he called people "faggots," teased
classmates, and was generally a mean-spirited person. 26 However, Jona-
than's attorney disputed the description and said that his client "didn't come
across to [him] as the demon he's being portrayed as."'' 27 In response to the
incident, a Georgia state representative, Chuck Scheid, introduced a bill tar-
geted at bullies.'28 The bill would require schools, both public and private, to
post the law in their classrooms and require school officials to "notify police
and the parents of all students involved in a complaint of bullying."'
12 9
Representative Scheid believed that schools protect bullies and that their
conduct often goes unmentioned to parents and police. 30
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Bixler & Hannigan, supra note 109.
121. Id.
122. Teen Faces Adult Trial, supra note 109.
123. Id.
124. See Mark Bixier, Teen's Case Highlights Issue of Bond for Murder Defendants,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 10, 1998, at 9JQ, available at 1998 WL 3730954 [hereinafter
Teen's Case Highlights Issue].
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Bixler & Hannigan, supra note 109.
128. Mark Bixler, E.T. Booth Focuses on Memorials, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 19,
1998, at 12JH, available at 1998 WL 3727109.
129. Id.
130. See id.
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Jonathan Miller's lawyer successfully argued that the fifteen-year-old
should be released on bond while he awaited trial.131  Judge C. Michael
Roach set bond at $50,000 and placed a series of conditions on Jonathan
while on bond, despite protests from the murder victim's family.' 32 These
conditions, stipulated to by Miller, were that he had to live at least fifteen
miles from his neighborhood where the incident occurred, wear a monitoring
device, and not contact any witnesses.
33
On December 14, 1998, prosecutors proceeded to indict Miller for first-
degree murder. 34 Unlike the prosecutors in the Tate and Brazill cases, the
Georgia prosecutors used Georgia's felony-murder law from the outset to get
a first-degree murder indictment from the grand jury.'35 The underlying
felonies cited by the prosecution were aggravated assault and aggravated
battery. 136 So, in Georgia, in order to obtain a first-degree murder convic-
tion, prosecutors only needed to convince jurors that Jonathan was guilty of
aggravated assault.137 The indictment said that Miller committed aggravated
assault when he hit Josh with his hands and feet "about the head and
body.' ' 3
8
Only a few weeks after being released on bond and then indicted for
first-degree felony murder, Judge C. Michael Roach ordered Jonathan Miller
back to jail after the boy hosted a slumber party for several friends expected
to testify against him. 139 The party was a direct violation of the bond agree-
131. Teen's Case Highlights Issue, supra note 124.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Mark Bixler, Felony Murder Law Used in Cherokee Rule Allows Charge, Regardless
of Intent, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 16, 1998, at 2C, available at 1998 WL 3731847 [here-
inafter Felony Murder Law Used in Cherokee].
135. See id.
136. Id. Although most states do not allow aggravated assault as the predicate felony,
Georgia is an exception. In general, most states rely on some form of "independent felony" or
"merger limitation" when employing the felony-murder rule. Under the limitation, felonious
assault, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter are not eligible for use as the
predicate felony. The rationale is that without this limitation, almost every felonious assault,
voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter could be turned into a felony-murder
and the need for the distinction of a separate offense would be unnecessary.
137. See Bixler & Hannigan, supra note 109.
138. Felony Murder Law Used in Cherokee, supra note 134.
139. Teen Back in Jail on Violation in Fatal Ga. Beating, CHATrANOOGA TIMES FREE
PRESS, Feb. 7, 1999, at B8.
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ment. 4° Subsequently, a "flamboyant" Atlanta attorney, Bruce Harvey,
joined the Jonathan Miller defense team. 141
Jonathan Miller's trial date was set for April 26, 1999. On April 20,
1999, just days before the trial was to begin, two boys, Dylan Klebold, age
seventeen, and Eric Harris, age eighteen, opened fire on classmates at Col-
umbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. The two boys killed twelve stu-
dents and a teacher and wounded over twenty before turning the guns on
themselves. 141 In light of the events at Columbine, Miller's attorneys tried
unsuccessfully to get the trial delayed citing public concern over school vio-
lence following the Columbine murders as potentially influencing the july. 43
However, Judge Roach denied the request and began jury selection immedi-
ately.' 44
The jury selection for Miller's trial took longer than anticipated given
the Columbine incident and intense media coverage of that case. 145 Defense
attorneys continuously argued that Miller could not receive a fair trial in the
Atlanta metro area because of the media's characterization of the beating and
their client, and the media's attempt to link the case to the Columbine case. 146
However, these arguments fell on deaf ears. 147 The prosecution's witnesses
were heard on May 5, 1999.148 The defense maintained that Jonathan did not
intend to kill Josh Belluardo, and that the teen was only guilty of involuntary
manslaughter, not felony-murder as the prosecution claimed. 49 The prosecu-
tion continued to insist that Jonathan was guilty of aggravated assault or ag-
gravated battery, and that under Georgia's felony-murder law, he should be
140. Id.
141. Mark Bixler, Youth getting famed lawyer, Cherokee teenager accused in fatal beating
will be represented by Bruce Harvey, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 8, 1999, at 2D, available at
1999 WL 3761120.
142. See Angie Cannon et al., Why? There were plenty of warnings, but no one stopped
two twisted teens, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 3, 1999, at 16; Nancy Gibbs, In Sorrow
and Disbelief, TIME, May 3, 1999, at 20.
143. Judge Rejects Delay of Bus Stop Beating Trial, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
Apr. 27, 1999, at B2.
144. Id.
145. Mark Bixler, Youth Trial Moving Slower Than Normal, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May
1, 1999, at Fl, available at 1999 WL 3767365.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. Mark Bixler, Victim's Sister Testifies in Teen's Trial: There was no Response When
Katie Belluardo Went to Help Her Brother After He Was Punched, She Says, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., May 6, 1999, at B 1, available at 1999 WL 3768690 [hereinafter Victim's Sister Testi-
fies in Teen 's Trial].
149. Id.
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convicted of first-degree murder. 5° Meanwhile, defense attorney Bruce
Harvey argued that the attack was only a misdemeanor assault or battery, and
that under Georgia law, Miller was guilty of involuntary manslaughter if he
were found to have committed a misdemeanor that unintentionally leads to
death.' 51
Jonathan Miller's trial lasted just three days. 52 The victim's sister took
the stand and testified that she saw her brother on the grass outside their
home, ran out to him, saw him gasp for air, and watched his face turn from
red to purple to blue.'53 Others testified that Miller had taunted the victim
often in the days preceding the attack. 54 Medical experts said that a torn
artery in Josh's brain was the actual cause of the death.'55 The small tear in
the artery allowed the brain cavity to fill with blood and leave the teenager
brain dead.'56 After the prosecution finished presenting its case, the defense
made the surprise announcement that it would not present any evidence or
call any witnesses.15
After only six hours of deliberation, the jury found Jonathan Miller
guilty of felony-murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery.'58 The
conviction meant an automatic life sentence for the teenager with the possi-
bility of parole after fourteen years.'59 However, the judge could decide to
impose a longer sentence for the aggravated assault and battery charges. 6°
Following the verdict, attorneys for Jonathan Miller vowed to appeal on the
basis of Judge Roach's denial to delay the trial until after the panic over the
Columbine shootings had died down. 161
150. Id.
151. Id. The "misdemeanor-manslaughter" rule permits conviction of involuntary man-
slaughter for an accidental homicide that occurs during the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony (a dangerous misdemeanor) without the required showing that the de-
fendant intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently caused the death. JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.09, at 538 (3d ed. 2001).
152. Boy Convicted in Killing Cites Littleton in Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1999, at 17.
153. Victim's Sister Testifies in Teen's Trial, supra note 148.
154. Id.
155. Mark Bixler, Cherokee teen found guilty of murder, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 8,
1999, at Al, available at 1999 WL 3769128 [hereinafter Cherokee teen found guilty].
156. Id.
157. Mark Bixler, Cherokee Bully Case Goes to Jury Teen-On-Teen Crime: 15-Year-Old
Facing Felony Murder or Involuntary Manslaughter Sentence in Neighbor's Death, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., May 7, 1999, at D1, available at 1999 WL 3768950 [hereinafter Cherokee bully
case].
158. Cherokee Teen Found Guilty, supra note 155.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Boy Convicted in Killing Cites Littleton in Appeal, supra note 152.
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One juror said that the jury had no choice but to convict Miller.,6 2 Ac-
cording to the juror, Assistant District Attorney Rachelle L. Carnesale had
proved the definitions of the charges against Miller, and the defense did little
to rebut them when it failed to call any witnesses. 63 According to the juror,
the most difficult part of the conviction was whether Miller was guilty of
aggravated battery." Under Georgia law, to be guilty of aggravated battery,
the victim has to be deprived of the use of one of his body parts, in this case
his brain.'65 The jury had trouble deciding whether Josh died instantaneously
or not. 166 In the end, the jury decided that the young boy did not die instantly
given the victim's sister's testimony that she found her brother gasping for
air. 167
Judge Roach sentenced Miller to life in prison on May 21, 1999.168 The
judge said that he had no choice because Georgia law required a life sentence
for a felony-murder conviction. 69 If Jonathan had been convicted of invol-
untary manslaughter, as the defense argued, his sentence would have been
one to ten years in prison.
70
As in the Brazill case, some in the community argued that Miller should
have been tried in juvenile court. 7 ' "They can try him as an adult, but the
reality is he's a kid.... Life in prison to me is going way too far," said Rick
McDevitt, president of the Georgia Alliance for Children. 7 2 Following the
sentencing, Miller's attorneys said they would appeal the sentence because
the punishment was cruel for a death that was unintended. '71 Months after
162. Ben Schmitt, Cherokee Juror: Defense Didn't Give Us Much Choice, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REPORT, May 11, 1999 available at .LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fulton File.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-24(a) (2003).
166. See generally Patrick v. State, 274 S.E.2d 570 (Ga. 1981). If a victim dies instanta-
neously, the defendant cannot be subjected to aggravated battery. Id. at 572. On appeal,
Miller's attorneys argued, among other things, that Josh Belluardo died instantaneously when
he was hit, and therefore Jonathan could not have been guilty of aggravated battery. See Ap-
pellant's Brief in Support of His Appeal, Miller v. State, 571 S.E.2d 788 (Ga. 2002) (No.
S02A0626); Appellant's Supplemental Brief in Support of His Appeal, Miller v. State, 571
S.E.2d 778 (Ga. 2002) (No. S02A0626).
167. Schmitt, supra note 162.
168. Id.
169. Boy, 15, Gets Life in Bus Stop Killing, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, May 22,
1999, at B5.
170. Mark Bixler, Teen Gets Life in Bus Stop Beating Death, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May
22, 1999, at Gl, available at 1999 WL 3772782.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Appeal Planned of Life Sentence in Killing at Bus Stop, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE
PRESS, May 24, 1999, at B8.
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being sentenced to life in prison, Jonathan Miller told reporters, "I'm not a
murder - I shouldn't - I don't see myself as a murderer... I'm a good kid,
but I just made a few mistakes in my life.' 174
On May 2, 2002, Jonathan Miller's lawyers asked the Supreme Court of
Georgia to reverse the conviction and grant the boy a new trial. 175 Miller
raised several issues relating to the felony-murder doctrine, including
whether Georgia's statutory scheme for trying juveniles as adults, which
gives original jurisdiction to the criminal court over all thirteen to seventeen-
year-olds charged with murder, applies to felony-murder cases, and whether
it is proper to use aggravated assault to win a felony-murder conviction when
life is lost unintentionally. 76 On October 28, 2002, the Supreme Court of
Georgia rejected all of Jonathan's arguments and affirmed his conviction and
sentence. 177 Although he concurred in the judgment, Justice Benham felt
compelled to write a separate opinion in which he questioned the result:
While I concur in the majority opinion, I cannot help but believe
that as we treat more and more children as adults and impose
harsher and harsher punishment, the day will soon come when we
look back on these cases as representing a regrettable era in our
criminal justice system. As we were developing our juvenile jus-
tice system, we sought to treat children differently from adults be-
cause we recognized they had not developed the problem-solving
skills of adults. We now lump certain children in the same cate-
gory as adults and mete out harsh punishment to them, ignoring
the differences between childhood and adulthood.
178
In the cases discussed above, most of the debate focused on the issue of
whether the boys should have been tried as juveniles or adults. 179 In the Flor-
ida cases, there was little or no debate about the appropriateness of using the
felony-murder rule to gain first-degree murder convictions against Brazill
and Tate once these boys were prosecuted in adult court. 80 Although the use
of the felony-murder rule was questioned by the lawyers in the Miller case,
the attacks were premised on the propriety of using felony-murder as a
174. They Called it Murder; Border Crossing (CNN & TIME television broadcast, Sept. 19,
1999), available at LEXIS, News, CNN Transcripts.
175. D. Aileen Dodd, Appeal Sought in Boy's '98 Punching Death, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
May 2, 2002, at D12, available at 2002 WL 3720956.
176. See id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(i) (2001).
177. Miller v. State, 571 S.E.2d 788, 798 (Ga. 2002).
178. Id. at 798-99 (Benham, J., concurring).
179. See id.; Brazill v. State, 845 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
180. See supra Part I.A-B.
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predicate for transferring a juvenile to adult court, and the propriety of using
aggravated assault or battery as a predicate for felony-murder, rather than a
more broad-based attack on the appropriateness of using the felony-murder
rule on teenage defendants. In the sections that follow, we will argue that the
historical and doctrinal underpinnings of the felony-murder rule make little
sense in the case of children and teenagers, and that old and new understand-
ings of developmental differences between children and adults also make
application of the felony-murder rule problematic in the cases involving
child-defendants.
III. FELONY-MURDER RULE & TEENAGERS
(HISTORY/SUMMARY/RATIONALE)
In cases like those of Lionel Tate, Nathaniel Brazill, and Jonathan
Miller, the felony-murder rule imposes liability for murder when death re-
sults from actions taken during the commission or attempted commission of
a felony. The rule applies in all situations-when the felon kills intention-
ally, recklessly, or accidentally. This rule allows prosecutors to charge a
defendant with murder, even if the defendant did not intend to kill the victim.
Prosecutors must only prove that the defendant intended to commit the un-
derlying felony, and are not required to offer any separate proof of intent
with regard to the death.
In response to criticism of the felony-murder rule, supporters of the rule
offer deterrence, reaffirming the sanctity of human life, and easing the prose-
cutor's burden of proof as rationales for the rule.'8 ' The most commonly
cited defense of the felony-murder rule is deterrence, the hope of preventing
negligent and accidental killings during the commission of felonies. 182 The
rule can also be viewed as reaffirming the sanctity of human life in that it
reflects the view of society that a felony resulting in death is more serious
than one that does not and, therefore, deserves greater punishment.
83
Finally, although not an explicit justification for the rule, easing the
prosecutor's burden of proof is often the result because prosecutors can con-
vict on a lesser level of intent than that required for murder. 84 Although
these are the primary justifications for the rule, one commentator views them
as mere pretenses. To LaFave, the most likely rationale behind the felony-
murder rule is perhaps more retributive in nature: "that the defendant, be-
cause he is committing a felony, is by hypothesis a bad person, so that we
181. DRESSLER, supra note 151, § 31.01, at 516-19.
182. Id.
183. Id. § 31.01, at 517.
184. Seeid.§31.01,at518.
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should not worry too much about the difference between the bad results he
intends and the bad results he brings about." '85
The felony-murder rule is a much-condemned doctrine. In 1834, His
Majesty's Commission on Criminal Law found the felony-murder rule "'to-
tally incongruous with the general principles of our jurisprudence." 186
"Principled argument in favor of the felony-murder doctrine is hard to
find.' 1 7 In addition, the "ancient rule ... has been bombarded by intense
criticism and constitutional attack."'188 Moreover, "[c]riticism of the rule
constitutes a lexicon of everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong
with a legal doctrine."' 189 Such criticism led England to abolish the felony-
murder rule by statute in 1957.190 In the United States, although few states
have abolished the felony-murder rule, others have limited its scope, but by
and large the felony-murder rule still thrives in most jurisdictions. 9'
The felony-murder rule, which is codified in several states, cannot be
traced to one clear source. In some instances, scholars have traced the first
formal statement of the rule to Lord Dacre's Case, 1558.192 In Lord Dacre's
Case, Lord Dacre and some companions were hunting in a park, an unlawful
act, and agreed to kill anyone who might resist them.'93 One member of the
hunting party killed a gamekeeper who confronted him. ' 94 Although not
present during the confrontation, Lord Dacre and all the members of the
party were convicted of murder and hanged. 9' Although accepted by many
as an example of the felony-murder rule, some legal scholars believe the case
is an early example of placing liability on the companions on a theory of
constructive presence, or because the group had earlier agreed to the crime
185. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5, at 682 (3d ed. 2000).
186. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 319 (Mich. 1980).
187. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. at 37 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
188. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1171 (N.J. 1994) (citing Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at
327-29).
189. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine of Consti-
tutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446 (1985).
190. See id. at n.12.
191. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 701 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Michie 1999);
Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 321 (interpreting a Michigan statute where the rule is no longer recog-
nized by statute). While in New Mexico, the state supreme court has effectively obliterated
the rule by imposing a mens rea requirement for felony-murder. See State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d
1196, 1204 (N.M. 1991).
192. See Norval Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U.
PA. L. REV. 50, 58 (1956).
193. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 307.
194. Id. at 308.
195. Id.
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and therefore had a shared mens rea.96 Nevertheless, the case is the most
often cited source of the felony-murder rule, although some scholars cite
later sources such as Edward Coke, 1644,'9' or Sir Michael Foster, 1762, as
promulgating the rule that a killing during a felony would automatically be-
come a murder.' 98 By 1769, the felony-murder rule was simply stated by
William Blackstone: one who caused a death in the commission or at-
tempted commission of any felony is guilty of murder.' 99 In any case, the
felony-murder rule can be traced back to the 1700s. As far back as the his-
tory of the rule can be traced, so can one trace condemnation of it.
A much criticized rule when applied to adults, the felony-murder rule is
even more problematic when applied to children under the age of fourteen.
Under the common law, such children are presumed to be incapable of form-
ing criminal intent.00 The common law infancy defense can be stated as
"children under the age of seven are conclusively presumed to be without
criminal capacity, those who have reached the age of fourteen are treated as
fully responsible, while as to those between the ages of seven and fourteen
there is a rebuttable presumption of criminal incapacity.'2'2°  The infancy
defense reflects the law's "unwillingness to punish those thought to be inca-
pable of forming criminal intent. '20 2 According to one scholar, "[t]he in-
fancy defense was an essential component of the common law limitation of
punishment to the blameworthy.,
20 3
This common law "infancy defense" dates back to the tenth century,
when it was established by statute that no one under the age of fifteen could
be subjected to capital punishment unless he attempted to escape or refused
to give himself up.2°3 "[B]y the beginning of the fourteenth century, it was
established that children under the age of seven were without criminal capac-
ity.' 5 By 1338, children over the age of seven were presumed to lack the
capacity to commit a crime, however this could be rebutted by proof of mal-
196. See People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 308 (Mich. 1980).
197. See James W. Hilliard, Felony Murder in Illinois-The "Agency Theory" vs. the
"Proximate Cause Theory": The Debate Continues, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 331, 332 (2001).
198. James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the
Forces That Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429, 1442 (1994).
199. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 200-01 (1769).
200. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 4.11, at 398 (2d ed.
1986); see ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 938 (3d ed. 1982).
201. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 200.
202. In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
203. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 503, 507 (1984).
204. LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 4.11, at 424-25.
205. Id. § 4.11, at 425.
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ice.216 It was firmly established by the seventeenth century that the presump-
tion of incapacity operated until a child was fourteen years old.2°7 Before the
state could gain a conviction against a child, it had the burden of overcoming
the presumption of incapacity. 20 8
With the emergence of the juvenile court system it seemed that the in-
fancy defense would become unnecessary. The juvenile court system acted
as parens patriae, and the state became the punisher, substituting itself for
the parents. The need to establish moral blameworthiness and, hence, the
defense that it does not exist vanished.2 9 Indeed, many courts, citing the
non-adversarial and non-punitive purposes of the juvenile courts, held that
the infancy defense was unavailable to children tried in juvenile court."(0
However, the juvenile justice system has undergone considerable change
over time and is becoming much more like a penal court. This trend, first
noted by the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault2l' and In re Win-
ship,2t 2 has only accelerated in the last decade as more and more juveniles
are being tried in adult courtrooms.2 13 In short, the infancy defense was once
very important in protecting the child who faced criminal prosecution. How-
ever, the defense became less important in the early years of the juvenile
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id. According to LaFave, the prosecutor's burden was a heavy one, sometimes
stated to be "beyond a reasonable doubt" and sometimes "clear and convincing evidence."
LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 4.11, at 425.
209. See Devon T., 584 A.2d at 1291. Some have argued that In re Gault and In re Win-
ship, by bestowing upon juvenile defendants almost all of the same due process rights as
adults, may have laid the foundation for the recent increase in laws permitting adult prosecu-
tion of juveniles. See, e.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L CTR FOR
JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 89 (1999),
available at http://ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html. See generally Martin L.
Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of
Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 361-71 (1991). If juve-
niles are capable of exercising these "rights" as adults, or so the argument goes, then they
should be held accountable as adults when convicted. Id.
210. See, e.g., State v. D.H., 340 So. 2d 1163, 1166 (Fla. 1976); In re Davis, 299 A.2d
856, 860 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973); In re Robert M., 441 N.Y.S.2d 860, 863 (Fam. Ct. 1981).
211. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
212. 397 U.S. 358 (1969).
213. A 1998 Department of Justice study showed that almost 200,000 children under the
age of eighteen are prosecuted in criminal court each year. See MACOLM C. YOUNG & JENNI
GAINSBOROUGH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PROSECUTING JUVENILES IN ADULT COURT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES 5 (2000), available at http://www.sentencing
project.org/pubs/2079.pdf. In addition, between 1992 and 1997, forty-seven states passed
laws to make it easier to prosecute children as adult. See Snyder & Sickmund, supra note
209.
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justice system; only recently has it gained relevance again as more and more
juveniles are tried as adults.
A closer look at the justifications for the doctrine of incapacity and the
felony-murder rule confirms that the felony-murder rule was not intended to
be applied to children under the age of fourteen. The early common law
infancy defense was based upon an unwillingness to punish those thought to
be incapable of forming criminal intent, and not of an age where the threat of
punishment would serve as a deterrent." 4 The felony-murder rule, in con-
trast, was justified as a deterrent for negligent and accidental killings during
the commission of a felony,2 5 or as means to punish those who do bad things
generally."1 6
In light of the presumption that children under age fourteen are incapa-
ble of forming criminal intent, the deterrence rationale makes no sense if
applied to children. As for punishing those who do bad things, the juvenile
justice system was designed to deal with the special needs of child defen-
dants while still punishing them. Applying the felony-murder rule to chil-
dren under the age of fourteen also produces unfair and nonsensical out-
comes. By relieving prosecutors of the burden of rebutting the presumption
of incapacity through proof of premeditation or malice, courts essentially
would be permitting murder convictions of child-defendants who are pre-
sumed incapable of forming criminal intent. It is inconsistent with common
law to make it easier for prosecutors to obtain a murder conviction in the
case of youthful defendants, when the objective of the presumption of inca-
pacity is just the opposite-to make it harder to prove intent when the defen-
dant is a child.
Finally, the doctrine of incapacity must surely trump the felony-murder
rule since "capacity" is a necessary foundation for the formation of "intent"
in the culpability, or mens rea, context of a felony.
Put simply, mens rea is the state of mind required to commit a
blameworthy act. The concept of legal responsibility, or the ca-
pacity to have a culpable state of mind, overlaps, in part, with
mens rea. Unless an accused has the capacity to be culpable, it is
impossible for him to maintain the specific mental state, or mens
rea, required for commission of a criminal offense. Legal respon-
sibility may also be viewed as a fundamental pre-requisite to the
existence of mens rea. The mens rea inquiry focuses on whether
the accused, when assumed capable of complying with the law's
214. LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 7.5, at 425.
215. See DRESSLER, supra note 151.
216. See LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 7.5, at 671.
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command, possessed the specific state of mind required to con-
sider an act blameworthy. Legal responsibility focuses instead on
the question of whether the accused's deficiencies of judgment dis-
tinguish him from others in society such that we do not expect him
to comply with the law ... Legal responsibility and mens rea also
differ in terms of the time frame in which the court analyzes the
problem of culpability. The mens rea inquiry focuses on the time
period in which the harmful act was committed. Proof of the ca-
pacity to be legally responsible for one's acts focuses on the life
experience of the individual. By widening the time frame, legal
responsibility differences allow the court to explore a broader
range of behavior that might exculpate the accused.217
In other words, capacity is the prerequisite for mens rea. In order for
prosecutors to prove mens rea, they must first prove that the defendant was
capable of forming criminal intent. But, especially when dealing with a
child, this inquiry is much broader in scope than a traditional mens rea
analysis and necessarily involves consideration of developmental factors
which bear on a child's ability to form intent-factors which are incompati-
ble with the felony-murder rule. It is to these developmental factors in which
we now turn.
IV. PSYCHOSOCIAL RESEARCH & BRAIN RESEARCH
Courts applying the infancy defense typically focus on the child's ca-
pacity to understand the nature and consequences of his acts, and the ability
to distinguish right from wrong.218 Given current understandings about the
moral development of children and psychosocial literature on the compe-
tence and decision-making of teens, courts exploring the infancy defense
must also inquire into the degree of impulse control that the youth is capable
of exercising."1 9 Recent research showing that adolescent brains are less
developed than adult brains in the very areas of the brain that govern impulse
control and judgment-the prefrontal lobes-provides added weight to the
need for courts to factor impulse control into the traditional infancy analy-
sis.2
20
217. Walkover, supra note 203, at 537-38 (emphasis added).
218. See id. at 512.
219. Id. at 560; see Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Juvenile Justice: Rebirth of the Infancy De-
fense, 12 CRIM. JUST. 45, 46 (1997).
220. See, e.g., 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 15, 37 (Lois T.
Flaherty & Richard M. Sarles eds., 1997).
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Although research on the development of the teenage brain in compari-
son to the adult brain is still in its infancy, recent studies have focused on the
cognitive and psychosocial factors of adolescent development. Early studies
concentrated on decision-making and cognitive aspects of development, and
looked at teenagers' ability to reason, comprehend, "and appreciate decisions
as adults would." '221 These studies were initiated in response to the legal
changes surrounding medical decision-making and informed consent by
young people.2 22 Therefore, the findings, although helpful, do not answer all
questions regarding teenage development. Instead, the studies show that
teenagers, especially from age fifteen on, are not that much different than
adults. 223 However, criticism of the early studies reveals methodological
flaws such as small, unrepresentative samples of mostly white, middle class
subjects.224 A study of Miranda waivers by Thomas Grisso supports the con-
tention that teenagers over fifteen are capable of understanding their
Miranda rights as well as adults.225 However, Grisso stressed that the under-
standing of Miranda rights is only consistent when the teenagers and adults
are of comparably average intelligence.226 When compared to adults with a
similarly low I.Q., teenagers with a lower intelligence did not possess an
equivalent understanding of their rights.227
Youth advocates used the cognitive similarities of adults and older teen-
agers professed by these studies to support an expansion of adolescent
autonomy in the medical context for teenagers, especially to consent to abor-
tion.228 However, these studies were used years later to attack the juvenile
justice system and argue in support of teenagers being tried as adults in
criminal courts.2 29 The argument was that if teenagers could make autono-
mous healthcare decisions, then they were equally capable of being tried as
adults and making legal decisions.23 0 The juvenile justice system was based
on the idea that juveniles were less competent or culpable than adults and a
finding that their decision-making capabilities are equal to adults undermines
the very laws and system meant to protect these differences.
221. Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents'
Competence and Culpability, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 403, 406 (1999).
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 407.
225. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REv. 1134(1980).
226. See id. at 1164-65.
227. See id.
228. See Cauffman et al., supra note 221, at 408.
229. Id. at 408-09.
230. Id.
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Researchers point to non-cognitive or psychosocial aspects of adoles-
cent development to rebut the argument that teenagers and adults are not
different.23' Some of these psychosocial aspects include responsibility,
which includes self-reliance, clarity of identity, and healthy autonomy; per-
spective, which relates to the ability to see the complexity of the situation
and place it in a larger context; and temperance, or the ability to limit im-
pulses and see the overall situation prior to acting.232 According to Steinberg
and Cauffman, early research shows that adolescents do differ from adults in
many aspects of responsibility, perspective, and temperance, although more
research is necessary. 33 Other researchers examined similar aspects of psy-
chosocial development, and all hypothesize that the development of different
psychosocial aspects could impact how cognitive capacities are employed in
real-world situations.234
By early adolescence, most children have reached "conventional" moral
reasoning. 235 At this stage, the adolescent's moral reasoning is based on how
others will judge his or her behavior.2 36 Elementary age children who have
reached this level focus on pleasing their parents and other adults, while jun-
ior high school students are more concerned with the opinions of their
peers.237 However, most adolescents are only capable of reasoning at this
level in hypothetical situations, and their actual behavior often does not re-
flect their reasoning ability.23
8
By late adolescence or early adulthood, some individuals shift to "post-
conventional" moral reasoning. 239 At this level, reasoning switches from
being concerned with social approval to more important principles like fair-
231. See generally Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective
Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1768 (1995); Thomas
Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3,
9-14 (1997); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision-Making in Legal Con-
texts, 19 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 221 (1995); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Matur-
ity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision-Making, 20
LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 249 (1996).
232. See Cauffman & Steinberg I, supra note 231, at 1764-65.
233. See id. at 1788.
234. See Cauffman et al., supra note 221, at 412.
235. ABA, KIDS ARE DIFFERENT: How KNOWLEDGE OF ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT
THEORY CAN AID DECISION-MAKING IN COURT 27 (Lourdes M. Rosado ed., 2000), available
at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/macarthur.html [hereinafter KIDS ARE DIFFERENT].
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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ness and justice.2 4' However, this level of moral reasoning is rare, even in
adults, and most adolescents follow only "conventional" moral reasoning.24'
In addition, research on the moral development of children shows that
although children may be able to distinguish right and wrong, they may not
behave in a way consistent with that understanding.242 Also, the develop-
ment of moral judgment results from the "interaction of impulse with the
response of key externalities, such as parental approval or disapproval.
243
From a developmental perspective, it is grossly unfair to apply the fel-
ony-murder rule to pre-teens like Lionel Tate and Nathaniel Brazil. Such
children, lacking the foresight and judgment of fully competent adults, are
prone to make decisions without careful deliberation, and do not fully under-
stand the consequences of their actions. Studies in both neuroscience and
psychology demonstrate that children do not have the same capacity to con-
trol their behavior or make rational decisions as adults.2 "
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the historical and doctrinal arguments against the use of the
felony-murder rule in cases involving children, there appears to be no good
reason for retaining the felony-murder rule in cases involving children and
teenagers. However, the felony-murder rule is deeply entrenched in the
American legal system and has proven to be resistant to calls for its abolition
for centuries. For this reason, we have proposed a number of solutions to
limit the scope of the felony-murder rule in cases of children and teenagers.
These limits are divided into three categories: 1) the use of the felony-
murder rule against children tried in adult and juvenile court; 2) the use of
the felony-murder rule as a basis for transferring children and teenagers to
the adult court; and 3) the use of the felony-murder rule as mitigation in sen-
tencing juvenile offenders in adult court.
A. Limiting the Use of the Felony-Murder Rule in Juvenile and Criminal
Court Cases
First, we believe that there should be an absolute ban on the felony-
murder doctrine for child defendants under the age of fourteen in adult and
240. KIDS ARE DIFFERENT, supra note 235, at 27.
241. Id. at 28.
242. See Walkover, supra note 203, at 542.
243. Id. at 542-43.
244. See id. at 542; Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A
Study off 7 Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 26, 27 (2000).
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juvenile court systems.245 As argued above, at common law, such children
were presumed to be unable to form the criminal intent necessary to prove
the underlying felony. Even if the State can rebut the presumption of inca-
pacity, none of the traditional justifications of the rule make sense in the con-
text of children under the age of fourteen.
The least compelling justification of all is probably the one that explains
the longevity of the felony-murder rule: it eases the prosecution's burden of
proving intent in murder cases. It is the least compelling because it is debat-
able as to whether we should ease the prosecution's burden for a crime that
can carry the death penalty or life without possibility of parole, and espe-
cially debatable when child defendants are involved. As the Lionel Tate case
demonstrates, children under fourteen now face similar draconian penalties if
tried and convicted as adults. Because youth has historically been a mitigat-
ing factor in punishment, we should make it harder, not easier, to impose
such sentences on youthful defendants.
For children ages fourteen to seventeen, we propose a presumptive ban
on using the felony-murder rule. Children in this age range can probably
form the criminal intent of the underlying felony but they still do not have
the same capacity to control their behavior as adults, and often are less capa-
ble of foreseeing the consequences of their actions. Their brains are still
developing in the pre-frontal cortex, the very area which governs delibera-
tion, judgment, and impulse control, and the part of the brain which is argua-
bly the seat of mens rea. In addition, some of these children, especially four-
teen-year-olds and older teens who are mentally limited, may not be compe-
tent to stand trial.24 6 In order to charge fourteen to seventeen-year-olds with
245. Most courts have held that the common law presumption of incapacity does not apply
in juvenile court proceedings. See LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 7.5, at 427-28. The reason for
this rule has been that the infancy defense is unnecessary in light of the juvenile court's reha-
bilitative and non-punitive purposes. See id. § 7.5, at 428. This rule continues to be the pre-
vailing rule despite the fact that the modem juvenile court is far more punitive than its
predecessors. See Shepherd, supra note 219, at 46 (applying the felony-murder rule, which
has the effect of making it easier to convict and punish juveniles, in a "rehabilitative" juvenile
court makes little sense).
246. For the most recent study, see Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand
Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 333 (2003), available at http://www.childrensrights.org/Policy/policyresources
_juvenilejuvenilescompetence.htm. See also Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and
the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003); Richard J. Bonnie &
Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 87
(Thomas Grisso et al. eds., 2000). See generally Thomas Grisso, What We Know About
Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 146-52 (Thomas Grisso et al.
eds., 2000); Alan E. Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision Mak-
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felony-murder, prosecutors should bear a heavy burden. They should be
required to prove by "clear and convincing" evidence that the defendant is a
fit subject for application of the felony-murder rule. This burden can be met
by evidence that the defendant was capable of forming the criminal intent of
the underlying felony; that the alleged offense was committed in an aggres-
sive or violent manner; that death or great bodily harm is a natural and prob-
able consequence of the defendant's actions; and that the defendant's actions
are the proximate and legal cause of the victim's death.247
The above-mentioned rules seek to constrain the application of the fel-
ony-murder rule to children and teenagers who are tried in the adult court. In
other words, they seek to impose restrictions on the ability of prosecutors to
charge children and teenagers in adult court with first-degree murder under a
felony-murder theory. We also believe that judges, prosecutors, and legisla-
tors should be constrained from using the felony-murder rule as a basis for
transferring children and teenagers to the adult court in the first instance.
Under such a rule, prosecutors could no longer seek an indictment for murder
based strictly upon a felony-murder theory in order to prosecute a juvenile in
adult and legislators should carve out an exception for felony-murder when
drafting statutes that require that cases involving juveniles charged with
murder must originate in the criminal, rather than the juvenile court.
B. Limiting the Use of the Felony-Murder Rule to Transfer Cases to the
Adult Court
In the 1990s, in response to an alarming increase in juvenile violence,
many states enacted tough transfer laws.248 Using the sound bite "adult time
ing of Delinquent Youths, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 33 (Thomas Grisso et al. eds., 2000). To ensure
that child-defendants who clearly lack the capacity to be tried as adults are not wrongfully sent
to the criminal courts, all children should engage in competency hearings prior to any transfer
decision. Informal research revealed that only one state, Virginia, requires a hearing on a
youth's competence to stand trial before waiver to criminal court. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
269.1 (Michie 2003). Arkansas requires a transfer hearing but competence is only one factor
in a list of many that is considered by the judge in determining whether to transfer. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(g) (Michie 2002).
247. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 7.5, at 671-72. These circumstances track
the ways in which courts have sought to limit the felony-murder rule to mitigate its harshness.
See id.
248. In the decade from 1984 to 1994, the number of murders committed by youth nearly
tripled from 823 to 2320. The overall serious violent crime rate (including homicide, rape,
robbery, and aggravated assault) among youths aged twelve to seventeen also soared - from
twenty-nine offenses per 1000 youth in 1986 to fifty-two in 1993. See RICHARD A. MENDEL,
LESS HYPE, MORE HELP: REDUCING JUVENILE CRIME, WHAT WORKS -- WHAT DOESN'T, Am.
Youth Policy Forum, 30-31 (2000). As Frank Zimring has demonstrated:
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for adult crime" as their mantra, critics of the juvenile court pushed for laws
to make it easier to prosecute juveniles as adults.249 Their successful efforts
produced a legal response to serious and violent juvenile crime, which
flushed pre-teens, first-time offenders, and even non-violent offenders into
an adult criminal court system that had all but abandoned the concept of re-
habilitation. As a result of harsh mandatory minimum sentencing policies,
the abolition of parole, and "truth-in sentencing laws," which required con-
victed defendants to serve most or all of their prison terms, criminal court
judges could no longer use youthfulness to mitigate sentences.
These new transfer laws differed from past practices. Historically,
transfers had been reserved for older teens who were recidivists or who had
committed especially heinous crimes. Since the United States Supreme
Court's 1966 decision in Kent v. United States,50 judicial waiver had been
the most common approach to transferring juveniles to criminal court.251 The
Kent decision enumerated a list of substantive factors to guide judges in
making transfer decisions, and many states simply adopted these standards in
[T]he most important reason for the sharp escalation in homicide [among offenders 13 to 17]
was an escalating volume of fatal attacks with firearms ... That homicide increases are only
gun cases has two important implications. First, it would require only a small number of at-
tacks to change the death statistics during the 1985 to 1992 period. Because gunshot wounds
are deadly, a relatively small number of woundings can produce a relatively large number of
killings .... The second implication of the guns-only pattern is that the hardware used in
many attacks seems to be the major explanation for the expanding rate rather than any basic
change in the youth population involved in the assaults.
FRANKLIN ZIMRrNG, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 35-36 (1998). For the best introduction to
the theory and practice of transfer, see JEFFREY FAGEN & FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (2000).
See generally Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdic-
tion: A History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 83-135
(2000), for a history of the statutory exclusion of specific offenses, including murder.
249. MENDEL, supra note 248. It's hard to pinpoint who coined the phrase "adult time for
adult crimes," but the phrase clearly permeated the political scene in the mid-1990s. In fact,
virtually every major Republican gubernatorial candidate in the mid-1990s mouthed the
words. See, e.g., Laurence Hammack, 'Compassion' May Be Lost Gov. Allen Accepts Report
That Proposes Tougher Penalties on Juvenile Offenders, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS,
Oct. 6, 1995, at Cl; Jon R. Sorensen, Pataki Plan on Juvenile Offenders Includes Longer;
Sentences in Adult Jails, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 10, 1995, at 16A; Governor Pete Wilson of
California Sets State Agenda (Transcript # 1777-10, Nat'l Pub. Radio Morning Ed., Jan. 9,
1996); Editorial, The Young Killers: Adult Crimes Warrant Adult Time, WORCESTER
TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, June 10, 1996, at A6; Judy Putnam, Engler Proposes 'Punks' Do
'Adult Time for Adult Crimes', GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 27, 1995, at C3. For a history of
juvenile transfer laws, dating from the inception of the juvenile court, see David S. Tanenhaus
& Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused": The Changing Legal
Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641,699 (2002).
250. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
251. Seeid.at556.
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their juvenile codes verbatim or with minor modifications.252 The 1990s
revolution in the transfer laws, however, differed from past efforts to try
more children as adults in two significant ways: 1) the decision to transfer
was less often a judicial decision; it was now increasingly the province of
prosecutors or the legislatures; and 2) younger children could now be tried as
adults for a wider array of offenses.253
Although judicial waivers used to make up the bulk of the children in
adult court, today, prosecutorial and legislative waivers predominate. In
1997, for example, an estimated 8400 juveniles were waived from juvenile
court to adult court by judges.5 Because prosecutorial waivers and legisla-
tive waivers, however, are more difficult to track, it is currently not known
how many total youths under eighteen years of age are prosecuted as adults
each year, but at least one estimate places the number as high as 200,000.25
A recent multi-jurisdictional study of adult courts in eighteen large urban
counties revealed that eighty-five percent of all transfer decisions during a
six-month period from January 1, 1998 to June 30, 1998 were made by
prosecutors (45%) and/or legislatures (40%), instead of judges. 56
The shift from a transfer regime in which judges made most of the deci-
sions to one in which prosecutors and legislatures do the deciding necessarily
means that the system has become more rigid and less flexible in deciding
which juveniles stay in juvenile court and which are tried as adults. Legisla-
tive waivers are typically based on only two factors: the minor's age at the
time of the offense and the nature of the alleged offense.257 Prosecutorial
252. Id. at 566-67. These factors include the seriousness of the offense, prosecutorial
merit, the sophistication and maturity of the child, the child's past history of delinquency,
responses to prior juvenile court efforts at rehabilitation, and the ability of the juvenile court's
dispositions to rehabilitate the child and protect the public. Id.
253. Twenty-three states now have at least one provision, typically governing children
charged with murder or other violent felonies, which places no bottom age limit for juveniles
to be transferred to criminal court. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 209, at 106.
254. EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTHS, AND
JUSTICE FOR SOME 2 (1998), available at http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/justice
forsome.
255. Id. at 13; see SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 209, at 106. Not all of the estimated
200,000 youths under eighteen who are prosecuted as adults each year are "transfers." Many
of these youths come from the thirteen states where the upper age limit for juvenile court
jurisdiction is fifteen or sixteen, meaning that their cases originate in adult court and that they
are considered "adults" as soon as they are arrested for a crime. Id.
256. JOLANTA JUSZKIEWICZ, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTHS, YOUTH CRIME/ADULT TIME:
IS JUSTICE SERVED? (2001), http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/ycat/ycat.
html.
257. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 210 (1999).
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waiver decisions are often based on three factors: 1) the minor's age; 2) the
seriousness of the alleged offense; and 3) the minor's criminal history.258
The minor's amenability to treatment, social and emotional age, family back-
ground, and mental and intellectual capacity are not often available at the
time that prosecutors decide to seek a transfer.259 Waiting to acquire such
information is often a luxury most prosecutors believe they cannot afford,
especially in cases in which a victim has died.
We agree that in many cases, the seriousness of the offense should be a
significant factor in the transfer decision. Many felony-murders, however,
are not among the most "serious offenses." The underlying crimes can be
less serious but can still result in the unintentional or unforeseeable result of
the victim's death. For this reason, we propose that children charged with
felony-murder should not be eligible for legislative or prosecutorial waiver,
unless the underlying felony could itself have led to a transfer to adult court.
This is the rule which has been adopted in New York. For example, in Peo-
ple v. Roper,260 the New York Court of Appeals overturned a juvenile defen-
dant's conviction for felony-murder because the child-defendant could not
have been tried for the underlying felony in adult court.21 The court noted
that murder in the first-degree requires "felonious intent," which in felony-
murder cases comes from the underlying felony.262 Since Roper could not be
charged as an adult with the "felony" of robbery, he lacked the implied intent
necessary for felony-murder.263
In judicial waiver hearings, which typically involve a weighing of fac-
tors relating to the seriousness of the offense, the minor's criminal history,
and the minor's prospects for rehabilitation before reaching the age of major-
ity, there should be a presumption against transferring juveniles to adult
court on felony-murder charges; a presumption which can be overcome with
evidence that the underlying felony was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner. At the very least, minors who are waived to
adult court on felony-murder charges should be given the opportunity to have
"reverse waiver" hearings, hearings in which criminal court judges have the
ability to send juvenile defendants back to juvenile court, either for their tri-
als or for sentencings. Such hearings act as a check against prosecutorial
258. See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice
Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1006-07 (1995).
259. See id. at 1007-08.
260. 259 N.Y. 170 (1932).
261. Id. at 177.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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overcharging and ensure that only the most culpable juveniles are eligible for
adult prosecution.2
C. Limiting the Death Penalty and Life Without Parole Sentences in Cases
of Juvenile Felony-Murder
Finally, we believe that felony-murder convictions of sixteen and seven-
teen-year-olds should be exempted from the death penalty in the twenty-two
states 265 that permit it and children of all ages who are convicted of felony-
murder should be exempted from the sentence of life without the possibility
of parole. Such draconian sentences should be reserved for the most culpa-
ble offenders, and both the youth of juvenile defendants and the fact that they
committed "felony-murder" should exempt them from this class of offend-
ers.266 When a reduced level of intent is used to convict, a reduced sentence
should be handed down.
264. Approximately twenty-four states have "reverse waiver" statutes. See SNYDER &
SICKMUND, supra note 209. Such statutes are especially important in jurisdictions that rely
extensively on legislative and prosecutorial waivers. In these jurisdictions, reverse waiver can
act as a check against overcharging by prosecutors by allowing for an examination of the
minor's role in the alleged offense, potential for rehabilitation, and other factors beyond the
minor's age, and the seriousness of the charged offense. Reverse waiver statutes also mitigate
the consequences of overly broad transfer statutes that sweep into criminal court accomplices,
non-violent, first-time offenders, and defendants charged with felony-murder. See Tanenhaus
& Drizin, supra note 249.
265. ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE SYS., CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, FACTSHEET: THE JUVENILE
DEATH PENALTY (2003), http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/factsheetgeneral.pdf.
266. In Atkins v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the execution of the
mentally retarded violates the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the United States
Constitution. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Among the reasons cited for this decision was the
majority of the Court's belief that the mentally retarded, because of their limited mental ca-
pacity, were less culpable than adult offenders of average intelligence. Id. In the wake of
Atkins, the dissent of Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer to the denial of certiorari in the
case of Toronto Patterson, urged the full Court to revisit the issue of whether it is still consti-
tutional to execute children over the age of fifteen. Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Many of the same arguments for reduced culpability of the mentally
retarded have already been argued in the cases of juveniles on death row. See In re Stanford,
537 U.S. 968 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner on Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal, Beazley v. Cockrell, 534 U.S. 945 (2001) (No.
00-10618), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Beazleycert02.pdf; Brief for
Petitioner on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal, Patterson
v. Cockrell, 536 U.S. 967 (2002) (No. 0 1-10028), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust
/juvjus/supreme%20court%/o20petition.pdf.
77
: Nova Law Review 28, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LA WREVIEW
VI. CONCLUSION
The cases which we have highlighted in this article-Lionel Tate, Na-
thaniel Brazill, and Jonathan Miller-highlight the unfairness of applying the
felony-murder doctrine to cases involving children and adolescents, and il-
lustrate the devastating consequences that result when the eoctrine is used to
secure murder convictions against youthful defendants in criminal court. In
Lionel Tate's case, a boy who may not have been competent to stand trial for
murder-he was unable to decide on his own whether to take a reasonable
plea offer or roll the dice by going to trial-was convicted and sentenced to
life in prison without parole. In Nathaniel Brazill's case, a boy whose emo-
tions overcame his judgment and who, upon reflection, could not even un-
derstand what had caused him to kill his favorite teacher, was convicted and
sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison. In Jonathan Miller's case, a boy
who neither intended to kill his victim, nor could have foreseen that the boy
would die from a punch to the head, was convicted and sentenced to life in
prison. Applying the felony-murder rule in such cases borders on "cruel and
unusual punishment" because the connection between culpability and pun-
ishment is severed in two ways. By allowing a defendant to be punished for
a crime he did not intend to commit and for results he did not intend to cause,
the rule takes a first cut at the connection between culpability and punish-
ment. When the rule is applied to children and teenagers, the rule takes a
second, and perhaps even deeper, cut-it denies the historical connection
between youth, culpability, and punishment, a connection which is supported
by developmental psychological research and more recent studies of the
structure and function of the teenage brain.267
The felony-murder rule has proven to be extremely resistant to the
many attacks which have been leveled against it throughout the ages. It con-
tinues not only to survive, but to thrive, in many jurisdictions throughout the
United States. It should no longer be allowed to thrive in cases involving
children and teenagers.
267. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind, States of Development, 14 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 143 (2003) (arguing for a developmental analysis of mens rea concepts).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Florida has decided a very important issue con-
cerning appellate practice in termination of parental rights cases, ruling that
the United States Supreme Court doctrine established in Anders v. Califor-
nia,' regarding an attorney's withdrawal from an appeal for lack of appeal-
able issues in a criminal case, did not apply to termination of parental rights
cases.2 The Supreme Court of Florida set forth a less onerous standard of
withdrawal The doctrine of prospective neglect has been at issue in a num-
ber of cases in Florida's intermediate appellate courts over an extended pe-
riod of time, including the time period addressed by this article, and no con-
sensus has yet been reached regarding application of the doctrine.' The opin-
ions rendered by the district courts of appeal continue to be in conflict over
proper application of the doctrine.' On the delinquency side, the appellate
courts continued the longstanding practice of holding the trial courts strictly
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. This
article covers cases through June 30, 2003. The author thanks Diane Howard and Gary Scott
Turner who assisted in the preparation of this article.
1. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
2. N.S.H. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 843 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 2003).
3. Id. at 904.
4. See, e.g., F.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 849 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
5. See id. at 1124.
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responsible for compliance with statutory provisions, including proper notice
to children of their right to counsel6 and proper application of dispositional
statutes.7 Legislative activity was limited during the past year, although a
major change occurred in the placement of the guardian ad litem program,
which moved from the Supreme Court of Florida to the Justice Administra-
tive Commission.8
II. DEPENDENCY
Florida case law and prior surveys in this Journal have reported on cor-
poral punishment as one of the bases for a finding of dependency.9 The
question under Florida law is whether corporal punishment is excessive
enough to qualify as abuse.' ° In O.S. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies," the appellate court held that the evidence established substantial bruis-
ing over a majority of the child's buttocks, legs, and neck and that some of
the bruises were still present six weeks later. 12 The child also testified that
this was not the most severe beating she had received. 3 The appellate court
upheld the trial court's fact-finding, distinguishing cases in which the court
found that bruises were insignificant, did not constitute temporary disfigure-
ment, and did not put the child at risk of imminent abuse or cause the child to
suffer significant mental impairment.'4
An important question of how to prove the grounds for dependency was
before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in D. Children v. Department of
Children & Family Services. 5 D. Children involved charges against both
parents, the father claimed he was not at home at the time the infant was in-
6. E.g., A.L. v. State, 841 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
7. E.g., Fisher v. State, 840 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
8. FLA. STAT. § 39.8296 (2003).
9. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2001 Survey of Florida Law, 26 NOVA L. REv.
903, 915 (2002).
10. Id. Parents can also be charged with criminal child abuse for excessive corporal
punishment. § 39.01(30)(a)(4). Parental immunity is not a defense to criminal child neglect.
Radford v. State, 828 So. 2d 1012, 1019-20 (Fla. 2002) (citing State v. McDonald, 785 So. 2d
640, 642 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
11. 821 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
12. Id. at 1148.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1147-48 (citing J.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 773 So. 2d 1220, 1221
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000); R.S.M. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 640 So. 2d 1126
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)); see also W.H. v Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 846 So. 2d
636, 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); K.R. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 784 So. 2d 594,
597 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
15. 820 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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jured, although he was charged and a dependency finding was made as to
him. ' 6 The mother, however, was at home and dependency was also found as
to her. 7 In a split opinion, the appellate court held that the dependency as to
the father would still be affirmed; even assuming he was not home at the
time of the infant's injury.'8 Moreover, the majority held that the trial court
did not abuse its very broad discretion.' 9 Specifically, the court held that
there was ample evidence to support dependency as to the mother, the perpe-
trator was not identified, and there was an intact family."0 The court also
relied upon an earlier case, In re B.J.,2 1 where a parent's rights were termi-
nated, even though there was no evidence that the parent had inflicted any
abuse. 2 The court stated "'where there is evidence that a child suffered
abuse by one or both of the parents present, there is clear and convincing
evidence of egregious abuse to support termination of parental rights of both
parents."'
23
Judge Warner dissented in the D. Children case.24  First, she distin-
guished In re B.J. on the facts.25 Specifically, she noted that the abuse oc-
cuffed when the mother was in the residence.26 In the case at bar, according
to the dissent, there was no evidence that the father was at home when the
abuse occurred, nor was there any evidence to suggest that the injuries oc-
curred at any time when the father was at home.2 ' Although the majority
opinion states that it does not "'accept as a given, that the father was not in
the home at the time the injury occurred,"' there was no evidence to support
that fact unless one rejects the parties' unreported testimony as not credible.2"
Thus, the majority opinion seems to stand for the proposition that it is not an
abuse of discretion for the court to find dependency as to one parent based
upon acts committed by the other in the absence of the parent and without
16. Id. at 981.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 982 (citing D.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 769 So. 2d 424, 426 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
20. D. Children, 820 So. 2d at 982.
21. 737 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
22. Id. at 1228.
23. D. Children, 820 So. 2d at 984 (Warner, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 983.
25. Id.
26. D. Children v. Department of Children & Family Services 820 So. 2d 980, 984 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 984-85 (Warner, J., dissenting).
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any showing of evidence that the other parent had any involvement in the
behavior which gave rise to the abuse or neglect.29
The second issue in D. Children dealt with the ongoing question of
whether a child may be found dependent based upon abuse or neglect af-
flicted upon a sibling, which is also discussed in the section of this article on
termination of parental rights.3" Relying upon In re MF.3, and D.H. v. De-
partment of Children & Families, 32 the majority recognized that the trial
court cannot rely solely on the existence of one child's injury in finding two
other children dependent.33 Moreover, the majority decided it would "defer
to the trial judge, who heard and observed the witnesses, and resolved the
conflicts and doubts in favor of protecting all three of the children, not just
the one who was abused."34 In so doing, it relied upon a social worker who
testified at the trial level about the lack of explanation for the injury and the
inability to assess the parties' needs to be assessed to ensure the safety of the
children.35 Again, on this ground, Judge Warner dissented.36 She explained
that the social worker never interviewed the children, nor the parents, but
found the same risk for the boys as for the infant girl.37 Relying upon the
precedents supporting the proposition that there has to be some kind of inde-
pendent evidence apart from the single act to allow for a finding of depend-
ency as to two other children, Judge Warner held that "[w]here there is no
evidence to support the trial court's ruling, or where the facts as found by the
trial court do not as a matter of law support the relief granted, no deference
should be given. 38
The issue of prospective neglect regularly comes before the Florida ap-
pellate courts in both dependency and termination of parental rights cases.
As demonstrated by the D. Children case, it usually arises in the context of
prior abuse or neglect of siblings forming the basis of an allegation of "pro-
spective abuse" against the child who is the subject of the present proceed-
ing.39 It can also arise in the context where no child has yet been abused or
29. See id. at 981, 982.
30. Id. at 982.
31. 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2000).
32. 769 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
33. D. Children, 820 So. 2d at 982.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 985 (Warner, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. D. Children v. Department of Children & Family Services 820 So. 2d 980, 986 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002). (Warner, J., dissenting).
39. See Dale, supra note 9, at 913; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law in Florida in 1998, 23
NOVA L. REV. 819, 821-22, 825 (1999).
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neglected but where the parents' behavior suggests prospective neglect.4°
The standard for such termination cases originated in the Supreme Court of
Florida case, Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,4'
decided in 1991. In In re P.S.,42 the question was whether the "court abused
its discretion in admitting evidence of the father's prior DUI arrest" in de-
termining whether there was dependency.43 The arrest had occurred six years
before the proceedings and long before the child was born.4 The appellate
court held that such information was not relevant.45 Applying the prospec-
tive neglect standard, and citing Palmer v. Department of Health & Rehabili-
tative Services, 6 the court held that under the standard provided by section
39.01(14)(f) of the Florida Statutes, involving substantial risk of imminent
abuse, abandonment, or neglect, the "court abused its discretion in finding
that the father's single act 'clearly and certainly' predicted future neglect." '47
As reported in this Journal, a trial court can find a child dependent, who
was not being abused, based upon abuse inflicted on a sibling where a
"nexus" exists between the "act of abuse and prospective abuse., 4 8 This was
the conclusion of the court in O.S. v. Department of Children & Families,49
where a severe beating by the mother, intended as corporal punishment, was
likely to be employed on the younger child even though the child had not
been paddled as often as the older sibling.50 In light of the fact that the older
child was no longer in the home, the appellate court upheld the concept that
the younger child might "receive the brunt of the mother's rage" and for that
reason affirmed the dependency finding as to the younger child.5 Another
dependency case predicated on proof of neglect or abuse of other children is
MN. v. Department of Children & Families.52 The question in MN. was
whether an incident of prior neglect or abuse of one child would be sufficient
40. See L.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2002); Hroncich v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 667 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1995); Palmer v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 547 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
41. 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991).
42. 825 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
43. Id.
44. id.
45. Id.
46. 547 So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
47. P.S., 825 So. 2d at 531.
48. See D.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 769 So. 2d 424, 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000).
49. 821 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
50. Id. at 1149.
51. Id.
52. 826 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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by itself to establish "a substantial risk of imminent abuse" of another child,
as required by Chapter 39.53 Relying upon a body of Fifth District Court of
Appeal cases, in MN., the court held that independent evidence must be in-
troduced establishing a nexus between the prior abuse or neglect and the
allegation of prospective abuse. 54 An example of a nexus may be a "mental
or emotional condition of [a] parent which will continue, such as mental ill-
ness [or] drug addiction., 55 In the MN. case, the parent did not suffer from a
mental illness but had a below average intellectual ability that resulted in an
adjustment disorder that was neither serious nor disturbing. 6 For that rea-
son, the appellate court held that the Department of Children and Families
("DCF") failed to meet its burden of establishing the sufficient nexus be-
tween the prior abuse of one child and the prospective abuse or neglect of the
other child. 7
In a series of opinions commencing with Beagle v. Beagle,58 the Su-
preme Court of Florida has rejected grandparent intervention in family af-
fairs by means of claims of right to visitation.59 Grandparent visitation rights
arose in a different context in C.S. v. Biddle,6° where grandparents initiated
the dependency proceeding and sought custody of the children. 61 The court
ordered the mother to make the three children available to the grandparents,
in order to permit the grandparents to evaluate the children's medical, dental
and educational circumstances.62 Furthermore, the court ordered the parents
to deliver the children to the grandparents for overnight visitation and author-
ized the grandparents to obtain evaluations of the children, all absent a find-
ing that the children were dependent.63 On a petition for writ of prohibition,
the appellate court granted the writ and quashed the service.' Citing to the
53. Id. at 447 (citing§ 39.01(14)(f)).
54. Id. at 448 (citing K.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 800 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2001); Gaines v. Dep't of Children & Families, 711 So. 2d 190, 194 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1998); O.S., 821 So. 2d at 1145; D.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 769 So. 2d
424 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 449.
58. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
59. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L. REV.
91, 98-99 (2000); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So.
2d 26 (Fla. 2000); Von Eiffv. Azicn, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998); Lonon v. Ferrell, 739 So. 2d
650 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
60. 829 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1005.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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fundamental rights of parents to raise their children absent a compelling state
interest, as articulated in the Beagle case,65 the appellate court held that
"[w]hen individuals enlist the judicial system to intervene in a parent/child
relationship, the court must scrupulously adhere to the pertinent statutes in
determining whether such interference is warranted."66 The court concluded
that the "status as grandparents does not confer on them any special rights to
direct the upbringing of these children or to visit with the children without
parents' permission.,
67
The failure of parents to appear both at dependency hearings and in
termination of parental rights cases can result in a default judgment. Impor-
tant issues of proper notice and adequate due process protections arise in
these cases. Over a dissent, the Third District Court of Appeals, in L. W. v.
Florida Department of Children & Family Services,68 upheld a default order
of dependency as to a father who failed to appear at an arraignment hearing
where the father's attorney was notified of the hearing and left two recorded
messages for the father.69 The dissent argued that less than twenty-four
hours notice of the arraignment hearing on the dependency proceeding to the
lawyer, while sufficient as a general proposition under Florida law,70 was
insufficient because fundamental rights were at stake and a mere twenty-four
hours notice was inadequate particularly given the lack of assurance that the
father had actually received the notice.7
In another failure to notify case, S.H. v. Department of Children &
Families7 the mother, but not the father, was served at home with a sum-
mons in a dependency proceeding.73 He was at the courthouse on the morn-
ing of the arraignment, "signed an attendance sheet outside of the courtroom
... [but] left the courthouse before the arraignment began. ' 74 The trial court
ruled that he had been properly served by substituted service and entered a
default judgment finding the child dependent. 75 Noting that it was sympa-
65. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996).
66. C.S., 829 So. 2d at 1005.
67. Id.; see also Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing
grandparents' lack of liberty interest in making decisions about care, custody, and control of
their grandchildren).
68. 829 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
69. Id. at 939.
70. See M.E. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 728 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
71. L.W., 829 So. 2d at 940.
72. 837 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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thetic to the "considered ruling of the trial judge,"76 the court reversed based
upon the language of Chapter 39 regarding service of process.77 The court
found that the father's signing of the attendance sheet did not constitute ap-
pearance in a hearing before the court as required by Florida law.78 Further-
more, there was no substituted service on the father "because the mother's
residence was not [the father's] 'usual place of abode' at the time of ser-
vice. ' 9 Finally, the father's knowledge of the dependency proceeding is not
enough to waive the statutory service requirement.80 In addition, this was not
a case of deliberate refusal to accept delivery of service.8' Thus, "[t]he order
of disposition with respect to the father [was] reversed. 82
In the third case involving default at the dependency hearing stage, AJ
v. Department of Children & Families Services," parents, who had attended
two days of trial and many hearings in their dependency case suffered a de-
fault judgment and consent order against them when they were twenty-five
minutes late for the commencement of the third day of trial in Miami.84 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's order on grounds
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the parents' motion to set
aside the default judgment. 85 The appellate court recognized that the purpose
behind the statutory authority enabling the court to enter a default order at
this stage is to avoid the parents defeating the object of the dependency pro-
ceeding through neglect and further that the court has the authority to bring
the case to a conclusion even if the parents do not participate. 86 However,
the appeals court noted, nonetheless, that "[t]he purpose of the statute is not
to inject 'gotcha' practices into the dependency process."87 Under the facts
of the case, the lower court abused its discretion in deciding the case by way
of a default rather than the merits.88
There are times when at the end of the dependency proceeding the re-
maining issue is one of custody. In L.F. v. Department of Children & Family
76. Id. at 1118.
77. S.H., 837 So. 2d at 1118.
78. Id.; see § 39.502(2).
79. S.H.,837So. 2dat 1118.
80. Id. (citing Bedford Computer Corp. v. Graphic Press, Inc., 484 So. 2d 1225-27 (Fla.
1984) (finding that actual notice does not render attempted service valid)).
81. S.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 837 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
82. Id. at 1120.
83. 845 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
84. Id. at 974.
85. Id. at 976.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. A.J., 845 So. 2d at 976.
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Services," two half siblings resided with their natural father/step-father in
Georgia during the course of a dependency proceeding against the mother.9°
At the end of the proceeding, the court, having previously found dependency,
ordered both reunification and strengthening/maintaining the current place-
ment, placing custody of both children with the natural father of one who
was also the step-father of the other.9 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed because, while under the dependency statute the court was within its
discretion to use the best interest standard to determine which parent should
have custody of the dependant child, the step-father was neither a parent nor
a relative under the Florida statute to whom custody might go.92 Thus, the
court remanded to consider how the parties might resolve long-term custody
and whether a new case plan might be appropriate.93
S.C. v. Guardian Ad Litem,94 involved an important issue of a juvenile's
right to privacy in the context of a dependency proceeding. S.C., a child of
fourteen, was the subject of a dependency proceeding and had a guardian ad
litem appointed on her behalf.95 In the course of the proceeding against the
mother, the child sought to maintain the privacy of information contained in
her records held by a former therapist and psychologist.96 In an effort to
avoid release of the information to her guardian ad litem, the child "moved to
enjoin the guardian ad litem program, and any individual guardian ad litem
assigned, from obtaining any confidential or privileged records" in the ab-
sence of the formal petition or hearing as provided under Florida law. 97 Con-
sequently, because the doctor was going to be called at the adjudicatory hear-
ing, the child sought to enjoin anyone from calling the doctor.98
On a writ of certiorari, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded
that the order denying the child's motion violated Florida law by failing to
allow the child, fourteen years of age, an opportunity to be heard.99 It did not
rule on the issue of maturity or competency of the minor to seek the relief.'
The court concluded that the child had a right to assert the therapist-patient
89. 837 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
90. Id. at 1099.
91. Id. at 1101.
92. Id. at 1102 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(49), (60) (2002)).
93. Id. at 1104.
94. 845 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
95. Id. at 955.
96. Id. at 955-56.
97. Id. at 956.
98. Id.
99. S.C., 845 So. 2d at 956.
100. Id.
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privilege, and that nothing contained in Chapter 3910 provided the guardian
ad litem with the right to review the privileged records of the dependent
child. 1 2 The power of the guardian ad litem found in Section 61.403(2) does
not authorize the guardian ad litem to obtain confidential psychotherapist-
patient records absent the child's right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard to challenge such access.' °3 The court recognized the child's right of
privacy under the Florida Constitution and case law." Moreover, the court
concluded that the child had the right to notice and the opportunity to be
heard, that the matter should be resolved in camera giving the child the op-
portunity to be heard, and that such was the least restrictive and intrusive
means of determining whether the material should be made available.
0 5
Finally, the court relied upon case law from California, °6 and a body of pro-
fessional literature to support the proposition that mature minors have pri-
vacy interests that ought to be recognized in medical decision-making con-
texts.'O7 It is also significant that the child in this case had a lawyer from a
legal aid program representing her. Under Florida law, the child has no right
to counsel in a dependency proceeding but is only entitled to representation
by the guardian ad litem with whom she was at odds in this case.'0 8
Jurisdiction of the dependency court over a family that had no ties to the
state of Florida and was merely in transit when the children were seized at
Miami International Airport was before the Third District Court of Appeal in
K.H. v. Department of Children & Family Services.'0 9 The case involved a
father from Trinidad who was living with his wife, an employee of the U.S.
State Department posted in Brazil, but who was not the mother of his chil-
dren. " The father, according to the appellate court, disciplined his daughter
by striking her on the buttocks repeatedly with a wooden stick, leaving
bruises and abrasions."' The discipline took place on U.S. Embassy prop-
erty in Brazil." 2 Believing that the family might abscond to Trinidad, the
101. See FLA. STAT. § 39.4085(21) (2003).
102. Id.
103. § 61.403(2).
104. S.C., 845 So. 2d at 958 (citing FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23; In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186
(Fla. 1989)).
105. S.C. v. Guardian Ad Litem, 845 So. 2d 953, 959 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
106. Id. (citing In re Kristine W., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369 (Ct. App. 2001)).
107. Id. (citing Kristine W., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373-74).
108. See generally Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel to Children in Dependency Pro-
ceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769 (2001).
109. 846 So. 2d 544, 545-46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
110. Id. at 546.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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State Department detained them and the children were taken into the DCF
custody when their plane arrived at Miami International Airport."3 Despite
its statement that "[w]e agree with the father that their case raises serious
concerns over jurisdiction, as the family had no ties to the State of Flor-
ida,"' 14 the court held that under section 39.40(2) of the Florida Statutes, it
has original jurisdiction when a child is taken into custody by the DCF."5
The court also found that under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
applicable in Florida pursuant to section 61.503(4) of the Florida Statutes,
the dependency court had emergency jurisdiction over a child who was pre-
sent in the State of Florida." 6 In addition, it noted that no proceedings were
brought in Virginia." 7 It upheld the jurisdiction despite the fact that it rec-
ognized that jurisdiction was created by acts of the U.S. State Department
and Florida officials.' 18
And finally, in a statement that is becoming redundant in appellate deci-
sions, the court concluded its opinion by stating that "[t]his case presents yet
another unfortunate failure of the Department of Children and Families and
the court system to fulfill their statutory duties to the children and the fam-
ily." 11
9
For well over a decade the appellate courts and this author have com-
mented on the failure of the dependency trial court to state the facts upon
which findings of dependency are made. 2 ° In MS. v. Department of Chil-
dren & Families,2' the court was faced with the same problem and, once
again, it reversed and remanded because the trial court failed to adequately
state facts upon which the conclusion of abuse was made, or to state any
facts to support the conclusions that the relationship between the mother and
her child was unhealthy but simply tracked the factual allegations of the
amended petition for dependency.'22
113. Id.
114. K.H., 846 So. 2d at 546.
115. Id. at 547.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. K.H., 846 So. 2d at 547.
120. See In re T.S., 557 So. 2d 676, 677 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Williams v. Dep't
of Health & Rehab. Servs., 568 So. 2d 995, 997 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see also J.C.G.
v. Dep't of Children & Families, 780 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Michael J.
Dale, Juvenile Law Color: 1994 Survey of Florida Law, 19 NOVA L. REv. 139, 140 (1994).
121. 827 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
122. Id. at 1090.
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III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Florida Rules of Judicial Administration provide that the parties must
consent for testimony to take place through the use of communication
equipment rather than in court.13 In A.B. v. Department of Children & Fam-
ily Services,'24 the appeals court reversed in a case where the trial court took
testimony of a treating psychiatrist as well as a former foster parent of the
child via telephone over objections by the mother's counsel. 125 The court
held that given the seriousness of the witnesses' testimony and the nature of
the issue in the case the use of telephone testimony without the mother's
consent violated the mother's due process rights. 1
26
Florida law provides that in a termination of parental rights case one of
the grounds for termination is the setting where a case plan has been filed, a
child has been previously adjudicated dependent and the child continues to
be abused, neglected and abandoned by the parents.127 That issue is clear on
its face. However, in In re T.B., 2 s the intermediate appellate court reversed
because the child was never declared dependent, the father "had no tasks to
complete under the case plan he was given, there was no factual basis to find
that he failed to substantially comply with the [case] plan."'' 29
The issue of whether the failure of parents to appear at termination pro-
ceedings may constitute grounds for default termination of parental rights
has been before the appellate courts on a number of occasions.13 As it has in
the dependency context, 13' in C.R.K. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies,132 the trial court defaulted a mother at a calendar call for failure to ap-
pear after having been given notice. 133 "The mother's attorney was present,
123. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.07 1(d).
124. 820 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
125. Id. at 1086.
126. Id.
127. § 39.806(l)(e).
128. 819 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
129. Id. at 272.
130. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1998 Survey of Florida Law, 24 NOVA L. REV. 179
(1999).
131. See infra Part 11.
132. 826 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
133. Id. at 1054. The notice provision provided "Termination of failure to personally
appear at the advisory hearing constitutes consent to termination of parental rights of the
child(ren). If you fail to personally appear on the date and time specified, you may lose all
legal rights as a parent to the child(ren)." Id.
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but the mother was not."' 34 Nonetheless, the trial court went forward and
took testimony on the second part of the Florida test for termination of paren-
tal rights-manifest best interest of the children.'35 The appellate court re-
versed finding that the trial court had entered a default at the calendar call.' 36
The appellate court held that the "calendar call is not an adjudicatory hear-
ing" which is the event where failure to appear can produce a default.'3 7 For
that reason, the appellate court held that the notice was inadequate.'38 Sec-
tion 39.801(3)(v) of the Florida Statutes refers specifically to the failure of a
parent to appear at the adjudicatory hearing.'39 The court therefore re-
versed. 4 ° As a matter of fundamental due process, a parent in a termination
of parental rights case is entitled to notice by service of the petition, plead-
ings, and other papers.'
41
In MJ. W. v. Department of Children & Families,42 the question was
whether the trial court could hold an adjudicatory hearing where the mother
was never served in compliance with the Florida Rules of Juvenile Proce-
dure and the statute. "43 Under the facts of the case, the mother learned of the
hearing through telephone conversations but was never served in compliance
with the statute by officials from DeKalb County, Georgia, where she
lived. 44 The appellate court reversed the adjudication of termination of pa-
rental rights finding that the statute and the rule provide for the sole manner
to effectuate service in a parental termination proceeding-either personal
service or constructive service. 45 Neither happened here, and thus, the court
reversed. 4
6
A second case involving termination of parental rights and the question
of proper service upon a parent who fails to appear is J.M v. Department of
Children & Families. 47 In J.M, when the DCF filed its petition to terminate
parental rights to appellant's three children, the DCF could not serve the in-
dividual personally so it sought service through publication as required by
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. C.R.K., 826 So. 2d at 1055.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. § 39.801(3)(v).
140. See also In re C.R., 806 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
141. See generally § 89.801(1).
142. 825 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
143. Id. at 1039.
144. Id. at 1039-40.
145. Id. at 1040-41.
146. Id.
147. 833 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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Florida law.'4 8 The problem the DCF faced was that when it published no-
tice of the termination of parental rights, it did so less than twenty-eight days
before the advisory hearing. 49 Florida statute requires that written defenses
be filed with the Clerk not later than the date set in the notice, which shall
not be less than twenty-eight nor more than sixty days after the first publica-
tion of the notice. 5 ° The fact that the parent had a lawyer is not dispositive
of the issue, according to the appellate court, because that makes it clear that
the issue was the initial notification, not the presence of counsel. 5 ' Subse-
quent notification can be served upon the lawyer and such notification will
be appropriate, as the court held in ME. v. Florida Department of Children
& Family Services. 52 Because fundamental rights are at issue, strict adher-
ence to notice requirements is required and for that reason the court reversed
and remanded. 5 3  It is also significant that the court cited Santosky v.
Kramer,54 which speaks to the significant interests on a constitutional basis
of parents in termination cases. 1
55
Section 39.806(l)(i) allows for termination of parental rights to one
child where parental rights have previously been terminated involuntarily to
a sibling.'56 Two appellate courts recently dealt with the related issue of rec-
ognizing a termination of parental rights order from another state in an ongo-
ing proceeding within Florida. 157 In Department of Children & Families v.
V. V., "'58 a mother in a Florida termination case had her rights terminated as to
a different child in Mississippi under circumstances where she was not af-
forded counsel. 5 9 Nonetheless, the court in V. V. held that "[p]rinciples of
comity and of full faith and credit demand that the judgment be recognized.
No paramount rule of public policy dictates otherwise."' 60 In J.H.K., the
appellate court reversed the dismissal of a termination case and remanded for
new hearing so that the DCF could offer evidence surrounding a New Mex-
ico termination, according to the court, based upon the presumption arising
148. Id. at 280 (citing § 49.09).
149. Id. at 281.
150. § 49.011(13).
151. J.M., 833 So. 2d at 282.
152. 728 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
153. J.M., 833 So. 2d at 282-83.
154. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
155. Id.
156. § 39.806(1)(i).
157. Dep't of Children & Families v. J.H.K, 834 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002);
Dep't of Children & Families v. V.V., 822 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
158. 822 So. 2d at 555-56.
159. Id. at 558.
160. Id.
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from the prior termination.' 6 The court's analysis is troubling, in addition to
being so simplistic and lacking in analysis.
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Services 62 recognized the importance of the protected liberty
interest to parents, even though it held there was no absolute right to counsel
in a termination of parental rights case. 163 Not looking behind the termina-
tion decree in the other jurisdiction raises basic constitutional questions.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the concept of a
collateral attack upon judgments of other jurisdictions if they lack fairness. "
The seminal United States Supreme Court case, Williams v. North Caro-
lina,165 demonstrates this proposition in the context of recognition of foreign
divorce decrees.
The issue of the appointment of a guardian ad litem continues before the
appellate courts in Florida. In G.S. v. Department of Children & Family Ser-
vices, 16 6 the appellate court reversed the trial court in a termination of paren-
tal rights case for failure to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the inter-
ests of the minor child.167 With little discussion, the appellate court cited
Florida law that requires a trial court to appoint a guardian ad litem to repre-
sent the best interests of a child in any termination of parental rights proceed-
ing if a guardian ad litem had not been previously appointed. 68 Despite the
fact that the court in G.S. described the failure to appoint a guardian as a
clear violation of the statutory mandate, and the fact that the federal funding
statute, the Childhood Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974
("CAPTA") 169 requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a depend-
ency proceeding, there is Florida case law that inexplicably accepts the fail-
ure to either appoint or continue the appointment of a guardian ad litem in
dependency and termination cases. 1
70
161. J.H.K, 834 So. 2d at 299.
162. 452 U.S. 18 (1981); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
163. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33.
164. See id. at 33-34.
165. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
166. 838 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
167. Id. at 1222.
168. Id. (citing § 39.808(2); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.5 10(A)(2)(c)).
169. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-19 (2000).
170. For a discussion of this issue see Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel to Children in
Dependency Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769, 797 (2001).
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B. Appellate Issues
The Supreme Court of Florida has decided the issue of whether the pro-
cedures set forth in Anders v. California,7' in which the United States Su-
preme Court enunciated the method by which counsel for an indigent defen-
dant in a criminal case could withdraw from the appeal on grounds that there
is no valid basis to appeal, applies to a termination of parental rights case. In
Anders the United States Supreme Court ruled that when an attorney for an
indigent defendant believes the case on appeal to be wholly frivolous, the
lawyer may seek permission to withdraw after conscientious examination of
the record. However, the attorney must submit a brief referring to anything
in the record that the lawyer believes might reasonably support the appeal.1
2
Since 1971, Florida has applied the Anders procedure to criminal appeals in
this state.'7 3 In N.S.H. v. Florida Department of Children & Family Ser-
vices,' 4 the Supreme Court of Florida held that Anders did not apply to ter-
mination of parental rights cases.'75 It did so, despite the fact that it had ear-
lier expanded the Anders procedures to appeals of involuntary civil commit-
ment to mental health facilities, where a person's physical liberty was at is-
sue.'7 6 The court in N.S.H. held that the Anders procedures were not neces-
sary in a termination of parental rights case because the risks at stake were
not the same. 77 The court held that there was no loss of liberty in the termi-
nation of parental rights setting.'78 The court also noted that the interests at
stake were not just of the parents but also those of the child. 7 9 The court
believed that because termination cases, apparently unlike criminal cases,
involved extensive fact-patterns, the burden placed on the appellate court in
reviewing extensive records would be a substantial burden. Finally, the court
applied the three-part test of Matthews v. Eldridge8" to conclude that there
was no due process violation in the failure to require the Anders process to
be employed in termination of parental rights proceeding. 18 ' The court did,
however, set up a procedure for withdrawal by appellate counsel. It relied
171. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
172. Id. at 744.
173. State v. Wooden, 246 So. 2d 755, 757-58 (Fla. 1971), abrogated on other grounds by
State v. First Dist. Ct. of App., 569 So. 2d 439, 442 (Fla. 1990).
174. 843 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2003).
175. Id. at 900.
176. Pullen v. State, 802 So. 2d 1113, 1120 (Fla. 2001).
177. N.S.H., 843 So. 2d at 902.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
181. N.S.H., 843 So. 2d at 903.
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upon the Fourth District Court of Appeal's opinion in Ostrum v. Department
of Health & Rehabilitative Services,82 which held that the attorney should
file a motion seeking leave to withdraw, along with a certification. 3
[W]here appellate counsel seeks leave to withdraw from representation of
an indigent parent in a termination of parental rights case, the motion to
withdraw shall be served on the client and contain a certification that after
a conscientious review of the record the attorney has determined in good
faith that there are no meritorious grounds on which to base an appeal.
The parent shall then be provided the opportunity to file a brief on his or
her own behalf. 1
84
IV. PROSPECTIVE ABUSE AND NEGLECT
Prospective abuse and/or neglect occurs in both dependency proceed-
ings and termination of parental rights ("TPR") cases.'85 This is an important
topic that has been the subject of a number of appellate cases in both settings
this year, and for this reason it is addressed separately in this survey. "The
issue in prospective neglect or abuse cases is whether future behavior, which
will adversely affect the child, can be clearly and certainly predicted." '186 The
genesis for predicting a parent's future behavior can be the prior abuse or
neglect of a sibling.'87 It can also be a finding of "substantial risk of immi-
nent abuse ... or neglect,"' 88 usually stemming from a showing in the record
that the parent's behavior "was beyond the parent's control, likely to con-
tinue, and placed the child at risk,"' 89 but where there was no prior finding of
abuse or neglect of another child. The most often cited behavioral conditions
in the latter setting include mental illness, drug addiction, or pedophilia 90
182. 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
183. Id. at 1361.
184. N.S.H., 843 So. 2d at 904.
185. Denson v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 661 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
186. Palmer v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 547 So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1989).
187. M.N. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 826 So. 2d 445, 447 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
188. Id.
189. Gaines v. Dep't of Children & Families, 711 So. 2d 190, 193 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
190. Id. Addressing conflict between circuits regarding whether a dependency ruling could
be based entirely upon the commission of a single sex act on a different child, the Supreme
Court of Florida held in In re MF. that courts should focus on a totality of circumstances in
each case and not rely upon only "one particular fact." 770 So. 2d 1189, 1193 (Fla. 2000). In
MF., the father who had committed the sex act on his child had been incarcerated for the
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The Supreme Court of Florida initially addressed prospective abuse or
neglect in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services'91 in
1991. The court held that permanent termination of rights in one child be-
cause of abuse or neglect could be sufficient grounds to terminate parental
rights to a different child.' 92 However, because fundamental liberty interests
are at stake in a TPR case, the Supreme Court of Florida held that "the state
must show by clear and convincing evidence that reunification with the par-
ent poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child."' 93 Further, the
state must show that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting
the child from harm by the parent.1
94
There is continuing appellate conflict over the appropriate application
of the prospective abuse and neglect doctrine, particularly in termination
cases. In A.B. v. Department of Children & Families, the mother appealed
an order terminating her parental rights claiming that termination, under sec-
tion 39.806(1)(i) of the Florida Statutes, was unconstitutional because the
statute allowed termination "without regard for extraneous circumstances,
depriv[ing] parents of the fundamental liberty interests they have in deter-
mining the care and upbringing of their children."' 95 The court stated that
"implicit in the recognition of neglect or abuse of other children as a ground
for termination of parental rights to a different child is the absence of any
factor that would evince a break in the chain of demonstrated parental fail-
ure."'196 In effect, this created a rebuttable presumption of prospective ne-
glect or abuse whenever there had been a prior termination under conditions
of abuse or neglect, shifting the burden to the parent to prove that past con-
duct, condition, or circumstances could not serve as a "predictor" of future
behavior. 97 This appears to be at odds with Padgett's mandate that the State
crime. Id. at 1194. DCF sought a dependency determination based upon this act rather than
upon the totality of the circumstances, which included the fact that the father would be incar-
cerated for a "substantial portion of the children's years of minority." Id The Supreme Court
of Florida approved the lower court's result, but disapproved the remainder of the lower
court's opinion for failure to apply the totality of the t ircumstances test. Id. at 1194-95.
191. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
192. Id.at 571.
193. Id.; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
194. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571. The evidentiary standard required in a dependency pro-
ceeding is a preponderance of the evidence. M.N. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 826 So. 2d
445, 447 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
195. 816 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002). In A.B., the mother appealed a
termination based upon a prior termination of her rights in a different child at the age of one
month because of the child's medical problems. Id. at 684.
196. Id. at 686.
197. Id.
[Vol. 28:3:543
96
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/1
2003 SUR VEY OF JUVENILE LAW
clearly and convincingly show imminent harm to the child,'98 and is in direct
conflict with the Fourth District's subsequent decision in F.L. v. Department
of Children & Families.'99
Several months later, in his concurrence and dissent to C. W v. Depart-
ment of Children & Families,20° a First District case, Judge Ervin expressed
doubt over whether the Legislature can "trump" a parent's liberty interest in
raising children by allowing a termination proceeding based solely upon that
parent's past egregious conduct to another child without requiring some
"proof of a causal connection between the prior conduct and the parent's
current conduct with the child sought to be committed. 2 0' Then, in Depart-
ment of Children & Families v. B.B.,2 °2 a Fifth District case involving termi-
nation of parental rights to seven children based upon the sexual abuse of an
eighth child, the court addressed the "current uncertainty in the law," ac-
knowledging potential constitutional issues and a need for the least restric-
tive means of protecting a child.2 °3 This uncertainty became manifest in F.L.
v. Department of Children & Families.204 The Fourth District reversed a
termination that had been based solely upon involuntary termination of rights
to a prior child.25 The court held that termination under section 39.806(1)(i)
"unconstitutionally shifted the burden to the parent to prove that reunifica-
tion would not be harmful to the child,, 20 6 stating that the "DCF carries the
198. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571.
199. 849 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
200. 814 So. 2d 488, 493 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
201. Id. at 496. In C. W., the mother's rights to her child were terminated because she had
lost her rights to three of the child's siblings involuntarily and had surrendered her rights to a
fourth child. Id. at 491. The court found that she had not remedied the situations leading to
these prior terminations and affirmed the termination of her rights to the fifth child. Id.
202. 824 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002). In B.B., the father, a polygamist,
"married" his natural daughter, consummating the marriage when she was twelve years old.
Id. at 1002.
203. Id. at 1007-08. The court stated that there may be constitutional implications in a
termination proceeding because a parent has a "constitutionally protected liberty interest in the
care, custody, and management of his or her child." Id. at 1008.
204. 849 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The mother appealed a termination
of her rights in her seventh child that had been based upon her voluntary surrender of her first
four children, and DCF's attempted termination of her rights in her fifth and sixth children
because of medical neglect. Id. at 1116. After mediation, the mother surrendered her rights to
the fifth child and her rights to the sixth were terminated because she had failed to comply
with the DCF case plans. Id. at 1116-17. However, the record for termination proceedings for
the seventh child showed extensive evidence that the mother was taking appropriate care of
this child, voluntarily attending parenting classes, living on her own, and holding down a job.
Id. at 1118-19.
205. Id. at 1124.
206. F.L.,849So.2dat 1116.
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burden not only to establish a ground for termination but the continuing sub-
stantial risk of harm to the current child."2 °7 There is far more accord among
the district courts of appeal in dependency proceedings involving prospective
abuse or neglect. In O.S. v. Department of Children & Families,°8 the DCF
initiated a dependency action for two children based upon a mother's exces-
sive corporal punishment of one of the children.2 9 Relying upon J. C. v. De-
partment of Children & Families,21° the mother claimed that corporal pun-
ishment in and of itself was not sufficient to order dependency.21  However,
the court held that the evidence supported a charge of abuse, based upon
substantial bruising that was present six weeks after the incident and evi-
dence of mental injury to the child.2 12 Furthermore, the court held that de-
pendency could be found as to the second child who had not been beaten,
when the evidence "support[ed] a nexus between the act of abuse and any
prospective abuse to another sibling. 213
The concept of nexus is a key issue in a line of dependency cases deal-
ing both with step-children and natural children. In MN. v. Department of
Children & Families,214 the Fifth District held that evidence that a father had
abused a step-child was not sufficient to find that his natural child was de-
pendent, stating that additional proof in the form of independent evidence
was required to prove a nexus between the past abuse and the prospective
abuse.2 5 The court went on to say that this nexus was most often established
through the presence of an ongoing mental or emotional condition of the
parent.2  The father had been shown to have below average intellectual abil-
ity. However, this did not constitute a mental condition that would make the
allegations of future abuse likely.217 Likewise, in In re C.Af' 8 a father's bio-
logical children were adjudicated dependent based solely upon evidence that
the father had abused his step-children.2'9 However, the Second District
Court of Appeal found that the evidence relied upon by the DCF was insuffi-
207. Id. at 1122.
208. 821 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
209. Id. at 1146.
210. 773 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
211. O.S., 821 So. 2d at 1146. For further discussion of corporal punishment, see infra
Part II.A.
212. Id. at 1148.
213. Id.
214. 826 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
215. Id. at 447-48.
216. Id. at 448.
217. Id. at 449.
218. 844 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
219. Id.
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cient to establish a nexus between the abuse of the step-children and prospec-
tive abuse of his biological children, and the DCF provided no evidence of
an ongoing condition that would make abuse of his natural children highly
probable.2 °
The Fourth District continued this line of reasoning in J.B.P.F. v. De-
partment of Children & Families.22' Here, the court held that the evidence
was insufficient to establish a nexus between one instance of a mother's
abuse of her son and the risk of prospective abuse of her other child. 2  Al-
though both were the mother's natural children, the court looked at evidence
showing that the son suffered "severe psychological and behavioral prob-
lems," making him extremely difficult to discipline.223 The other child was
well adjusted, and the dynamic between this child and the mother was quite
different from the dynamic between the son and the mother.224 However, the
court also noted that there was evidence of domestic violence between the
mother and her live-in boyfriend that had perhaps occurred in the presence of
this second child.225 Section 39.01(30)(i) of the Florida Statutes allows do-
mestic violence in the presence of children to serve as the basis for harm to
the child.26 Unwilling to reverse the dependency adjudication outright based
upon this evidence of domestic violence, the court remanded the case for a
factual determination of whether the child ought to be adjudicated dependent
based upon the domestic violence.227
Another dependency case addressed the question of whether a father's
six-year-old DUI conviction could serve as the basis for a charge of prospec-
tive neglect to render a child dependent.228 In P.S. v. Department of Children
& Families, discussed in the "Dependency" section above, the Second Dis-
trict held that the DUI arrest was too remote in time, having occurred even
before the child was born, to predict clearly and convincingly any substantial
220. Id. at 766.
221. 837 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
222. Id. The son had been adjudicated dependent based upon an incident of "excessive"
discipline where the mother and her live-in boyfriend physically restrained the child with
handcuffs and poured an entire bottle of hot sauce into his mouth. Id. at 1109. The court noted
that the mother had sought help with the son, acknowledging her difficulty in raising him by
initiating contact with DCF to get assistance in parenting him appropriately. Id. at 1110.
223. Id. at 1108.
224. J.B.P.F., 837 So. 2d at 1110.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1I11.
228. P.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 825 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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risk to the child.229 In fact, the court noted that evidence of the arrest was not
relevant to any material fact at issue.23 °
In D. Children v. Department of Children & Families,23 ' also discussed
in the "Dependency" section above, the court upheld the dependency of the
three children as to both the mother and the father, based upon the apparent
abuse or neglect of one child.232 The court looked at the totality of the cir-
cumstances, as per ME..,233 noting that the court had broad discretion when
dealing with child welfare, that there was sufficient evidence to affirm de-
pendency as to the mother, the perpetrator of the abuse had not been estab-
lished, and the family was intact with both parents being the only adults who
had access to the abused infant prior to injury.3
Although the districts have been consistent in the treatment of prospec-
tive neglect and abuse in a dependency setting, it is clear that the application
of the doctrine in the context of termination of parental rights is an issue rife
with uncertainty among Florida's appellate courts. This issue will continue
to stir up conflict until the matter is ultimately resolved by the Supreme
Court of Florida.
V. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
It is a basic principle that the prosecutor in criminal and juvenile delin-
quency cases has the authority relating to the allocation of prosecutorial re-
sources and may use discretion in deciding which cases to file charges.2 35 In
State v. D. W.,236 the State filed a petition for delinquency against a child for
threatening a teacher.237 After reading the arrest report the trial judge, sua
sponte, dismissed the petition with prejudice.238 The State appealed and the
appellate court reversed.239 It held that in a juvenile delinquency proceeding
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 820 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
232. Id.
233. In re M.F., 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2000).
234. D. Children, 820 So. 2d at 982. Police never identified who caused the injury. Id. at
981. In a somewhat bizarre twist, the mother told medical personnel that she thought the
injury had been caused by the family Dachshund. Id. None of the experts who testified found
this claim credible. Id.
235. See generally State v. Earl, 545 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
236. 821 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
[Vol. 28:3:543
100
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/1
2003 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW
the court did not have the power to dismiss without giving the State an op-
portunity to present evidence. 4 ° While the court did review the arrest report,
such review did not constitute proper substitute for the State's presentation of
evidence.24'
Sometimes juveniles claim they are adults when arrested in order to
bond out of jail rather than be held in secure detention for twenty-one days,
as required by Florida law. In T. W. v. Jenne242 a child who was fifteen, but
represented that he was eighteen, brought a writ of habeas corpus for release
from the Broward County Jail.243 The juvenile had been released on bond,
but when he missed his court appearance he was held in the adult jail without
bond.244 The writ sought a determination that he was a juvenile and that he
should be treated as such.245 In an earlier case, Williams v. State,246 the juve-
nile who had lied about his age to obtain a favorable probation sentence was
sentenced to 364 days in jail for violation of probation.247 The child, who it
turns out, was sixteen, moved to vacate the adult conviction and sentence.248
The appellate court in Williams held that the child had waived his right to be
treated as a juvenile by lying about his age and failing to disclose his age at a
plea conference to secure a favorable bond and probation sentence. 249 The
court in T.W. distinguished Williams on the grounds that the correction
sought in T. W. occurred early in the case rather than after receiving a more
beneficial and lenient sentence as in Williams.250 The court concluded in
T.W that the child did not "unalterably waive" his right to be treated as a
juvenile.25'
School students often make threats, sometimes of violent activities, and
such behavior has been the subject of substantial discussion in the media. 2
Such threats often result in charges of juvenile delinquency. Section 790.163
of the Florida Statutes provides that "it is unlawful for any person to make a
false report, with intent to deceive, mislead, or otherwise misinform any per-
240. Id.
241. D.W., 821 So. 2dat 1180.
242. 826 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 536-37.
246. 754 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
247. Id. at 68.
248. Id.
249. Id. (citing Smith v. State, 345 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
250. TW., 826 So. 2d at 537.
251. Id.
252. An Epidemic of Violence Incidents in Schools Rise Sharply Since Santee Shooting,
CNN.coM, Mar. 8, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/03/08/alarming.incidents/ (last
visited Mar. 27, 2004).
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son, concerning the placing or planting of any bomb, dynamite, or other
deadly explosive." In D.B. v. State,253 a juvenile public school student made
"threats to school officials that he would 'blow up' or 'burn down' his school
at some time in the future. ' 54 He was adjudicated delinquent upon those
threats.255 The appellate court held that threats of future activity were not a
violation of the statute.256 The court found that the threats could not fairly
be characterized as a "false report" under the statute.2 157 The First District
Court of Appeal relied upon an earlier decision by Maryland's highest court,
in Moosavi v. State,258 in which that court recognized that the crux of its stat-
ute was a finding that the telephone, mail, or other transmission was of false
information.259 Thus, the Florida court in D.B. reversed the adjudication for
the same reason-no showing of a false statement.26°
In a second case involving the issue of unlawfully making a false report
of a bomb, 26' a juvenile appealed from a disposition that committed him to
the Department of Juvenile Justice ("DJJ") for high-risk residential place-
ment and then probation in C.C.B. v. State.262 After the adjudication, the DJJ
recommended in its report that the court place the child on probation and
withhold adjudication of the delinquency. 263 Departing from the DJJ recom-
mendation, the trial court found that in 2001 there had been an epidemic of
bomb threats made by young people and that it was necessary to send a mes-
sage to other young people in the community, despite the fact that the child
had no prior record. 6 In C. C.B., the appellate court reversed.265 Ruling as
it had in an earlier case in In re A.C.N.,266 the First District Court of Appeals
held that a court's desire to send a message to the community's youth is not a
valid reason for disregarding the recommendation of the DJJ. 267 Further, the
court was required to explain why the commitment was necessary for a child
who had no prior criminal record and why it was important for the safety of
253. 825 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1044.
256. Id. at 1043.
257. Id. at 1043-44.
258. 736 A.2d 285 (Md. 1999).
259. Id. at 291.
260. D.B., 825 So. 2d at 1044.
261. See § 790.163.
262. 828 So. 2d 429, 430 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 433.
266. 727 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
267. Id.
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the community.268 Because the departure was not supported by competent
substantial evidence, the appeals court in CCB. reversed.269
Minors may be adjudicated delinquent on the basis of searches con-
ducted in school. In 1985, the Supreme Court decided New Jersey v.
T.L. 0., 270 where the Court established that school officials must have a rea-
sonable ground to suspect that the search would result in evidence that the
student has violated either the law or school rules.27' A.N.H. v. State,272 was a
case where a school teacher advised a school counselor that the teacher was
concerned about a student.273 The teacher, believing that the child "was not
'acting himself,' had bloodshot eyes, and that 'something wasn't right,"'
requested that the student empty his front pockets, where he discovered mari-
juana.274 Relying upon T.L.O., the appellate court held that the student's be-
havior could have resulted from a variety of non-criminal circumstances and,
as such, did not rise to reasonable grounds to suspect the child was involved
in criminal activity.275 The appellate court reversed.276
The battle over constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances contin-
ues in Florida. In 2001, the Supreme Court of Florida, in TM v. State,
277
and MR. v. State,278 involving juvenile curfew ordinances in the city of Pi-
nellas Park and Tampa, ruled that the Second District Court of Appeal had
applied a heightened scrutiny test rather than the strict scrutiny test, and thus
remanded. 79 On remand, the court in J.P. v. State,280 and MR. v. State,
28
'
held that the ordinance in Tampa was unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny
standard and the Supreme Court of Florida noted jurisdiction in both cases.282
The State often seeks to hold delinquents in pretrial detention past the
twenty-one days as provided by Florida law283 when the state intends to file
other charges against the child.284 For the second time, a Florida appeals
268. Id.
269. C.CB., 828 So. 2d at 433.
270. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
271. Id. at 341.
272. 832 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
273. Id. at 171.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 172.
276. Id.
277. 784 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2001).
278. 788 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 2001).
279. T.M, 784 So. 2d at 443-44 ; MR., 788 So. 2d at 958.
280. 832 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
281. 832 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
282. JP., 832 So. 2d at 113-14; MR., 832 So. 2d at 122.
283. See § 985.215(5)(c).
284. Id.
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court has held that extending detention for an additional period of time based
upon the state's articulation of intent to file charges in adult court without a
showing of good cause is impermissible.2"5 The court thus ruled that the trial
court lacked grounds to continue the detention despite the fact that it dis-
missed the child's petition for writ of certiorari as moot while deciding theissue .28 Good cause would involve such circumstances as where witnesses
were unavailable or an investigation was incomplete.287
For over a decade, this author has reported on the failure of Florida trial
courts to comply with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in In re
Gaul 8 8 by not properly advising juveniles of their right to counsel. 28 9 In
A.L. v. State,290 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a dispositional
order for failure of the trial court "to renew the offer of counsel to the juve-
nile after [the juvenile] had waived counsel at an earlier proceeding" because
the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure compelled the court "to offer coun-
sel at each subsequent stage of the proceedings.,
29
'
B. Dispositional Issues
For a number of years now, the Florida state courts, based on separation
of powers, have refused to intervene and force the state DCF and the state
DJJ to provide appropriate services for children in the care of those two
agencies. In Department of Children & Family Services v. MH.,292 the ap-
pellate court was faced with a petition by the DCF to avoid the obligation to
place four juveniles facing delinquency charges but found to be incompetent,
into appropriate facilities for their treatment.293 Instead, the children were
housed in the local detention center.2 94 Once again commenting on "the cir-
cuit court's impatience with the state of affairs which allows incompetent
children to be warehoused in detention facilities due to insufficient bed space
to begin treatment designed to restore their competency;" the court also
commented on the dilemma faced by the DCF to provide treatment when
sufficient funds have not been allocated. 295 Based on separation of powers
285. T.T. v. Esteves, 828 So. 2d 449,451 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
286. Id.
287. Id.; see E.W. v. Brown, 559 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
288. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
289. See Dale, supra note 9, at 904.
290. 841 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
291. Id.; see also M.Q. v. State, 818 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
292. 830 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
293. Id. at 850.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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grounds in case law, the appellate court held that the trial court was without
authority to compel the DCF to place the children in programs for which
space is simply not available, citing the variety and number of prior court
cases.296 The problem, of course, has been compounded by the failure of the
federal courts to recognize the problems in the foster care system and the
inability of the state courts to resolve them. In 31 Children v. Bush,2 97 the
Eleventh Circuit recently held that such matters should be resolved in de-
pendency court.29 The catch-22 situation that results is blatant.299
In the adult criminal justice system, defendants receive credit for time
served, which may even include time spent in the mental institution due to
involuntary commitment.3°° However, the juvenile justice system is designed
to rehabilitate youngsters; and therefore, juveniles may be placed in com-
mitment status for indeterminate periods of time.3' But in C.C. v. State,3 °2
the appellate court held that the juvenile was entitled to credit for time spent
in secure detention because the adjudication was a misdemeanor for which
the maximum period of commitment was statutorily limited to one year.
30 3
The juvenile was committed within one year of reaching the age of nine-
teen.3" In this determinate setting, the court held that the credit for time
served was appropriate.3 5
One of the dispositional alternatives available to the court under Florida
306thlaw is restitution. Under the Florida restitution statute found in Chapter
985, the court may, under certain circumstances, in addition to the sanctions
imposed upon the child, order the parent to pay restitution in money or in
296. Id.
297. 329 F.3d 1255 (11 th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub. nom. Reggie v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 483
(2003).
298. Id. at 1279.
299. See 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Dep't of
Children & Family Servs. v. 1.C., 742 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Dep't of
Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Bills, 661 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Singletary v.
Acosta, 659 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Quiala v. State, 659 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Pelz, 609 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Stoutamire, 602 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. V.L., 583 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Nourse, 437 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983).
300. See Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738, 740 (Fla. 1987).
301. C.C. v. State, 841 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
302. Id. at 657.
303. Id. at 658-59.
304. Id. at 658.
305. Id. 658-59.
306. § 985.231(1)(a)(9).
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kind, for damage which has resulted from the child's offense.3 °7 In Fisher v.
State,"8 the child pleaded no contest and was adjudicated a delinquent and
placed in a Level Four program, resulting from a burglary and arson in which
the child and two others broke into a vacant home and set it on fire, burning
it to the ground. 39 The court order included restitution payable by the par-
ents.310 It was the first notice or statement by the judge or the State that the
mother was to be held personally liable for restitution.31' She failed to make
payment and she was held in contempt.3 2 After entering the order requiring
restitution, the court actually held a restitution hearing in which it heard tes-
timony about its value.3 3 The court entered an order requiring the mother to
pay restitution in the amount of $25,861 and to pay $250 a month.314 The
mother told the judge that her income was $21 per hour and that she could
not afford to pay restitution.315 The statute requires the court to find that the
parent failed to make diligent and good faith efforts to prevent the child from
engaging in the delinquent acts prior to making an order that the parent per-
form community service.316 However, the statute does not explicitly require
a similar finding when the question is one of restitution.31 7 The court re-
manded the case for a hearing because it found that there was no finding
made that the mother failed to make any diligent and good faith effort, that
there was no evidence of her parenting efforts, and because statutes in dero-
gation of the common law ought to be narrowly construed.318 The court also
reversed on due process grounds because the mother had never received no-
tice.319 She was not a party to the daughter's juvenile delinquency proceed-
ing although she appeared in her role as parent and possible witness."' She
might be subjected to an order of restitution as the court's ruling was "with-
out prejudice to the right of the state to seek to reimpose restitution sanc-
tions.., should that be appropriate under the new juvenile rules. '321 The
307. Id.
308. 840 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
309. Id. at 327.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Fisher, 840 So. 2d at 327.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See § 985.23 l(l)(a)(9); Fisher, 840 So. 2d at 329; B.M. v. State, 744 So. 2d 505, 510
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
317. See § 985.231(1)(a)(9).
318. Fisher v. State, 840 So. 2d 325, 329-31 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
319. Id. at 330.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 331.
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problem of notice has been cured since the events that occurred in Fisher,
due to changes to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure requiring the State
to file and serve the petition on the parent or guardian in cases where restitu-
tion or other sanctions are sought against them.322
C. Appellate Issues
In Brazill v. State, a case of wide public interest, in the spring of 2003
the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled on the appeal of Nathaniel Bra-
zill. 323 Brazill was convicted as an adult for second degree murder and ag-
gravated assault with a firearm of shooting and killing a teacher at his middle
school during the 1999-2000 school year. 24 In addition to a claim about
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, Brazill challenged the statute
under which he was charged.325 Specifically, he claimed that the statute,
which allowed him to be charged with a violation of state law punishable by
death or life imprisonment as an adult, thereby denying the rehabilitative
system of the juvenile court, was unconstitutional in violation of due process,
equal protection, and separation of powers.326 The appellate court found that
there was no absolute right at common law or in the constitution to be treated
in the juvenile system, and that nothing contained in Kent v. United States, 327
the Supreme Court opinion on procedural due process in transfer cases, pro-
vided a right to be tried in the juvenile system.2 8 Further, the court held that
no constitutional violation resulted from the prosecutor's use of broad discre-
tion to charge as an adult.329
VI. STATUTORY CHANGES
The Florida Legislature in its 2003 Spring regular session made only
minor changes to laws relating to children in the child welfare and juvenile
justice systems. The Legislature expanded descriptions of persons who hav-
ing mandatory reporting responsibilities with regard to child abuse, aban-
donment or neglect by redrafting section 39.201 of the Florida Statutes. The
322. Id. at 329 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.040, 8.030, 8.031).
323. 845 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see Steven A. Drizin & Allison
McGowen Keegan, Abolishing the Use of the Felony-Murder Rule When the Defendant is a
Teenager, 28 NOVA L. REV. 507 (2004).
324. Id. at 286.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. 383 U.S. 541 (1996).
328. Brazill, 845 So. 2d at 288 (citing Kent, 383 U.S. at 552-54).
329. Id. at 289.
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Legislature noted that certain persons, under certain circumstances, are not
obligated to make reports to the hotline. 3 ° For example, a professional
working with the DCF need not render a second report where the treatment is
the result of a prior report."' Similarly, court officials are not obligated to
report when there is an ongoing investigation by the DCF or where there is a
dependency case where the matter has previously been reported to the
DCF.332 On the other hand, the Legislature reasserted the notion that com-
munity-based care providers have obligations to report suspected or actual
child abuse, abandonment or neglect.333
The Legislature also slightly expanded the limitations on confidentiality
of reports and records in cases of child abuse or neglect to allow access to
services for victims of domestic violence to attorneys representing a child in
civil and criminal proceedings,34 and to principals of public, private, and
charter schools.335 Chapter 39 was also amended to allow for release of fur-
ther information on children in the foster care system who are found to be
missing.336
Finally, the Legislature passed section 39.8296 of the Florida Statutes,
which created the Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office to oversee the Guard-
ian Ad Litem program.337 Previously, the Guardian Ad Litem program was
"supervised by court administration within the circuit courts;" however, the
Legislature found that "there [was] a perceived conflict of interest created by
the supervision of program staff by the judges before whom they appear. 338
Therefore, the Legislature passed section 39.8296 of the Florida Statutes
with the intent to "place the Guardian Ad Litem Program in an appropriate
place and provide a statewide infrastructure to increase functioning and stan-
dardization among the local programs currently operating in the 20 judicial
circuits. ' ' 339 That location is the Justice Administrative Commission.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida has ruled in an important case involving
appellate practice in termination cases, holding that the Anders standard does
330. § 39.201(1)(b).
331. § 39.201(1)(c)-(d).
332. Id.
333. § 39.201(1)(e).
334. § 39.202(2)(5)(d).
335. See § 39.202(2)(p).
336. § 39.202(4).
337. § 39.8296(2).
338. § 39.8296(1)(b).
339. § 39.8296(1)(d).
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not apply to lawyers who seek to withdraw where there is no colorable ap-
peal for a client in a termination of parental rights case. 34' The application of
the Padgett doctrine continues to be an issue discussed by the appellate
courts in dependency and termination cases. 4 In delinquency matters, the
appellate courts continue its longstanding effort to hold the trial courts ac-
countable for compliance with the variety of procedural obligations under
Florida law.342 The Legislature moved the state office of guardian ad litem
from the Supreme Court to a freestanding agency.
343
340. N.S.H. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 843 So. 2d 898, 904 (Fla. 2003).
341. See, e.g., P.S. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 825 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2002); O.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 821 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2002); M.N. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 826 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
342. See, e.g., A.L. v. State, 841 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
343. § 39.8296.
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Arrival time is 8.15 a.m.' Attorneys conjure up thoughts of issues, such
as what time the judge will take the bench, how full is the morning docket
and whether it has been updated, how many arraignments have been sched-
uled,' children on pickup order status,3 termination of a plea and pass,4 af-
* The author is a J.D. Candidate for May 2004 at Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center. He is originally from Boca Raton, Florida. The author extends a
special thank you to Professor Phyllis Coleman for her invaluable dedication and helpful
suggestions to this article. He also extends a thank you to Maria Vernace, Editor-in-Chief of
Nova Law Review, for her contribution to the publication of this article.
1. This is an account of my personal experience as a Certified Legal Intern with the
Broward County Public Defender's Office, Juvenile Division. I was an Intern during the Fall
semester of my third year of law school, interning for a period of two and a half months.
2. An arraignment is the step in a criminal prosecution where the defendant is brought
before the court for a formal reading of a charges and entering of a plea. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 82 (7th ed. 1999).
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ternoon docket, number of trials, witnesses and whether they have been sub-
poenaed, violation of probation hearings,5 and on and on. The adversarial
playground called juvenile court awaits the arrival of a public defender.
Children and their families line the benches inside the courtroom. Stacks of
delinquency petitions are placed neatly next to the large pile offace sheets.6
The first child of the day, only fourteen years old, had pled no-contest to a
first-degree felony six months earlier. Now he faces third-degree felony and
first-degree misdemeanor charges. After speaking with the 5 '3 ", 150 pound
adolescent about the charges, the lawyer notices his face is blank. Obviously
confused, he turns to his mother. The unfortunate truth is that he barely un-
derstands how he arrived at the courthouse, let alone the charges that he is
facing. His mother, aware of this reality, begins to cry. The lawyer poses
questions, which are answered by the mother and child.
The youth's psychological history is extensive and severe, ranging from
bipolar disorders to anger management issues. Although an attorney's day
is overflowing with time pressures and obligations, under these circum-
stances, at the top of his to-do list should be filing a motion for competency.7
I. INTRODUCTION
It is imperative that a criminal defendant understands the nature of the
proceedings against him and has the ability to assist his defense counsel dur-
ing trial.' Whether tried in juvenile court or as an adult in criminal court, the
3. A.M.W. v. Portesy, 714 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (describing
the term "pick-up order" as one often used in juvenile proceedings to describe the orders to
take the children into custody); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.207(3) (2003) (stating that taking a
child into custody is not equivalent to an arrest, but will precede a finding of whether the
taking was a lawful one).
4. Term describing a state's offer to a child when he or she is a first time offender. This
is most commonly offered for minor misdemeanors and if completed successfully often results
in the state's dismissal of the charges.
5. Probation is a court-imposed criminal sentence that, subject to certain conditions,
calls for the release of the convicted person back into the community instead of prison time.
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 978 (7th ed. 1999).
6. P.H. v. Fryer, 570 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (describing the
juvenile's "face sheet" and probable cause affidavit as evidencing his prior charges in the
juvenile court system).
7. See § 985.223 (providing circumstances for which a competency evaluation may be
raised); see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.095 (stating the procedures involved when competency of a
juvenile is raised).
8. THOMAS GRIsso, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES 83 (David Anson & Debra
Fink eds., 1998) [hereinafter GRISSO 1]; see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960) (holding that the test for competency must be whether the defendant "has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-
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concept remains the same: a child must be competent to stand trial.9 This
article focuses on competency questions and the attorney's obligations when
representing a minor. Beginning with Part II and through Part VII, this arti-
cle focuses on the impact of the Tate decision. Part VIII analyzes the history
of due process rights in juvenile court, including the right to counsel, by sift-
ing through the rationales of two landmark juvenile cases.' ° Part IX empha-
sizes the importance of a juvenile's right to be tried while competent. Part X
tackles the predicament lawyers often encounter when they disregard the
duty to file a motion for competency: ineffective assistance of counsel."
Part XI addresses the judge's role in determining whether a juvenile is com-
petent. Part XII proposes a legislative change requiring a mandatory compe-
tency hearing for a youth under the age of sixteen charged with a serious
crime. Part XIII will conclude that a mandatory competency hearing is cru-
cial, without which, a youth is not sufficiently protected in the criminal jus-
tice system.
II. THE TATE OPINION
The grand jury returned a first-degree and felony murder indictment
against Lionel Tate on August 11, 1999."2 Tate was only twelve years old.'3
Evidence introduced at trial demonstrated that he viciously killed Tiffany
Eunick.'4 In fact, his six-year-old victim sustained in excess of thirty-five
injuries, including a skull fracture, contusions to the brain, more than twenty
bruises, a fractured rib, kidney and pancreas wounds, and a detached liver."'
Tate was convicted of premeditated murder. 6 Despite Tate exhibiting odd
behavior during trial, which should have raised serious questions about his
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.").
9. GRISSO 1, supra note 8.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16; see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165 (stat-
ing that court has a duty to advise a child of his or her right to counsel and unless that right is
waived by the child, that counsel shall be appointed at each and ever stage of the proceed-
ings).
11. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984). Tate does not discuss this issue
because it was not raised on appeal. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 47-54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (discussing the points on appeal, none of which raised the issue of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel).
12. Jodie Needle, Boy Charged With Murder in Death of Playmate, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Aug. 12, 1999, at B2.
13. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
14. Id.
15. Id. Experts on both sides agreed these injuries were not the result of an accident. Id.
16. Id.
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competency, a motion for a competency evaluation or a hearing was not filed
until the post-trial hearing. 17
III. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Tate's post-trial and appellate attorney, Richard Rosenbaum, called for
that post-trial hearing to demonstrate Tate lacked the competency to stand
trial prior, during, and subsequent to trial. 8 The testimony of Tate's trial
counsel, Jim Lewis,19 was sought by Rosenbaum, but would only be allowed
if Tate waived the attorney-client privilege. ° At the hearing, Rosenbaum
argued Tate did not appreciate the consequences of refusing to waive the
attorney-client privilege.2' Indeed, the record indicated Tate merely followed
his mother's orders not to waive.2 Nevertheless, despite the fact that both
attorneys, Rosenbaum and Lewis, took the position that it was in his "best
interests to waive the privilege," after conferring with his mother, Tate re-
fused2 3 Consequently, the trial judge refused to allow Lewis to testify and
held that raising the competency issue after Tate had been convicted was
untimely.24 Therefore, the court denied the post-trial motion for a compe-
tency evaluation and a hearing.25
IV. THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
As a result of that denial, the main issue on appeal was whether a com-
petency evaluation was constitutionally mandated.26 More specifically, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal questioned whether Tate had had "sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and whether he had a rational, as well as factual, understand-
17. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47. His appellate counsel argued Tate was not competent during
any stage of the proceedings. Id. The primary thrust of that competency motion was that Tate
did not understand the consequences of going to trial and could not assist counsel before,
during or after trial. Id.
18. Id.
19. Needle, supra note 12.
20. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003). Lewis wanted to tes-
tify for him so that the court would be aware of what led to his belief that Tate was not com-
petent during trial. See Paula McMahon, Attorneys Renew Bid for Evaluation of Tate, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Mar. 7, 2001, at B3.
21. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 48-49.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
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ing of the proceedings against him. 27 Tate's lack of understanding was evi-
dent though his behavior.28 Although Lewis was prohibited from testifying
about Tate's behavior during the trial, his troubling demeanor and attitude
during the post-trial hearing supported a need for a competency hearing.29
For example, Rosenbaum argued that Tate was drawing pictures, not listen-
ing, apparently oblivious to the proceedings, and simply not helping with his
defense.30 In addition, Tate lacked any real comprehension of his situation.31
Rosenbaum pointed to such indications as that his eyes constantly wandered,
illustrating a lack of comprehension of his situation.32  Nevertheless, the
judge completely disregarded Rosenbaum's arguments, concluding a "lack of
interest in the proceedings did not equate withincompetency.
' 33
V. THE EXPERT TESTIMONY AT TRIAL
However, due to the extensive and significant defense expert testimony
at trial concerning Tate's inability to understand his situation, the compe-
tency issue should have been addressed in the lower court.34 It went uncon-
troverted that Tate possessed an IQ of approximately ninety.35 Furthermore,
Wiley Mittenberg, 36 a neuropsychologist, testified Tate's mental age was
equivalent to that of a nine or ten-year-old. 37 Joel Klass, a child psycholo-
gist, explained that Tate had the social maturity of a six-year-old.38 Lastly,
27. Id.; see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
28. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
34. Id.
35. Id; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 39, 45 (4th ed. 1994) (explaining the essential feature of mental retarda-
tion as subaverage intellectual functioning coupled with limited adaptive abilities). Intellec-
tual abilities are considered together with adaptive abilities, i.e., communication, self-care,
self-direction, health and safety. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra, at 39. Taking
into account a measurement error of about five points, a person with an IQ of 70 may be con-
sidered mildly retarded. Id. at 39-40. Furthermore, even one with an IQ of 75 can be consid-
ered mildly retarded when he lacks certain adaptive functions. Id. An IQ of 71-84 describes
a person with borderline intellectual functioning. Id. at 45.
36. Attorneys Argue Prison Fate of Convicted Teen Murderer, CNN.COM, Mar. 2, 2001,
http://edition.cnn.com/200I/LAW/03/02/wrestling.death.02/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
37. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
38. Id.
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even the State's expert witness, Sherri Bourg-Carter, testified Tate was im-
mature.39
VI. THE STATE'S POSITION REGARDING TATE'S COMPETENCY
Notwithstanding Bourg-Carter's earlier testimony at trial, at the post-
trial hearing, she opined that Tate was legally competent. ° Moreover, she
testified that a pre-trial "evaluation" was performed, and Tate's trial counsel
was aware of it.4' Furthermore, a pre-trial agreement between Bourg-Carter
and John Spencer, a defense expert psychologist, called for certain "exami-
nations" to be performed to prevent Tate from being subjected to repeated
testing. 42 Bourg-Carter acknowledged that competency was a logical issue
that a forensic psychologist would "need to consider. 4 3 However, neither a
formal competency hearing nor an evaluation was ever performed. 44 As a
result, Tate's ability to proceed to trial was never examined in a formal com-
petency hearing.45
VII. THE ULTIMATE DECISION BY THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction.46  The
court held that the denial of the defense's post-trial demand for a competency
evaluation, combined with the trial court's failure to order, sua sponte,47 a
pre-trial competency evaluation, violated due process.4 ' The decision fo-
cused on 1) Tate's age and immaturity, 2) facts that evolved pre- and post-
39. Id.
40. Id. at 49.
41. Id.
42. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 49. The State also pointed the court's attention to the plea hear-
ing. Id. Tate's trial lawyer, during this plea hearing, consulted with Tate and his mother. Id.
The record revealed that Tate was not willing to accept the plea offer and desired to move
forward to trial. Id. The judge conferred with Tate who informed the court that he had had
plenty of time to speak with his mother and wanted to proceed. Id. Furthermore, he asserted
he had not been coerced and had no questions about his choice. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 49. With-
out a formal competency hearing or even an evaluation, the judge found that "Mr. Tate has
sufficient ability to make a decision in this very important matter." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at48.
45. Id.
46. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
47. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1155 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the term "sua sponte" mean-
ing on the court's own motion or without prompting or suggestion).
48. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 46. See generally Paula McMahon, Court Tosses Verdict Ruling:
Teen's Murder Conviction Reversed Reason: Judge Failed to Order Competency Test, SUN
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Dec. 1, 2003, at Al.
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trial, 3) Tate's lack of experience with the court system, and 4) the complex-
ity of the legal proceedings against him.4 9
VIII. JUVENILES AND DUE PROCESS
A. History of Due Process
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 established the first court for
delinquents under sixteen. It mandated that a child's records must remain
confidential to lessen the stigma of adjudication.5 1 Constitutional protections
were considered unnecessary because children were kept separated from
incarcerated adults and the emphasis was on rehabilitation.5 2 For approxi-
mately the next seventy years, the lack of the right to counsel was justified
through the doctrine of parens patriae, which allowed the State to act in the
best interests of the child rather than to punish him.53 Thus, the proceedings
were not considered adversarial, rendering competency to proceed to trial
and participate in his defense immaterial. 4 By contrast, competency to stand
trial in the adult criminal justice system dates back to 1836, sixty-three years
prior to the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.55 R v. Pritchard involved a deaf and
dumb adult defendant whose attorney questioned his "fitness to stand trial. 56
Pritchard, irrespective of its application to juveniles, is an example of
how the concept of incompetency entered into the criminal justice system
and why it barred conviction.5 7 The court focused on the defendant's compe-
tency and established three elements for determining fitness to stand trial:
49. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 50.
50. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Still Seeking the Promise of Gault: Juveniles and the Right
to Counsel, 18 CRIM. JUST. 23, 23 (2003).
51. Id. This court was established in Cook County, Illinois and was set up to be a more
forgiving setting than the adult criminal court. Id. Juveniles were kept separate from adults
when incarcerated and detention of any juveniles under the age of twelve was not allowed.
Id.; see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 33 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the term "adjudication" as the
process of judicially deciding a case).
52. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part H: Race and the
"Crack Down " on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 338 (1999).
53. Shepherd, supra note 50; Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A
Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L.
REV. 288, 296 (2003) (arguing that the civil nature of the proceedings distinguished the juve-
nile system from that of the adult system).
54. GRISSO I, supra note 8, at 85.
55. THOMAS GRISSO, YOUTH ON TRIAL-A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE 74 (2000) [hereinafter GRISSO II].
56. Id. (citing R. v. Pritchard, 173 Eng. Rep. 135 (K.B. 1836)).
57. Id.
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1) whether the defendant "stood mute of malice;, 58 2) whether the defendant
is capable of pleading to the indictment; and 3) whether the defendant pos-
sesses the sufficient intellect to comprehend the proceedings to form a proper
defense.59
The Pritchard "fitness to stand trial" test can be compared to the "adju-
dicative competency test" articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
1960.60 Dusky v. United States required that a defendant have a "rational"
understanding of the proceedings and have the cognitive ability to consult
with his attorney. 6' Thus, both Pritchard and Dusky focus on the defendant's
present ability to understand his current situation to participate in his de-
fense.62 However, neither case addressed the problem that convicting an
incompetent defendant, or failing to follow proper procedures to assess his
competence when doubt has been raised, violates the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution.63
In Drope v. Missouri, the defendant was indicted for rape.64 His coun-
sel moved for a continuance seeking examination by a psychiatrist who had
recommended an evaluation. 65 The judge denied the motion.66 On the first
day of the trial, the defendant's wife testified that the defendant attempted to
kill her the previous day.67 On the second day, the defendant attempted sui-
cide.68 His lawyer then requested a mistrial because his client became hospi-
talized.69 The court denied the motion concluding the defendant's inability to
attend was voluntary.7" The defendant was convicted after which he filed a
motion to vacate alleging that the rejection by the court of his request for a
psychiatric evaluation violated his right to due process. 7' The Missouri
Court of Appeal held that neither the psychiatrist's recommendation, nor his
58. Id. "A defendant who 'stood mute' of malice was said to being doing so willfully."
Id.
59. GRISSO 1I, supra note 55, at 74-75; see also Pritchard, 173 Eng. Rep. at 135.
60. GRISSO II, supra note 55, at 75; see Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 n.9
(1960).
61. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
62. GRISSO II, supra note 55, at 74-75.
63. Id. at 75; see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975).
64. Drope, 420 U.S. at 162.
65. Id. Although it is not stated in the case, the defendant's trial lawyer must have con-
sulted with a psychiatrist to determine whether his client should be evaluated.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Drope, 420 U.S. at 162.
70. Id. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the denial of the motion for a mistrial
and held that the denial of the motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion. Id.
71. Id.
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wife's testimony, raised sufficient question about his ability to proceed to
trial to demonstrate a constitutional violation.72 However, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that sufficient doubt of his competency
was raised and that further inquiry was required.73
Drope addressed the issue within the context of a trial, but the Supreme
Court has also recognized that a defendant cannot enter a guilty plea unless
he is mentally competent.7 4 The bottom line is that, "[i]ncompetency bars
adjudication, whether by plea or by trial."75
While case law afforded an adult the procedural due process protection
of not being tried while incompetent, lack of history and precedent make
understanding the issue of a juvenile's right to be competent to stand trial an
uphill battle.76 Evaluating a juvenile's competency to proceed was consid-
ered unnecessary.77 This was because the juvenile justice system was so set
apart and distinct from that of adult criminal court.78 The two systems dif-
fered in purpose and principle. 79 The purpose of juvenile court was rehabili-
tation for their alleged wrongdoing, rather than punishment.8 0 While the two
seminal cases of Kent v. United States8' and In re Gault8' failed to establish
an absolute right for a juvenile to be competent to stand trial, the right can be
logically inferred from their holdings.83 Competency played practically no
role in the juvenile justice system until 1966.84 Both Kent and In re Gault
granted minors several of the identical due process rights available to adult
defendants.85
In Kent, a fourteen-year-old was arrested after being reported for break-
ing into houses and attempting to snatch several purses.8 6 Two years later,
Morris A. Kent was arrested again, this time for housebreaking, robbery, and
72. Id.
73. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180.
74. Id. (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993)).
75. GRISSO I1, supra note 55, at 75.
76. Id. at 73.
77. GRISSO 1, supra note 8, at 85.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
81. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
82. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
83. Thomas Grisso, Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial: Questions in an Era of Punitive
Reform, 12 CRIM. JUST. 4, 6 (1997) [hereinafter Grisso IlI].
84. Laurence Steinberg, Juveniles on Trial: MacArthur Foundation Study Calls Compe-
tency Into Question, 18 CRIM. JUST. 20, 21 (2003).
85. Id.; see also GRISSO III supra note 83. But see § 985.228(2) (stating that a juvenile is
not entitled to a trial by jury).
86. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543.
118
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/1
NOVA LA W REVIEW
rape.87 Because he was not yet eighteen, Kent fell within the juvenile court's
jurisdiction.88 Kent's mother retained counsel for him the day after he was
arrested.89 Kent's attorney, along with his mother, met with the Social Ser-
vice Director of the Juvenile Court to discuss the possibility of waiving ju-
risdiction.9" His lawyer filed a motion opposing the waiver, asserting that his
client was "a victim of severe psychopathology" and suggesting hospitaliza-
tion for psychiatric observation. 91 Kent's attorney argued that the court
should retain jurisdiction and try Kent as a juvenile to stress rehabilitation. 9
He also requested copies of the juvenile records used to determine whether to
try Kent as an adult.93 The judge did not rule or hold any hearings on those
motions.94 Furthermore, the judge rendered his decision without consulting
Kent's attorney or his mother. 95 Instead, the court merely entered an order
waiving jurisdiction and allowing him to be tried as an adult.96 The judge
simply stated that he made this decision as result of a "full investigation." 97
Following the indictment, Kent's counsel moved to dismiss, claiming the
court erred by allowing Kent to be tried as an adult. 98 The motion was de-
nied.99 Kent's attorney appealed, asserting Kent was not afforded certain
procedural rights that, under normal circumstances, would have been af-
forded to an adult."°
Among other deprivations, he claimed Kent was denied his liberty
without a probable cause determination, had been interrogated by the police
without counsel present, and was never informed of his right to remain si-
lent.' ' On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, avoiding the constitu-
tional issues, found the statute allowing waiver of jurisdiction after a "full
87. Id. at 544.
88. Id. at 543.
89. Id. at 544.
90. Id.
91. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 545 (1966).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 546.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Kent, 383 U.S. at 546.
97. Id. at 548. The Juvenile Court Act, which governed waiver, merely stated there
needed to be a "full investigation." Id. at 547. No standards were set out in the statute to
govern the Juvenile Court's ultimate decision regarding waiver. Id.
98. Id. at 548.
99. Kent, 383 U.S. at 549.
100. Id. at 551.
101. Id. The attorney also argued that Kent's parents were not notified when he was being
interrogated and that he had been unlawfully fingerprinted. Id. The conviction was affirmed
and Kent appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
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investigation" could lead to arbitrary determinations, thereby reversing the
decision.10 2 According to the Justices, this is a "critically important" ques-
tion not capable of fair resolution without the right to a hearing and to effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 03 Thus, Kent began the erosion of the State's
parens patriae role in juvenile courts.
The Court, construing the Juvenile Court Act in Kent to be "rooted in
social welfare philosophy,' explained that juvenile proceedings primarily
focus on the needs of the child and society rather than on adjudicating crimi-
nal conduct. 5 However, despite the State's continuing parens patriae role,
this doctrine is "not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.' ' 06 Conse-
quently, the Justices reversed Kent's conviction, stating that a waiver hear-
ing, although not required to conform to all the requirements of a criminal
trial, "must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."'0 7
The Kent Court, unwilling to further expand the procedural protections for a
minor being tried in juvenile court, took that leap only one year later in the
case of In re Gault.
In In re Gault, a fifteen-year-old was arrested on June 8, 1964.'08 Ge-
rald Gault was brought to a detention facility without his parents having been
notified. 9 After learning of the situation through his brother, his mother
went to the institution and spoke to a deputy probation officer." 0 He told her
why her son was there"' and said a hearing was scheduled for the next
day. ' 2 The deputy filed a petition for the hearing, and although the parents
were verbally informed of the hearing, the deputy never officially served
them.' '3  The petition was unsupported by sufficient facts indicating the
crime Gault allegedly committed.' 14 It merely stated that Gault was a "delin-
102. Kent, 383 U.S. at 552, 553.
103. Id. at 553-554; see also Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104, 105 (1965) (holding
that the assistance of counsel in the "critically important" waiver determination is vital to the
just determination of juvenile court proceedings).
104. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 555. The Court made it clear this holding was limited to instances involving
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and did not afford minors any additional procedural due
process rights when they are tried in juvenile court. Id. at 556.
107. Id. at 562 (citing Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (1959)).
108. 387 U.S. 1,4 (1967).
109. Id. at5.
110. Id.
11. Id. at 4. Gault had been taken into custody because of a complaint by a neighbor that
he and his friend phoned her making lewd and indecent remarks. Id.
112. Gault, 387 U.S. at 5. It is not clear what type of hearing this was.
113. Id.
114. Id.
2004]
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quent," requested a hearing for a judicial order reflecting the same, and that
Gault needed the court's protection." 5 Additionally, it requested a judicial
order be issued regarding Gault's custody and care." 6
The court conducted the hearing the next day." 7 However, the hearing
was deficient in the following ways: 1) the victim was not present; 2) Gault
lacked counsel; and 3) there was neither sworn testimony nor a record." 8
During this hearing, the judge questioned Gault about his alleged criminal
act."'9 Gault gave conflicting testimony regarding certain admissions that he
made to a probation officer. 20 After the hearing, Gault returned to the deten-
tion center and then was sent home three days later with no explanation
about why he had been detained or why he was released.' 2' The same day,
Mrs. Gault received a note from one of the probation officers, which stated
that the "judge has set Monday June 15, 1964 at 11:00 a.m. as the date and
time for further hearings on Gerald's delinquency.' 22
Gault, his mother and father, and the two probation officers involved,
attended the proceeding.2 3 Again, Gault lacked counsel, with no offer made
to provide counsel. 2 4 Questions posed by the judge led to certain admissions
by Gault regarding the charged crime. 2 5 As a result of the victim's contin-
ued absence, Gault did not have an opportunity to cross-exam. 2 6 Although
one of the probation officers prepared a report of the proceeding, Gault and
his parents failed to receive a copy. 27 Following a finding of delinquency,
the judge sentenced Gault to a State Industrial School until he reached the
age of twenty-one.
28
Gault filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona.2 9 The hearing, however, was in the superior court. 3° It focused on a
substantial and vigorous cross-examination of the trial judge who committed
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Gault, 387 U.S. at 5.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Gault, 387 U.S. at 6.
123. Id. at7.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Gault, 387 U.S. at 7.
128. Id. at 7-8.
129. Id. at8.
130. Id. The facts do not indicate why the hearing was in the Superior Court.
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Gault. 3' The judge's position was that confinement until Gault reached the
age of majority was appropriate under the Arizona Code. 132 When the supe-
rior court agreed and dismissed the writ, Gault sought review in the Supreme
Court of Arizona. 1
33
Gault argued the Juvenile Code was invalid on its face because it ran
contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 34  He
contended that fundamental procedural rights were denied him at the trial
court level.'35 Those rights included: 1) notice of the charges; 2) lack of
counsel; 3) the lack of the opportunity to confront and cross-examine his
accuser; 4) the privilege against self-incrimination; and 5) appellate re-
view.
136
The Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that due process is "requisite
to the constitutional validity of proceedings in which a court reaches the con-
clusion that a juvenile has been at fault, has engaged in conduct prohibited
by law, or has otherwise misbehaved with the consequence that he is com-
mitted to an institution in which his freedom is curtailed."' 137 However, the
holding was limited to determinations of delinquency resulting in incarcera-
tion.138
Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, expanded on the meaning of act-
ing as parens patriae over a child.'39 Justification for depriving juveniles of
their liberty without providing the procedural protections afforded to adults
arose out of the civil rather than criminal nature of the proceedings. 140 A
minor did not have a "right to liberty but to custody."'14' He had to listen to
his parents and go to school. 142 Thus it followed that a parent's failure,
which results in a delinquent child, calls for state intervention. 43 Accord-
131. Id.
132. Gault, 387 U.S. at 8-9.
133. Jd. at 9.
134. Id. at 9-10.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 9.
137. Gault, 387 U.S. at 12. Notwithstanding this decision by the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona, Gault's writ of habeas corpus was dismissed. Id.; see also In re W., 19 N.Y.2d 55
(1966) (holding that it is unconstitutional to admit a juvenile's involuntary confession); In re
State of Interests of Carlo, 225 A.2d 110 (N.J. 1966) (holding that prior to the admission of a
juvenile's confession, fundamental fairness element of due process must first be met).
138. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
139. Id. at 17.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
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ingly, a child was provided custody and not deprived of any rights.'" Never-
theless, the Court noted, "unbridled discretion, however benevolently moti-
vated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure, and Due
process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual
freedom."1 45  Furthermore, relaxed procedures, busy calendars, and "high-
handed" methods often result in a deprivation of the fundamental rights for
juveniles. 146  Referring to the fundamental fairness rationale in Kent, the
Court found that the same principles of due process apply in a delinquency
adjudicatory setting. 47 Therefore, it would be astonishing not to require pro-
cedural regularity and the exercise of caution implied in the term due proc-
ess. 48 Additionally, "[u]nder the United States Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a Kangaroo court."' 49 Thus, the Supreme Court
found that Gault was the victim of multiple constitutional violations.'
B. Notice
Due process requires sufficient notice to allow a reasonable opportunity
for preparation.151 More specifically, the alleged misconduct must be "set
forth ...with particularity."' 52  The notification of the June 15 hearing
merely stated there were to be further delinquency proceedings, but failed to
describe the nature of the charges and failed to provide any supporting
144. Id.
145. Id. at 18, 20.
146. Id. at 19.
147. Id. at 30-31.
148. Id. at 27-28.
149. Gault, 387 U.S. at 28; see also Shepherd, supra note 50, at 24.
150. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967). Although it was raised on appeal, the court
did not rule on whether a juvenile was entitled to a right of appeal from a finding of delin-
quency. Id. But see § 985.234 (stating that an appeal from a juvenile court order may be
taken to the appropriate district court of appeal by any child and any parent or legal guardian
or custodian of the child).
151. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33.
152. Id.; see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.010(a) (stating that no detention order shall be entered
without a hearing during which all the parties shall have an opportunity to be heard); FLA. R.
Juv. P. 8.0 10(d) (requiring the intake officer to make a diligent effort, in the most expeditious
manner, to notify a parent or custodian of a child to inform them of the time and place of a
detention hearing); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.013 (providing that a detention petition order shall state
the reasons why the child is in custody and should to be detained); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.035
(mandating juvenile delinquency petitions allege facts showing the child to have committed a
delinquent act).
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facts. 153 Thus, the notice was insufficient to provide Gault an opportunity to
reasonably prepare a defense.
54
C. Right to Counsel
Since Gault, a child has the same right to counsel in a juvenile hearing
as in an adult criminal setting because a delinquency adjudication that results
in loss of liberty is equivalent to punishment when convicted in felony
prosecutions.' 5 The assistance of counsel is essential for carefully examin-
ing the facts of his case, as well as determining, preparing and presenting a
defense. 56 The possibility of incarceration is too severe a penalty to not pro-
vide a child with legal representation. 57 Consequently, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands, in those situations where
delinquency may result in incarceration, that the child and parents be notified
of the right to counsel and to the appointment of a lawyer if indigent.'58
D. Self-incrimination
Gault asserted that the privilege against self-incrimination was unavail-
able to him. 59 No one advised him that making certain admissions could
result in a loss of his liberty.' 6 The Court concluded that the privilege
against self-incrimination goes the heart of procedural safeguards necessary
to guarantee that "admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy.',
6 1
Providing the privilege against self-incrimination to adults but not children
creates a non-existent exception to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, in
essence excluding minors from its protection.1 62
153. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33.
154. Id.
155. InreGault, 387U.S. 1,36(1967). But see Florida v. T.G., 800 So. 2d 204, 210 (Fla.
2001) (holding that although the inquiry into waiver of counsel in juvenile proceedings should
be equal to that afforded to adults, courts should be even more cautious when accepting a
waiver of counsel from children).
156. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
157. Id.; see supra note 10.
158. Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
159. Id. at 42.
160. Id. at 43-44.
161. Id. at 47.
162. Id.
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E. Confrontation and Cross-Examination
Gault also argued that denying his right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses violated his constitutional rights.'63 Moreover, it was not
enough that sworn testimony was taken of those involved in the juvenile
proceedings.' 64 Absent a finding of a valid confession, confrontation and
sworn testimony by witnesses accessible for cross-examination are indispen-
sable for a finding of delinquency.
61
IX. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
The rising number of children committing violent offenses has been the
catalyst for a change in the way states view competency of a juvenile. 66
Moreover, as juvenile proceedings rapidly approach the similarity of adult
criminal proceedings, the argument that a child must be competent to stand
trial becomes stronger.6  For example, Florida has amended its statutes re-
garding competency to stand trial in juvenile cases to almost mirror the adult
criminal code. 16 The resemblance between the two systems yields a height-
163. Gault, 387 U.S. at 42
164. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56 (1967).
165. Id.
166. GRISSO 1, supra note 8, at 86; see also Steinberg, supra note 84. Steinberg discusses
more than a century of change in the juvenile justice system from rehabilitation to punish-
ment. Id. The cause for this change seems to be the dramatic increase in homicides and vio-
lent crimes committed by children. Id. Steinberg argues this is due to the increase in the
availability of guns. Id.
167. Judy L. Estren, Adjudicatory Hearings in Delinquency Cases, FLA. Juv. L. & PRAC. §
7.2 (2003) (pointing out that the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure have removed practi-
cally all distinctions between adult criminal trials and adjudicatory hearings). The juvenile
rules mimic those of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. ld. Further, an adjudicatory
hearing is virtually the same, procedurally, as an adult non-jury trial. Id.; see also Jennifer A.
Parker, Role of the Lawyer in Delinquency Cases, FLA. Juv. L. & PRAC. § 2.1 (2003) (arguing
that the juvenile justice system is moving towards protection of the public rather than rehabili-
tation); Julianne P. Sheffer, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Reconciling
Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L. REv. 479
(1995) (arguing that juvenile justice systems have increasingly promoted punitive goals);
FLA. STAT. § 985.01 (2003) (stating that the purpose of the delinquency chapter is to "ensure
the protection of society" through "the most appropriate control, discipline, punishment and
treatment while taking into account the need to protect the public safety). Accord McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (upholding the constitutionality of the lack of a right to
a jury trial involving a juvenile). But see § 985.228(2) (mandating that adjudicatory hearings
be held without a jury); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.110(c) (stating that an adjudicatory hearing shall be
conducted by a judge without a jury).
168. Grisso III, supra note 83, at 7; see also § 985.223; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.211 (explaining
competency to proceed as it relates to adults).
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ened interest in examining a youth's competency. Although In re Gault did
not explicitly mandate juveniles be competent to stand trial, that requirement
can be logically inferred from the right to counsel mandated by the Court.'6 9
A right to counsel would be meaningless if an incompetent juvenile was
compelled to stand trial. 7 °
A determination of an adolescent's competency is a complex question
based on evaluations by mental health experts. 7 ' Historically, incompetence
was a tool used by adult defendants with mental illnesses. 72 In addition to
mental incompetence, children have the additional problem of developmental
immaturity.'73 In other words, a minor could be completely free from any
mental disorder, yet, based on his age and immaturity, be unable to proceed
to trial. 7 4 Conversely, a child could be mature, but lack the requisite mental
capacity.' 75 Therefore, it is imperative to analyze an adolescent's cognitive
and psychosocial capacities to understand how they relate to his competence
to stand trial.'76
A 2003 MacArthur Foundation Research Network Study ("MacArthur")
revealed astonishing results involving a juvenile's competence to proceed to
trial."' MacArthur defined adolescence as between ten and seventeen years
old. 7 8 During those seven years, developmental changes are rapid and ex-
169. See Grisso III, supra note 83.
170. Id. at 7; see also In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d 810 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the right
to legal counsel would be meaningless if a juvenile defendant was not capable of exercising it
and participating in his own defense).
171. § 985.223(b) (stating that all determinations of competency shall be made at a hear-
ing based on evaluations of not less than two nor more than three experts appointed by the
court).
172. Steinberg, supra note 84.
173. Id.
174. GRISSO 1, supra note 8, at 86; see also In re Causy, 363 So. 2d 472, 476 (La. 1978)
(stating that a child's "tender years" may form a basis for a finding of incompetency);
Steinberg, supra note 84, at 21.
175. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 22. See generally § 984.223(f) (applying only one set of
factors when evaluating juvenile incompetency regardless of the child's mental status or age).
Experts appointed to evaluate a child must consider whether the child can: 1) appreciate the
charges or allegations against him; 2) appreciate the range of possible penalties that could be
imposed by the judge; 3) understand the "adversarial nature of the legal process;" 4) reveal
important facts to defense counsel; 5) behave accordingly in the courtroom; and 6) testify
relevantly. § 984.223(f).
176. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 22.
177. Id. at 21. Commentators are already using this study to support their legal arguments
relating to juveniles and competency. Lynda E. Frost & Adrienne E. Volenik, The Ethical
Perils of Representing the Juvenile Defendant Who May Be Incompetent, WASH. U. J.L. POL'Y
327, 353 (2004).
178. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 22.
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treme.179  These researchers sought to contrast cognitive and psychosocial
differences with those of young adults, ages eighteen to twenty-four.18° Of
the 1,400 people tested, half were either in jail or a juvenile detention facil-
ity, while the rest were from the general public. 8 '
Almost one-third of the eleven to thirteen-year olds and approximately
one-fifth of the fourteen to fifteen-year olds were deemed not competent to
stand trial. 82 Not surprisingly, many of the younger adolescents could nei-
ther understand the judicial process nor the judge's role. 83 Few could dis-
cern differences between prosecutors and defense attorneys.' 84 Even when
their rights were explained to them, they could not grasp them.'85 Many of
the children fifteen and younger were incapable of putting facts together and
drawing logical conclusions.'86 Their ability to imagine future consequences
stemming from their actions was considerably less than adults. 87 Thirty
percent of eleven to thirteen-year olds performed at the level of mentally ill
adults regarding trial appreciation and interpreting important information.'88
Juveniles under the age of thirteen were least likely to comprehend risks or
consider the long-term consequences of their decisions.' 89 Similar to those
under thirteen, nineteen percent of fourteen to fifteen-year olds also per-
formed at the level of mentally ill adults in relation to trial appreciation and
interpreting vital information. 9  Predictably, adolescents fifteen and
younger were far more likely to just adhere to an authority figure's request
than older adolescents and younger adults.' 9' Overall, adolescents were more
eager than adults to "come clean," particularly when promised the confession
will result in a prize like going home.' 92 Most significant is that these find-
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 23.
183. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 23; see also Grisso III, supra note 83, at 7 (suggesting
that current research indicates that thirteen to fourteen year olds have questionable ability to
deal with abstract legal concepts that a majority of adults can).
184. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 23.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 23.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
[Vol. 28:3:575
127
: Nova Law Review 28, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
2004] THE NEED FOR A MANDATORY COMPETENCY HEARING 593
ings were the same regardless of the youth's previous contact with the judi-
cial system. 1
93
This study demonstrates that a child's intelligence level can have a
strong impact on whether a juvenile will be deemed competent to proceed to
trial. 94 A disproportionate number of children in the justice system have
below average intelligence and, of course, these were "most likely to lack the
abilities related to competence."'' 95 Additionally, of the incarcerated minors
fifteen years old and younger, two-thirds had an IQ below eighty-nine.' 96
The MacArthur study also suggests the necessity for social policy and
legislative change.' 97 Just as important is that it supports imposing a heavy
burden on defense attorneys to address their juvenile clients' competency
issues.' 9' In fact, Patricia Lee, a member of the MacArthur Research Net-
work, warns that "competency is the first question defense attorneys have to
confront in these cases."' 99
X. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:
THE BURDEN ON THE ATTORNEY
A juvenile charged with a crime faces a frightening experience and is in
a very difficult position.200 Being arrested in and of itself is a traumatizing
experience for a child.20' The decisions he has to make will affect the rest of
his life.202 An attorney must know his juvenile client's level of development
to ensure he is able to appreciate the choices he will have to make and to aid
193. Id.; see also Grisso III, supra note 83, at 8 (stating that research indicates that the
"mere fact that a youth is a repeat offender is not a reliable indicator of the youth's under-
standing of the trial process or his rights"). This is particularly interesting in light of the fact
that the Tate court considered this as a factor in reversing his conviction. Tate v. State, 864
So. 2d 44, 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
194. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 23.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 24; see AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 35.
197. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 24.
198. Id.
199. Id.; see also Grisso II, supra note 55, at 77 (noting that most reported opinions in-
volving adjudicative competency revolved around the lawyer's failure to seek competency
evaluations).
200. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 24.
201. Id.
202. Id. Compounding this are the cognitive defects and learning disabilities from which
the child may suffer. Unfortunately, the minor may be in a situation where he has been aban-
doned by his family. Id. In fact, Lee points to pressures children face when placed in cus-
tody, such as: 1) sitting in a holding cell for hours; 2) waiver of important legal rights; 3) plea
offers from the prosecutors; and 4) plea offers from the judge rushing through their case. Id.
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in his defense °.2 3 Thus, failure to explore competency may constitute inef-
fective assistance of counsel. 2' To establish ineffective assistance of counsel
the following must be proved: "1) counsel's performance was deficient, in
that his representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;
and 2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense depriving the defen-
dant of a fair trial, in that there is a reasonable probability that but for coun-
sel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different., 20 5 A rea-
sonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.20 6
A finding of incompetency precludes a conviction, so a failure to inves-
tigate a defendant's competency is ineffective assistance of counsel.0 7 In
Broomfield v. State, the defendant, James Broomfield, pled guilty to robbery
of a firearm and grand theft of a motor vehicle. 0 s One year later he filed a
motion for post-conviction relief alleging he was incompetent when he en-
tered his plea.209 His first trial attorney, Kenneth Garber, testified that he had
filed a motion in the trial court seeking a competency evaluation.2 0 The
psychologist who evaluated Broomfield reported that he was "actively psy-
chotic" and incompetent to stand trial, but that his competency could have
been restored with suitable hospitalization and medication. 21
When a conflict of interest forced Garber to withdraw, Frank Porter was
appointed to represent Broomfield.212 The psychologist's report was given to
Porter.213 By the time of the post-conviction hearing, Porter could not re-
member whether he discussed the report with Broomfield, but he did say that
203. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 24. Lee argues, "the burden is on defense attorneys to
make certain their clients understand the situation and the choices they must make." id.
204. Broomfield v. Florida, 788 So. 2d 1043, 1044-45 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
205. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984); see also Jones v. Florida, 845
So. 2d 55, 65 (Fla. 2003). But see Davis v. Florida, No. SC02-1580, SC02-2472, 2003 WL
22722316, at *3 (Fla. Nov. 20, 2003) (holding that strategic decisions made by trial counsel
do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
206. Jones, 845 So. 2d at 55 (citing Ragsdale v. Florida, 798 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2001)).
207. Broomfield, 788 So. 2d at 1043, 1044-45 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Jones
v. Florida, 740 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. 1999)).
208. Id. at 1043. The defendant was currently serving a sentence for a federal crime. The
plea for both of the felonies was to run concurrently with the federal sentence. Id.
209. Id. The defendant did not file a direct appeal from his sentence. Id. Thus, the facts
of the case were developed at the post-conviction hearing. Id.
210. Broomfield v. Florida, 788 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
211. Id. The facts do no explicitly indicate whether Broomfield had at one time been
competent, but the psychologist's report would indicate that because there was a chance of
restoration, he may have been competent in the past. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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he did not have reservations about his client's competency to enter into the
plea.2 14  Notably, however, when asked at the post-conviction hearing
whether he would have permitted Broomfield to enter a plea without a sec-
ond report, Garber responded, "probably not. 215 In addition to Porter's own
observations at the plea hearing, a letter Broomfield sent influenced his deci-
sion not to raise competency.' 1 6 In the letter, Broomfield wrote that he would
be entering his pleas in state court and questioned how his state sentence
would be imposed given his current federal sentence.21 7 It was unclear
whether Porter ever spoke to Broomfield prior to the plea hearing. 2 8 Thus,
testimony by Broomfield was imperative for the trial court's resolution of
whether Porter was ineffective.
Broomfield's testimony at the post-conviction hearing related to Por-
ter's deficient representation. 219 He stated that he had not been given the
psychologist evaluation, and if he had been furnished the report, he would
not have entered his pleas.2 Moreover, Broomfield had been hospitalized in
federal prison and was taking medication.22 ' The trial court found that
Broomfield was competent at the time he entered his pleas and that his coun-
sel was not ineffective.222
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that Porter
was ineffective based on his failure to investigate Broomfield's competency
at the time he entered his pleas.223 The psychologist's report that Porter dis-
regarded was sufficient to support an incompetency defense.224 Moreover,
214. Broomfield, 788 So. 2d at 1044.
215. Id.; see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(b) (explaining that upon motion by the court, counsel
for the defendant or the state concerning a defendant's competency, the court shall order the
defendant to be examined by no more than three, nor less than two experts).
216. Broomfield, 788 So. 2d at 1044.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Broomfield v. Florida, 788 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1044. Broomfield also testified that when he entered his plea in federal court,
that judge found him competent. Id.
222. Id.
223. id. at 1045; see also Powell v. Florida, 464 So. 2d 1319, 1319 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (recognizing that a failure to raise a defendant's incompetency can be grounds for inef-
fective assistance of counsel); Lilley v. Florida, 667 So. 2d 887, 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (stating that failing to inform the court of a defendant's mental illness and alcohol prob-
lems could rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel); Saunders v. Florida, 704 So.
2d 224 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing a defendant's conviction due to absence of
record refuting claim that counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate defendant's compe-
tency).
224. Broomfield, 788 So. 2d at 1045.
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Porter's reliance on the letter Broomfield sent to him was misplaced. 225 The
court also questioned Porter's personal assessment of Broomfield's compe-
tency when the record did not indicate whether they ever spoke prior to the
plea hearing.226 An attorney's obligation to find out information about his
client, especially when certain facts become known that should trigger fur-
ther inquiry, is imperative to effective representation.227
A lack of client consultation can rise to the level of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel if the defendant can show prejudice resulted. 28 In Jackson
v. State, for example, the defendant alleged that his attorney was ineffective
because he only visited him twice while in prison.29 The Fifth District Court
of Appeal held that the defendant must also show how he was prejudiced by
the failed communication. 230  The defendants in Jackson and Broomfield
were adults, but the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can also be
raised by a youth being tried in juvenile court.23'
Although ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from the failure to
investigate a youth's competency in juvenile court has not been addressed in
Florida, based on Kent and Gault, minors should have the same rights as the
adult defendants in Jackson and Broomfield. A finding of incompetency will
bar adjudication of an adolescent in juvenile court just as it prohibits convic-
tion of an adult or a juvenile being charged as one. 32 Thus, based on the
225. Broomfield v. Florida, 788 So. 2d 1043, 1045 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001). The
court found that the letter Broomfield sent Porter could not rebut the findings of the psycholo-
gist's report. Id.
226. Id.
227. Jackson v. Florida, 801 So. 2d 1024, 1025 n.1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
228. Id. at 1025.
229. Id.
230. Id.; see also Cook v. Florida, 792 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 2001) (holding that failing
to investigate the defendant's family history and mental health mitigators could be ineffective
assistance of counsel); McCann v. Florida, 854 So. 2d 788, 790-91 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (failing to investigate and prepare a meaningful defense may not be a strategic decision
but could rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel). Wyoming has held the failure
of trial counsel to interview a defendant is ineffective assistance of counsel when the attorney
could have realized through a consultation that inculpatory statements were made by his client
which would have lead to the filing of a motion to suppress based on a Miranda violation.
LDO v. Wyoming, 858 P.2d 553, 556-57 (Wyo. 1993).
231. P.M.W. v. Florida, 678 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
juvenile trial counsel's failure to file an initial appeal brief constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel).
232. § 985.223(5) (a)-(c) (mandating that a child found to be incompetent shall remain
under the juvenile court's jurisdiction for two years following the date of the order of incom-
petency). If the court determines that, at any time, a youth will never become competent to
proceed, the court may dismiss the petition for delinquency. Id. Furthermore, at the end of
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rationale of Broomfield, failing to investigate a youth's competency in juve-
nile court can lead to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 233 Accord-
ing to a Senior Attorney of the Broward County Public Defender Juvenile
Division, an influx of ineffective assistance of counsel allegations by juve-
niles because of a failure to explore the youth's competency will be a ramifi-
cation of the Tate opinion. "After Tate, more juveniles will be appealing
based on ineffective assistance of counsel for a failure to inquire into their
competency. 234 Thus, incompetency to proceed must be the first issue an
attorney addresses when his client is charged with a serious crime.235
XI. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: THE BURDEN ON THE JUDGE
While the lawyer bears the burden of filing a motion for competency,
the judge carries the responsibility of ruling on the defendant's compe-
tence.236 In addition, when neither of the lawyers raise the issue of compe-
tency, a judge may also have the obligation to order a competency hearing.237
the two year period, if there is no evidence that a child will retain competency within one year,
the court must dismiss the petition. Id.
233. Kentucky recognizes that children are often the victims of informal juvenile judicial
process. Catherine Browning Hendrickson, The Legal Practitioner's Guide to RCR 11.42for
Juvenile Defendants, 5-SPG KY. CHILD. RTS. J. 16, 24 (1997). As a result, counsel and adoles-
cent clients meet for the first time shortly prior to arraignment or trial. Id. Thus, the youth
may have a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel so that disposition may be set aside. Id.
But see A.F.E. v. Florida, 853 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that collateral
relief on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is not practical for a juvenile because
the sentence imposed by the court may conclude prior to the granting of appellate relief).
234. Interview with Melinda Blostein, Senior Attorney, Broward County Public Defender
Juvenile Division, in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (Mar. 2, 2004).
235. See Diana Marrero, Miami-Dade 8th Grader Charged with Murdering Classmate in
School, SUN- SENTINEL (Miami-Dade), Feb. 19, 2004, at Al. A juvenile was charged as an
adult for first-degree murder. Id. Steve Drizin, a law professor at Northwestern University,
stated that "one of the first issues that will have to be addressed is the boy's competency to
stand trial in adult court." Id.
236. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 25.
237. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(b) (stating that a court shall, on its own motion, order a com-
petency hearing when the court has reasonable ground to believe the defendant is not compe-
tent to proceed); see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.095(2) (providing that during any time prior to or
during the adjudicatory hearing the court has reasonable grounds to believe the child may be
incompetent, the court on its own motion shall immediately stay the proceedings and order a
hearing to determine the child's competency to proceed); Mike Folks, Judge Rejects Teen's
Plea, Sets Competency Hearing, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Mar. 1, 1995, at B2 (stating
a fourteen-year-old was charged as an adult with murder whereafter the judge did not accept
his plea deal when she learned of his past psychiatric treatment and instead ordered a compe-
tency hearing).
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A judge's failure to order a hearing on the issue of a defendant's competency
can violate his constitutional right to a fair trial.238
In Pate v. Robinson, after admitting he shot his wife, the adult defen-
dant was convicted of murder.239 The defense attorney never filed a motion
for competency, and the court failed to order one on its own.24 As a result,
one issue was whether the defendant was competent to stand trial.24 ' The
State argued the trial judge was not required to order a competency hearing
sua sponte.242 After examining the extensive evidence of defendant's trou-
bling behavior, the United States Supreme Court disagreed.243
Each witness for the defense testified that the defendant exhibited er-
ratic behavior and was insane.2" His mother testified that the defendant had
always acted a little peculiarly after a brick fell from the third floor and hit
him on the head when he was seven or eight years old.245 Years later, while
the defendant was visiting his mother from the Army and speaking with a
guest, he jumped up and kicked a hole in the bar.246 When asked what was
wrong, the defendant just paced back and forth with his hands in his pock-
ets.247 At other times he would not speak or answer questions and would
have an odd glare in his eyes.248 He would imagine people were "after him"
and saw people who were not there.249 His behavior was described as ex-
tremely violent and erratic. 250 His grandfather testified to the defendant's
forgetful behavior.251 Testimony also revealed he was suicidal.252
238. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966).
239. Id. at 376.
240. Id. at 376-377.
241. Id. at 376. Another issue was whether Pate was insane at the time he committed the
crime. Id.
242. Pate, 383 U.S. at 378.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 378, 383.
245. Id. at 378.
246. Id. at 378-79.
247. Pate, 383 U.S. at 379.
248. Id. Testimony by the defendant's grandfather indicated that when the defendant
worked for him he would have a strange dazed look in his eyes. Id. at 380.
249. Id. at 379. Testimony indicated that while visiting his aunt he was seeing a person
who "was going to shoot him." Id. During this time his mother testified he was foaming at
the mouth. Pate, 383 U.S. at 379.
250. Id. at 379, 380. On the way to a hospital, he tried to leap from a policeman's car, and
while at the hospital he had to be strapped into a chair. Id. at 379.
251. Id. at 380. The defendant would leave and come back from work without ever realiz-
ing he left. Id. at 380-381.
252. Pate, 383 U.S. at 381. The defendant attempted to kill himself by a gunshot wound
to the head, and another unsuccessful drowning attempt. Id. This came on the heels of shoot-
ing and killing his eighteen month old son. Id.
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After serving time for the murder of his son, the defendant beat up his
mother's brother-in-law?. 3 The mother sought an arrest warrant explaining
to the police that he was out of his mind. 54 In addition, she attempted to
have him arrested for continually fighting on the streets.2 55 The defendant
eventually murdered his wife while she worked 6.2 5  The State offered only
one piece of rebuttal evidence to the testimony that the defendant was not
competent.257
William H. Haines, the Director of the Behavior Clinic of Criminal
Court of Cook County, had examined the defendant two or three months
prior to trial. 25 8 He was not, however, present to testify at trial.2 59 Neverthe-
less, the State introduced his opinion that the defendant "knew the nature of
the charges against him and was able to cooperate with counsel when he ex-
amined him before trial. 26 °
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was
constitutionally entitled to a hearing to determine his competency; the trial
judge's failure to make that inquiry, sua sponte, denied him of his right to a
fair trial.
A judge's obligation to order a competency hearing is also applicable in
juvenile court when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a child may
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Pate, 383 U.S. at 381-382.
256. Id. at 382. Testimony indicated he came into the restaurant where she worked, stared
at her for a minute, and eventually shot her once or twice. Id. He never said a word the entire
time he was in the store. Id. After the killing, the defendant went to his friend's house who
called the police. Id. The defendant was present when the police arrived but he said he did
not know anything about a murder when asked by the police. Pate, 383 U.S. at 382-383.
257. Id. at 383.
258. Id.
259. Id. The facts do not indicate why Dr. Haines was not present to testify at trial.
260. Id.
261. Pate, 383 U.S. at 385; see also Hill v. Wainwright, 473 So. 2d 1253, 1259 (Fla.
1985). The trial court failed to address the issue of whether the evidence at trial mandated a
competency hearing for the defendant. Hill, 473 So. 2d at 1259. Testimony indicated that the
defendant had an IQ of sixty-six, had a history of grand mal epileptic seizures, mental retarda-
tion with communication issues, and accepting guilt without considering the facts. Id. at
1254-1256. The court, relying on the principle rationale of Robinson, held that the judge's
failure to order a competency hearing, sua sponte, denied the defendant of the right to a fair
trial. Id. at 1259. But see Agan v. Florida, 503 So. 2d 1254, 1256 (Fla. 1987). The mere fact
that a defendant confesses, pleads guilty, and disregards his lawyer's advice does not raise
doubt about his mental competency. Id. The court, on its own motion, must order a compe-
tency hearing only when there is "evidence, information, or any showing before the court that
raises questions concerning the defendant's competency." Id. Here, this principle cannot be
extended to the defendant merely because the decision he made to plead guilty was a bad one.
Id.
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be incompetent to proceed.262 W.S.L. v. State is illustrative. A nine-year-old
boy was adjudicated guilty of first-degree felony murder, sexual battery,
attempted sexual battery, and aggravated battery.263 Prior to trial, the child's
trial attorney filed a motion for a competency hearing.26 In support, he in-
cluded the report of the psychologist who had examined the boy.265 Despite
the psychologist's conclusion that the adolescent "did not have an under-
standing of the adversary nature of the criminal justice system and had no
ability to assist his attorney in planning a defense because of his age and
intellect," the trial judge denied the motion.266 The Second District Court of
Appeal held that the psychologist's report provided reasonable grounds to
believe that the juvenile "may have been incompetent., 267 Thus, the court
concluded that the trial judge erred in denying the youth's motion for a hear-
ing to determine his competency to stand trial.268
Although W.S.L. was decided in 1985, the Juvenile Rules have not
changed. When reasonable grounds exist, before or during an adjudicatory
hearing, to believe a youth may be incompetent, the court "shall" immedi-
ately order a hearing to determine the adolescent's competency.269 On the
other hand, the Florida statute relating to incompetency in a juvenile delin-
quency case does not mandate the judge order a competency hearing; it is
discretionary.27° It states that when there is reason to believe, prior to or dur-
ing a delinquency case, that the child may be incompetent to proceed, the
court on its own motion "may" order an evaluation of the child's mental
condition.27' The statute and rule differentiate between the time before or
during an adjudicatory hearing and prior to or during a delinquency case.
Those two periods of time overlap and can be considered the same. For ex-
ample, an adjudicatory hearing can occur at any time "during a delinquency
case." Likewise, any time before or during an adjudicatory hearing is con-
262. W.S.L. v. Florida, 470 So. 2d 828, 830 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), rev'don other
grounds, 485 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1986); see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.095(2) (providing that during
any time prior to or during the adjudicatory hearing the court has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve the child may be incompetent, the court on its own motion shall immediately stay the
proceedings and order a hearing to determine the child's competency to proceed).
263. W.S.L., 470 So. 2d at 829.
264. Id. at 830.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. W.S.L., 470 So. 2d at 830. The Second District Court of Appeal relied on what was
rule 8.170(a)(1) of the Florida Juvenile Rules of Procedure in holding that the judge was
obligated to order the competency hearing. Id.
269. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.095(a)(2).
270. § 985.223(1).
271. Id.
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sidered to be "part of the delinquency case." Because those two periods of
time can be considered to be identical, the different language in the rule and
in the statute can lead to confusion and unfair results. Thus, making the stat-
ute discretionary and the juvenile rule mandatory is illogical. Moreover, the
rationale of Tate, Pate, and W.S.L. obligates the judge to order a competency
hearing when there are reasonable grounds, which leads to the conclusion
that the discretionary nature of the Florida statute gives a judge leeway he
should not have.
XII. PROPOSAL
The evolution of juvenile competence turns on historical issues of jus-
tice and fairness. 2 Early intervention in a child's development establishes a
pattern that prevents delinquency in later years.2" The most important and
effective programs are those that highlight family support structure, as well
as those providing health care services, and others that stress parental support
and education.274 Interceding in a troubled child's life as soon as possible is
also imperative for the prevention of recidivism.2 75 Likewise, early determi-
nation of a child's competency to stand trial will help to prevent a violation
of his procedural due process rights. The findings of the MacArthur study
illustrate that, on average, children fifteen and younger are less likely to pos-
sess essential characteristics necessary to be competent to stand trial than
those sixteen and older.276 Thus, a mandatory competency hearing for chil-
dren under sixteen, either being tried in juvenile court or in adult court,
would, at the very least, address the issue of competency to stand trial.
Intervening as early as possible to reduce the potential for recidivism is
just as important as the court's obligation to make an initial determination of
a child's competency prior to proceeding on a petition. The former protects
the child from committing future criminal acts, and the latter guards against
adjudicating or convicting an incompetent youth. Therefore, states must
272. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 24.
273. Gloria Danzinger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family Court: Balancing
Intervention, Prevention, and Adjudication, 37 FAM. L. Q. 397, 398 (2003).
274. Id. at 397-98. Danzinger writes that intervening means to do so early in the adoles-
cent's development through pre-school education programs and through parent educational
services that improve the child's ability to prepare for school. Id. at 397. This, she argues,
may set up patterns that prevent criminal behavior by the child when he or she grows up. Id.
It is her position that the children who elect to participate in these programs are less likely to
drop out and become delinquents. Id.
275. Id. Recidivism means that a child has multiple similar charges. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1021 (7th ed. 1999).
276. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 24.
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require immediate obligatory hearings to determine an adolescent's compe-
tency. If a state does not require competency inquiries of a juvenile, a judge
can and ought to consider competency first, says Robert Schwartz, cofounder
and executive director of the Juvenile Law Center. 7  One state does just
that.278
Under Virginia law, a competency hearing is required when the State
Attorney requests a transfer hearing, and the child, fourteen or older, is
charged with what would be a felony if committed by an adult.279 However,
this does not go far enough. A youth charged with a felony in juvenile court
should also be entitled to a mandatory competency hearing. 280 The reasons to
discriminate between the two systems, adult and juvenile, have diminished
with the current movement toward punishment in the juvenile system. 281
"The fact is, the juvenile justice system has become so punitive, the conse-
quences of a juvenile adjudication have such long-term effects on kids' lives,
that we have to address the competence issue., 282 The vital notions of proce-
dural due process support the proposal for a mandatory competency hearing.
The Tate opinion provided a juvenile tried as an adult with an additional
procedural safeguard at the trial court level. Irrespective of Tate's trial law-
yer's failure to move for competency, the judge's failure to do so violated his
due process. However, that holding cannot be limited to a juvenile tried in
adult court. Under W.S.L, it would seem that a judge would have that same
obligation in juvenile proceedings. Due process should not be limited just
because the child is tried as a minor. Mandatory competency hearings for
children under sixteen charged with a felony, either in juvenile or adult court,
would provide important and extra protections to children who can easily fall
victim to a complex and unforgiving system.
Certainly a mandatory competency hearing would be a drain on judicial
and other resources. Nevertheless, the time and money spent trying a child
without addressing his competency wastes judicial resources when the end
result is a reversal because of a constitutional due process violation.283 In
addition, the lack of a compulsory competency hearing can have adverse
consequences on the child as well as undermine the integrity of the judicial
system.
277. Id.
278. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(A)(3) (Michie 2004).
279. Id.
280. Grisso III, supra note 83, at 9 (explaining that youths up to mid-adolescence may
need a mandatory competency hearing).
281. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 25.
282. Id.
283. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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XIII. CONCLUSION
A child is not just a shorter, more compact version of an adult.2 84 The
immaturity level a youth brings with him to court is evident and must be
considered in a justice system that strives "to be both effective and fair." '85
A lawyer cannot ignore his adolescent client's due process rights any more
than a judge cannot ignore the same. Moreover, uniformity among the Rules
of Juvenile Procedure and the Florida Statutes, relating to delinquency,
should uniformly require a judge to address competency, not merely give
him the discretion to do so. Unfortunately, adolescents under the age of six-
teen will convert from defendants to the vulnerable victims of the Criminal
Justice System without the due process of a mandatory competency hearing
prior to being tried.
284. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 25.
285. Id.
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SARBANES-OXLEY: A PRIMER FOR PUBLIC
COMPANIES, AND THEIR OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS, AND AUDIT FIRMS
ROBERT C. BRIGHTON, JR.*
On July 30, 2002, in response to widespread concern about corporate
governance excesses and financial fraud, United States President, George W.
Bush, signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Act"),' a bill effect-
ing the greatest change in United States regulation of the securities markets
since the original adoption of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act")
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").
Two years after the collapse of Enron, complaints regarding the damag-
ing effect on corporate growth of the Act spawned by Enron can be plain-
tively heard. However, continuing corporate scandals involving household
name companies, including the Italian food giant Parmalat, and the health
services company, HealthSouth, have kept the issue of corporate accountabil-
ity prominently before the public.
In fact, in response to scandals involving the New York Stock Exchange
and several prominent mutual funds, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC") and other regulators and law enforcement officials have called
for additional regulation of the securities markets.
OVERVIEW OF THE ACT
The focus of the Act and this article is the regulation of the accounting
profession and of the auditing and financial reporting process of public com-
panies. For this purpose, a public company is a company, the securities of
which is registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, or which is re-
quired to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, or that files,
* Robert C. Brighton, Jr. chairs Ruden McClosky's Securities Law Practice Group.
His practice focuses on general corporate and securities law, and merger and acquisitions. He
frequently advises public and private companies and financial institutions on corporate finance
and securities law issues, including corporate governance issues. He can be reached at (954)
527-2473 and robert.brighton@ruden.com.
1. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
2. See Floyd Norris, Too Much Regulation? Corporate Bosses Sing the Sarbanes-Oxley
Blues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at Cl. According to a survey of global chief executives
released by PricewaterhouseCoopers at the World Economic Forum, fifty-nine percent of
global chief executives surveyed viewed overregulation as a significant risk and more of a
threat to corporate growth than global terrorism or currency fluctuations. See id.
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or has filed a registration statement that has not yet become effective under
the Securities Act. In addition, the Act also significantly regulates the corpo-
rate functions of public companies, particularly regarding corporate govern-
ance, as well as their executives, directors, and outside advisers. Accord-
ingly, this article also discusses the more significant aspects of the Act's im-
pact on these individuals.
The Act affects:
" public companies, by subjecting them to enhanced disclosure require-
ments and requiring them to adopt strict corporate governance standards;
" officers and directors of public companies, by requiring them to certify
their company's annual and quarterly reports (including, specifically, the
financial statements), return profits and bonuses relating to false financial
statements and forego loans to them by the company, except in limited cir-
cumstances;
" auditors of public companies, by requiring them to register and be sub-
ject to regulation by a newly-created independent audit review board, and
by placing additional restrictions on their ability to perform non-audit ser-
vices to their audit clients;
" employees of public companies, by insulating them from retaliation for
reporting questionable corporate activities;
" securities lawyers who represent public companies, by requiring them
to report to the company's CEO or general counsel, or qualified legal
compliance committee, and in some cases, the board of directors, evidence
of material violations of securities laws or breaches of fiduciary duty; and
" investment banks employed by public companies and the research
analysts who are employed by investment banks to follow public compa-
nies for investment banks, by subjecting them to increased regulation re-
garding conflicts of interest between analysts and the banking arm of the
investment banks, including increased disclosure of actual and potential
conflicts of interest.
The Act also added and increased criminal penalties for certain viola-
tions of the U.S. securities laws and increased the statutes of limitation for
certain existing private rights of action for violations of certain existing secu-
rities laws.
The Act is part of an enhancement of the public company regulatory re-
gime that includes rulemaking by the SEC, other SEC initiatives, changes in
stock exchange listing standards and actions by private groups, such as the
Financial Accounting Standards Board and the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants, and stricter regulation and enforcement by the secu-
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rities law administrators of the individual states. The Act contemplates that
the SEC and the stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") and the Nasdaq Stock Market ("Nasdaq"), will implement their
provisions through rules adopted by them. In some cases, the Act provides
significant discretion to these regulators as to how its provisions may be im-
plemented. In other cases, the Act requires specific acts of compliance.
Some of the provisions of the Act are immediately effective. However,
in the case of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Board
was not required to become fully functional until April 26, 2003, and audi-
tors were not required to register with the Board until 180 days afterward.3
And in the case of the requirement to file internal control reports with com-
pany annual reports, the requirement becomes effective in 2004 for larger
U.S. companies and in 2005 for other U.S. companies and for non-U.S. SEC-
reporting companies.
In some cases, the Act required expedited rulemaking and implementa-
tion of the Act's requirements. For example, the SEC was required to, and
did, adopt regulations regarding the accelerated reporting requirements for
public company insiders that became effective on August 29, 2002.
The breadth and depth of the regulatory changes effected by the Act,
and the unknown impact of existing and future rulemaking and interpreta-
tion, make the Act's practical requirements and effect difficult to currently
evaluate. Moreover, it is unclear at this time what additional exemptions the
SEC may adopt to, or alternative versions of, the Act's requirements insofar
as they relate to non-U.S. persons and small business issuers.
What follows is a brief summary of the more significant general provi-
sions of the Act. It is not intended to be comprehensive and should not be
relied upon as legal advice. Moreover, it generally only reflects develop-
ments through August 2003.
THE ACT'S EFFECT ON PUBLIC COMPANIES
"Real Time'" Disclosure Requirements
The Act accelerates a public company's reporting obligations by requir-
ing "real time" "plain English" disclosure of material changes in the financial
condition or operations of a public company.4 The Act suggests that such
3. See Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certifi-
cation of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003).
4. See Section 409 of the Act which amended the Exchange Act by adding a new para-
graph (1) to Section 13 thereof as follows:
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disclosure may include trend and qualitative information and graphic presen-
tations. These disclosures would require subjective determinations by the
issuer regarding the materiality of agreements, reduction in revenues from
major customers, material direct or contingent financial obligations and ma-
terial write-offs and impairments. Under the final Rule amending Form 8-K
disclosure requirements and deadlines, these judgments, are required to be
made within the constraints of a four-business day filing requirement. There
are significant consequences for inaccurate or late filings (though the final
Rule ameliorates some of those consequences if appropriate disclosure is
made by the time of the next required periodic report under the Exchange
Act). Compliance with these requirements promises to pose significant chal-
lenges for U.S. public companies.5
This requirement is a significant departure from existing U.S. law. Pre-
viously, companies had broad latitude in the timing of the disclosure of mate-
rial corporate developments so long as insiders were not trading on the basis
of their knowledge. Although not part of the Act, the SEC has also acceler-
ated the filing date requirements for annual reports on Form 10-K and quar-
terly reports on Form I0-Q. These requirements will be phased-in over three
years and do not apply to small business issuers or companies with less than
$75 million in public float.
Management Report on Internal Controls
The Act requires management to establish an internal control structure.
Management is also required to prepare a report, to be included in the com-
pany's annual report, which assesses the effectiveness of these controls and
procedures on the company's financial reporting for the past year. The com-
"(1) REAL TIME DISCLOSURES. Each issuer reporting under section 13(a) or 15(d)
shall disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such additional information concerning
material changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer, in plain English, which
may include trend and qualitative information and graphic presentations, as the Commission
determines, by rule, is necessary or useful for the protection of investors and in the public in-
terest."
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 409, 116 Stat. at 791.
5. See additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date,
Release Nos. 33-8400 and 34-49424 (March 16, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules
/final/33-8400 (last visited April 8, 2004). The Final Rules expand the list of disclosure items
under Form 8-K (adding, among others, disclosure regarding 1) material agreements, 2) mate-
rial financial obligations, 3) sales of unregistered securities, 4) material modifications to the
rights of securities holders and 5) actions to delist the company's securities from a national
securities exchange or SRO) and shorten the filing deadline for most Form 8-K items to four
business days. The expanded disclosure and accelerated reporting requirements are effective
as of August 23, 2004 and will operate prospectively only.
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pany's outside auditors that prepare its audit report must attest to, and report
on, management's internal control assessment. The SEC has adopted rules
providing details regarding the content of the report. These reports are re-
quired to be included in a public company's annual report on Form 10-K, 20-
F, or 40-F, as applicable, beginning with the annual report for its first fiscal
year ending on or after June 15, 2004 for accelerated filers; and April 16,
2005 in the case of other U.S. companies and all non-U.S. SEC reporting
companies.
This requirement will likely cause senior officers of public companies
and their significant subsidiaries of public companies to assume greater re-
sponsibility for the accuracy of the financial reports generated by the busi-
ness operations under their management.
Use of Pro Forma Financial Information
The Act addresses some of the perceived abuses relating to the use of
pro forma financial information. It does this by requiring that pro forma
financial information, whether appearing in a company's SEC reports or in a
company press release or other public disclosure:
" comply with the U.S. federal securities law's standard for accuracy and
completeness (that is, the disclosure does not contain an untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the dis-
closure not misleading); and
" include a reconciliation with the company's financial statements prepared
in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principals
("GAAP").
The SEC has adopted Regulation G,6 which governs the use of non-
GAAP financial measures in all public disclosures, including earnings re-
leases containing non-GAAP financial measures. Under Regulation G, a
non-GAAP financial measure is a numerical measure of a company's past or
future financial performance, financial position or cash flows that:
* excludes amounts, or is subject to adjustments that have the effect of ex-
cluding amounts, that are included in the most directly comparable meas-
ure calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP; or
6. See Conditions for Use of non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed Reg. 4820 (Jan.
30, 2003).
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* includes amounts, or is subject to adjustments that have the effect of ex-
cluding amounts, that are excluded from the most directly comparable
measure calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP.
Regulation G requires that when a company makes a public disclosure
that includes material non-GAAP financial information, it must include a
presentation of the "most directly comparable" financial measure calculated
and presented in accordance with GAAP and a reconciliation of the differ-
ences between the non-GAAP financial measure with the "most directly
comparable" financial measure calculated and presented in accordance with
GAAP.
Other Financial Information Requirements
In a requirement of potentially far-reaching consequence, the Act re-
quires public companies to provide in each annual and quarterly SEC filing
disclosure of all material that may have a material current or future effect on
the company's (i) financial condition, (ii) changes in financial condition, (iii)
results of operations, (iv) liquidity, (v) capital expenditures, (vi) capital re-
sources, or (vii) significant components of revenues or expenses, including:
* off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (including con-
tingent obligations); and
* other relationships of the company with unconsolidated entities or other
persons.
Audit Committees
The Act requires all audit committee members to be independent. The
Act also requires companies to grant their audit committee authority over the
selection, compensation, and oversight of outside auditors. Compounding
the difficulty of complying, the Act sets a stricter standard for determining
independence. A person is considered "independent" only if he does not
receive any consulting or similar fees from, and is not affiliated with, the
company or any of its subsidiaries, other than in his capacity as a director.
In addition, the Act requires public companies to disclose whether or
not its audit committee has at least one member who is a "financial expert,"
and, if not, an explanation of why not. The SEC has defined "financial ex-
pert" in its rulemaking as a person who has the following attributes:
[Vol. 28:3:605
144
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/1
2004] SARBANES-OXLEY A PRIMER FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES 611
(i) An understanding of generally accepted accounting principles
and financial statements;
(ii) The ability to assess the general application of such principles
in connection with the accounting for estimates accruals and re-
serves;
(iii) Experience preparing, auditing, analyzing, or evaluating fi-
nancial statements that present a breadth and level of complexity
of accounting issues that are generally comparable to the breadth
and complexity of issues that can reasonable be expected to be
raised by the registrant's financial statements, or experience ac-
tively supervising one or more person engaged in such activities;
(iv) An understanding of internal controls and procedures for fi-
nancial reporting; and
(v) An understanding of audit committee functions. 7
Under the Act, the SEC has directed the national securities exchanges
(that is, the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) to prohibit the listing of the securi-
ties of companies that do not have an audit committee that complies with the
requirements of the Act.
Both the NYSE and Nasdaq have adopted rules relating to corporate
governance standards that in some respects are stricter than the standards
included in the Act. For example, both the NYSE and Nasdaq rules require
that the nominating and compensation committees of public companies con-
sist solely of independent directors. Moreover, to empower non-
management directors, the rules of both NYSE and Nasdaq require non-
management directors to meet regularly and participate more directly in ap-
proval of related party transactions, the nomination of directors, and the de-
termination of CEO compensation.
Enhanced SEC Review of Periodic Reports and Enforcement Powers
The Act requires the SEC to review disclosures, including financial dis-
closure, made by public companies that have a class of securities listed on a
national securities exchange or Nasdaq "on a regular and systematic basis"
and, in any case, at least once every three years. This provision of the Act is
intended expressly to include review of the periodic filings of non-U.S. com-
panies.
The Act gives the SEC and the U.S. federal courts additional enforce-
ment and injunctive powers. For example, the SEC now has the power to
impose a forty-five-day freeze (which can be extended in some circum-
7. See Instruction to paragraph (h)(I) of Item 401 of Regulation S-K.
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stances) on extraordinary payments to a company's directors, officers, agents
or employees by a company that is under investigation.
In addition, the Act amends current law to permit a court, in an action
brought by the SEC, to prohibit a person who violates the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws from acting as an officer or director of a public
company when the conduct indicates the "unfitness," versus the current stan-
dard of "substantial unfitness," to serve as an officer or director. The SEC
may also issue orders to such effect in some circumstances.
THE ACT'S EFFECT ON DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
Certifications of Periodic Reports
Under the Act, the chief executive and chief financial officers of public
companies must comply with two separate certification requirements with
respect to their company's periodic reports filed with the SEC. The Act does
not indicate, and the SEC has provided no guidance as to, whether the two
separate certification requirements can be satisfied by use of one certifica-
tion. In addition, the NYSE's corporate governance rules require CEOs of
NYSE-listed companies to certify annually to the SEC as to their company's
compliance with NYSE corporate governance listing standards.
In the certification required by Section 906 of the Act, chief executive
officers and chief financial officers must certify in a written statement ac-
companying the filing of their company's period reports that:
" such periodic report "fully complies" with the requirements of Section
13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
* the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all mate-
rial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the com-
pany.
These certifications may not be qualified as being to the knowledge of
the officer giving the certifications. However, the officer is only subject to
criminal penalties when the officer has knowledge of the non-compliance.
The Act provides no guidance on what it means for the certification to "ac-
company" the report. The approach most commonly used to date has been to
file the certification as an exhibit to the report. Another approach is to file
the certification in a non-public EDGAR (the SEC's electronic filing system
for public companies) correspondence format along with the report, and to
concurrently file the certification with the SEC on a current report (Form 8-K
for domestic companies; Form 6-K for foreign private issuers).
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The Act makes it a federal crime, punishable by imprisonment, to make
a false certification. An officer who certifies that a report complies while
"knowing" that the report in fact does not comply, can be fined up to $1 mil-
lion or imprisoned up to 10 years. If this false certification is made "will-
fully," the officer may be fined up to $5 million and imprisoned for up to 20
years, or both. The Act does not address the consequences of failing to file
the certification or filing a certification that does not comply with the Act.
In addition, under Section 302 of the Act, pursuant to rules adopted by
the SEC and effective August 29, 2002, a public company's principal execu-
tive officer and principal financial officer must certify the contents of the
company's quarterly and annual reports. The certification must provide that
the officer has:
" reviewed the report;
" based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in or-
der to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances in which
they were made, not misleading;
" the officer and the other certifying officers of the company:
o are responsible for establishing and maintaining "disclosure
controls and procedures" for the company;
o have designed such disclosure controls and procedures to en-
sure that material information is made known to them;
o have evaluated the effectiveness of the company's disclosure
controls and procedures within 90 days of the date of the re-
port; and
o have presented in the report their conclusions about the effec-
tiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on
their evaluation;
* the officer and other certifying officers have disclosed to the company's
auditors and to the audit committee of the board:
o all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of inter-
nal controls which could adversely affect the company's abil-
ity to record, process, summarize and report financial data,
and have identified for the company's auditors any material
weaknesses in internal controls; and
o any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the com-
pany's internal controls; and
" the officer and other certifying officers have indicated in the report
whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in
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other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to
the date of their evaluation, including any corrective actions with respect
to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.
In connection with the adoption of Section 404 of the Act's rules con-
cerning management reports on internal controls and related auditor's attesta-
tion reports, the SEC amended the required certification regarding the ade-
quacy of disclosure controls and procedures. This certification requires the
evaluation of disclosure controls as of the end of the period covered by the
registrant's report under the Exchange Act. Moreover, the final rules
adopted by the SEC make clear that the certification relates to an evaluation,
not only of the issuer but also of its consolidated subsidiaries.8
Code of Ethics
Pursuant to the Act, the SEC adopted rules requiring all public compa-
nies, including non-U.S. companies, to disclose in their periodic reports
whether they have adopted a code of ethics for their senior financial officers.
The final rules, as adopted, extended this requirement to the issuer's princi-
pal executive officer, as well as its principal financial officer and principal
accounting officer or controller or officer with similar functions. If the com-
pany has not adopted a code, it is required to disclose the reasons why it has
not adopted a code, thus placing an onus on any company that fails to adopt a
code of ethics. Moreover, the Act requires a public company to immediately
disclose any change or waiver of any provision of a code of ethics for any
principal executive officer or senior financial officers on Form 8-K, or by
dissemination on the Internet or other electronic means.
In addition, the NYSE's and Nasdaq's corporate governance rules ex-
pand the requirements of the Act. These proposals contemplate the manda-
tory adoption of a code of ethics. These codes of ethics govern the conduct
of all directors, officers and employees of public companies listed on the
NYSE or Nasdaq and promptly disclose any waivers of the code for directors
and executive officers. Non-U.S. companies are exempt from the NYSE rule
and are also probably exempt from the Nasdaq requirement.
8. See Item 601 (b)(31) of Regulation S-K.
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Disgorgement of Bonuses and Profits
Under the Act, if the material noncompliance of the company with the
financial reporting requirements of the securities laws results from "miscon-
duct:"
* the Act "requires" a public company to restate its financials; and
" the CEO and CFO of the company must reimburse the company for any
bonus or other incentive or equity-based compensation received by the of-
ficer from the company during the twelve-month period following the first
public issuance or filing with the SEC of the financial information, as well
as any profits realized from the sale of securities of the company during
such period.
However, the Act does not provide any guidance regarding:
" how to determine whether the restatement resulted from the misconduct
(or what constitutes "misconduct"), or whose misconduct is relevant; or
" when such restatements are "required," as opposed to when they are dis-
cretionary by the company.
Companies and commentators are seeking clarification of these re-
quirements from the SEC.
The SEC has the authority to exempt any person from these provisions
and non-U.S. companies are expected to lobby to obtain exemptions for their
officers.
Prohibition on Personal Loans to Directors and Executive Officers
The Act makes it unlawful for any company, directly or indirectly, in-
cluding through a subsidiary, "to extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the
extension of credit, or to renew any extension of credit, in the form of a per-
sonal loan to or for any director or executive officer (or the equivalent
thereof)" of the company. Although most types of loans that have histori-
cally been made to management are now prohibited, the Act grandfathers
extensions of credit in place on the date of adoption of the Act (but not mate-
rial modifications thereto or renewals thereof). Among others, the Act pro-
hibits companies from making officer relocation loans and loans to officers
to enable them to purchase company equity. The application of the prohibi-
tion to some compensation arrangements (such as split dollar insurance poli-
cies) is currently unclear.
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Although many questions remain, some practitioners have focused on
the language of Section 402 of the Act and suggested that the prohibitions of
the Section apply only to transactions that meet two separate requirements:
* the transaction must take the form of a loan, and not merely be an exten-
sion of credit (such as an advance of funds for indemnification, or where
the intent is to confer a compensation benefit such as a tax indemnity pay-
ment); and
• the loan must be a "personal loan."
Under this view, a loan is not a "personal loan" if the primary purpose
of the loan is to advance the business of the company. This would exclude
business travel advances and use of company credit cards and company cars.
Under this view the following transactions would be permitted:
* travel and similar advances;
" personal use of a company credit card, if the individual is required to repay
within a reasonable period of time after the charges have been presented;
" personal use of a company car, if limited and ancillary to business use and
reimbursement is required to be settled within a reasonable period of time;
" relocation payments (treated the same as travel since primarily for a busi-
ness purpose);
" "stay" and "retention" bonuses subject to repayment, if they must be re-
paid and they are contingent upon employment or a similar condition;
" indemnification advances;
" deferred compensation in which an executive officer makes an "invest-
ment" (through deferring compensation) in an index or notational assets
with terms giving them a favorable return;
" tax indemnity for payments to overseas-based executive officers;
* loans from 401(k) plans;
" loans from annuities and other broad-based employee benefit plans; and
" "cashless" option exercises.
Acceleration of Section 16 Reporting Obligations
The Act amends the Exchange Act to require directors, officers, and ten
percent shareholders to disclose any change in their ownership of equity se-
curities before the end of the second business day following the day on
which the change in ownership occurs. The SEC has modified this deadline
[Vol. 28:3:605
150
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/1
2004] SARBANES-OXLEY: A PRIMER FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES 617
in the case of certain transactions where the insider does not select the date
of execution of the transaction resulting in the ownership change such as:
" transactions pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 (c) plans (which provide a safe harbor
from the antifraud provisions of Rule 10b5 under the Exchange Act) that
provide for purchases and sales triggered by the occurrence of certain
events; and
" specified transactions under employee benefit plans, such as fund-
switching transactions.
The Act also requires that insiders file electronically with the SEC the
forms disclosing changes in ownership within one year of the effective date
of the Act. The SEC is required to publish such statements on an Internet
accessible site no later than the end of the business day following the filing
and companies are required to put the statements on their corporate websites,
if they have one.
Improper Influence on Conduct of the Audit
The SEC has adopted rules making it unlawful for any officer or direc-
tor of a public company to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or
mislead any accountant for the purpose of rendering a company's financial
statements materially misleading. Rule 13b2-2 prohibits officers and direc-
tors of an issuer, and persons acting under their direction, from directly or
indirectly taking any action to coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently
influence any independent public or certified public accountant engaged in
the performance of an audit or review of the financial statements of that is-
suer that are required to be filed with the SEC if they knew or should have
known that such action, if successful, could result in rendering the issuer's
financial statements materially misleading. In the case of registered invest-
ment companies, the rule also covers officers and directors of the investment
advisor to the investment company and an investment company's sponsor,
depositor, trustee, and administrator.
Restrictions on Trades During Pension Plan Blackout Periods
The Act prohibits directors and executive officers from purchasing, sell-
ing, or otherwise acquiring or transferring any equity security acquired as
part of their compensation during a "blackout period." A "blackout period"
is a period designated by the company and applicable to not less than fifty
percent of the participants or beneficiaries in plans maintained by the com-
pany that prohibits trades during a period of more than three consecutive
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business days. The profits from any transactions made in violation of this
prohibition must be paid to the company. The Act provides a private right of
action to compel such payment or, if the company fails to bring suit within
60 days of a request, by a securityholder in the name of the company. Com-
panies must provide notice of blackout periods to the SEC, as well as to offi-
cers and directors of the company.
The Department of Labor will likely take additional regulatory action,
pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), that will require companies to provide notice to employees of
blackouts and may also prohibit discriminatory exercises by executives dur-
ing a blackout period.
IMPLICATIONS FOR AUDITORS
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
Under the Act, the SEC has established a five-member Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board ("Board"). The initial Board was appointed in
October, 2002. The SEC retroactively approved the Board's by-laws effec-
tive January 2003. (These by-laws were adopted by the Board on January 9,
2003 and amended on April 25, 2003.) Three of the Board's members must
be non-accountants and two members must be or have been certified public
accountants. All members must be "prominent individuals of integrity and
reputation." The SEC approved William J. McDonough, the former presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be chairman in May 2003.
Mr. McDonough's appointment followed the resignation of William H.
Webster as a result of concerns about his role as an audit committee member
of a financially troubled company.
The Board's jurisdiction extends to registered public accounting firms
and their associated persons. The Board does not regulate accounting firms
that perform services only for private companies.
The primary purpose of the Board is to:
* register public accounting firms;
* establish or adopt auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other
standings relating to the preparation of audit reports;
" conduct inspections of registered public accounting firms;
" conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings concerning registered
public accounting firms and associated persons; and
* enforce compliance with the Act, the Board's rules, professional stan-
dards, and the securities laws relating to the preparation of audit reports by
registered public accounting firms and associated persons.
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The Board members are authorized to propose rules and adopt auditing
and other professional standards subject to the approval and oversight of the
SEC.
Mandatory Registration with the Board
Every public accounting firm that prepares or issues, or participates in
the preparation or issuance of, any audit report with respect to any public
company must be registered with the Board. This requirement means that
any accounting firm that participates in the audit of a public company or one
of its consolidated subsidiaries must be registered. Mandatory registration
becomes effective 180 days after the date that the SEC determines that the
Board is capable of carrying out its obligations (which occurred on April 25,
2003). Non-U.S. public accounting firms that participate in audits of U.S. or
non-U.S. Sec reporting companies were granted an 180-day grace period and
must register by April 19, 2004.
The Board has developed a form application for registration. The regis-
tration application includes a "consent" to cooperation in and compliance
with any request for testimony or production of documents made by the
Board. The application also includes an agreement to secure similar con-
sents from each of the firm's "associated persons."
Although non-U.S. accounting firms are generally subject to the same
requirements as their U.S. counterparts, the Board's rules permit a certain
narrowing of the scope of the disclosure required of non-U.S. public account-
ing firms in the registration process such as:
* a non-U.S. public accounting firm is permitted to limit disclosure to the
associated accountants with status as proprietor, partner, principal, share-
holder, officer or manager of the firm, as opposed to all accountants in the
case of U.S. firms, and who provided at least ten hours of audit services to
an issuer client during the last calendar year; and
* a non-U.S. public accounting firm is permitted to withhold from its appli-
cation information prohibited from disclosure under a non-U.S. law, by
submitting 1) a copy in English of the conflicting non-U.S. law, 2) a legal
opinion regarding the conflict, and 3) an explanation regarding the appli-
cant's efforts to eliminate the conflict by seeking consents or waivers, if
applicable.
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Auditing, Quality Control, Ethics and Independence Standards
The Board's auditing standards must include at least the following stan-
dards for all registered public accounting firms:
" the firm must retain for at least seven years audit work papers and other
information in sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached in the
audit report;
* the Board may require the retention of records (not otherwise required) for
purposes of Board inspections; and
" the firm must provide a concurring or second partner to review and ap-
prove each audit report and must describe in each audit report the scope of
the auditor's testing of the internal control structure and procedures of the
public company and present, in its report or a separate report, the firm's
findings from such testing, an evaluation of the internal control structure,
and a description of material weaknesses in such internal controls and cir-
cumstances or instance of noncompliance with the Board's rules and stan-
dards.
Inspections, Investigations and Disciplinary Procedures
The Act requires the Board to conduct a program of inspections to as-
sess compliance by each registered public accounting firm and its associated
persons with the Act, and SEC and Board rules, and professional standards.
Board inspections replace the existing "peer review" system and must be
conducted annually for each registered firm that regularly provides audit
reports for more than 100 issuers and less often for other firms. The results
of these inspections will be available for public review, subject to the protec-
tion of confidential and proprietary information. However, no portion of the
report that contains criticism or defects in quality control systems shall be
made public if the firm addresses these criticisms or defects within twelve
months after the date of the inspection report.
Except to the extent discussed above, non-U.S. accounting firms that
sign audit reports for any SEC registrant are fully subject to the Act. In addi-
tion, accounting firms, even if they do not issue audit reports, but nonetheless
play a substantial role in the preparation and furnishing of reports for particu-
lar public companies, are also required to register with the Board. This ap-
pears to require all firms that audit subsidiaries of public companies, includ-
ing non-U.S. accounting firms, to register with the Board.
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Auditor Independence
A primary focus of the Act is auditor independence. To ensure an audi-
tor's independence the Act prohibits a company's auditors from concurrently
providing certain specified categories of services while also providing audit
services to the company, whether or not approved by the company's audit
committee. These services are:
" bookkeeping;
" financial information systems design and implementation;
" appraisal or valuation services;
" fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports;
" actuarial services;
" internal audit outsourcing services;
" management or human resources services;
" broker or dealer, investment adviser or investment banking services;
" legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and
" expert services unrelated to the audit.
The Board is authorized to exempt companies or audit firms from these
prohibitions on a case-by-case basis. Such exemptions would probably be
restricted to situations where the discontinuation of an auditor's non-audit
services would result in extreme hardship to the company.
The Act permits a company's auditors to perform any other non-audit
services (such as "tax services," which could encompass a broad range of
services) for the company, but only if approved in advance by the company's
audit committee. More broadly, the Act requires a public company's audit
committee to pre-approve audit and non-audit engagements by firms that
provide audit services to the company and to disclose the approval in the
company's periodic reports filed with the SEC. Under Rule 2-01(3)(1) an
accountant is not independent unless either:
" before the accountant is engaged by the issuer or its subsidiaries to render
an audit or non-audit service, the engagement is approved by the issuer's
audit committee, or
* the engagement to render the service is entered into pursuant to pre-
approval policies and procedures established by the audit committee of the
issuer, subject to:
o the requirement that the policies and procedures must be de-
tailed as to the particular service;
o the audit committee is informed of each service; and
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o such policies and procedures do not include delegation of the
audit committee's responsibilities to management.
The pre-approval process extends also to audit and non-audit services
provided by accounting firms other than the issuer's principal auditor. The
audit committee has no required role, however, regarding non-audit services
provided by a firm that is not involved in the audit of the SEC-filed financial
statements.
Under the rules, issuers must also disclose aggregate fees billed by their
accountants for audit services, audit-related services, tax services, and all
other services for each of the last two fiscal years. In addition, the rules re-
quire issuers to disclosure the audit committee's pre-approval policies and
procedures.
Auditor Reports to Company Audit Committees
The Act requires auditors that perform an audit for a public company to
report to the company's audit committee:
" the "critical accounting policies" and practices to be used in the audit;
* all "alternative treatments" of financial information permitted by GAAP
that have been discussed with management officials, the ramifications of
the use of the "alternative disclosures" and the treatment preferred by the
audit firm; and
" any other material written communications between the audit firm and the
company's management, such as a management letter or schedule of unad-
justed differences.
Other Provisions of the Act Affecting Auditors
In addition, the Act requires the rotation of 1) the lead (or coordinating
audit) partner who has primary responsibility for the audit or 2) the audit
partner who reviews the audit every five years. The Act also prohibits an
audit firm from auditing a company if the company's CEO, controller, CFO,
CAO, or any person serving in an equivalent position was employed by the
auditor and participated in any capacity in the audit of the company within
one year prior to the date of the initiation of the audit.
The SEC has also adopted rules under the Act regarding audit partner
rotation, reports to audit committees and the cooling-off period requirements,
and a rule relating to compensation of audit partners not mandated by the
Act. These rules:
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" require rotation of certain audit partners after five or seven years, depend-
ing on the partner's role in the audit engagement;
" prohibit compensation of audit partners based upon procuring non-audit
services for audit clients;
" require a one-year cooling-off period prior to employment by an issuer of
certain former members of the accountant's audit engagement team; and
" mandate that auditors and audit committees communicate about critical
accounting policies and alternative GAAP treatment for material items.
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
The Act protects employees of a public company who assist or partici-
pate in investigations by U.S. enforcement or regulatory authorities of certain
fraud-related activities. The Act provides for the payment of compensatory
and special damages to such employees and makes it a crime, punishable by
fine and up to ten years of imprisonment to retaliate against an employee
who provides truthful information to a law enforcement officer relating to the
commission or possible commission of a federal offense.
ATTORNEY PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The Act requires attorneys, including in-house and outside counsel, to
report evidence of corporate wrongdoing to the boards of directors of the
companies that they represent. Specifically, the Act requires attorneys to
report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduci-
ary duty to the company's general counsel or chief executive officer. If the
general counsel or CEO does not respond appropriately to the evidence, the
attorney must present the evidence to the company's board of directors, or
audit committee or other committee of the board of directors comprised
solely of directors who are not members of the issuer's management.
The SEC has adopted rules to implement Section 307's requirement for
the establishment of minimum standards of professional conduct for attor-
neys practicing before the SEC in the representation of issuers. These rules
go beyond the requirements of Section 307 and are arguably the most con-
troversial of all provisions adopted by the SEC to implement the Act.
The rules require covered attorneys who become aware of "credible
evidence" of a "material violation" on the part of the issuer or its agent to
report such evidence "up-the-ladder" within the issuer and to determine
whether an "appropriate response" has been undertaken. The final rules ex-
clude, the controversial requirement of "noisy withdrawal" from representa-
tion of the issuer and notification of the SEC if the issuer has not appropri-
ately responded to the attorney's report of the issuer's violation and permit
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the report of the perceived violation to a qualified legal compliance commit-
tee, if established by the issuer, as an alternative to "up-the-ladder reporting".
However, simultaneously with the adoption of the final rules, the SEC pro-
posed an alternative withdrawal and notification procedure that would re-
quire a covered attorney faced with "credible evidence" of a "material viola-
tion" to withdraw and notify the issuer. The issuer would be required to dis-
close the withdrawal and attendant "circumstances" to the SEC within two
business days on Form 8-K, 20-F or 40-F, as applicable.
The rules for the most part do not apply to non-U.S. attorneys and non-
practicing attorneys.
OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
Lengthening of Statute ofLimitations for Private Securities Fraud Actions
The Act extends the statute of limitations for private securities law
fraud actions to the earlier of two years (from one year) after the date of dis-
covery of the facts constituting the violation, or five years (from three years)
after the violation itself.
Securities Fraud Debt Not Dischargeable in Bankruptcy
The Act effects a change in U.S. bankruptcy law by providing that debts
incurred in violation of securities fraud laws, or as part of a common law
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, and that result
from a judgment, settlement, or other resolution of a judicial or administra-
tive proceeding, are no longer dischargeable in a U.S. bankruptcy proceed-
ing.
New Criminal Penalties
The Act makes it a crime under federal law to commit securities fraud
involving a public company. The Act provides for fines or imprisonment or
both for any person that knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a
scheme or artifice (i) to defraud any person in connection with any security
of a public company or (ii) to obtain by means of false pretenses, any money
or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any security of a pub-
lic company.
The Act also makes it a crime to destroy records in any federal investi-
gation or bankruptcy. The Act states that "whoever knowingly alters, de-
stroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any
record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct or
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influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case
filed under" the bankruptcy code, will be fined or imprisoned for not more
than twenty years or both.
Increased Federal Criminal Penalties
The Act increases the penalties for a "willful" violation by an individual
of the Exchange Act from a fine of up to $1 million to a fine of up to $5 mil-
lion, and from imprisonment of up to ten years to imprisonment up to twenty
years. The maximum fine for entities is increased from $2.5 million to $25
million.
The Act also increases the penalties for mail fraud and wire fraud from
a maximum of five years imprisonment to a maximum of twenty years im-
prisonment. In addition, the Act increases criminal penalties for violations of
ERISA from one year to ten years imprisonment, with additional increases in
the fines permitted.
Moreover, the Act extends these same penalties to persons who attempt
or conspire to commit an offense such as wire fraud, mail fraud, and securi-
ties fraud.
Disgorgement Fund
Section 308 of the Act authorizes the SEC to establish a disgorgement
fund using the civil monetary penalties and settlements in enforcement ac-
tions for securities law violations for the benefit of the victims of those viola-
tions.
Although the effective date of this provision is July 30, 2002, the SEC
has interpreted the Section's provisions to be applicable based on the date
that the funds are received. For example, the SEC has applied the $500 mil-
lion cash and $250 million stock settlement received as a civil penalty from
WorldCom in connection with the settlement approved by the court on July
7, 2003 of an action brought relating to the company's accounting fraud, an
event that pre-dated the enactment of the Act. The SEC has also announced
its intention to direct payments of $135 million and $125 million to be re-
ceived from J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc., respectively, to the
disgorgement fund. These payments relate to settlement of claims brought
by the SEC for these banks' roles in several structured finance transactions
of Enron and Dynergy (in the case of Citigroup) that were allegedly used to
distort the companies' financial picture.
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Research Analysts
Section 501 of the Act addresses concerns about conflicts of interests
that may arise when securities analysts recommend equity securities in re-
search reports and public appearances and seeks to enhance the objectivity of
research and provide investors with more useful and reliable information.
The rules adopted by the self-regulatory agencies and approved by the
SEC impose a number of restrictions designed to limit the ability of member
firms to use research to obtain investment banking business and to reduce
conflicts of interest that research analysts may have, either because of the
firm's investment banking business or because of personal relationships that
the analyst may have with the companies covered by the analyst, including
those relating to securities ownership.
Rating Agencies
Section 702 of the Act requires the SEC to conduct a study of the role
and function of credit rating agencies in the operation of the securities mar-
kets. The study's scope includes six areas:
* the credit agencies' role in evaluating issuers;
* the importance of that role to investors and the markets;
* any impediments to accurate appraisals by the agencies;
* any entry barriers to the credit agency business and measures needed to
remove those barriers;
* measures to improve dissemination of rating agency appraisals of issuers;
and
* conflicts of interest in rating agency operations and ameliorative measures.
SUMMARY OF IMMEDIATE CONCERNS
For Companies and Their Management
CEO/CFO Certifications
* Non-U.S. companies should immediately begin the internal process to
support certifications and review and revise internal control systems as ap-
propriate
* U.S. companies may require officers of their subsidiaries and divi-
sions to certify to the financial controls and results as they relate to their lo-
cal operations
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Loans to Directors and Executive Officers
* Prohibitions on loans and extensions of credit will have an immediate ef-
fect on management of public companies and will make it more difficult to
attract and retain top management personnel
* Exceptions to the Act's prohibition mitigate this burden for banks and
other financial institutions
" The impact on routine corporate extensions of credit is still uncertain but it
seems likely not to prevent:
o travel and similar advances
o use of company credit cars
o use of company cars
o relocation payments
o "stay" and "retention" bonuses
o indemnification advances
o deferred compensation arrangements
o tax indemnity loans to overseas-based executives
o 401(k) plan loans
Whistleblower Protection
* Management will need to review their personnel policies for possible
changes.
Forfeiture of Bonus and Share Trading Profits
" CEOs and CFOs of public companies could be made to reimburse the
company for any bonus or other incentive-based compensation, as well as
profits from the sale of company securities, received during the twelve-
month period following initial publication of financial statements required
to be restated as the result of material noncompliance with financial re-
porting requirements due to misconduct.
Restrictions on Trades During Pension Plan Blackout Periods
* The prohibition on trades made during benefit plan "black-out" periods
may cause companies to revise plan procedures for their management.
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Audit Committees
" Members of audit committees must be "independent" as defined in the
Act, significantly restricting the ability of committee members to receive
compensation from the company or be affiliated in any manner with the
company; and
" The entire board of directors of public companies that do not have an audit
committee will be considered the audit committee and thus subject to these
restrictions.
"Real Time" Disclosure
" An expanded Form 8-K may be used by public companies to report sig-
nificant events on a current (four days after occurrence) basis;
* Trend and qualitative information may be required to be included in a
company's MD& A.
Internal Controls Disclosure
" Public companies must establish and maintain an adequate internal control
structure and financial reporting procedure
* Management will be subject, both directly and indirectly, to the require-
ment to prepare internal controls reports
Pro Forma Financial Information
" The Act requires companies reporting results on a pro forma basis to rec-
oncile these results with financial results prepared in accordance with
GAAP
Extension of Statute of Limitation for Private Securities Actions
" Investors now have two years after the disclosure of an alleged fraud or
five years after the violation itself to initiate a suit based on violation of
Rule 1 Ob-5 of the Exchange Act, rather than the one and three year limits
that previously applied.
[Vol. 28:3:605
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For Audit Firms
Auditor Oversight Board
" Audit firms that audit SEC-registered companies will be required to be
registered with the Board;
* The Board may require by rule the registration of accounting firms that
audit subsidiaries and divisions of public companies or which otherwise
play a "substantial role" in the audits of such companies;
* The Board will adopt and administer accounting rules that auditors that are
registered with the Board will be required to follow.
Auditor Independence and Rotation
" Audit firms that audit a public company will be prohibited from providing
specified non-audit services to the companies they audit, and may only
provide other services with the consent of the audit committee;
* Such firms will also be required to rotate audit partners;
" Audit partners may no longer be compensated based on the generation of
non-audit service-related business from audit clients;
* Public companies will be restricted from employing their former auditors
within one year of such individuals' involvement in auditing the company.
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ANTHONY CHASE*
"The fresh look is always the fresh hope."
-Karl Llewellyn'
THE GREAT FEAR
A specter is haunting international politics-the specter of American
unilateralism.2 Robert Rubin, the highly regarded former United States
("U.S.") Secretary of the Treasury, told National Public Radio's Diane Rehm
that he hoped 2004 would bring a national debate over the country's "rela-
tively unilateralist policy," an approach to "how we deal with the rest of the
world" that is "not going to work but also creates an enormous antagonism
against the United States."3 At one level, anxiety about American unilateral-
ism simply expresses a desire that U.S. foreign policy, and the way it is ap-
plied, should be popular with as many nations as possible. And it would be
nice if some of those nations could more enthusiastically support American
policy, whether diplomatically, financially, or militarily.
At another level, the unilateralist critique covers concerns about an
American embrace of the doctrine of preemption or preventative wars 4 as
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida.
1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 510 (1960).
2. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL: AMERICA'S QUEST FOR
GLOBAL DOMINANCE (2003); SAUL LANDAU, THE PRE-EMPTIVE EMPIRE: A GUIDE TO BUSH'S
KINGDOM (2003); CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, ROGUE NATION: AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND THE
FAILURE OF GOOD INTENTIONS (2003). For a wide range of contributors with conflicting views
on the subject, see generally UNDERSTANDING UNILATERALISM IN AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Gwyn Prins ed., 2000) [hereinafter Prins]; UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (David M. Malone & Yuen Foong Khong eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Malone & Khong].
3. The Diane Rehm Show (WAMU radio broadcast, Dec. 2, 2003),
http://www.wamu.org/dr/2003/drarc_031201.html (audio commentary) (last visited Mar. 27,
2004).
4. Jeff Guntzel, Iraq Peace Team Briefing #2: Preemptive Strikes and International
Law, Aug. 27, 2002, http://www.iraqpeaceteam.org/pages/iptbriefing_2.html (last visited Mar.
27, 2004).
Addressing an enthusiastic crowd of West Point Military Academy graduates on June 1, 2002,
George W. Bush declared, "Our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and
resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend
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well as an abandonment of the long-standing U.S. commitment to the United
Nations ("U.N.") organization.5 Does the launching of preemptive wars re-
vealed a new and dangerous departure in American foreign policy? Has
American deployment of military force without U.N. Security Council sup-
port signaled that the U.S. has decided to undercut the premiere world peace
organization, an institution the U.S. played such a critical role in bringing
into existence? The purpose of this essay is to measure the current criticism
of American unilateralism against both the reality of contemporary politics
and the rules of international law.
our lives." The crowd roared. Bush was thinking about Iraq that morning. He was not think-
ing about international law.
Id.
5. See Richard Falk & David Krieger, Subverting the UN, THE NATION, Nov. 4, 2002,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/UnitedNations/Subverting_UN.html.
To save the UN from the [Bush] Administration's destructive and radical unilateralism, other
key nations will have to stand up to its bullying. France, Russia and China, because of their
veto power in the Security Council, could withhold legal authority for America to proceed to
war. Whether they will exercise this power, given the pressure they're under from the Ad-
ministration, remains to be seen .... If [the US] were to go ahead with war, it could deliver a
death knell not only to Iraq but also to the UN itself. It is emblematic of US global wayward-
ness that it is necessary to hope for a veto to uphold the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN
as a force for peace but to also be concerned that Administration threats of unilateral military
action could render the veto ineffective and thereby the role of the Security Council largely
meaningless.
Id. Within months, the fears of Falk and Krieger were realized. See Matthew Rothschild,
Bush Trashes the United Nations, THE PROGRESSIVE, April 2003,
http://www.progresive.org/april03/roth0403.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004); see also Mi-
chael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2003,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030501 faessay 11217/michael-j-glennon/why-the-security-
council-failed.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
[O]n March 5 [2003], France and Russia announced they would block any subsequent resolu-
tion authorizing the use of force against Saddam. The next day, China declared that it was tak-
ing the same position .... At this point it was easy to conclude, as did President Bush, that the
UN's failure to confront Iraq would cause the world body to "fade into history as an ineffec-
tive, irrelevant debating society." In reality, however, the council's fate had long since been
sealed. The problem was not the second Persian Gulf War, but rather an earlier shift in world
power toward a configuration that was simply incompatible with the way the UN was meant to
function. It was the rise in American unipolarity-not the Iraq crisis-that, along with cultural
clashes and different attitudes toward the use of force, gradually eroded the council's credibil-
ity.
Glennon, supra.
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FIRST STRIKE
The current language of "preemptive strikes" originates in American
political discourse immediately following the Second World War.6 Kenneth
Waltz observes that during the brief period when the U.S. alone possessed
nuclear weapons, it was debated whether we should "drop the bomb quickly
before the likely opponent in a future war has time to make his own."7 The
question remained unanswered on that summer afternoon in 1949 when news
arrived that the Soviets, within five months of the establishment of NATO,
had detonated an atomic device in Kazakhstan. On the one hand, such stra-
tegic thinking could lead to George C. Scott's hysterical antics in front of the
NORAD-like global positioning map in Stanley Kubrick's classic motion
picture, Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
Bomb (1964). On the other hand, one suspects that when India and Pakistan
periodically approach the brink of nuclear war over Kashmir, most Ameri-
cans hope the Pentagon has something up its sleeve, designed to preempt the
kind of atomic conflagration on the Indian subcontinent which, uncontrolled,
might finally produce Carl Sagan's legendary "nuclear winter."
But the most recent version of anti-preemption ideology was ably, even
nobly, offered by West Virginia Democrat, Robert C. Byrd, on the floor of
the U.S. Senate, in February, 2003.8 Undaunted by the drum beat of war or
the building momentum behind President Bush's Iraq invasion plan, Senator
Byrd deplored his colleagues' willingness to "stand passively mute" while
the country was dragged into a potentially disastrous war. "This nation,"
declared Byrd, "is about to embark upon the first test of a revolutionary doc-
trine."9 The senator did not hesitate to identify it: the doctrine of preemp-
tion, he asserted, "the idea that the United States or any other nation can le-
gitimately attack a nation that is not imminently threatening but may be
threatening in the future-is a radical new twist on the traditional idea of
self-defense.""° Not least was Byrd's concern that the preemption doctrine
"appears to be in contravention of international law and the UN Charter." "
6. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Good Foreign Policy a Casualty of War: Today, It Is We
Americans Who Live in Infamy, Los ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, at MI, available at
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0322-01.htm [hereinafter Schlesinger 1].
7. KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR 236 (rev. ed. 2001).
8. Senator Robert C. Byrd, Senate Remarks: We Stand Passively Mute, Feb. 12, 2003,
http://byrd.senate.gov/byrdspeeches/byrdspeeches_2003february/byrdspeeches_2003marc
h-list/byrd speeches_2003march list l.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
2004]
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Arthur Schlesinger heralded Byrd's comments, endorsed a plan to have
the senator's "doctrine of preemption" speech printed in the New York
Times as a "full-page advertisement," and decried the fact the U.S. was go-
ing to war "not because of enemy attack," but because of "the Bush Doctrine
of preventive war."'' 2  Like Byrd, Schlesinger saw the radical preemption
doctrine as representing "a fatal turn in U.S. foreign policy."' 3 Schlesinger
had himself argued the previous summer that "[o]ne of the astonishing events
of recent months is the presentation of preventive war as a legitimate and
moral instrument of U.S. foreign policy.' 14 Denied legitimacy, morality, and
any basis in law or the Charter of the U.N., how could such a "revolutionary
doctrine" have been adopted as the driving principle behind the deployment
of American troops abroad, in the Iraqi desert, very definitely in harm's
way? 5
In order to answer this question it is necessary to juxtapose, to the ad-
monitions of Byrd and Schlesinger, two interesting and widely-
acknowledged features of American political history. 16 First, as was fre-
quently observed at the time of the September 11, 2001, terrorist assault on
New York and Washington, Americans are hardly accustomed to having
their homeland attacked. 7 Whether as targets of bombers, missiles or civil-
ian aircraft transformed into missiles; this was something new and uncom-
fortable, and deeply traumatizing, for many thousands of Americans.8 The
territory of the U.S. and its possessions had not been attacked since the
bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941.19 And setting that devastating strike on
America's Pacific fleet to one side, the country had never been attacked, let
alone invaded, at least not since the British, our partners at the time in a not
so special relationship, rather unceremoniously burned the White House in
1814.20 Dolly Madison managed to save a full-length portrait of George
Washington from the flames.
Second, another common observation, provided for our purpose here by
Seymour Melman, is that "[t]he Permanent War Economy of the United
12. Schlesinger I, supra note 6.
13. Id.
14. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Immorality of Preventive War, Los ANGELES TiMES, Aug.
26, 2002, reprinted in History News Network, http://hnn.us/articles/924.html [hereinafter
Schlesinger II].
15. Id.
16. See Byrd, supra note 8; Schlesinger I, supra note 6.
17. See Schlesinger I, supra note 6.
18. Id.
19. See Schlesinger II, supra note 14.
20. See Press Release, White House Historical Association (Fall 1998),
http://www.whitehousehistory.org/10/subs/images-archives/j oumal4prerelease.pdf.
[Vol. 28:3:631
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States has endured since the end of World War II in 1945" and, indeed,
"[s]ince then the U.S. has been at war-somewhere--every year, in Korea,
Nicaragua, Vietnam, the Balkans, Afghanistan-all this to the accompani-
ment of shorter military forays in Africa, Chile, Grenada, Panama."'2 Like
Melman, Sidney Lens refers to "permanent war, ' 2 Carl Boggs to "milita-
~,,24rism,'2 and Chalmers Johnson to the "sorrows of empire. 2  In their classic
study of America's postwar economy, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy identify
defense spending as crucial to the maintenance of "monopoly capital" it-
self.2 5 In any event, when you add it all up, something has got to give. It
simply is not possible for a country virtually never to be attacked, go to war
only when attacked, and to be constantly at war. The weak link here is the
part about going to war only when attacked. It is true that America has at
least had the option of being isolationist throughout most of its history be-
cause it is a big country, bounded by two large oceans, and has thus been
relatively safe, at least until recently, from foreign navies or the armies of
God. It is also true that the U.S. has been almost constantly at war with
someone somewhere for the past sixty years. To suggest that going to war
before the fight has a chance to come to you is somehow un-American, how-
ever, or more politely is "against the American grain," is just not supported
by the historical record.26
PERMANENT WAR
Anyone who has seen Frank Capra's compelling World War II-era
documentary film series, Why We Fight, knows that there appeared to be
some pretty compelling reasons for American soldiers being sent to fight in
Europe, even though nobody in Europe had attacked the U.S. Capra's argu-
ment was simple and straightforward, designed specifically for young sol-
diers about to be sent into combat: we fight now in order to prevent some-
thing a lot worse later. Who can forget Capra's globe drenched in totalitar-
ian domination-like a can of paint dumped on the free world-smothering
21. Seymour Melman, They Are All Implicated in the Grip of a Permanent War Econ-
omy, COUNTERPUNCH, http://www.counterpunch.org/melman03152003.html (Mar. 15, 2003).
22. See SIDNEY LENS, PERMANENT WAR: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA (1987).
23. See CARL BOGGS, MASTERS OF WAR: MILITARISM, AND BLOW BACK IN THE ERA OF
AMERICAN EMPIRE (2003).
24. See CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE
END OF THE REPUBLIC (2004).
25. See PAUL A. BARAN & PAUL M. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL: AN ESSAY ON THE
AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER (1966).
26. See LENS, supra note 22; BOGGS, supra note 23; JOHNSON, supra note 24; BARAN &
SWEEZY, supra note 25.
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our rights and liberties under a flood of fascist conquest? Not exactly "a
wonderful life" to look forward to-so that's why we fight.27
Not just Korea and Vietnam, but the whole of the Cold War was fought
not in self-defense, conventionally understood, but to prevent or preempt the
communists from gaining a foothold in the Western Hemisphere (Cuba), or
another foothold in the Western Hemisphere (Nicaragua), or to try to keep
that first domino from falling (China today, Japan tomorrow), or the second
(Vietnam, then Laos and Cambodia), or to prevent our allies from realizing
we could not be trusted to keep our word or our international commitments.
Americans were prepared to do whatever we had to abroad, now, in order to
prevent being forced to live under the communist jackboot, at home, later.
One of the last great theatrical events of the Cold War was the costly ABC
television miniseries, "Amerika," which not only lost twenty million dollars
but also somehow failed to explain how the Russians were able to take over
the U.S. without a fight.2 The part of the script where, finally, Americans
take up arms in the actual defense of the homeland, of American territory-a
real war rather than more of the same endless worldwide preemptive skir-
mishing-was simply lost, or redacted, or erased, like the famous 18.5 min-
ute gap in Richard Nixon's tapes. Whatever else the doctrine of preemption
or preventative war may be it is not, as Senator Byrd described it, revolution-
ary.29 And, contrary to Arthur Schlesinger, it is not something invented by a
former owner of the Texas Rangers baseball team.
The point, obviously, is not that the doctrine of preemption is moral or
legal or even necessary-just that it is neither new nor something foreign to
the American experience. Despite their recent potshots at Bush administra-
tion foreign policy, Byrd and Schlesinger know this perfectly well. Senator
Byrd, after all, was a supporter of the Vietnam War in spite of the fact the
Vietnamese had not landed sampans on Redondo Beach.3" Byrd, like strate-
gic policy planners in the Johnson and Nixon administrations, justified the
brutal American war in Southeast Asia as a mission to prevent Vietnam, and
then its neighbors, from falling to communism. Secretary of State, Dean
Rusk, described the Vietnamese as merely "stalking horses" for Red China.
Never mind the fact, as it turned out, that the only domino to fall after Saigon
27. See JOSEPH MCBRIDE, FRANK CAPRA: THE CATASTROPHE OF SUCCESS (St. Martin's
Griffin 2000) (1992).
28. See Anthony Chase, Historical Reconstruction in Popular Legal and Political Cul-
ture, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1969, 2009-11 (1994).
29. Byrd, supra note 8; see also Paul J. Nyden, Byrd Questions War Spending Request,
THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 23, 2003, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines
03/0923-12.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004)
30. Id.
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was the genocidal regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia, to which the Vietnamese
communists mercifully put an end.3
Schlesinger warned readers of the Los Angeles Times, in 2002, that by
"using his weaponry, [Saddam] Hussein would give the U.S. president his
heart's desire: a reason the world would accept for invading Iraq and enforc-
ing 'regime change."' 3 2 He also alerted members of Britain's Royal Institute
of International Affairs in 1998 to the fact that, in the U.S., the "isolationist
impulse has risen from the grave in what has always been its essential pro-
gramme - unilateralism."33  Thankfully, Charles William Maynes, joining
Schlesinger at Chatham House in 1998, assured the Royal Institute that "no
country in history has been able to maintain a hegemonic position without a
degree of ruthlessness in its international policies that would be profoundly
distasteful to the American people."34 Distasteful to the American people,
perhaps, but not to Arthur Schlesinger, not when in government.
As an assistant to President Kennedy, Schlesinger was much less skep-
tical of unilateralism, the doctrine of preemption, and "regime change." Al-
though Cheddi Jagan, the socialist Prime Minister of Guyana, met personally
with Kennedy in Washington and assured him that Guyana had no interest in
becoming a Russian base, Schlesinger nevertheless advised the President, as
Jagan later recalled, "that the way to remove from the government my party,
which had won three successive elections, was to change our traditional first-
31. See Nyden, supra note 29. "Byrd again referred to the Vietnam War, which he sup-
ported at the time." Id.
But who was the aggressor in Vietnam .... The Sino-Soviet split became so evident by the
mid-1960s that even the most militant Cold Warriors had to take notice. Perhaps the "enemy"
was China, and Dean Rusk conjured up the frightening image of a billion Chinese armed with
hydrogen bombs.
John Garry Clifford, Vietnam in Historical Perspective (1975), excerpted from John Gary
Clifford, Change and Continuity in American Foreign Policy Since 1930, in PATHS TO THE
PRESENT: INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (James 1. Patterson ed., 1975),
http://www.ecfs.org/projects/fieldston57/since40/units/unit4/supplements/cliff-vietnam.htm
(last visited Mar. 27, 2004). "Containment continued during the 1960s, when the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations escalated US military intervention against the advance of Viet-
namese communism, which they believed was a stalking-horse for Chinese imperialism in
Southeast Asia." Jeffrey Record, Thinking About China and War, AEROSPACE POWER J.,
http:// www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/winOl/record.html (last visited
Apr. 4, 2004). See generally GABRIEL KOLKO, ANATOMY OF A WAR: VIETNAM, THE UNITED
STATES, AND THE MODERN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE (The New Press 1994) (1985).
32. Schlesinger II, supra note 14.
33. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Unilateralism in Historical Perspective, in
UNDERSTANDING UNILATERALISM IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 18, 24 (Gwyn Prins ed.,
2000).
34. Charles William Maynes, Two Blasts Against Unilateralism, in UNDERSTANDING
UNILATERALISM IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 30, 39 (Gwyn Prins ed., 2000).
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past-the-post district electoral system., 35 In the event, it was the Central In-
telligence Agency that did the heavy lifting in removing Jagan's government,
but Schlesinger seemed much less concerned, at that time, about unilateral
"regime change" than now.36 Schlesinger's own account of these events, in
his memoir of the Kennedy presidency, 37 does not differ materially from that
of Jagan, a democratically-elected national leader who lost his job because of
an American wish to preempt any possibility of his moving farther to the left,
down the road.3 8 Although Arthur Schlesinger, in 2003, found rather thin the
Bush/Rumsfeld case for Iraq's representing an imminent threat to the U.S.,
there has of course never been even a remote possibility that Guyana could
launch a military strike against the U.S. 39 But for psychotic cult leader Jim
Jones, most Americans would probably never have heard of Guyana. Never-
theless, whatever eventuality was to be prevented, even John F. Kennedy
believed in the doctrine of preemption.
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
More rigorously if less accessibly, debate over the legitimacy of pre-
emptive war is fought out by international lawyers within the doctrinal ter-
rain of what is called "anticipatory self-defense."4 Arthur Schlesinger, who
has at least heard of the term, proves once again that a little knowledge can
be a dangerous thing. "The president has adopted a policy," warns
Schlesinger, "of 'anticipatory self-defense' that is alarmingly similar to the
policy that imperial Japan employed at Pearl Harbor on a date which, as an
earlier American president said it would, lives in infamy."' This from the
35. Cheddi Jagan, Is Guyana to be Another Vietnam? (1968), at http://www.jagan.org/
articles2i.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
36. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Unilateral Preventative War: Illegitimate and Immoral, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 21, 2002, http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/UPWIaI.html; see
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE
774-79 (1965) [hereinafter SCHLESINGER 111].
37. See SCHLESINGER III, supra note 36.
38. See CHEDDI JAGAN, THE WEST ON TRIAL: MY FIGHT FOR GUYANA'S FREEDOM
(1966); JOHN PLATrS-MILLS, MUCK, SILK AND SOCIALISM: RECOLLECTIONS OF A LEFT-WING
QUEEN'S COUNSEL 399-417 (2001).
39. Schlesinger I, supra note 6.
40. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 71-79 (1993); YEHUDA Z. BLUM, FOR ZION'S SAKE 174-89 (1987); RICHARD J.
ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM 136-50 (1989); JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 115-17 (1894); T.J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
609-10 (6th ed. 1910).
41. Schlesinger 1, supra note 6.
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taciturn, bow tie-wearing, Democratic historian of the New Deal? When
British Labour Party leader Tony Benn pushed his loyal phalanx of support-
ers further to the left, in spite of the fact that Margaret Thatcher, the "Iron
Lady," and her right-wing conservative colleagues waited menacingly just
over the horizon, impatient to bury the coal miners' union along with the rest
of the British welfare state, historian Eric Hobsbawm suggested the wily
Benn had "lost [his] marbles."42  American anti-war protestors from the
1960s, instructed at the time by cautious liberals like Professor Schlesinger,
never to employ sheer hyperbole in their denunciation of American policy
(like referring to President Lyndon Johnson as a "fascist pig"), must now be
shaking their heads in disbelief as a roller derby of cat's-eyes, boulders, and
steely shooters come careening off Schlesinger's atrophied brow.
First, the Japanese did not attack Pearl Harbor in anticipation of an im-
minent attack on Japan by the U.S. Navy-indeed the "reasoning of Japan's
leaders was that the United States had little effective power in the western
Pacific."43 More than that, Japan's wartime goals were primarily economic.
The Japanese "strategy was to carve out an area within which economic self-
sufficiency would be possible and to defend it until the United States tired of
war."" So the legal doctrine of anticipatory self-defense could not be made
to fit the facts in the Pacific in 1941. Second, Schlesinger would have been
on firmer ground had he attributed the anticipatory self-defense argument to
the Nazis: Hermann Goring, in fact, sought to justify at Nuremberg the
German occupation of the Rhineland by claiming it constituted merely "mo-
bilization measures in ... case of an attack on Germany. 4 5 Germany's inva-
sion of Europe, in G6ring's account, was carried out "from the very begin-
ning only in the interest of defense., 46 Third, the issue is not whether the
anticipatory self-defense argument can be misused-Schlesinger, a staunch
defender of Arkansas lawyer, Bill Clinton, should know by now that any
legal argument can be misused. But that is not a reason for abandoning the
law. The issue is whether in a given set of circumstances, a state's use of
force meets the requirements of an anticipatory self-defense argument.
Fourth, Schlesinger not only fails to convey a sense of what rules govern the
doctrine's application but makes it sound as if it is just another excuse for a
policy of "anything goes." That is not true. Finally, one would never glean
from Schlesinger the knowledge that anticipatory self-defense doctrine's
42. TONY BENN, THE END OF AN ERA: DIARIES 1980-90, at 250 (Ruth Winstone ed.,
1992).
43. JOHN K. FAIRBANK ET AL., EAST ASIA: TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION 721 (1973).
44. Id. at 720.
45. MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 1945-46, at 128 (1997).
46. Id. at 129.
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basic formulation not only comes from American jurisprudence but is actu-
ally more than 150 years old.
"The classic illustration of this right of anticipatory self-defense," ob-
serve Anthony Arend and Robert Beck, "was the Caroline case., 47 Leaving
the facts of the case to one side, it was Secretary of State Daniel Webster,
who in 1842 in a note to Britain's Lord Ashburton, coined the language that
became the test for when a state can legitimately engage in anticipatory self-
defense.48 In short, "customary international law recognized a right of an-
ticipatory self-defense provided the conditions of necessity and proportional-
ity were met."'49 Philip C. Jessup makes the interesting point that the Caro-
line test "is obviously drawn from consideration of the right of self-defense
in domestic law ... [but] [i]t is an accurate definition for international law."5°
And just as an individual, under domestic criminal law, need not wait until
he has been killed before he is legally allowed to defend himself against im-
minent deadly force, states need not wait until they have been bombed or
their borders transgressed before they initiate a proportionate defense. This
point of law has frequently been echoed in comments by President Bush to
the effect that the U.S. need not wait for an attack like the one on the World
Trade Center in order to be able to defend itself against terrorism."
THE END OF HISTORY
Beyond his rejection of preemption/anticipatory self-defense, there was
another extraordinary claim made in Senator Byrd's February 2003 anti-war
speech.52 He argued that unilateral American action against Iraq violated
international law and the U.N. Charter.5 3 It is, in fact, the decision by the
Bush administration to invade Iraq without prior approval from the U.N.
Security Council-indeed, in the face of a certain French veto-that has led
47. AREND & BECK, supra note 40, at 72.
48. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 42-43
(1963); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 105-06 (2000); 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, PEACE 298 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
49. AREND & BECK, supra note 40, at 72.
50. PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 164 (1948).
51. See Robert Kagan, On to Phase II, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2001,
http://www.ceip.org/files/publications/wpost I 12701.asp.
Saddam and his regime pose a direct and unacceptable threat to the United States. And there-
fore the United States has the right to take preemptive action. America need not wait 'for ter-
rorists to try to strike us again,' the president said recently. We can take 'the fight to the en-
emy.'
Id.
52. Byrd, supra note 8.
53. Id.
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so many administration critics to argue that the U.S. has effectively buried
the most important international organization ever created. To adequately
evaluate this argument, it will be necessary to situate recent American his-
tory in its proper relationship to international law and the practice of the U.N.
And to do that, it is essential to briefly survey the background of world poli-
tics, if you will, and the contours of modem American foreign policy.
If the U.S. found itself almost continuously at war, from Pearl Harbor
through the fall of communism, the end of the Cold War suggested the pos-
sibility that a very different kind of world was just over the horizon. Every-
one discussed how best to spend the "peace dividend." When the U.N., with
most of its member states on the same page, launched a military intervention
in Kuwait in 1991, it was the U.N.'s first real military mission since the Ko-
rean War. When the effort succeeded, and Iraqi troops were ejected from
Kuwait, it seemed a new day had dawned. The U.N., it was argued, had fi-
nally fulfilled the dream of San Francisco and Dumbarton Oaks. Former
Reagan administration advisor, Francis Fukuyama, went so far as to suggest
this new world represented, perhaps, "the end of history. 5 4 With both fas-
cism and communism decisively defeated by western liberalism by the close
of the twentieth century, grand theorists might be forgiven for having jumped
to the conclusion that seemingly intractable conflicts dominating the past
century had finally been resolved.
Extending an inchoate, certainly uneven, human rights doctrine, how-
ever, into Yugoslavia at the point of a gun, the Clinton administration caused
some to fear that America could not necessarily be trusted to use its rela-
tively uncontested, world class military power wisely. "In the midst" of
NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia, Charles William Maynes recounts, he
"had the occasion to ask the Secretary-General of NATO in public to cite the
source for the legality of NATO's decision to attack another country."55 The
only response he got was that members of NATO had endorsed the action.56
Worse still, it was believed the U.S. might have bombed a pharmaceutical
plant in Sudan, certainly based upon flimsy intelligence, in an effort to dis-
tract domestic focus from the President's personal political problems. When
President Clinton unleashed a bombing campaign against Baghdad on the
eve of a Congressional vote to impeach him, a chorus of critics accused the
President of "wagging the dog"--that is, of manufacturing a military crisis
abroad to divert attention from the Lewinsky scandal.5 "I would like to
54. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (2d ed. 1993).
55. Maynes, supra note 34, at 36.
56. Id.
57. See Anthony Chase, Elections and Party Politics, in COLUMBIA COMPANION TO
AMERICAN HISTORY ON FILM (Peter C. Rollins ed., 2004).
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think that no American president would even consider using the military to
help him remain in office," observed House Majority Leader Richard Armey,
a Texas Republican, but he continued, "the fact that Americans are express-
ing these doubts shows that the president is losing his ability to lead."58
Operating under the umbrella of NATO peacekeeping, the U.S. did not
seem to believe it needed U.N. Security Council permission to deploy force
against the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic. The desire to extend
American might, however, has increased exponentially with the terrorist at-
tacks of September 11, 2001. Clearly prepared to use whatever force might
be required, the U.S. invaded and conquered first Afghanistan, then Iraq, in
quick succession. Despite majority opposition within the Secretary Council
and warnings from Secretary General Kofi Annan that the U.N. might soon
follow the League of Nations into the dustbin of history, the U.S. invaded
Iraq, backed only by a "coalition of the willing," and briefly raised an
American flag over Baghdad the day the capital city was taken. In June
2003, the British Broadcasting Company reported that, based on polling re-
sults, eighty-one percent of Russians and sixty-three percent of the French
opposed the U.S. attack on Iraq.59 In both Jordan and Indonesia, the U.S.
was regarded as more dangerous than al-Quaida, and in nations as diverse as
Canada, Brazil, France, and South Korea, the U.S. was perceived to be more
dangerous than Iran, Syria, or both. 60 Germans, according to the authorita-
tive news magazine, Der Spiegel, considered George Bush to be more dan-
gerous to world peace than Saddam Hussein.61
While the U.S. occupation of Iraq dragged on during the summer of
2003 and American soldiers were killed in sniper or mortar attacks, debate
raged on both sides of the Atlantic over why no weapons of mass destruction
had yet been found and whether President Bush and British Prime Minister
Tony Blair had leveled with trusting citizens, prior to launching hostilities,
about the actual threat to Atlantic security posed by Saddam Hussein. If
Democratic Senator John Kerry called for "regime change" in the U.S. dur-
ing the war, another Democrat (and, briefly, presidential hopeful) Senator
Bob Graham hinted that impeachment might be appropriate if Bush could be
58. Bill Sammon, Clinton Unleashes Missiles on Iraq, Stalling House Vote to Impeach
Him, WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 17, 1998, (quoting Richard Armey), http://www.mega.nu:8080/amp
/stonewall boguswar.html.
59. Poll Suggests World Hostile to US (BBC TWO news broadcast, June 16, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2994924.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
60. Id.
61. Umfrage Zum Weltfrieden: Deutsche halten Bush fir gefdnrlicher als Saddam,
SPIEGEL ONLINE POLITIK, Feb. 14, 2003, at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,
235071,00.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
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shown to have intentionally lied about Iraq's nuclear threat in his State of the
Union address.62 Fletcher School professor, Michael J. Glennon, writing the
lead essay in the Summer 2003 issue of Foreign Affairs, announced what
then seemed increasingly obvious: the U.N. experiment was over.63 "With
the dramatic rupture of the UN Security Council," wrote Glennon, "it be-
came clear that the grand attempt to subject the use of force to the rule of law
had failed."'
While the subsequent capture of Saddam Hussein by U.S. forces pro-
vided the Bush administration a brief respite from criticism of post-war U.S.
policy in Iraq, it did not lead to any sort of let up in the mounting U.S. death
toll. American service men and women continued to be killed almost every
day by an Iraqi resistance that no longer appeared dependent upon Saddam
Hussein for either strategic planning or inspiration. Turning his father's late-
term political situation upside down, George W. Bush and his advisors hoped
that an improving economy could still snatch victory from the jaws of defeat,
that domestic success could trump the perception of international failure and
thus secure a Republican return, by however narrow a margin, to the White
House for another four years. But with continued European refusal to sig-
nificantly aid the effort to build "democracy" in Iraq coupled with American
denial of reconstruction contracts to private firms from nations that President
Bush regarded as having earlier blocked America's path to war, the unilater-
alist tone to American foreign policy remained. Unchecked by the U.N. and
seemingly indifferent to international law, the U.S. had become, if not a
rogue state then, at least, a cowboy state, feared and disliked by many, in-
cluding some former allies, around the globe. It was this state of affairs that
former-Secretary Bob Rubin hoped would be seriously debated in the 2004
presidential election campaign.
GRAND STRATEGY
Was there a method to what, at least, several Democratic presidential
contenders and some leading European diplomats regarded as a form of
madness? Was there any sort of political or historical backdrop against
which American foreign policy in the new century could be made to make
some kind of sense or reveal a plan or strategy, of sorts? And what should be
62. Glen Johnson, Kerry Says US Needs Its Own 'Regime Change, 'BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
3, 2003, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0403-08.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2004); Graham Defends Argument for Impeachment, CNN.cOM, July 27, 2003), at
http://www.cnn.com/2003ALLPOLITICS/07/27/ graham.impeach/.
63. See Glennon, supra note 5.
64. Id. at 16.
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the proper relationship, anyway, between foreign policy goals and interna-
tional legal rules?
Public international law is a norm, a set of standards, rules for govern-
ing the conduct of states in their relations with other states.65 That is why it
is alternatively referred to as international law or "the law of nations. 66 But
it is not a political strategy, a set of goals and purposes animating foreign
policy. International law is, rather, a framework within which a strategy is
mounted. Liddell Hart, Richard Rosecrance, and Arthur A. Stein describe
grand strategy as a military policy combined with other elements of national
strength. Yet they go further and, relying on strategic theorists like Richard
Howard and Paul Kennedy, argue that grand strategy encompasses "the ad-
aptation of domestic and international resources to achieve security for a
state. 67 They specifically underline the "necessity of including domestic
politics and economics in any broad calculus of grand strategy. 68
Consider the domestic economic and political angle first. One of the
most fruitful theories of social development was given comprehensive state-
ment in the work of historical sociologist Barrington Moore. In his land-
mark, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Moore sketches "with
broad strokes the major features of each of the three routes to the modern
world., 69 The first route "combined capitalism and parliamentary democracy
after a series of revolutions: the Puritan Revolution, the French Revolution,
and the American Civil War."7 One of the distinguishing aspects of these
early modernizers-Britain, France, the U.S.-was the strength of "a group
of the middle class," or as economist Kohachiro Takahashi put it, "the class
of free and independent peasants and the class of small-and middle-scale
commodity producers."'" This is the route to modern industrial society that
Moore calls that "of bourgeois revolution, a route that England, France, and
the United States entered at succeeding points in time with profoundly dif-
ferent societies at the starting point. "72 Moore is quick to point out that the
second path to modernization "was also a capitalist one, but, in the absence
65. Public International Law, International Committee for Human Rights,
http://www.ichr-law.org/english/expertise/areas/pil.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
66. Id.
67. Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy, in THE DOMESTIC BASIS OF GRAND
STRATEGY 4, (Richard Rosecrance & Arthur A. Stein eds., 1993).
68. Id. at 5.
69. BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 413
(1966).
70. Id.
71. Kohachiro Takahashi, A Contribution to the Discussion, in THE TRANSITION FROM
FEUDALISM TO CAPITALISM 68, 94 (Rodney Hilton, ed., 2d ed. 1976).
72. MOORE, supra note 69.
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of a strong revolutionary surge, it passed through reactionary political forms
to culminate in fascism. ' 73 Here, Moore is describing the characteristic de-
velopment of Germany and Japan. And following Max Weber's "conflict in
the two ways of capitalist activity," Takahashi also contrasts social develop-
ment in Western Europe with that of Prussia and Japan where "the erection
of capitalism under the control and patronage of the feudal absolute state was
in the cards from the very first."74 The third and final route observed Moore,
in 1966, "is of course the communist one.
' 75
In Law & History, The Evolution of the American Legal System,7 6 the
reader will find a much more systematic and fully explained rendition of this
particular approach to history-the periodization over three centuries of an
unfolding dialectic of bourgeois transformation, the map of how a particular
approach to modern industrial society worked itself out in legal terms in the
U.S. What is important here, however, is simply to stress the progressive
and liberal capitalist nature of American society and politics, the particular
form taken in this country by what Rosecrance and Stein refer to as the do-
mestic bases of grand strategy. Given American liberal, rather than authori-
tarian, capitalist "path dependence," how did this domestic orientation shape
American grand strategy over the past century.?
77
Immanuel Wallerstein characterizes the First and Second World Wars
as part of one long conflict: "the end of the First World War represented far
more a truce in a 'thirty years' war' than a definitive victory for the Allies. 78
"Germany had lost a battle in its struggle with the US to be the successor
hegemonic power to Great Britain" but, Wallerstein concludes, "it had not
yet lost the war.",79 Two decades later, the U.S. entered into a strategic alli-
ance with the Soviet Union in order to defeat fascism. In so doing, the U.S.
adopted a "left of center" international position.8" "When Germany moved
definitively 'right' under the Nazis," asserts Wallerstein, "it isolated itself
diplomatically and allowed the US to construct the worldwide diplomatic
'popular front' which would ultimately make possible final victory in the
73. Id.
74. Takahashi, supra note 71, at 94-95.
75. MOORE, supra note 69.
76. ANTHONY CHASE, LAW AND HISTORY: THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM (1997).
77. See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE
ECONOMY (1994).
78. Immanuel Wallerstein, The USA in the World Today, in THE POLITICS OF THE WORLD-
ECONOMY 69 (1984).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 71.
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'thirty years' war' of 1914-45."8I More recently, constitutional lawyer Philip
Bobbitt has similarly regarded the First and Second World Wars as encom-
passed within one "Long War," a war that "could not have ended so long as
fascism was alive in a great power., 82 "Resolute actions might have deterred
Germany for a time; absent such actions,' 83 in Bobbitt's view, "the tempo-
rary stalemate of Versailles was bound rapidly to end in violence. 84 How
different was the view from Washington during the years immediately fol-
lowing the Second World War-with fascism defeated (in fact, prosecuted in
court) and communism on the rise in Asia and enjoying a newly-won pres-
tige in Europe due to the central role played by communists in a range of
bold, if rarely militarily significant, anti-fascist resistance movements during
the war. In terms of the international political picture, argues Wallerstein,
"the US emerged as the uncontested hegemonic power."85 "Furthermore,
there were no longer any significant 'rightist' governments among the core
states. 86 Thus, grand strategy took another turn. "[T]he US," says Waller-
stein, "quickly shifted therefore from being 'left of center' to being the leader
of a 'free world' alliance against the world left."87 So just as the United
States had assumed a position "left of center" in the 1930s, when it became
apparent that fascism would be the main enemy for the foreseeable future,
the U.S. took up an international stance "right of center" once the fascist
threat had been eliminated.88
While in the sweep of history, the fall of communism in 1989 may still
deserve to be categorized as "current events," it seems clear from the present
vantage point that the twists and turns of American grand strategy have al-
ready found expression in the post-communist world. Turning the "reverse
course" (as it was called when the U.S. occupation policy in postwar Japan
shifted to the right) on its head, the U.S. positioned itself "left of center" after
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, i.e., once the communist threat had
been eliminated. The U.S. has gone to war three times since 1989: twice
against Saddam Hussein's Iraq and once again Slobodan Milosevic's Yugo-
slavia. While Hussein called upon all Muslims to resist American imperial-
ism's effort to destroy Islam and Milosevic, in fact, directed his "ethnic
81. Id.
82. PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF
HISTORY 37 (2002).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Wallerstein, supra note 78, at 71.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See generally CHASE, supra note 76, at 197-202.
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cleansing" against the ethnically-Muslim Albanian Kosovars in Yugoslavia,
the two regimes had something crucial in common, even beyond constituting
totalitarian dictatorships: they were both ideologically neofascist. Historian
Walter Laqueur, in his exhaustive annotation of sources on fascism, produces
Saddam Hussein as the essential contemporary neofascist, and as mundane a
source as an online student encyclopedia cites Saddam Hussein, along with
France's Jean-Marie LePen and Russia's Vladimir Zhirinovsky, as prominent
examples of neofascist political leaders.89 The latter reference adds to the
neofascist list "the Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Seselj."9 The
Serbian Radical Party, supported by deposed Yugoslavian President, Slobo-
dan Milosevic, sponsored paramilitary forces in the Bosnian war and is even
farther to the right than Milosevic's party. After receiving about a quarter of
the votes cast in the autumn 2002 Serbian presidential elections, Seselj was
indicted for crimes against humanity and jailed by the war crimes tribunal in
the Hague. Nevertheless, at the end of December, 2003, Slobodan Milosevic
"and another U.N. war crimes suspect [Vojislav Seselj] won seats in Serbia's
parliament as [the] extreme nationalist [Serbian Radical] party swept week-
end elections."'" If the U.S./NATO intervention in Yugoslavia managed to
secure its main aim, the protection of Albanian Kosovars from genocidal
brutality administered by the country's Serb majority, it has clearly failed to
dissuade the Yugoslavian people from endorsing the parliamentary politics
of neofascist war criminals.
Identifying the fundamental domestic basis of American grand strategy,
following Rosecrance and Stein, it seems clear the U.S. has employed con-
ventional balance of power tools to defend the social and economic founda-
tions of the liberal capitalist state. In a nutshell, American grand strategy
over the past century can be characterized in terms of a shift to the left (com-
bating imperial Germany at the front end of the Long War, making the world
"safe for democracy"), a shift to the right (engaging the Red Army in Russia
in 1918), a shift left (diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union during
Roosevelt's New Deal and a wartime "popular front" to defeat fascism), a
shift right (the Cold War), and finally, or at least most recently, another shift
back to the left (America at war with neofascism in Eastern Europe and the
89. Neofascism, BRITANNICA CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=409628 (last visited Mar. 27, 2004); WALTER
LAQUEUR, FASCISM: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (1997); Dusan Stojanovic, Milosevic and
Another Jailed War Crimes Suspect Win Parliamentary Seats, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (AP),
Dec. 30, 2003, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20031229-1738-serbia-
elections.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
90. Stojanovic, supra note 89.
91. Id.
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Middle East in the wake of communism's demise). Thus, a remarkable pat-
tern begins to emerge. Of Barrington Moore's three roads to modern indus-
trial society, the U.S. has rigorously adhered to the first, that of liberal capi-
talism. V. I. Lenin characterized bourgeois democracy as the best possible
political shell for capitalism and America's grand strategy, with or without
acknowledgement of Lenin, has certainly amounted to a consistent effort to
hew that course, drawing further to the left when fascism, the option on the
right, appeared ascendant and correspondingly further to the right when
communism, the option on the left, appeared to be gaining strength.92 Once
the century's various channels and currents were charted, steering the helm
of state became a relatively straightforward process, well within the capacity
of Republicans and Democrats alike.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Grand strategy, of course, is sometimes capable of dictating a foreign
policy well within the confines of international law, and always, in any
event, stands in an important relationship to international law-but the two
are not the same. Defining international law as "the rules of legitimate be-
havior for states," 93 Philip Bobbitt argues that because international law helps
to shape the political goals that grand strategy exists to serve, it is "among
the first resources consulted in a crisis, and its treaties and treatises are
among the last resources deployed when violence has ended and its conse-
quences must be healed., 94 Where, then, is international law to be found?
The generally recognized sources of international law, authoritatively estab-
lished in the charter of the World Court, the primary judicial organ of the
international legal system sitting in The Hague, the Netherlands,95 are: inter-
national conventions; international custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law; general principles of law accepted by civilized nations; and
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
various nations.96 Testifying to the relative stability of this legal regime, the
92. See MARK MAZOWER, DARK CONTINENT: EUROPE'S TWENTIETH CENTURY (1998);
ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991(1994).
93. BOBBITT, supra note 82, at 356.
94. Id.
95. See LORNA LLOYD, PEACE THROUGH LAW: BRITAIN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
IN THE 1920s (1997); HOWARD N. MEYER, THE WORLD COURT IN ACTION: JUDGING AMONG
THE NATIONS (2002) (for the official World Court web page, see International Court of Justice,
Peace Palace, the Hague, the Netherlands, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinforma
tion.htm.).
96. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE: DISPUTES, WAR, AND
NEUTRALITY 55-56 (Arnold D. McNair ed., 1926).
[Vol. 28:3:631
181
: Nova Law Review 28, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
SOME REALISM ABOUT UNILA TERALISM
list of sources has remained unchanged since the World Court was founded,
as the Permanent Court of International Justice, in 1922. In his "Report and
Commentary" on the World Court project, published by the Carnegie En-
dowment in 1920, after listing these specific sources of international law,
James Brown Scott provides a detailed examination of judicial decisions by
which the law of nations had already been incorporated into the laws of Eng-
land and the U.S., respectively. Although the international Advisory Com-
mittee of Jurists that drafted the World Court's charter worked long and hard
to agree to the language adopted, eventually, as the American delegate to the
Committee, former-Secretary of State Elihu Root, put it at the time: "Leg
over leg the dog went to Dover."97
This corpus of law has long been in the making, dating back to the work
of the important Dutch writer, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645),98 and to the Peace
of Westphalia, whose adoption in 1648 signaled, in effect, that "the doctrine
of sovereignty achieved 'codification.' 99 The emergence of the sovereign
state as the dominant political unit, at least in Europe, was a prerequisite to
the rise of a modem international law, a set of legal rules and principles
whose "persons" are sovereign states. To be sure, the "fact that Shakespeare
preceded the birth of modern international law," as Theodore Meron reminds
us, "does not mean that no broadly recognized rules applied, at least in prin-
ciple, to nations' conduct of war."' 00 In fact, it can be said that the gradual
emergence of international law after the Peace of Westphalia represented a
stage in the long process of development whereby principles applying to the
conduct of war were transformed into the modern law of war.
For many, however, the transformation of principle into law, so far as
international law is concerned, is more apparent than real. In what sense can
the rules of international law be regarded as genuine law-or, at least, what
is usually meant by the reference "law," the kind of statutory and case law
with which we are most familiar? And how can law exist in the absence of
any enforcement mechanism, especially without a police force, criminal
courts, jails, and so forth? Even without these, international law still looks a
good deal like conventional, i.e., domestic or municipal law. Consider a
97. JAMES BROWN ScoTT, THE PROJECT OF A PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS 48, 106-111 (1920),
reprinted in 7 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, DIVISION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW PAMPHLET SERIES 32-37 (2000).
98. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF HuGo GROTIUS (1969); HUGO
GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE AND THE LAW OF
NATIONS (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901).
99. AREND & BECK, supra note 40, at 16.
100. THEODOR MERON, HENRY'S LAWS AND SHAKESPEARE'S WARS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
LAW OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 11 (1993).
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concrete example: on July 25, 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA")
abandoned its Llapushnik Prison Camp due to Serbian military forces retak-
ing the area around the camp.'' A number of prisoners held in the camp
were marched into a clearing in a nearby forest and eleven of them were shot
and killed. °2 Haradin Bala, Isak Musliu, and Agim Murtezi were accused of
being responsible for these murders and, in February 2003, were arrested by
KFOR forces.'0 3 The three detainees were transferred to the detention unit of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and
two of them will be tried, like the Serb political leaders, Slobodan Milosevic
and Vojislav Seselj, for their conduct in Bosnia."°
Bala and Musliu are charged with having planned, instigated, ordered,
or committed acts or omissions such as imprisonment, violence, and murder
against Serb and Albanian civilians held in the Llapushnik camp.' °5 Agim
Murtezi's defense counsel, Stephane Bourgon, informed the ICTY that Mr.
Murtezi was not the individual identified in the indictment and Murtezi was
subsequently released. 0 6 This is a remarkable example of international law
in practice where the elements of a conventional western legal system are
clearly present (statutory rules, accusation, arrest, investigation, trial, pun-
ishment upon conviction) and, indeed, where some features are in play, in
spite of the fact they might not be present in the standard legal process of
many states. For example, Bala and Musliu, both members of the KLA, are
being prosecuted for the same kind of infractions (crimes against humanity,
violations of the laws or customs of war) as the Serb officials, Milosevic and
Seselj. Murtezi was released because a careful investigation revealed he was
the wrong man. And Fatmir Limaj, the KLA commander on whose orders
Bala and Musliu allegedly relied, a member of Parliament and public figure,
managed to leave Yugoslavia on a business flight before he could be ar-
rested.'0 7 Thus can one identify elements of equality before the law and due
process-even occasional common law's inadequacy of enforcement-that
tend to characterize municipal legal systems. Why, then, must international
law, "as law," receive such low marks?
101. Press Release, ITCY Office of the Prosceutor, Haradin Bala, Isak Muslu, and Agim
Murtezi Transferred to the ICTY Following Their Indictment for Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes, http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2003/p729-e.htm (Feb. 18, 2003).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Press Release, The Prosecutor v. Umjaetal: Agin Munezi Released Following the
Withdrawal of the Indictment Against Him, http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2003/p736-e.htm
(Feb. 28, 2003).
107. See Press Release, ITCY Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 101.
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H.L.A. Hart, one of legal philosophers, does not think that it should. 108
Though reference to "international law" has been an accepted usage for al-
most two centuries, Hart nevertheless acknowledges that "the absence of an
international legislature, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and centrally
organized sanctions have inspired misgivings, at any rate in the breasts of
legal theorists."'0 9 But Hart believes that any comparison of international
law with, and in contrast to, municipal law is misleading." 0 War within the
international system, he maintains, is not the same thing as violence between
individuals, not least because "long years of peace have intervened between
disastrous wars."'' . This circumstance is without analog to municipal legal
systems, and further, Hart regards as crucial that when international legal
"rules are disregarded, it is not on the footing that they are not binding; in-
stead efforts are made to conceal the facts."' 12 Citing the immediate subordi-
nation of new states to international law and the similar case of states acquir-
ing new territory or access to the sea, Hart rejects as "dogma," with little
respect for practical facts, the notion that "international obligations as self-
imposed.""' International law, in Hart's view, can no more be reduced to
mere moral exhortation than can the rules of municipal legal systems them-
selves. ''4
Writing in 1930, in the second edition of his Grammar of Politics, Har-
old Laski acknowledged, as H.L.A. Hart would a generation later, that "[t]he
famous epigram that international law is not law at all has had a serious ef-
fect historically, both upon its prestige and its range of influence." I " But
Laski optimistically assessed the prospects for international law, suggesting
that its rules "should be made universally binding through the power to have
them definitely interpreted by a recognised tribunal."' 6 It was the (then) new
World Court which Laski hoped would constitute just such a tribunal, a court
charged "with the task of consolidating international law, and revising its
substance from time to time in the light of experience.""' 7 Thirty-years later,
after a worldwide economic depression, another devastating world war and
the onset of a cold war, Laski was still prepared to defend international law
108. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (2d ed. 1965).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 214.
112. Id. at 215.
113. H.L.A. HART, supra note 108, at 219.
114. See generally id. at 224, 227-32.
115. HAROLD J. LASKI, A GRAMMAR OF POLITICS 649 (1925).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 648.
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"as law"--certainly by comparison with municipal law."18 "[T]o make the
legal character of international law dependent upon its success in getting
applied," argued Laski, "is to apply to it canons of validity which the jurist
does not dream of applying to national law.""' 9 Before considering whether
U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have, because of their transparent
unilateralism, transgressed that international law in which Hart and Laski
invested such confidence, it remains necessary, first, to juxtapose the devel-
opment of the U.N. to the structure of international law.
THE UNITED NATIONS
The World Court has been sitting continuously in the Hague since the
Court's founding in 1922-with the exception, that is, of those years when
the Nazis overran and occupied Belgium and the Netherlands. Describing
the "creation of a nominally 'new' Court" after the defeat of the Nazis at the
end of World War II, Howard Meyer states that "in doctrine, procedures,
acceptance and application of precedent, facilities, and most staff personnel,
even a few judges-to-be," the post-war World Court was quite properly
treated as a "re-created or revived Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice." 120 Thus, the World Court has been and remains the world's preeminent
international legal institution. The U.N. organization, from the very begin-
ning, was conceived more as a political than legal institution. To be sure, all
legal institutions are "political" in the same sense that all reality is socially
constructed. But the U.N. was not designed to replace international law or
the World Court, and in that sense, is more about power politics than it is the
law of nations. All of the major historical sources on the founding of the
U.N. underscore complex problems of politics, not law, which had to be
overcome, first by President Franklin Roosevelt, and subsequently by Presi-
dent Harry Truman and Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, so that agree-
ment could eventually be reached at the U.N. founding conference in San
Francisco. 121
The U.N. Charter established the dominant position, within the organi-
zation, of the Security Council. The distinction alluded to here, between law
118. Id.
119. HAROLD J. LASKI, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS 79 (1962).
120. MEYER, supra note 95, at 88.
121. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND, PURSUING A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE (1988);
TOWNSEND HOOPES & DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, FDR AND THE CREATION OF THE U.N. (1997);
EVAN LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1945-1955: THE COLD WAR YEARS
(1982); STEPHEN SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION, THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(2003).
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and power, between international rules and Security Council votes, was ef-
fectively drawn early on, in 1950, by John Foster Dulles. "It is not safe to
give coercive power to the Security Council or to any other international
body," Dulles argued, "unless that body is bound to administer agreed
law."' 22 While world peace might be one of the goals of the U.N., the or-
ganization was not bound by international law. "At Dumbarton Oaks," ob-
served Dulles, "the Big Three did not make any provision whatever for de-
veloping international law.' ' 123 To be sure, Secretary of State Dulles was a
right-wing politician, but the same could not be said of University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley's Hans Kelsen, described by Philip Bobbitt as the "leading
figure of twentieth century jurisprudence.' 24 In his treatise on the U.N., first
published in 1950, Kelsen argues "[t]he competence of the Security Council
coincides to a great extent with the competence of the entire Organisa-
tion."' 125 This is just another way of saying what many others have said
since: given the role assigned to the Security Council under the Charter and
the veto system of voting on the Council itself, the latter very nearly is the
U.N. in terms of effective power.126 "The Security Council," concludes Kel-
sen, "has almost the character of a governmental body., 127 Crucially, Kelsen
points out that the Security Council, as a governmental body answerable only
to itself, is not bound to follow any regime of law and "[i]f a state can rely
upon one of the five powers," i.e., one of the five permanent members of the
Security Council (the U.S., Russia, France, Britain, and China), then "no
action can be taken against it, even in case of open violation of the law. The
veto right of the five permanent members of the Security Council may lead
to a political system of more or less open clientage."' 128 And whatever else it
may be, a political system of open clientage should not be confused with a
legal system governed by international rules. 129
These comments from Dulles and Kelsen, now more than fifty years
old, apply as perfectly today as they did when written. After all, the U.N.
Charter, effectively exempting the Security Council from the rule of law, has
gone virtually unchanged since it was written. In fact, Mohammed Bedjaoui,
a member of the Institut de droit international, recently-retired judge and
former President of the World Court, opens his book, The New World Order
122. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, WAR OR PEACE 198 (1950).
123. Id.
124. BOBBiTr, supra note 82, at 586.
125. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 279 (1950).
126. Id. at 275.
127. Id. at 276.
128. Id. at 275.
129. ld. at 274-79.
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and the Security Council, by quoting John Foster Dulles: "'The Security
Council is not a body that merely enforces agreed law. It is a law unto it-
self."" 131 Judge Bedjaoui adds that Dulles "was giving utterance to a vague
idea - never clearly articulated but none the less generally received or suf-
fered - to the effect that the Security Council applies a law of its own, i.e. an
autonomous body of rules, much of which the Council elaborates at its entire
discretion."' 31 Conservative columnist and television commentator, Laura
Ingraham, in a book attacking the current U.N. and its supporters as elitist,
heralds the late Senator Patrick Moynihan of New York for his courageous
stand against America's opponents while he was our U.N. Ambassador.
132
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that she is a graduate of the University of
Virginia Law School and clerked at the U.S. Supreme Court, Ingraham does
not once mention Moynihan's defense of international law-indeed, she
seems never to have heard of international law.
13 3
Secretary of State Robert Lansing, according to Moynihan, "believed in
law, and as much on those grounds as any other was suspicious of organiza-
tion."'34 Extending Lansing's distinction, Moynihan argues that "the inter-
ested reader wants to be clear that the question of international law is inde-
pendent of the question of international organization. The League of Na-
tions, like the United Nations later, was designed to enforce law, not to make
it . . . .""' But as long as the Security Council is a "'law unto itself,'"'36 as
Dulles put it, or in Bedjaoui's phrase, "applies a law of its own," then it will
remain important to sharply distinguish international law and its enforcement
from the work of international organizations like the U.N.
137
SELF-DEFENSE AND SELF-HELP
Calcovoressi, Wint, and Pritchard record there were
at the end of 1941 three separate theatres of war: first, the USSR
where Leningrad was invested, German forces had come within
sight of Moscow... secondly, the remnant of a war in the west
130. MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL I (Ber-
nard Noble, trans., 1994) (emphasis omitted).
131. Id.
132. See LAURA INGRAHAM, SHUT UP AND SING: How ELITES FROM HOLLYWOOD,
POLITICS, AND THE UN ARE SUBVERTING AMERICA (2003).
133. Id.
134. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 40 (1990).
135. Id.
136. BEDJAOUI, supra note 130, at 1 n.1.
137. Id. at 1.
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maintained by the Royal Air Force in Great Britain but pushed out
into the Atlantic and waged chiefly by German U-boats and their
pursuers; and thirdly, the Mediterranean where the Germans and
Italians were trying to win North Africa.1
38
Then, on December 7, the air force of the Empire of Japan bombed the
American fleet at Pearl Harbor. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not
surprising that, as George Schwarzenberger observed at the time, the "sug-
gestion has been put forward which is as startling in its simplicity as in its
fallacy: International Law has broken down.' 139 There was a break down, of
course, but it was one of international organizations, not international law.
At no other time in history was it more important to understand the distinc-
tion between the two, later drawn by Dulles, Kelsen, and Moynihan, than at
the end of 1941. "The deniers of International Law put up a seemingly for-
midable barrage of arguments," continued Schwarzenberger, yet it was cru-
cial to resist "this destructive and defeatist thesis" a thesis or argument that
"attempts to establish an equality of status between the defenders of Interna-
tional Law and ... their deadliest foes."' 141 It was Schwarzenberger's inten-
tion, in his brief lectures on the subject during 1940-1941 at University Col-
lege, London, to "show what weapons International Law can put in the hands
of its defenders.''
As we know, among those weapons were the armed forces of the U.S.,
the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the other Allied Powers.'42 Without the
sanction of any international organization, but on behalf of international
law's enforcement, even against the most formidable of outlaw states, the
Allies not only won the Second World War, but they placed many of those
responsible for having waged aggressive war on trial in Nuremberg at war's
end. 4 1 Just as the Soviet Union and Great Britain had been attacked by
Germany, and responded with military force, the U.S. was attacked by Japan,
and international law clearly authorized these nations to employ unilateral
action-or "self-help"-to defeat the Axis powers.1" Twenty years later,
138. PETER CALVOCORESSI ET AL., TOTAL WAR: CAUSES AND COURSES OF THE SECOND
WORLD WAR 113 (2d rev. ed. 1989).
139. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TOTALITARIAN LAWLESSNESS
10 (1943).
140. Id.
141. Id. at ll.
142. See CALVOCORESSI ET AL., supra note 138.
143. KELSEN, supra note 125, at 274.
144. See, e.g., 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 115 (Arnold D. McNair
ed., Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd. 1926) (1906). "A State may be driven into war because it
cannot otherwise get reparation for an international delinquency, and may then maintain that it
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Schwarzenberger was somewhat less enthusiastic about the role of self-help
within international law. "Although action of a State amounting to self-help
may be within the law," Schwarzenberger wrote in 1962, "no certainty exists
on the level of international customary law that it will keep within such lim-
its."' 4 5 This is, in a sense, a rather odd comment. While it is true of "action
amounting to self-help," it is only true of self-help because it is actually true
of all action in which states engage in the world. While state conduct may
fall within the parameters of international law, there are no guarantees that
states will confine their conduct within the limits of international law. In
other words, Schwarzenberger's description of the nature of self-help would
appear to be tautological. "In these circumstances," he adds, "the classifica-
tion of intervention, reprisals, and war as measures of self-help or sanctions
of international customary law is a euphemism. It provides a convenient
legal cloak for action which more often than not belongs to the sphere of the
rule of force.' ' 146 Again, virtually every attempt to label state conduct, espe-
cially the deployment of military force, as justified by international law will
amount to either a legal cloak (an intentional misrepresentation of the con-
duct) or a legal defense (an accurate characterization of law applied to facts).
The only way to tell the difference between the two is by reference to the
rules.
Some "self-help arguments" will correspond to the canons of interna-
tional law whereas others will not. For example, the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trial established that the Nazi argument, cited earlier, was wrong to the ef-
fect that the German offensive action in World War II was merely anticipa-
tory self-defense. The British argument that in bombing Germany, England
was engaged in self-defense, was a much more compelling argument under
international law. After all, it was Germany that attacked England, not the
other way around. The different positions of Great Britain and Germany, at
the end of the war, with respect to international law and criminal responsibil-
ity, hinged on a good deal more than the stark reality that Britain was among
exercises by war nothing else than legally recognised self-help." Id. "Again, the very nature
of international law, resting as it does largely on customary rules built up as rationalizations
by jurists and statesmen on historical precedents, permitted governments to assert that armed
coercion was a procedural method sanctioned by customary international law." THE LAW OF
NATIONS: CASES, DOcUMENTS, AND NOTES 684 (Herbert W. Briggs ed., 1938). While Secu-
rity Council voting on issues of war and peace is extremely contentious, there is little or no
disagreement as to a state's fundamental legal right to self-defense. The factual issues are the
ones most hotly debated. See GRAY, supra note 48, at 85. "In theory it should always be
possible to determine whether there was an armed attack and who is acting in self-defence.
But in practice the situation is more complex." Id.
145. GEORGE SCHWARTZBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (1962).
146. Id.
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the victorious. It is true that if Hitler had won the war, German leaders
would not have been put on trial at Nuremberg. But that fact does not some-
how reduce to naught the real content of international law. Again, in his
treatise on the U.N., Hans Kelsen writes that if an "international organization
abolishes or restricts the principle of self-help established by general interna-
tional law, it must fulfil two requirements." '147 The two requirements cited by
Kelsen are that the organization itself must guarantee to settle the dispute
between states that precipitates a use of force and must also enforce that set-
tlement to the degree that an injured state's ability to protect itself is limited
by the organization.'48 The U.N., Kelsen candidly acknowledges, does not
meet either of these requirements.'49 Any organization, including the U.N.,
which simultaneously attempts to limit a state's ability to act in its own self-
interest and yet does not satisfy the two requirements Kelsen outlines "con-
stitutes, instead of an improvement, a dangerous deterioration of the legal
status under general international law."' 5 °
THE RULE OF LAW
If the U.S. (or any other state) must choose between the legal right of
self-defense and fidelity to the U.N. Charter, then national security dictates
violation of the charter or at least a policy of indifference to the organization
and its pretense to authority. The right to self-defense is worthless if its ex-
ercise hinges on the meaning given to that phrase by each of the five perma-
nent members of the U.N. Security Council. '5' Since the Bush administra-
tion disagreed with France, and probably China and Russia as well, over
whether invading Iraq was a legitimate exercise of American self-defense (or
anticipatory self-defense), what it finally comes down to is a choice between
the U.N. on the one hand and, on the other, what much of the rest of the
world saw as recourse to self-help.'52 Following Dulles, Kelsen, Moynihan,
and others, the U.S. may in fact be faced with a choice between self-help
enforcement of international law and abandonment of international law alto-
gether out of deference to the U.N. and its political process. It is virtually
impossible to square that political process with the rule of law. Kelsen
147. KELSEN, supra note 125, at 270.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. But see contra, Jorge Ramirez, Iraq War: Anticipatory Self-Defense or Unlawful
Unilateralism? 34 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 9 (2003).
152. Id. at 21-22.
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makes two points tending to buttress such a conclusion.5 3 First, he asserts
that the "veto right of the five permanent members of the Security Council,
which places the privileged powers above the law of the United Nations,
establishes their legal hegemony over all the other members of the Organisa-
tion and thus stamps on it the mark of an autocratic or aristocratic regime."'54
Kelsen argues that we cannot fail to see a contradiction between such a re-
gime and the purported goals of the U.N. The veto, in Kelsen's view, cannot
be reconciled with an institution that "presents itself ideologically as the
crowning of a war waged for victory not only of arms but of ideals, espe-
cially the ideal of democracy."'' 5 5 But Alexis de Tocqueville demonstrated a
century earlier, in Democracy in America, that the rule of law and democracy
are not equivalent, that majorities can in fact impose their will in spite of and
at the expense of the rule of law.'56 And this view represents, of course, a
fundamental precept of America's "anti-majoritarian" constitutionalism.
It is Kelsen's second point, however, which has such great import for
the argument advanced here. He asserts that at the level of international rela-
tions,
the principle of equality must refer to the states as members of the
community. This is the reason why the Charter proclaims as its
first principle the sovereign equality of all its members. There is
an open contradiction between the political ideology of the United
Nations and its legal constitution.
The determination of international law, with reference not to law at all but to
the votes of Security Council members, places the Council above the law.
And the veto privilege held by five permanent members of the Council vio-
lates the very first principle of the rule of law: the sovereign equality of all
citizens (in this instance states) before the law. The U.N. is thus, as Kelsen
makes transparent, an Orwellian institution in which some states are more
equal than others. 5 8 All law stands or falls with the credibility and effec-
tiveness of the rule of law itself and even when equality before the law seems
to mask a persistent inequality of social and economic power, formal juridi-
cal equality, nevertheless, constitutes a great advance over regimes of aris-
tocracy, autocracy, serfdom, slavery, and terror.
153. KELSEN, supra note 125, at 274.
154. Id. at 276.
155. ld. at 277.
156. ld. at 276-77.
157. KELSEN, supra note 125, at 277.
158. Id.
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Confirming this point from the philosophical side of things, Hegel had
already warned, Franz Neumann reminds us, that though legal equality is
purely formal, that is negative, it should not for that reason be discarded.'59
And from the historical side, reflecting on those inequalities that ultimately
limit justice through legal formality, Edward Thompson adds:
But I do not conclude from this that the rule of law itself was
humbug. On the contrary, the inhibitions upon power imposed by
law seem to me a legacy as substantial as any handed down from
the struggle of the seventeenth century to the eighteenth, and a true
and important cultural achievement ... 160
The reader may or may not agree with Sir Henry Maine's conclusion that
since "all the modem progress of society seem[s] to be intimately connected
with the completest freedom of contract, and in some way almost mysteri-
ously dependent upon it, [we] should shrink from tampering with so power-
ful an instrument of civilisation."' 16' But the transition from status to con-
tract, whose historical description made Maine famous, constitutes a real
advance in the direction of both liberty and equality. In subordinating inter-
national law and the progressive regime of rules and values it represents to
the archaic power politics of status voting on the Security Council, nations
take a great leap backward in their foreign relations.
"By the middle of 1998," Blakesley, Firmage, Scott and Williams point
out, "the Security Council has applied Chapter VII to authorize the collective
use of force in Korea, and the Gulf War."'162 It is frequently suggested that in
San Francisco, in 1945, no one would have predicted that U.N. authorization
of the use of force to keep or restore world peace would have taken place
only twice in the next fifty years, and, in the event, separated by forty years.
But in fact, such authorization might not have occurred at all. Only because
the Soviets were boycotting the Security Council in 1950 did authorization of
the use of force in Korea escape permanent member veto. And the authori-
zation of force in the Gulf in 1990-1991 was nearly as strange. Like Korea,
"[t]he 1990 Iraq/Kuwait conflict was another exceptional case," according to
Christine Gray, "seen by many as marking a new role for the Security Coun-
159. See HERBERT MARCUSE, REASON AND REVOLUTION: HEGEL AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL
THEORY (1941); FRANZ NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE:
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1957).
160. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 265 (1976).
161. SIR M.E. GRANT DUFF, SIR HENRY MAINE: A BRIEF MEMOIR OF His LIFE 90 (J. & J.
Harper 1969) (1892).
162. CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1070 (5th
ed. 2001).
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cil and the start of a new legal order."' 63 With the return to American de-
ployment of force without first seeking Security Council permission, first in
Yugoslavia, then in Afghanistan and Iraq, the "new legal order['s]" bright
and shining moment faded quickly."6 The U.N. use of force in Korea was a
fluke, the Gulf War use of force was an "exceptional case" which, if a begin-
ning at all, was merely the beginning of a war in Iraq which would end, a
decade later, with the demise of the U.N. itself. Even during the Security
Council's debate over whether to authorize force in the Gulf in 1990, the
Cuban representative pointed out that the U.N. could only authorize force
under a multinational command structure. And once the bombs began falling
on Baghdad, it was obvious that the Cubans had been right: the U.S., not the
U.N., was calling the shots. And the war would end only when the Ameri-
cans said it was over.
Still, in January 2004, Massachusetts Senator and Democratic Presiden-
tial contender John Kerry, appearing on the CBS News program, Face the
Nation, contrasted Bush the Younger's war in Iraq with that of Bush the
Elder, emphasizing that President George Herbert Walker Bush, unlike his
son, went to the U.N. with his war plan, secured the affirmative votes of Se-
curity Council permanent members (with China abstaining), and deployed a
multinational fighting force under the aegis of the U.N.'65 It was actually
more complicated than that. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Even
prior to President Bush's famous "[t]his will not stand, this aggression
against Kuwait" statement to reporters on the South Lawn of the White
House on August 5th,'6 6 Brent Scowcroft recalls a conversation he had with
the President aboard a C-20 Gulfstream flight to Aspen, Colorado: "It was in
discussion on the changes in his speech that it became obvious to me that the
President was prepared to use force to evict Saddam from Kuwait if it be-
came necessary ...., Note that Scowcroft did not say the President was
prepared to go the U.N.; he said the President was prepared to use force to
evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. 168 In fact, under first the Reagan-Bush
administration and then the Bush-Quayle administration, the United States
considered withdrawing from the United Nations because its view of the
United Nations had sunk so low. 69
163. GRAY, supra note 48, at 85.
164. Id.
165. Face the Nation (CBS News television broadcast, Jan. 4, 2004).
166. GEORGE BUSH & BRENT SCOWCROFT, A WORLD TRANSFORMED 333 (1998).
167. Id. at 318.
168. See id.
169. See DAVID ARMSTRONG ET AL., FROM VERSAILLES TO MAASTRICHT: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996).
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America's patience with the snapping and snarling underdogs in
the General Assembly had run out.... This contributed hugely to
the Reagan administration's tendency to regard the UN at best as
'a troublesome sideshow.' At worst, the US attitude came peril-
ously close to the right-wing Heritage Foundation's belief that 'a
world without the United Nations would be a better world'. [sic]
170
The President, however, was far from confident that the U.S. Congress
would endorse his decision to send U.S. troops to Kuwait.17 1 He later re-
called that after ordering the deployment of troops and equipment to the
Gulf,
[t]he news of the troop increase, particularly its size, whipped up a
new outcry in Congress and furious attacks on me that I had
changed policy and decided to go to war without consulta-
tion.... The pundits and congressmen on the morning talk shows
and the op-eds averred that I was wrecking my presidency.
1 72
Senator Patrick Moynihan, a personal friend of the President, was especially
critical and warned Bush he would need both U.N. and Congressional ap-
proval before going to war.173 Scowcroft had already determined that a Con-
gressional vote in favor of war was too much to hope for.174
Although we did explore options for the involvement of Congress,
we never seriously contemplated invoking the War Powers Reso-
lution.
We were confident that the Constitution was on our side when it
came to the president's discretion to use force if necessary: If we
sought congressional involvement, it would not be authority we
were after, but support.' 
75
So where would authority for war come from?
"While I was prepared to deal with this crisis unilaterally if necessary,"
Bush candidly acknowledges, "I wanted the United Nations involved as part
of our first response, starting with a strong condemnation of Iraq's attack on
170. Id. at 114.
171. BUSH & SOWCRAFT, supra note 166, at 396-97.
172. Id. at 396.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 397.
175. Id. at 398; see also HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL. PROBLEMS 138
(4th ed. 1994).
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a fellow member."'7 6 "UN action would [not only] be important in rallying
international opposition to the invasion and reversing it," but also the Secu-
rity Council endorsement of the use of force could provide legal authority
which the engagement of American military forces abroad otherwise would
lack.117 Although "the Cold War caused stalemate in the Security Council,"
Bush admitted, "our improving relations with Moscow and our satisfactory
ones with China offered the possibility that we could get their cooperation in
forging international unity to oppose Iraq.'17  Carefully playing their cards,
Bush and Scowcroft managed to get from the U.N. Security Council the sort
of official approval for war that they believed was beyond their reach in the
Congress of the U.S.
After the President's post-November election troop deployment, provid-
ing "'an adequate offensive military option," ' 179 and Secretary of Defense
Dick Cheney's statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee that he
did "'not believe the President requires any additional authorization from the
Congress before committing U.S. forces to achieve our objectives in the
Gulf,""" ° some members of Congress filed a suit in federal court seeking to
enjoin the President from initiating an offensive attack against Iraq without
first "securing a declaration of war or other explicit congressional authoriza-
tion" for such action.'8 ' And, in fact, on November 30, at a meeting of bipar-
tisan congressional leaders, "President Bush made a pitch for a resolution
backing the UN vote-which avoided the problem of asking Congress for
authorization."'82 The plaintiffs, according to the court, alleged "in light of
the President's obtaining the support of the United Nations Security Council
in a resolution allowing for the use of force against Iraq, that he is planning
for an offensive military attack on Iraqi forces."'83 That, of course, is exactly
what the President was planning and, as it turned out, on January 12, 1991,
the U.S. Congress-by a vote of 52-47 in the Senate and 250-183 in the
House-managed to sign on to the war, after the decision-making was over
and just in time for the bombs to start falling on Baghdad four days later. 4
Whether the Gulf War of 1990-1991 comported with either international law
or America's national interest is an important question, but one quite sepa-
176. BUsH & SCOWCROFT, supra note 166, at 303.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1143 (D.D.C. 1990).
180. Id. at 1151 n.31.
181. STEINER ET AL., supra note 175.
182. BUSH & SCOWCROFT, supra note 166, at 421.
183. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1146.
184. BUSH & SCOWCROFT, supra note 166, at 446.
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rate from the process by which the U.S. decided to go to war. The U.N. was
used to provide a rubber stamp for a war fought without genuine congres-
sional authorization. If this is the kind of political process Senator Kerry
envisions as a model for decision-making in a Kerry or otherwise Democrat-
White House, voters may wish to think twice about ever returning the party
of Roosevelt and Kennedy to power.
KOREA
Finally, there is that other "exceptional case:" the Korean War. The war
was exceptional for a reason with which everyone is familiar. In the summer
of 1950, when the Korean War began, the Soviet Union was boycotting the
Security Council and, as a consequence, when the Security Council voted to
authorize the use of force in Korea to repel communist aggression, the Sovi-
ets were not there to veto the use of force resolution. By the time the Gulf
War rolled around forty years later, it was the Russia of Gorbachev rather
than Stalin that sat on the Security Council.
But the Korean War Security Council vote was exceptional for another
reason, one which was not unrelated to the Soviet boycott in 1950. David
Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd, and John Redmond write that "[a]n important leg-
acy of the Korean War, and another consequence of US dominance of the
Cold War UN, was the parody of Taiwan continuing to sit in China's Secu-
rity Council seat for 22 years after the establishment of the (Communist)
People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949."185 Indeed, it was this "parody"
or political charade that had caused the Soviets to boycott the Security Coun-
cil in the first place. So, not only were the Russians not present to veto the
use of force resolution in Korea, but the crucial Chinese vote was not cast on
behalf of the Chinese people. China's vote was not even cast on behalf of
the Taiwanese. Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig describe the arrival on Tai-
wan of a defeated Kuomintang, only a few years prior to the U.N. Korea
vote:
Relations between the ruling minority from the mainland and the
Taiwan-Chinese majority met an initial disaster in March 1947.
The flagrant corruption of the Nationalist take-over authorities, be-
fore the arrival of most of their compatriots, provoked widespread
demonstrations that were countered by the systematic killing of
several thousand leading Taiwanese.
1 86
185. DAVID ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 169, at 72.
186. FAIRBANK ET AL., supra note 43, at 927.
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So, the Chinese "Nationalists" in the Security Council did not represent
China, nor did they even represent Taiwan, which was not, of course, a
member of the U.N. On what theory of the rule of law could the Kuomin-
tang-in-exile, a reactionary force that had only just invaded Taiwan, be
placed in a position to approve or disapprove, veto or authorize, a use of
force by the U.N.? What could this have to do with international law?
Although President Truman informed the American people in June
1950 that Korea had been invaded by the Communists, the truth was that
Korea had been invaded by Koreans. 187 "Korea was a unitary and independ-
ent monarchy," observes Arnold Offner, "that had long governed itself
largely by Confucian doctrine... After waging war against China and Rus-
sia, the Japanese annexed Korea in 1910.,,188 Not surprisingly, "virtually all
Koreans loathed the Japanese and their Korean collaborators."'1 89 Once Japan
was defeated at the end of World War II, U.S. officials, including Colonel
Dean Rusk, recommended that Korea be divided into American and Soviet
zones at the thirty-eighth parallel.' 90 Although Stalin agreed to this proposal,
the Soviets "quickly replaced Japanese officials and collaborators with Kore-
ans-including non-Communist, moderate nationalists as well as exiles from
Siberia."' 9' What took place between the end of the war and 1950 was
pitched battle between various forces seeking to shape the new Korean po-
litical order. While Offner claims "historian Bruce Cumings has stretched a
point by denying legitimacy to the question of who started the Korean
War, ' 92 Cumings nevertheless answers an even more important question:
was what the U.S. confronted in 1950 a civil war? 193 International law for-
bad "outside" intervention in civil wars. Summarizing the "duty of non-
intervention" and other limits imposed by international law on the ability of
outsiders to interfere in the civil strife of other nations, Christine Gray adds
that "[t]he status of these rules on forcible intervention in civil wars is no
longer controversial; it was their application that led to fundamental divi-
sions during the Cold War when the superpowers and others waged proxy
wars in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.'
194
187. See ARNOLD A. OFFNER, ANOTHER SUCH VICTORY: PRESIDENT TRUMAN AND THE
COLD WAR, 1945-1953, 367 (2002); see also BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA'S PLACE IN THE SUN: A
MODERN HISTORY (1997).
188. OFFNER, supra note 187, at 348.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 350.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 367.
193. See OFFNER, supra note 187, at 367-68.
194. GRAY, supra note 48, at 52.
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So what the U.N. Security Council authorized in 1950, in voting to de-
ploy military force in response to North Korea's "unprovoked aggression,"
was not peace keeping or peace restoration, but in reality, a violation of in-
ternational law. 195 In 1952, while the Korean War was still going on, Hans
Kelsen pointed out that "[i]n the case of Korea the Security Council recom-
mended to the members to take enforcement action involving the use of
armed force, against 'forces from North Korea' or the 'authorities of North
Korea,' which the Security Council did not consider to be the government of
a state." '19 6 Kelsen then drew the obvious conclusion: "This implies that the
war between North Korea and South Korea was a civil war within the 'Re-
public of Korea,"' in which case "the 'armed attack' upon the Republic of
Korea by forces from North Korea could not be-as the Security Council
determined-a 'breach of the peace,' that is to say, a breach of international
peace." 197 Years later, when President Lyndon Johnson was escalating the
Vietnam War, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey advised him that "[i]n Ko-
rea we were moving under United Nations auspices to defend South Korea
against dramatic, across-the-border, conventional aggression. Yet even with
those advantages, we could not sustain American political support for fight-
ing Chinese in Korea in 1952." '198 Humphrey's words of caution are surreal in
their stupidity and incomprehension. Vietnam was, in fact, a replica of Ko-
rea. Within a few short years of the inconclusive end to the Korean War, the
U.S. illegally intervened in a civil war within Vietnam, a war without bor-
ders, and a war in which the dead, counted in tens of thousands, were over-
whelmingly American and Vietnamese. If a Korean Memorial was dedicated
in Washington D.C., alongside the much-visited Vietnam Memorial, it would
have about the same number of soldiers' names etched into its surface. If
Americans had understood the Korean War the way Robert McNamara even-
tually understood the Vietnam War, then the Vietnam War would never have
happened. The U.N., in 1950, played a key role in securing that particular
obfuscation of history.
But Korea was--except for the Gulf War-the one thing the U.N. Secu-
rity Council supposedly did right, its one achievement. It was in fact an out-
law's enterprise. Adding insult to injury, or perhaps "delict" in the sense of a
195. See also BLAKESKY ET AL, supra note 162, at 1190-1205 (civil war in international
law).
196. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 n.29 (Robert W. Tucker ed.,
2d ed. 1966) (1952).
197. Id.
198. See ROBERT DALLEK, HAIL TO THE CHIEF: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF
AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 122 (1996); see also ROBERT MCNAMARA, IN RETROSPECT: THE
TRAGEDY AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM (1996).
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criminal wrong, there was one further way in which the U.N. Security Coun-
cil vote on Korea was exceptional. Without the Russians present and with
one of Chiang Kai-sheck's henchmen voting for China, the permanent mem-
bership of the Security Council was delivered to the "Korea invaded!" lobby.
But that was not enough. Recall that the U.N. Charter, in 1950, required
seven votes, including the concurring votes of all five Security Council per-
manent members (or, perhaps, four members if one was absent) for a resolu-
tion to be adopted. Security Council Resolution 83 of June 27, 1950, which
called on U.N. members to "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea
as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international
peace and security in the area" had received the votes of four permanent
members, plus those of Ecuador and Norway.' 99 Egypt and India abstained,
and Yugoslavia had voted against the resolution.2° With one member of the
Security Council remaining, the resolution still required a seventh affirma-
tive vote to be adopted. 20 1 In an odd way, in a sense, a non-permanent mem-
ber of the Security Council held a veto on this one particular vote. The sev-
enth member was Cuba.
In the summer of 1950, the Cuban government's executive branch was
under the leadership of Carlos Prio Socariis, who had been elected President
in 1948. He would serve in that capacity until 1952 when he was removed
from office in a coup d'dtat, engineered by Fulgencia Batista. °2 The 1952
Cuban elections were cancelled, including the congressional race of Orto-
doxo Party candidate Fidel Castro Ruz.2 °3 Prio relocated to Miami after his
ouster from office in Cuba and, in 1955, according to Robert Levine, Direc-
tor of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami,
"[a]nti-Batista exiles in Florida, led by former President Carlos Prio Socar-
ris," sent Fidel Castro and his compatriots in Mexico "enough money to pur-
chase a barely seaworthy yacht, the Granma. ' '20 4 Near the end of 1956, the
soon-to-be legendary Granma arrived on Cuba's southern coast and was
immediately fired upon.211 Of the eighty-two rebels aboard, only twenty
survived, including Fidel Castro, his brother Rail, and Ernesto "Che"
Guevara.20 6 On October 14, 1957, U.S. Attorney General Herbert Brownell
199. U.N. SCOR, 4th Sess., 2d series, 474th mtg. at 5 (1950).
200. Id. at 5 n.12.
201. Id.; Global Policy Forum, Elected Members of the Security Council 1946-Present,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/mem2.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
202. ROBERT M. LEVINE, SECRET MISSIONS TO CUBA: FIDEL CASTRO, BERNARDO BENES,
AND CUBAN MIAMI 17 (2002)
203. Id.
204. Id. at 19.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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held a meeting in his office with officials from Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion, Department of Justice, the Treasury Department, the F.B.I, and the State
Department to discuss a letter Brownell had received from Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, expressing "concern over the activities of ex-President
Prio based on reports received from time to time from the Cuban Govern-
ment as well as from other sources."' 7 The Attorney General stated at the
meeting that "Prio's activities must indeed represent a serious issue between
our Government and the Cuban Government for Secretary Dulles to devote
his personal attention to it in this manner. '20 8 Brownell further "raised the
possibility of a conspiracy charge" against Prio and it was agreed at the
meeting that such an investigation should be seriously considered.20 9 Prio
had "financed conspiracies, using Miami Beach's Lucerne Hotel and his own
home in South Miami for meetings., 210 For his trouble in financing the anti-
Batista rebels, Prio was indicted by the U.S. Justice Department in 1958.211
Perhaps in part to atone for earlier sins, Prio became intensely anti-Castro
during the 1960s and, in 1968, along with Emilio Nfifiez Portuondo, a former
president of the U.N. Security Council, attended the "'Forum for the Libera-
tion of Cuba"' at the Kings Bay Yacht and Country Club near Coral Gables,
Florida. 212 Prio, thus, entered that murky underworld of anti-Castro paramili-
tary and intelligence operatives whose existence subsequently assured con-
spiracy theorists a thriving market for their books and movies. Former BBC
journalist, Anthony Summers, claims that Prio was a "friend of top Mafia
leaders" and "has been linked in testimony with both Jack Ruby and anti-
Castro militant Frank Sturgis. ' '213 The latter, a former CIA-employee living
in Miami and veteran of the Bay of Pigs operation, was one of the infamous
Watergate burglars. In one of those, "too weird to be true" footnotes, Sum-
mers adds that Prio "was found shot dead in 1977 ... seated in a chair, with
a pistol beside him, outside the garage of his Miami home. 
' 214
207. Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Af-
fairs (Snow), for the Files (Oct. 22, 1957), http://www.rose-hulman.edu/-delacova/ca
ble/cable-10-22-57.htm.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. LEVINE, supra note 202, at 39.
211. Werner Wiskari, US. Embargo Set on Arms to Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1958,
http://www.rose-hulman.edu/-delacova/cuban-rebels/4-3-58-embargo.htm.
212. LEVINE, supra note 202, at 178.
213. ANTHONY SUMMERS, CONSPIRACY 500 (1980); see also, ANN LOUISE BAVDACH,
CUBA CONFIDENTIAL (2002).
214. Id.
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BRINGING LAW BACK IN
Whatever additional job experience and training might be included in
Prio's extraordinary resume, international lawyer and treatise writer are not
among them. And even if they were, they would only qualify him to argue
before an international tribunal, not sit on one, let alone decide for millions
of Koreans and Americans whether, under the terms of international law, the
conflict that broke out in northeast Asia, in 1950, along the thirty-eighth par-
allel was or was not a civil war. The votes of politicians and dictators, their
ministers or agents, sitting from time to time on the Security Council of the
U.N., have been, and always will be, a poor substitute for legal reasoning
based upon the customary rules of law that have evolved over time and the
conventional sources of international law indexed in the charter of the World
Court. The more the U.S.-or any nation, for that matter--elaborates a
"grand strategy" that conforms to the parameters of international law, regard-
less of the politics and propaganda that invariably hold the U.N. Security
Council in a vice-like grip,"1 5 the closer they will be to formulating a foreign
policy that genuinely promotes both justice (at least that limited form of jus-
tice law standing alone can deliver) and the rule of law. The propriety of
unilateralism, the legality of unilateral action on the international plane,
raises questions of law--questions that cannot be answered in advance by
Security Council resolutions. Within the canons of the law of nations, argu-
ments can be identified both for and against the legality of recent American
military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is time that debate, however, gets
beyond the bogus issues of preemptive war and U.N. Security Council deci-
sion making. Too much is at stake for the law itself to be indefinitely ex-
cluded.
215. See Steven R. Weisman & John H. Cushman, Jr., U.S. Joins Iraqis to Seek U.N. Role
in Interim Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at Al. The U.S. government, having essentially
dismissed the U.N. going into the Iraq War, seems to be reconsidering its relationship to the
organization:
The Bush administration, trying to rescue its troubled plan to restore sovereignty to Iraq, is
joining Iraqi leaders to press the United Nations to play a role in choosing an interim govern-
ment in Baghdad, administration officials said Thursday .... The new move involved yet an-
other change in strategy for an administration under pressure from shifting events in Iraq.
From the start of planning the war to oust Saddam Hussein, the administration has had an am-
bivalent attitude toward the United Nations.
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This article is intended to serve as a commentary and analysis of a pub-
lic-eye view of disciplinary actions taken against licensed attorneys in the
State of Florida during the past fifteen years. The idea for this statistical
review arose in 2002, prompted by discussions regarding self-regulation of
various professions following the many corporate scandals then playing out
in the headlines. Through these discussions, Professors Curtis and Kaufman
* Debra Moss Curtis is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Shepard Broad Law Cen-
ter, Nova Southeastern University ("NSU") in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. She is a licensed
member of The Florida Bar, and has previously practiced in Florida. She teaches Lawyering
Skills and Values, Law Office Management, and Secured Transactions.
** Professor Kaufman is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Law Library at
American University's Washington College of Law. She teaches in the areas of Criminal
Law, Legal Research, and Lawyering Skills and Values.
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developed the idea of looking at empirical data-from the Florida Bar to
determine how the disciplinary system treated Florida lawyers.'
Each state that licenses attorneys is responsible for both the admittance
standards and the discipline system for its licensed lawyers. In some states,
the disciplining of lawyers is done behind closed doors, away from a public
that cannot be trusted in the same way as they are trusted with judicial mat-
ters.2 To be sure, much of the public seems to rely on the American Bar As-
sociation ("ABA") as the voice of the legal profession-even though the ABA
is a voluntary bar association and is not involved in the licensing of attorneys
in any state.3
The number of active attorneys continues to be on the rise. One study
has shown that Florida has approximately 3.1 active attorneys for every 1000
persons residing in the state.4 This increase in the size of the profession
raises questions as to whether the licensing system designed to handle a
fewer number of licensees is working. This article will take a look at infor-
mation regarding the admittance, licensing, and discipline of attorneys from
the public perspective, not from the attorneys' perspective.
The topic of discipline clearly is of interest to lawyers nationwide, par-
ticularly to the tens of thousands of solo practitioners and small firm attor-
neys around the country. The ABA Journal has reported a perceived disci-
plining bias against solo and small firm practitioners.' According to the ABA
1. Professor Kaufman was the Director of the Law Library at NSU Law Center until
August, 2003.
2. Frank J. Murray, Practitioners Almost Bulletproof When it Comes to Client Com-
plaints, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Sept. 4, 2000, at http://www.findarticles.com/cf dIs/
m1571/33_16/65091764/p 1/article.jhtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
3. See id. The American Bar Association boasts more than 400,000 members and is
"the largest voluntary professional association in the world." A.B.A., ABOUT THE ABA, at
http://www.abanet.org/about/home.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004); see also AM. BAR ASS'N
CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS, at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/sold/toc_2000.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). The
American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility, Standing Committee on
Professional Discipline has published for many years a "Survey on Lawyer Discipline Sys-
tems." See id. This survey brings together pure statistics on lawyer discipline from states, but
neither has a hand in shaping the disciplines, nor offers commentary on the states' systems.
Id.
4. Memorandum from Director of Academic Affairs and Licensing to the ABA Com-
mittee on Academic Affairs and Licensing, (September 3, 2003) (on file with author).
5. Mark Hansen, Picking on the Little Guy, 89 A.B.A. J. 30, 32 (Mar. 2003). This per-
ception has been discussed at several organized bar meetings in the past year or so. See id.;
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Journal, small-firm practitioners (the "little guys," as the ABA Journal sug-
gests) are disciplined at a disproportionately higher rate than lawyers in big-
ger firms, and the number of complaints against small-firm practitioners is
higher as well. 6 However, at the recent 28th National Conference on Profes-
sional Responsibility, studies were presented from three state bars, which
found no evidence of bias against solo and small firm practitioners in the
discipline process.7 A study by The State Bar of California concluded that
the discipline process indeed had a higher impact on small-firm attorneys.8
The impact, however, was a result of the factors that place small-firm attor-
neys at a greater risk for discipline, such as being overworked, and thus miss-
ing deadlines-rather than a result of an actual bias against these attorneys. 9
I. INTRODUCTION, METHODS, AND PURPOSE
For our study, we decided to review the licensing criteria and collected
disciplinary reports, for a set number of years, as published by The Florida
Bar, the licensing agency for attorneys practicing in Florida."0 In other
words, we placed ourselves in the shoes of a diligent consumer who may be
see also Sharon Lerman, No Bias Found Against Solos, CAL. ST. B.J., Aug. 2001, available at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov./calbar/2cbj/01aug/pagel2-1.htm. Sharon Lerman opined that the
lack of support and managerial skills were more likely to be the root cause of discipline inves-
tigations, as well as, clients of small firms were more likely to file a complaint against a solo
or small firm. Id.; see also STATE BAR OF CAL., INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTORNEYS IN SOLO PRACTICE, SMALL SIZE LAW FIRMS
AND LARGE SIZE LAW FIRMS 5 (2001), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/
reports/2001_SB143-Report.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). The California Bar reported
findings of a year-long study by Hilton Farnkopf& Hobson, LLC. Id.
6. Hansen, supra note 5, at 33.
7. Id. "Small firm practitioners" are defined by some states as those working in firms of
ten or fewer lawyers.
8. Lerman, supra note 5.
9. Hansen, supra note 5, at 33. Other such risk factors included experiencing money
worries and lacking documentation to defend themselves against complaints. Id. One of the
difficulties in assessing this type of potential problem was the lack of routinely collected data
on those who are disciplined and the specifics of their lawyer life. Id.
10. FLA. BAR ONLINE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.flabar.org/tfb/
flabarwe.nsf/f6301f4d554d40a385256a4f006e6566/47fc0a8f415aI Id285256b2f006ccb83?
OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). Any lawyer practicing law in Florida must be a
member of the Florida Bar. Id.
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evaluating a profession, and availed ourselves of information accessible to a
consumer of legal services.
On The Florida Bar website there is an enormous amount of informa-
tion geared to consumers of legal services." This information includes a
searchable database of all lawyers, information on the complaint process, and
rules about attorney conduct.' 2 But one piece of information it does not pro-
vide is a full report of all disciplines in a single format available to the pub-
lic.'3 We had both seen paragraphs listing the discipline of Florida attorneys
published on The Florida Bar website and in The Florida Bar News. How-
ever, if we wanted a complete overview of the discipline picture, the data
collection would be up to us.' 4 We developed a plan to collect reports from
the Florida Bar website and The Florida Bar News, enter the information
obtained into a database, analyze the data, and report the findings. We began
to compile data, anticipating results in a few months.
More than a year later, after steady work, we finally began our data
analysis. We hired some wonderful research assistants to help with our data
collection. 5 The research assistants began with The Florida Bar website.
After exhausting that resource, they began to collect earlier data published in
The Florida Bar News, while limiting their research to information accessi-
ble to a diligent consumer. The Florida Bar's method of reporting discipli-
nary actions has evolved through the years, with it recently becoming clearer,
more concise, and more thorough. However, that also meant that the older
11. See generally FLA. BAR ONLINE, at http://www.flabar.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
12. See id.
13. E.g., FLA. BAR ONLINE, THE FLORIDA BAR DISCIPLINARY STATISTICS, at
http://www.flabar.org/tfb/TFBLawReg.nsf/basic+view/F4AB3FF7CB9A5AFA85256B2FOO6
C9F09?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) [hereinafter DISCIPLINARY STATISTICS].
The Florida Bar has published an overview of Disciplinary Statistics from 1996 to 2003. Id.
14. See, e.g., Disciplinary Actions, FLA. B. NEWS, Jan. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.flabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNewsO1 .nsf/Articles?OpenView&Start-6&Count=-30
&Expand=6#6 (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). The Florida Bar News is the industry newspaper
of The Florida Bar. It is published twice monthly, on the first and the fifteenth of each month,
and a subscription is part of the fee based membership benefits of the Florida Bar. The news-
paper is readily available for review by the general public in most law libraries. The Florida
Bar publishes paragraphs under the heading Disciplinary Actions in this newspaper, detailing
actions taken by the Bar against members. See id. These paragraphs also appear for a time on
the Florida Bar website. Id.
15. Our everlasting thanks to Ian Dolan (NSU '04) and Paul Homick (NSU '04), who
completed this phase of the task.
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the copy of The Florida Bar News, the fewer-and more convoluted-were the
reports.
Through diligent research of old issues of the newspapers, 6 and the use
of a lot of copy-machine cards, the research assistants gathered page after
page of information on disciplinary actions. The research assistants' at-
tempts to obtain data from officials at The Florida Bar proved unfruitful. In
fact, The Florida Bar did not release any specific information to us that con-
tributed to our study.' We relied solely on what was published by The Flor-
ida Bar and what the "public" would be able to obtain. We readily admit that
this inconsistency through the years may affect our statistics.' 8 However, we
felt it imperative to rely only on information available to the public if we
were to remain true to the public access component of this project.
We initially set a period of twenty years for our data review. In the end,
we decided only to enter data for fifteen years. The main drive behind this
decision was the incomplete nature of the older disciplinary reports in The
Florida Bar News. The further back the issue of the report, the more spo-
radic the decisions." We decided that including reports compiled from in-
16. The newspapers were obtained through the Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center Library, ("NSU Library") as well as through interlibrary loan from the
Broward County Law Library. Both libraries are open to the public.
17. FLA. BAR ONLINE, at http://www.flabar.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). The Bar
Disciplinary Statistics, available at The Florida Bar website, are stated by fiscal year (July 1-
June 30), rather than by calendar year. DISCIPLINARY STATISTICS, supra note 13. These statis-
tics do not match our finds for two reasons. First, the study is calculated by calendar year
rather than bar year, and second, the study calculated only from published paragraphs rather
than directly from Bar files. See id.
18. See Gary Blankenship, Grievance Group Gears Up for Year-long Examination, FLA.
BAR. NEWS, Oct. 1, 2003 available at http://www.flabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf/
cb53c80c8fabd49d85256b5900678f6c/544d81763f45b83385256dac00526f7c?Open
Document (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). The authors know for certain that our numbers do not
reflect the full number of disciplinary actions occurring in the state. In a recent issue of The
Florida Bar News, it was reported that in 2002, 414 disciplinary actions were imposed. Id. In
our look at what was published, only 217 reports of discipline were found.
19. Disciplinary Actions, supra note 14. The authors considered the fact that there were
simply fewer disciplines twenty years ago, giving the appearance of incomplete reporting, but
our concern stemmed from the irregular intervals in which the discipline reports appeared. In
recent years, discipline reports appeared in every issue of The Florida Bar News, although
disparate in number. See id. In earlier years, we could find no such predictable appearance by
the reports. Also, it appeared that discipline categories and their definitions changed a bit in
early years. Id.
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formation two decades old, and probably incomplete, would not give us
anywhere near a reliable picture of the disciplinary actions taken by The
Florida Bar. We believe that fifteen years worth of data gives a clear, accu-
rate picture of the public's view of attorney discipline.
As we began our data-entry stage (converting printed paragraphs into
data in an a spreadsheet program) we thought we were near completion. We
were wrong again. The painstaking task of entering the information proved
to require a Herculean effort.2" We decided on which categories of informa-
tion to scrutinize-such as name, year admitted to the bar, and location-and
the research assistants began to sort. They took over a room in the library at
the NSU Law Center to house the materials and create the database frame-
work. One student became the keeper of each year's files-as well as the
precious duplicates, which were guarded for safekeeping-and monitored the
comings and goings of the valuable original data. The students divided up
the calendar years and began to enter it ... and enter it ... and enter it.2
We analyzed the data using a combination of tools and methods. The
use of Microsoft Excel helped us to sort and count the numbers, percentages,
and other hard facts. Ultimately, tallies were done by hand, page by page,
counting total numbers by county, discipline, and gender. Comparisons were
then made by hand, examining areas such as numbers of men versus women,
different counties in which the attorneys practiced, and years of experience.
Selected data and its commentary appear in Part III of this article.22
In doing this article, we do not intend to embarrass any member of The
Florida Bar or the institution itself. Rather, in this time of professional crisis,
when questions abound as to who oversees professionals and their ethics, we
felt that it was important to take this look at a small part of our profession.
20. This monumental task was accomplished thanks to the efforts of Paul Homick (NSU
'04), Marcia Lucas (NSU '04), Scott Havericak (NSU '04), and most particularly Ian Dolan
(NSU '04), Katherine Miller (NSU '05), and Jennifer Erdelyi (NSU '05). Extra thanks to
Jennifer Erdelyi and Ian Dolan who not only entered data but oversaw its completion and
structured its format.
21. While the earlier years of original data generally had few entries, the information
given was not as concise and well organized as later years; and thus, it was more difficult to
convert into the database format we had developed in Microsoft Excel.
22. Although the students were indispensable with the collection and organization of
data, they did not perform any of the analysis or commentary on the data for this article. See
infra Part 1II.
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Some important disclaimers are necessary. First, we have not seen the
original documents associated with these attorney complaints, nor have we
been involved with any of these cases. Second, to repeat, we did not obtain
our data directly from The Florida Bar. As stated, we collected what was
readily available to the public, through common methods-what was pub-
lished by The Florida Bar. We know there were many disciplines, which for
undeterminable reasons, did not appear on The Florida Bar website or in The
Florida Bar News. Therefore, the study's numbers most likely do not match
official Florida Bar information. Third, the authors are not trained statisti-
cians. The authors are legal scholars, who have collected research and used
it to evaluate the profession. Fourth, we are human. We recognize that, un-
fortunately, a portion of the public does not associate this trait with attorneys;
nevertheless, the authors are subject to error. Although we have used com-
puter programs and undertaken multiple reviews of our information, it is
possible that a portion of otherwise available data was missed or even mis-
calculated in our current data. Nevertheless, all of these issues notwithstand-
ing, we believe that the overreaching message that we present is on target.
Part II of this article provides an overview of the admittance system and
the discipline system for attorneys who are members of The Florida Bar.
Part III offers some of our data as well as our analysis of our findings. Part
IV outlines some of our conclusory thoughts and plans for the discipline of
attorneys.
II. THE FLORIDA SYSTEM
A. Admittance to the Florida Bar
The admission of attorneys to the practice of law in the State of Florida
is accomplished through the judicial system of the state. z3 The Supreme
Court of Florida, the highest court in the state, has an administrative arm,
called The Florida Board of Bar Examiners, which handles bar admissions.24
23. FLA.BARADMISS.R. 1-11.
24. FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 1-12. The Florida Board of Bar Examiners consists of twelve
members of The Florida Bar and three members of the general public who are not attorneys.
FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 1-2 1.
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The Florida Bar is often considered to be an exclusive organization,
which is difficult to join.25 Admission is divided into two general catego-
ries. 26 One is the taking, and passing, of the Florida Bar Exam and a Multi-
state Professional Responsibility Exam. The second requirement, which is
often improperly given less emphasis by potential applicants, requires appli-
cants to pass a character and fitness screening before admission.28
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that the "'good moral charac-
ter"' requirement emphasizes "honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of
others .... ,,29 An applicant's standard of conduct also "must have a rational
connection to the applicant's fitness to practice law."3
Rule 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admission to the
Bar, focuses on the "background investigation" of applicants.3' Rule 3-10
sets the standards of attorneys admitted to the Bar.32 Some are academic,
grasping fundamental principles and reasoning, while others focus on the
practice of law.33 More specifically, a potential Bar member should have
both the ability to, and in likelihood will:
(1) Comply with deadlines.
(2) Communicate candidly and civilly with clients, attorneys,
courts and others.
25. See FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 1-16. The fee for filing an application to The Florida Bar
and sitting for the exam can be as high as $2500. FLA. BD. OF BAR EXAM'RS, FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.floridabarexam.org/public/main.nsf/faq.html?
OpenPage (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). All applicants to the Bar must sit for the actual Florida
Bar examination. Id. No one may gain "reciprocity" through admittance from another state.
Id. Florida does not accept partial exam scores from other states. Id.
26. Id.
27. FLA. BAR ADMIss. R. 4-20. Rule 4 sets forth the requirements of the examinations
and standards for passing. Id.
28. FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 1-14.2. The Bar requires applicants to possess "good moral
character." FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 2-14.1. The purpose of the character and fitness screening is
"to protect the public and safeguard the judicial system." FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 1-14. Rule 2-
12 specifically states that all applicants seeking admission "shall produce satisfactory evi-
dence of good moral character." FLA. BAR ADMIss. R. 2-12.
29. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1978).
30. Id.
31. FLA. BAR ADMIss. R. 3.
32. FLA. BARADMISS. R. 3-10.
33. FLA. BARADMISS. R. 3-10.1.
[Vol. 28:3:669
209
: Nova Law Review 28, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
A TTORNEY DISCIPLINE IN FLORIDA
(3) Conduct financial dealings in a responsible, honest, and trust-
worthy manner.
(4) Avoid acts that are illegal, dishonest, fraudulent, or deceitful.
(5) Conduct oneself in accordance with the requirements.., and
the Rules of Professional Conduct.
34
Ultimately, an applicant who has complied with the rules for admission,
passed the requisite examinations, and met character and fitness standards
will be recommended to The Florida Bar by the Board of Bar Examiners for
admission.35 The Supreme Court of Florida will enter an order of admission
upon its satisfaction of this recommendation. 36 Once an attorney either par-
ticipates in an induction ceremony 37 or is otherwise swom in,38 the applicant
then becomes subject to the administration of The Florida Bar and the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar.39
B. The Disciplinary System
Chapter three of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar govern the disci-
plinary system of the Florida Bar.40 Through these rules, "[t]he Supreme
Court of Florida establishes the authority and responsibilities of The Florida
Bar.. ." as well as the responsibilities of its member attorneys.4 In Florida,
34. FLA. BARADMISS. R. 3-10.1(c)(1)-(5).
35. FLA. BARADMISS. R. 5-10.
36. FLA. BARADMISS. R. 5-11.
37. FLA. BAR ADMIss. R. 5-12.
38. FLA. BAR ADMISs. R. 5-13.
39. FLA. BARADMISS. R. 5-15.
40. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3. The Florida Bar is both a licensing organization as well
as a professional membership organization. This duality of function is called an "integrated"
bar. FLA. BAR ONLINE, HISTORY OF THE FLORIDA BAR, at http://www.fla.bar.org/tfb/TFB
Organ.nsf/basic+view/9C8 IAD9FC9FC8A5852566B2F006CD27B?OpenDocument (last
visited Mar. 27, 2004). In other states, the licensing and professional membership functions
for attorneys are held by separate organizations.
41. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW SANCS. 1.1, at http://www.flabar.org/TFB/TFBLawReg.
nsf/0/691CC4lE2886B8E785256B2F006CD7AD?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 27,
2004). The Supreme Court of Florida has the power under the Florida Constitution to regulate
the admission of members of the Bar with the right to practice law, and thus set the ethical
standards for those members. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15. The current Rules of Professional
Conduct were adopted in the late 1980's and are based on the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
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the Supreme Court of Florida has the power to set the "standards of conduct
for lawyers, [as well as] to determine what constitutes grounds for disci-
pline" for attorneys practicing in Florida.42 The Supreme Court of Florida is
also ultimately responsible for disciplining Florida attorneys, including re-
voking licenses to practice law. 43 This system is not without critics. The
executive director of the legal reform group HALT has been quoted as stat-
ing that non-lawyers are capable of having, and should have a role in the
discipline process.'
According to The Florida Bar website, the purpose of holding bar pro-
ceedings to discipline attorneys "is to protect the public and the administra-
tion of justice.. ." from attorneys who do not (or may not) correctly perform
their professional duties either to clients, or the entire legal system.45
It is important to note that the disciplining of lawyers in Florida, which
creates a public record, is different from the concept of the civil wrong of
malpractice in Florida.46 When attorneys are sued in a civil lawsuit for mal-
practice, the litigation is filed in the civil court system of the judicial circuit
having jurisdiction over the attorney's actions.47 A case proceeds according
to the court and substantive rules and laws governing that cause of action.
However, the case must be initiated within the statute of limitations as set
forth by section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes.48 The goal in a malpractice
lawsuit is usually monetary compensation for the client.49
sional Conduct. See Timothy P. Chinaris, A Brief Overview of Lawyer Regulation in Florida,
at http://www.flabar.org/tfb/TFBConsum.nsf/basic+view/90DAD2CF7A8F877B85256B2F00
6C61BD? (last visited F Mar. 27, 2004).
42. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-1.2.
43. Id.
44. Murray, supra note 2. As quoted, "'[i]f a jury made up of nonlawyers is good enough
to decide a murder case or a million-dollar lawsuit, it's certainly capable of determining
whether a lawyer has cheated a client."' Id. As will be discussed, non-lawyers do have some
input into the discipline system in the State of Florida.
45. FLA. STANDARDS IMPOSING LAW SANCS. 1.1.
46. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7. I (b).
47. See FLA. BAR. ONLINE, CONSUMER PAMPHLET: COMPLAINT AGAINST A FLORIDA
LAWYER, at http://www.flabar.org/tfb/TFBConsum.nsf/48e76203493b82ad852567090070
c9b9/c5b7d247a0c9c45a85256b2f006c6186?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 27, 2004)
[hereinafter COMPLAINT AGAINST A FLORIDA LAWYER].
48. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (2002).
49. COMPLAINT AGAINST A FLORIDA LAWYER, supra note 47.
[Vol. 28:3:669
211
: Nova Law Review 28, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
A TTORNEY DISCIPLINE IN FLORIDA
A bar disciplinary proceeding is different. As in other professions, such
as the medical practice, attorneys are self-regulated, meaning that they have
power to discipline their own members. ° In contrast with other professions
in Florida, attorneys are disciplined at a high rate. In the 1999-2000 fiscal
year, the Bar disciplined the second highest percentage of its members
among all Florida self-regulated professions.5
In Florida, the grievance process against an attorney begins with a com-
plaint.5 2 According to a public-access consumer pamphlet, Complaint
Against a Florida Lawyer, a client who has a dispute with a lawyer should
always write a non-threatening letter to the lawyer first.53 That letter should
thoroughly explain the problem and attempt to resolve it.54 If the resulting
action is unsatisfactory, the client should then contact the Attorney and Con-
sumer Assistance Program ("ACAP"), which was launched by The Florida
Bar in March 2001. This program is designed to assist a client in resolving
problems prior to a complaint being filed. 6 The following is a list of dis-
putes that The Florida Bar has the authority to investigate:
A lawyer will not give you money he or she is holding on your be-
half or will not give you a full written accounting; A lawyer con-
tinually fails to respond to inquiries about the case, to tell you
about the court dates, or to appear in court; A lawyer lies or ad-
vises you or someone else to lie in the course of a case; A lawyer
represents you as well as another person whose interests conflict
with yours. A lawyer does not do what he or she has promised or
does not do it in a timely way. 7
50. Jan Pudlow, Disciplinary Details, FLA. B. NEWS, Mar. 15, 2001, available at
http://www.flabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf/76d28aa8f2ee03e 185256aa9005d8d9a/Sc
b I a95d473c0a5585256b0a007269c0?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
51. Id. Only the Board of Dentistry disciplined a higher percentage of its licensees. Id.
52. COMPLAINT AGAINST A FLORIDA LAWYER, supra note 47.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Pudlow, supra note 50. The Attorney and Consumer Assistance Program ("ACAP")
was created by the Florida Bar to investigate charges of unethical conduct against lawyers
practicing in Florida. Id. ACAP does not handle fee disputes between clients and attorneys.
Id.
56. COMPLAINT AGAINST A FLORIDA LAWYER, supra note 47.
57. FLA. BAR ONLINE, CONSUMER PAMPHLET: ATTORNEY CONSUMER ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM, at http://www.flabar.org/tfb/TFBConsum.nsf/basic+view/90DAD2CF7A8F877B8
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When a client contacts ACAP, the client first discusses the problem
with ACAP's non-lawyer personnel, in order to explore the behavior of the
subject attorney." The information then is forwarded to ACAP attorneys,
employed by The Florida Bar, who contacts the client for further discus-
sion. 9 The role of the ACAP attorney is to help the client determine whether
a complaint should be filed.6° If the ACAP attorney determines that it is ap-
propriate to do so, the ACAP attorney will assist the client in beginning the
process of filing the complaint.6'
A complaint filed against an attorney must always be in writing and
signed under oath.62 The proper complaint is a simple one-page document,
although it allows the complainant to attach detailed information in order to
properly document the nature of the problem at issue.63 Complainants must
be aware that the name, address, and telephone number of the person making
the complaint, technically called an "inquiry" at this stage, not only becomes
public record, but also is affirmatively disclosed to the attorney who is the
subject of the complaint.' 4
Once a complaint is received by The Florida Bar, a file is created.65 The
case is assigned to a Florida Bar disciplinary staff attorney, in order to de-
termine whether The Florida Bar has jurisdiction to investigate the inquiry.66
5256B2F006C61BD? (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). [hereinafter ATTORNEY CONSUMER Assis-
TANCE PROGRAM]. ACAP, The Florida Bar website, has extensive Consumer Services
information. Id. Detailed guidance is available in print or the consumer can print it off the
web site in PDF form. Id. Information is available in both English and Spanish. Id. A con-
sumer of legal services merely has to go to The Florida Bar website, click on Consumer Ser-
vices and the information and forms necessary to institute a complaint are highly accessible
and available. Id.
58. ATTORNEY CONSUMER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 57.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. COMPLAINT AGAINST A FLORIDA LAWYER, supra note 47.
63. FLA. BAR ONLINE, CONSUMER PAMPHLETS: INQUIRY/COMPLAINT FORM, at
http://www.flabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/AB230E7DCCC3B75385256B29
004BD6DC/$FILE/acap-form-webO4.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
The Florida Bar website has a form which may be downloaded, or it may be sent from ACAP
to a client. Id.
64. COMPLAINT AGAINST A FLORIDA LAWYER, supra note 47.
65. Id. This file is retained "in The Florida Bar's records for twelve months after the case
is closed," even if the complaint is dismissed. Id.
66. Id.
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Where The Florida Bar finds it does not have jurisdiction, no further action is
taken by the Bar, and the file is closed.67 If Bar counsel determines that the
Bar does have jurisdiction, then the matter becomes technically known as a
"complaint."68 In this case, the file is converted to a formal disciplinary file,
and the Bar attorney begins the investigative process.69
Next, counsel for The Florida Bar writes to the lawyer, who is the sub-
ject of the complaint, and requests a response regarding the matter, which the
accused lawyer is required to provide.7" Generally, the accused attorney
must respond within fifteen days, although extensions are granted liberally.7'
Subsequently, the complainants are allowed to respond and rebut the infor-
mation contained in the lawyer's response.72
Depending on the nature of the allegations, counsel for The Florida Bar
may take other factual investigative steps before conducting a review to de-
termine whether the case should be moved to the next stage of the proceed-
ing-the grievance committee.73 A grievance committee is comprised of
volunteers.74 The committee's composition requires that at least one-third
are not lawyers. 75 The committee serves within its judicial circuit to review
"complaints with much the same purpose as a grand jury."76  Grievance
committees may be informal, and are not bound by the rules of evidence or
similar restrictions in its decision-making.77 However, the committee only
may hear complaints if a quorum, consisting of a minimum of three members
67. Id. The complaint is forever labeled "inquiries" at that point. COMPLAINT AGAINST A
FLORIDA LAWYER, supra note 47.
68. Id.
69. Id. A matter regarding discipline which is not at any point conducted in the courts is
confidential and may only be disclosed in accordance with rule 3-7.1 of the Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.1. These rules ensure the confidentiality of
information about cases that is provided the Bar in connection with disciplinary actions filed.
Id.
70. COMPLAINT AGAINST A FLORIDA LAWYER, supra note 47.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. COMPLAINT AGAINST A FLORIDA LAWYER, supra note 47.
76. Id. Florida's Courts are divided into twenty numbered Judicial Circuits, divided by
geography. Id. Some counties comprise an entire judicial circuit, while other small counties
may combine to be one judicial circuit. Id.
77. Id.
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"2 of whom must be lawyers" exists. 78 A finding of probable cause must be
made by majority vote of the group present.79
Upon a finding of probable cause by the grievance committee, counsel
for The Florida Bar proceeds to file a formal complaint against the accused
attorney with the Supreme Court of Florida.8° If that complaint is contested
by that attorney, the matter is sent to a circuit or county court judge for a trial
on the complaint.8 The judge in this matter is referred to as a "referee," and
hears evidence prior to making a finding of fact. 82 This finding serves as a
recommendation to the Supreme Court of Florida, which has the final author-
ity to decide on the discipline of any Florida attorney. 3 Alternatively, cases
may be settled without such a trial.8
The types of discipline which may be imposed upon a lawyer are enu-
merated in rule 3-5 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.85 When the
Supreme Court of Florida finds a member of The Florida Bar guilty of mis-
conduct, the court may impose one of many levels of discipline. 86 First, the
rules clearly distinguish situations which constitute "minor misconduct."87
Minor misconduct is defined by the rules as a function of what is not minor
misconduct rather than an affirmative statement of what is minor miscon-
duct.88 Rule 3-5.1(b)(1) enumerates six conditions in which misconduct will
not be regarded as minor: 1) "misappropriation of a client's funds or prop-
erty;" 2) behavior "likely to result in actual prejudice... to a client;" 3) im-
proper behavior by an attorney who "has been publicly disciplined in the past
3 years;" 4) "misconduct... of the same nature [for which the subject attor-
ney] has been disciplined in the past 5 years;" 5) "misconduct [which] in-
78. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.4(g)(1).
79. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.4(g)(3).
80. COMPLAINT AGAINST A FLORIDA LAWYER, supra note 47.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also Fla. Bar v. Barley, 777 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 2000).
85. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1. In addition, Part B of the Standard for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, describes the levels of discipline and reasons why each may be assessed.
FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 2.1-2.10.
86. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(a). The Referee usually recommends a specific sanc-
tion according to discipline, but the Supreme Court of Florida ultimately decides this issue. R.
REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1.
87. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(b).
88. Id.
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cludes dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit, or fraud" by the subject attor-
ney; and 6) behavior constituting a felony.89 Attorneys who are accused of
minor misconduct may either admit to the behavior, or may have the Board
of Governance reject a grievance committee report recommending minor
misconduct.9° In either event, appropriate steps to either conclude the matter
or to take it to the next stage of the proceeding will take place.
If minor misconduct is found, the appropriate discipline is an "admon-
ishment," which declares that the conduct of the attorney was not proper, but
does not limit that attorney's right to practice law within the state.9' A griev-
ance committee can recommend admonishment for behavior that is other
than minor if "unusual circumstances" are present in a case; otherwise, ad-
monishments only are administered for minor misconduct. 92 An admonish-
ment consists of a memorandum administering the admonishment, which is
placed as part of the record of the proceeding, and a requirement that the
offending attorney must appear before either the Board of Governors or a
grievance committee to be verbally reprimanded about the misbehavior. 93
Another option for disciplining an attorney is the issuance of a public
reprimand, which also declares the conduct in question to be improper.94
Like an admonishment, it does not put any limit on the attorney's right to
practice law in the state.95 Public reprimands may be appropriate where in-
jury or potential injury is caused, where the attorney's behavior was negli-
89. Id.
90. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(b)(4)-(5).
91. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(a). In our reading of published disciplines, the word
admonishment was not used. However, we occasionally (as reflected by data in Part I1) saw
a description of a "private reprimand" given to an attorney. As there is no such discipline
described in the rules, matching the concepts of the rules to the published discipline, we de-
termined that these were equal.
92. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(b)(2). Admonishments are generally given when
there is little or no injury, or where there is a technical violation of the rules. FLA. STDS.
IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 4.14, 4.24, 4.34, 4.44, 4.54, 5.14, 5.24, 6.14, 6.24, 6.34, 7.4.
93. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(a).
94. Id. at 3-5.1(d).
95. Id.
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gent and not knowing or intentional.96 The judgment of a public reprimand
is published in the Southern Reporter. 97
For misconduct by attorneys considered more than merely "minor," a
host of more severe disciplines are available to the court. The most severe of
these is disbarment which is authorized by Rule 3-5.1(f).9" Attorneys who
are disbarred lose their status as members of The Florida Bar and have their
privilege to practice law in the state terminated for a period of time.99 Attor-
neys who are permanently disbarred, or disbarred with leave, may apply for
readmission. °° An attorney who has been disbarred may reapply for admis-
sion to The Florida Bar only after a period of five years from the date of dis-
barment, or longer if so ordered.'' The disbarred attorney must demonstrate
total compliance with the rules required for bar admission, and have compe-
tent and substantial evidence of rehabilitation to again practice law.0 2
Florida Bar rules provide for a rebuttable presumption of disbarment
when an attorney is found guilty of theft from trust accounts or from other
funds received by a lawyer in a fiduciary relationship. 0 3 In addition, dis-
barment generally is recognized as an appropriate punishment when an attor-
ney intentionally reveals information regarding a client's matter, with the
intent to benefit a third person; and the disclosure, which would not other-
wise be permitted, causes potential or real injury to the client.' °4 Disbarment
also is appropriate when an attorney engages in actions that present a know-
ing conflict of interest with clients, such as representing clients with adverse
interests, causing injury, or using information from a conflict, which causes
injury.' O5 In fact, if an attorney knowingly or intentionally deceives a client,
96. See FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANcs. 4.13, 4.23, 4.43, 4.63, 5.13, 6.13, 6.23, 6.33,
7.3, 8.3; Fla. Bar v. Kelner, 670 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1996); Fla. Bar v. Lumley, 517 So. 2d 13 (Fla.
1987).
97. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1 (d).
98. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1 (f).
99. Id.
100. Id.; see Fla. Bar re Hipsh, 586 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1991); Fla. Bar v. Ryder, 540 So. 2d
121 (Fla. 1989).
101. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(f)
102. Id. According to a recent article in the ABA Journal, it is common for jurisdictions to
emphasize rehabilitation rather than simply punishment. Terry Carter, Bounced from the Bar,
89 A.B.A. J. 56, 59 (Oct. 2003).
103. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(f).
104. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 4.21.
105. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 4.31.
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disbarment may be appropriate, regardless of injury. 106 Failure to diligently
practice law may present disbarment problems when a lawyer abandons his
or her practice, "knowingly fails to perform services," or has repeating peri-
ods of neglect with client matters; any of which can cause potential or actual
serious injury to the client.0 7 Furthermore, disbarment may even be appro-
priate when a lawyer's lack of understanding of fundamental legal doctrines
or procedures causes potential or real injury to a client. 8
Other violations may be cause for disbarment. Standard 5.1 outlines
specific "failure[s] to maintain personal integrity," which include being con-
victed of a felony, engaging in a drug sale, fraud, or deceitful behavior.'19
Failure to maintain "public trust," intentionally deceiving the court, abusing
the legal process, improperly communicating with persons involved in the
legal system, or intentionally violating the terms of a prior disciplinary or-
der-all of which injure the client and potentially the public, the legal sys-
tem, or the legal profession-are all appropriate reasons to consider disbar-
ment. "0
There are additional sanctions that temporarily may remove an attorney
from the practice of law. The Florida Bar refers to these sanctions as "sus-
pension" and "emergency suspension."'' Authorized in Rules 3-5.1(e) and
3-5.2, suspension forbids a lawyer from practicing law for a specified period
of time."' Suspensions generally are divided into two categories-those of
ninety days or less, which do not require proof of rehabilitation or passage of
the bar examination); and suspensions of more than ninety days, which do
require rehabilitation and may also require passage of all or part of the bar
106. FLA. STDs. IMPOSING LAW. SANCs. 4.61.
107. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 4.41.
108. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 4.51.
109. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 5.1 1(a)-(f); see also Fla. Bar v. Mart, 550 So. 2d
464 (Fla. 1989).
110. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 6.21, 6.31, 7.1, 8.1.
111. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 2.3, 2.4.
112. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(e), 3-5.2; see Fla. Comm. on Prof'I Ethics and Griev-
ances, Formal Op. 90-3 (1990), available at http://www.flabar.org/tfb/tfbetopin.nsf/
SearchView/ETHICS,+OPINION+90-3?opendocument (last visited Mar. 27, 2004); Fla.
Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 62-26 (Reconsideration) (1986) (regard-
ing treatment of attorneys who have been suspended), available at
http://www.flabar.org/tfb/tfbetopin.nsf/SearchView/ETHICS,+OPINION+6226+(Reconsidera
tion)?opendocument (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
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exam."' Suspensions may not be ordered in excess of three years." 4 Sus-
pensions are appropriate for the same reasons as disbarment, albeit, with a
reduced penalty for less severe misconduct. The reasons for suspension may
include: violations regarding improper dealing with client property that
causes injury, revealing confidential information of a client, knowing of con-
flicts of interest without disclosing them to clients, knowingly fail to perform
services for a client, knowingly lack the necessary competence causing in-
jury, or knowingly deceive a client causing injury, or causing potential in-
jury. 15
In addition, suspension may be the appropriate sanction for an attorney
who engages in criminal conduct that "seriously adversely reflects" on that
attorney's fitness as an attorney, but does not reach the level as delineated in
Standard 5.11 regarding disbarment16 Failure to maintain public trust, mak-
ing false statements, violating court orders or rules, or interfering or poten-
tially interfering with a legal proceeding may be situations for suspension." 7
Violations of other duties, such as improper communication or other behav-
ior, causing intentional injury or potential injury to the client, the public, or
the legal system, are also appropriate scenarios under which suspension may
be imposed." 8 Finally, if an attorney already has been publicly reprimanded
for the same or similar conduct, and subsequently has another violation of a
similar type, a suspension may be the appropriate order."9
An "emergency suspension" is the temporary suspension of an attorney
from the practice of law pending the final outcome of a disciplinary action. 2
This disciplinary action may occur in circumstances when an attorney has
been convicted of a "'serious crime' or when an attorney's conduct will
cause, "or is likely to cause immediate and serious injury to a client or the
public."'' The Florida Bar is required to file a formal complaint of disci-
113. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 2.3.
114. Id.
115. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 4.12,4.22,4.32,4.42,4.62.
116. FLA. STDs. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 5.12; see Fla. Bar v. Finkelstein, 522 So. 2d 372
(Fla. 1988).
117. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 6.12, 6.22.
118. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 6.32, 7.2.
119. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 8.2; see Fla. Bar v. Shinnick, 731 So. 2d 1265
(Fla. 1999).
120. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 2.4.
121. Id.
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pline within sixty days of an order of emergency suspension.' 22 Such a case
then proceeds directly to trial, skipping the need for a probable cause hearing
before a grievance committee. 23 Attorneys may move to have the emer-
gency order dissolved.
24
The rules address in detail another form of discipline, probation, which
limits the right of an attorney to practice. 125 Attorneys may be placed on
probation between six months and three years, or for an indefinite period of
time according to a specific order. 26 The order declaring the discipline must
state the conditions of that attorney's probation.'27 According to rule 3-5.1,
these conditions "may include but are not limited to:" completing continuing
education programs, being supervised by licensed attorneys on substance or
finances, reporting to agencies, and being restricted on certain types of ac-
tivities. 121
In considering which of these sanctions should be applied to a lawyer
who has been subjected to the disciplinary system, the Florida Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states that a court should consider the following
factors: 1) the duty violated by the attorney; 2) the mental state of the attor-
ney; 3) "the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct";
and 4) whether any mitigating or aggravating factors existed in the matter. 29
Aggravating factors may justify an increase in the discipline level imposed
on an attorney. 30 Facts which may be considered aggravating include: prior
disciplinary offenses, experience level, patterns of misconduct, or vulnerabil-
ity of the victim of the offense. 
31
By contrast, mitigating factors may justify a reduction in the discipline
imposed. 32 Such mitigating factors may include: absence of prior records or
dishonest motive, personal problems or situations, good faith efforts to rec-
122. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.2(d).
123. Id.
124. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.2(e)(1).
125. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(c).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. FLA. STDs. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 3.0.
130. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 9.21.
131. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 9.22(a), (c), (h), (i).
132. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 9.3 1.
2004]
220
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/1
NOVA LA WREVIEW
tify consequences, impairments, and overall character. 33 Also, it is interest-
ing to note that several factors, such as resigning prior to discipline being
imposed, the complainant's recommendation as to sanction, or withdrawal of
a complaint, will not be considered either aggravating or mitigating.'34 Addi-
tionally, a specific set of standards regarding sanctions in drug-related mat-
ters has been set out by The Florida Bar. 3 5
III. OUR FINDINGS
"'What is abundantly clear is that The Florida Bar and the Florida Su-
preme Court take regulatory responsibility very seriously.... The Florida
Bar's regulatory system is highly rated among other states, and we have
again confirmed that it is highly effective in Florida.' "--Herman Russo-
manno, Florida Bar President 2000-2001.136
A. General Findings
Our findings lead us to a cross roads of expectations and results. Ulti-
mately, the numbers of disciplinary actions that we collected were a lower
number than we expected to find. 137 A relatively low number of disciplinary
actions issued by The Florida Bar could ultimately be interpreted by a con-
sumer in two ways. First, the Bar is doing a fabulous job of admitting attor-
neys with high character, and continually educating them because the num-
bers within the profession requiring discipline appear to be low. On the
other hand, a consumer could conclude that there is something wrong with
the discipline system itself, either the cases of misconduct are not being re-
ported or they are not being processed through the system all the way to
sanction.
133. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 9.32(a)-(d), (g)-(h).
134. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 9.4(c)-(e).
135. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 10.0.
136. Pudlow, supra note 50.
137. A reminder that the number we collected through public access sources is lower than
the actual number of disciplines rendered. Despite that, we still expected much higher num-
bers, particularly in light of scattered pieces of Bar information that indicated that "[i]n a
typical year ... the Bar receives between 8,000 and 9,000 complaints." Blankenship, supra
note 18.
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Table 1: Florida Disciplines
Year '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02
Total 149 136 151 147 196 188 187 177 202 202 273 217 250 281 217
For example, a consumer of legal services making a rough estimate
could conclude that according to The Florida Bar website, Bar membership
in August 2003, was 72,728 attorneys, including inactive, good standing, and
retired members. Since only 217 disciplines were reported, only about .30%
of all attorneys are being disciplined. Therefore, attorneys in Florida are, in
whole, an honest and respectable group.
However, given the scandals emerging from corporate America, and
given the publicity in the past year for a 'Dignity in Law"' public campaign
by The Florida Bar President, 38 this low percentage could also indicate, to a
skeptical consumer, that the attorney self-regulation process is not working.
Unlike other professionals in Florida who fall under the auspices of the De-
partment of Business and Professional Regulation, the Supreme Court of
Florida is the ultimate finder of discipline for attorneys.'39 As much as the
public may see the court system and attorneys as one entity, although they
138. Bar to Launch 'Dignity in Law' Campaign, FLA. B. NEwS, Apr. 15, 2002, available
at http://www.flabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews0 l.nsf/8c9fl 3012b9673698525699900624829
(last visited Mar. 27, 2004). This campaign, created by then President-elect of The Florida
Bar, Todd Aronovitz, was approved by the Board of Governors in April 2002 for the purpose
of communicating the positive work of attorneys throughout Florida. Id. It was the first pro-
gram of its kind in the nation. Id.
139. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-3.1. On the other hand, the DBPR of Florida licenses
more than 359,000 professionals, including "architecture and interior design; asbestos con-
sultants; athlete agents; auctioneers; barbers; building code administrators and inspectors;
community association managers; the construction industry; cosmetology; electrical contrac-
tors; employee leasing; farm and child labor; funeral directors and embalmers; geologists;
landscape architecture; pilot commissioners; pilots rate review; surveyors and mappers and
veterinary medicine." FLA. DEP'T OF Bus. & PROF'L REGULATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2002-
2003, available at http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/os/ospubs/ar0203.pdf (last visited Mar.
27, 2004).
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are clearly not, the concept of "inside regulation" may seem abhorrent to
many consumers. 40
B. Growth in Discipline Numbers Generally
While we clearly witnessed an increase in disciplines over our time pe-
riod, this growth can be attributed to various possible reasons. First, the
number of attorneys committing breaches of the rules of professional con-
duct could be growing. This is a simple, plausible explanation. As Bar
Membership increases, the members in practice undertake more cases, which
in turn, results in more ethical problems, rendering rule violations almost
inevitable. However, the rate is clearly growing slower than the Bar mem-
bership rate, which is a good sign for the Bar itself and for consumers of
legal services."'
Second, consumers of legal services could be getting more aggressive in
pursuing remedies to unethical conduct. As we as a society become more
selective in our consumer choices in general, we may also be more likely to
report perceived unethical conduct by otherwise trusted professionals.'42 In
the wake of corporate, church, and medical scandals, society has become less
trusting of professionals, who in the past we otherwise put our complete
faith, and more likely to bring a grievance.
Third, information is more readily available to the public about the
grievance process. With the inception of the ACAP program to assist the
public, and with widespread use of the Internet to gather information, par-
140. The system is not as cohesive as many in the public may believe. Not only are judges
and attorneys held to different standards of conduct, but it is important to remember that pub-
lic members also sit on the committees that hear probable cause in complaints. R.
REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-3.4(c). The Code of Judicial Conduct operates independently from
the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS COMM'N, SuP. CT. OF FLA.,
FILINGS, at http://www.flcourts.org/pubinfo/jqc/index.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
141. See Table 1. The year 2002 appears to be an exception to the growing trend in disci-
plines, with the 2002 total reverting back to the 1999 figure according to our numbers. Id.
One possible explanation for this is the September 11, 2001 tragedy, which may have changed
the focus of both attorneys and consumers lives. Attorneys may have taken stock of their
behavior and acted more ethically; while the attention of consumers may have been on other
matters than lawyer discipline.
142. See Don Klausmeyer, Web Sites that Work: Build Customer Loyalty and Satisfaction
Online, SMART PROS, Mar. 27, 2000, at http://finance.pro2net.com/x24208.xml (last visited
Mar. 27, 2004).
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ticularly from the Florida Bar website about grievances, the public, 143 al-
though perhaps not more inclined to file grievances against attorneys, is
more educated and has the accessibility to doing so.'44
Fourth, the grievance committees, those part attorney/part non-attorney
groups evaluating complaints for probable cause, may be doing a more thor-
ough job of finding probable cause in more recent years where perhaps pre-
viously none was found. The increasing diversification of the Bar member-
ship,145 trickling down to participation on the grievance committees charged
with finding probable cause, may be better able to follow through with disci-
plinary actions that in the past may have been overlooked. 46 When com-
bined with increased non-lawyer (consumer) sensitivity to professional regu-
lation, it may be possible that grievance committees are being more thor-
ough.
C. The Gender Gap
The most striking difference in the numbers of disciplines that we found
was by gender. Although it is clear that the number of women members of
the Bar is growing, the percentage of women being disciplined is very low
compared to the number of male attorneys being disciplined, considering the
percentage of women members in the Bar. 14
143. FLA. BAR ONLINE, CONSUMER PAMPHLET: COMPLAINT AGAINST A FLORIDA LAWYER,
at http://www.flabar.org/tfb/TBFConsum.nsf/48e760203493b82ad852567090070c9b9/
c5b7d247a0c9c45/c5b7d247a0c9c45a85256b2f006c6186?OpenDocument (last visited Mar.
27, 2004).
144. Internet usage continues to increase. According to one report, the amount of Ameri-
cans online has increased from 84.6 million to 116.5 million from December 1998 to August
2000 alone. Group Samasco, A Comparison of Increased Internet Usage Among Various
Demographic Groups, at http://rhetcomp.gsu.edu/-gpullman/3140/samasco.doc (last visited
Mar. 27, 2004).
145. Young Lawyers Work to Promote Diversity and Gender Sensitivity, FLA. B. NEWS,
Dec. 1, 2002, at 21.
146. In March 15, 2000, The Florida Bar News reported that the ABA was very concerned
with increasing minority attorney members and was creating a scholarship bank to fund mi-
nority law school scholarships. Mark D. Killian, ABA President: Increasing Diversity Is the
Issue of Our Time, FLA. B. NEWS, Mar. 15, 2000, at 12. In September 2, 2001, The Florida
Bar News reported that 89% of the Bar population was white, 2% was black, and 8% His-
panic. Mark D. Killian, Emphasizing a Diverse Bench, FLA. B. NEWS, Sept. 1, 2001, at 4.
147. The Florida Bar has the highest percentage of women currently in its history, at
29.5% as of October 1, 2003. FLA. BAR ONLINE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: HOW
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Table 2: Total Disciplines in Florida Bar by Gender/Percentage
Year Total Disciplines by Percentage of Discipline* M/W**
Disciplines Gender**
1988 149 140M/9W 94%M / 6%W
1989 136 128M/8W 94%M / 6%W
1990 151 146M/5W 97%M / 3%W
1991 147 138M/9W 94%M / 6%W
1992 196 182M/14W 93%M / 7%W
1993 188 168M/20W 89%M / Il%W
1994 187 167M/20W 89%M / ll%W
1995 177 158M/19W 89%M / ll%W
1996 202 185M/17W 92%M / 8%W
1997 202 179M/23W 89%M / ll%W
1998 273 241M/31W 88%M / ll%W
1999 217 197M/20W 91%M I 9%W
2000 250 221M/29W 88%M / 12%W
2001 281 242M/39W 86%M / 14%W
2002 217 188M/24W 87%M / ll%W
There are several possible reasons for the wide gender gap in discipli-
nary actions. First of all, the gender gap in the Bar is still wide. Although
The Florida Bar is currently nearly thirty percent women, our data revealed
MANY LAWYERS ARE LICENSED TO PRACTICE LAW IN FLORIDA?, at
http://www.flabar.org/tbf/flabarwe.nsf/f630l f4d554d40a385256a4fD06e6566/47fcoa8f415 al I
d2852 (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
* Numbers may not always add up to total; some attorneys were not able to be identi-
fied by gender. Percentages may not always add up to total; some attorneys were not able to
be identified by gender.
** Percentages are rounded up or down using a standard .5 divider.
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that the highest percentage of women disciplined was fourteen percent, in
2001.48
The most plausible explanation for the greater number of men being
disciplined is the gender difference in the history of the Bar.1 49 Although
women are joining the Bar at a growing rate, the longer attorneys are in prac-
tice, the more likely they are to have some claim made against them.
150
Therefore, newly admitted attorneys are not being disciplined at the same
rate as the more experienced attorneys. These more experienced attorneys
are generally men, and, therefore, higher numbers of men are being disci-
plined.
There may be many reasons for new attorneys being disciplined at
lower rates. New attorneys may not be responsible for clients directly. 5 '
Since the grievance process against attorneys generally commences with a
complaint by a client directly, new attorneys who work for a partner, who is
responsible for direct client contact, may not be brought into the Bar griev-
ance process. In these instances, the attorney of record would be subject to
discipline should there be a problem with the handling of the case.
52
In addition, many larger firms have structured supervision programs for
new attorneys beginning their careers.5 5 Even if a new attorney is directly
responsible for client contact, an attorney who may be formally and closely
supervised by an experienced attorney will not likely make a mistake that
would affect the client, and thus, would not generate a complaint against
him. 54 Many small firms may not have the time or budget for such supervi-
148. Id.
149. The number of women in the Bar has grown dramatically. Jan Pudlow, Women in
The Florida Bar, FLA. B. J., Apr. 2000, at 56. According to a 2000 issue of The Florida Bar
Journal, there were 175 women lawyers that were Florida Bar members in 1966. Id. at 59.
"By 1975, there were 684 out of 20,247" total Florida lawyers (3.3 percent); by 1980 the
percentage of women lawyers in Florida was up to 7.3 percent. Id.
150. This thought is usually articulated in the context of malpractice lawsuits, and ac-
counts for malpractice rates generally rising with years of experience in practice. JAY G.
FOONBERG, How To START AND BUILD A LAW PRACTICE 368 (Millennium 4th ed. 1999).
151. See Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP at http://www.wyattfirm.com/training.html (last
visited Mar. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Wyatt]. The law firm of Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP,
serving Kentucky, Tennessee, and Indiana with more than 200 lawyers offers details on their
website regarding the role of associates and the pride senior partners take in their training. Id.
152. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5.
153. Wyatt, supra note 151.
154. Hansen, supra note 5, at 33.
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sion programs, which may also be a reason why solo and small-firm attor-
neys are being disciplined at a higher rate. 55 Many attorneys begin their
careers in larger firms and then split off into smaller firms, where they can
take a larger role in the running of the business. However, by leaving their
supervisors behind, attorneys are more vulnerable to mistakes that ultimately
may result in discipline by The Florida Bar.156
Our thoughts about newer members (in this look, translating to female)
bore out in our brief examination of attorneys by year admitted to the Bar.
According to reliable figures for Bar admissions for attorneys disciplined in
2001 and 2002, show that the new members of the Bar are not the largest,
nor even the second largest, experienced group getting disciplined.'57 In fact,
in 2001, about sixty-six percent of all disciplines came from those practicing
ten to thirty years; while in 2002, about seventy percent of all disciplines fell
in that group."' So, even though women membership may be growing
quickly within the Bar, it may be ten years or more before we see the per-
centages of women disciplined coming in line with the membership numbers.
Table 3: Disciplines by Year Admitted to Bar 59
Year of Member Member Member Member Member Member
Disci- 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50+
pline years years years years years years
2001 49 102 83 31 6 1
2002 42 85 67 20 1 2
155. Id.
156. Id. (echoing an explanation by Virgina L. Ferrara, New Mexico's chief disciplinary
counsel).
157. See Table 3: Disciplines by Year Admitted to Bar.
158. Id.
159. Nine attorneys' admittance dates were unable to be ascertained.
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Other explanations for the low number of women being disciplined, other
than Bar membership, may be consumer oriented. Young women attorneys
can find themselves being treated differently than men by their clients. 6° It
is possible that clients are treating women differently in many ways, includ-
ing the discipline process.' 6 ' It is also possible that grievance committees are
treating women differently than male attorneys in finding probable cause in
cases involving women.'62 Some believe that women are more socialized to
communicate, which may result in better client communications than those
of male attorneys. 163 While there are no factual situations documenting this
type of behavior in The Florida Bar disciplinary process, the overall treat-
ment of women in the law leads to this possibility."6
D. Geography
Another factor that we examined in total Bar disciplines was the county
where the disciplined attorney practiced. The results were generally unsur-
prising: the higher the population; the higher or greater Bar disciplines. But
within this data, there were exceptions.
160. Galina Davidoff, Warm Body or a Key Player: Getting People to Care that You
Were There, DQ LIBRARY: DECISIONQUEST ARTICLES: at http://www.decisionquest.com/
site/dqlib74.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
161. The summary of a study on women in the legal profession found many differences in
the perception of women as a gender category, rather than as an individual, in the areas of
client satisfaction and development. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et. al., Glass Ceilings and Open
Doors: Women's Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 291, 302-05
(1995). In addition, some believe that projecting a powerful personal communication style
does not come naturally to most women. Maret McCoy, Career Survival Skills for Women, at
http://i.b52.net/i/u/565138/i/CareerSurvivalSkills-forWomen.doc (last visited Mar. 27,
2004).
162. Cf Epstein et al., supra note 161.
163. Amy Singer, Women Attorneys at a Disadvantage in Combative Courtrooms? Think
Again, at http://www.trialconsultants.com/Library/WomenAttorneysDisadvantage.html (last
visited Mar. 27, 2004).
164. Id. "[T]he norms of the legal workplace reflect a male culture." Beyond the Billable
Hour, LAWYERS LIFE COACH.COM, at http://www.lawyerslifecoach.com/newsletters/
issue27.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
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Table 4: Disciplines Sorted by County and Year
[Vol. 28:3:669
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Alachua 3 I 3 2 3 1 6 2 3 3 4 2 3 5 4
Bay 3 0 2 I 0 3 I 0 2 1 2 0 0 1 1
Bradford 0 I I 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 I 0 0 0
Brevard 0 0 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 5 3 9 6 3 5
Broward 22 23 14 26 17 23 24 25 36 25 28 27 27 40 24
Charlotte 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 1 3
Citrus 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 2 I
Clay 0 1 1 1 2 4 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 2
Collier 2 I 0 0 3 I 1 0 1 2 2 3 I 4 5
Columbia 0 I 2 0 2 0 I 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
De Soto 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Duval 9 8 3 5 8 7 6 10 6 5 II 6 6 5 4
Escambia 4 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 7 3 5 2 2
Flagler 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 1
Franklin 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gadsden 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 2 0 0 0 0
Hamilton 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Hendry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0
Hemando 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 0
229
: Nova Law Review 28, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
2004] ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE IN FLORIDA
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Highlands 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 I
Hillsborough 21 13 10 8 13 18 18 21 17 12 19 8 13 21 8
Indian River I 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0
Jackson 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I
Jefferson 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lake 0 3 0 I 1 0 1 1 3 1 3 0 I 0 0
Lee 4 3 4 6 2 0 2 I I 4 2 3 0 3 3
Leon I 3 3 0 1 2 5 3 2 2 6 9 6 5 7
Levy 0 0 0 I 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Liberty 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Manatee I I I 0 I 1 1 0 0 0 I l 3 1 1
Marion 3 3 5 I 1 0 6 5 1 0 1 3 3 3 I
Martin 0 2 0 I I 2 1 2 2 1 4 1 4 2 4
Miami-Dade 24 29 35 27 43 49 33 32 45 48 54 49 64 72 52
Monroe 3 1 0 I I 2 0 1 0 2 2 0 I 0 2
Okaloosa 0 0 1 3 I I 0 I 0 2 3 0 2 5 1
Orange 8 3 7 7 11 5 6 6 16 14 18 15 13 10 11
Osceola 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 0 1 I 2
Out of State 7 6 16 13 19 11 13 12 17 13 22 26 30 29 22
Palm Beach I 1 0 0 4 0 I 1 0 2 3 0 1 I 1
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Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Pasco 3 2 4 2 0 4 3 0 5 2 4 5 1 2 2
Pinellas 9 9 10 12 22 26 18 13 10 15 27 I1 22 21 9
Polk 6 11 8 8 10 14 13 16 14 13 15 13 19 17 23
Putnam 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
St. Lucie 3 1 2 5 4 3 3 2 0 2 3 3 2 4 6
St. Johns 4 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 I 0 1 3 0
Sara Rosa 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 I 0 0 I 0 0 1 0
Sarasota 2 0 1 4 3 I 4 3 1 4 5 3 I 1 3
Seminole 0 0 0 I 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0
Sumter 0 3 0 I 3 2 3 2 I 0 5 2 4 2 3
Suwannee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 I
Taylor 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0
Union 2 2 3 0 0 I 0 1 3 3 2 2 0 0 0
Volusia I 0 3 2 7 2 4 2 2 3 3 7 5 4 2
Wakulla 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Walton 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 I 0
TOTAL 149 136 151 147 196 188 187 177 202 202 273 217 250 281 217
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Some counties experienced little change over the years.'65 On the other
hand, other counties whip-lashed from no attorney discipline to a fairly large
number based on attorney population and history. 66 There are several plau-
sible explanations for these results.
The first data we noticed was the greater number of attorneys disci-
plined in Miami-Dade County. 167 However, the population of Miami-Dade
County is greater than anywhere else in the state. 68 More people translate to
more potential clients, and, thus, may mean more cases and more opportuni-
ties for something to go wrong. The percentage of disciplines brought
against attorneys with business addresses in Miami-Dade County has not
changed dramatically, despite the otherwise growing absolute numbers.
69
Despite such an enormous population in the county, the county has not had a
dramatic population growth; therefore, it is not surprising that the percentage
of total disciplines in Miami-Dade County has not dramatically grown.17°
In other counties where population growth has been larger, discipline
rates have grown slightly, in appropriate comparison to the larger popula-
tion. 7' In addition, it is important to note that, like many other professional
165. See Table 6.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE-U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 DATA FOR THE STATE
OF FLA. POPULATION FOR THE 15 LARGEST COUNTIES AND INCORPORATED PLACES: 1990 AND
2000, available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/tables/redist-fl.html (last
visited Mar. 27, 2004) [hereinafter FLA. CENSUS 2000]. The 2000 Census as reported by the
University of Florida Bureau of Economic Research listed the Florida population (in thou-
sands, rounded to hundreds) at 15,982.4, and the population of Miami-Dade county at 2,253.4.
Id. The next largest county was Broward, at 1,623.0 and then Palm Beach Bounty at 1,131.2.
Id. Although the overall population numbers were smaller in the 1990 Census, Miami-Dade
County still ranked the most populous, followed by Broward and then Palm Beach Counties as
well. Id.
169. Id.
170. FLA. CENSUS 2000, supra note 168. Although the population of Florida as reported
from the 1990 to 2000 Census increased from 12,938.0 (in thousands, rounded to hundreds) to
15,982.4, Miami-Dade County population only increased from 1,937.1 to 2,253.4, a growth of
approximately sixteen percent. Id. Compare this to the growth in smaller counties such as
Orange county, which grew from 677.5 to 896.3, a growth of approximately thirty-two per-
cent. Id.
171. See Table 4: Disciplines sorted by county and year; FLA. CENSUS 2000, supra note
168.
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industries, attorneys' decisions to work in metropolitan areas are likely to
follow population growth, not precede it.'72
Table 5: Out-of-State Disciplines
173
Year Total Disciplines Percentage
Disciplines Attributed to Disciplines for
Attorneys from Out-of-State
Out-of-State Attorneys
1988 149 7 5%
1989 136 6 4%
1990 151 16 11%
1991 147 13 9%
1992 196 19 10%
1993 188 11 6%
1994 187 13 7%
1995 177 12 7%
1996 202 17 8%
1997 202 13 6%
1998 273 22 8%
1999 217 26 12%
2000 250 30 12%
2001 281 29 10%
2002 217 22 10%
172. Phillip L. Clay, Choosing Urban Futures: The Transformation of American Cities, 1
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 28, 39 (1989).
173. This table is based on attorneys, published by The Florida Bar, who have an out of
state address. It does not take into account where the cases that caused the discipline were
handled.
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One geographic group that has seen a sharp rise in discipline is the at-
torneys with out-of-state addresses. 7 4 From a low in 1989 of only four per-
cent to a high of twelve percent in 2001, the number of attorneys being disci-
plined from out-of-state is a strong force.
175
There may be several reasons for such a large percentage of out-of-state
attorneys disciplined in Florida. First, as we become a more mobile society,
the numbers of attorneys claiming out-of-state addresses may have grown-
attorneys become licensed and then move, or may hold licenses in multiple
states by design. As the number of out-of-state attorneys grows, so does the
number of cases, resulting in more potential violations by this group. Sec-
ond, the grievance committees may be more active in following up on prob-
lems involving Florida-licensed attorneys with out-of-state addresses. Third,
The Florida Bar rules allow for reciprocal discipline, when an attorney is
disciplined in another state. 176 For example, if an attorney is disbarred for an
offense in another state in which he or she may be licensed, the Florida Bar
may reciprocally revoke his/her right to practice in Florida. 7 7 Such disbar-
ment in Florida would be the result of harm to a client outside of the state,
and the process through another state's discipline system to reach such a
result, yet would be counted in our statistics as a disbarment. However,
these cases cannot be explained by trends within Florida.1
78
174. See Table 5: Out-of-State Disciplines.
175. Id. More than one in ten attorneys in the years 1999 and 2000 claimed an out-of-state
address.
176. FLA. STDS. FOR IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 2.9, available at http://www.flabar.org (last
visited Mar. 27, 2004).
177. Id.
178. See Table 6.
2004]
234
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Table 6: South Florida (tri-county) Disciplines 79
Year Total Palm Beach, Percentage of
Disciplines Broward and Disciplines in
Miami-Dade the Tri-County
County Area
Disciplines
1988 149 52 35%
1989 136 63 46%
1990 151 57 38%
1991 147 61 42%
1992 196 70 36%
1993 188 86 46%
1994 187 70 37%
1995 177 73 41%
1996 202 95 47%
1997 202 86 43%
1998 273 97 36%
1999 217 89 41%
2000 250 110 44%
2001 281 129 46%
2002 217 99 46%
179. This table is based on those attorneys licensed by The Florida Bar, that list a Bro-
ward, Miami-Dade, or Palm Beach County address. It does not take into account where the
cases that caused the discipline were handled.
[Vol. 28:3:669
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The South Florida area, taken as a whole, has quite a large percentage
of the disciplines ordered each year.' In fact, ranging from a low of ap-
proximately a third to nearly half of all disciplines, the tri-county South Flor-
ida area seems fraught with unethical behavior. 8 ' But is that fair and true?
Not necessarily. First of all, the Palm Beach, Broward and Dade
County areas have an enormous population compared to most counties in
Florida.1 82 Because of this, the sheer number of cases being handled in these
counties is tremendous,'83 and more cases lend to more problems. Second,
the population of these counties is both very sophisticated and very ripe for
potential unethical behavior. These counties boast metropolitan, well-
educated and high income groups, leading to more watchful consumers.'84 In
contrast, the tri-county area also contains a great number of new immigrants,
who lack full English skills and otherwise are unfamiliar with the legal sys-
tem and its protections, rendering the tri-county area a breeding ground for
unscrupulous attorneys taking advantage of otherwise unknowledgeable cli-
ents. 85
In either event, consumers of legal services should not fear working
with an attorney in South Florida due to these figures, but may be concerned
based on the published accounts. It may be possible that due to the sophisti-
cation of the client base, consumers readily accept these behaviors, however,
they may not.
E. "Punishment "for the "Crime"
We then took a closer look at the total grievances handed out each year,
and the specific disciplines assessed to each attorney under the process, as
demonstrated in Table 7 & 8.
180. See Table 6.
181. Id.
182. FLA. CENSUS 2000, supra note 168.
183. See UNV. OF FLA., BUREAU OF ECON. & Bus. RESEARCH., FLORIDA STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT § 22 (2001) (tabulating by county the criminal justice system statistics in Florida).
184. See id. § 4.00 (tabulating Florida's educational statistics).
185. Id. at tbl. 1.91 (tabulating number of immigrants "admitted by country of birth and
intended residence in specified metropolitan areas of Florida").
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Table 7: Florida Disciplines by Category Percentages186
Year Total Disbar Suspend Resigned Reprimand Public Probation Unkown
Repri-
1988 149 17% 46% 9% 0% 25% 1% <1%
1989 136 15% 50% 13% 1% 20% 0% <1%
1990 151 15% 36% 16% 3% 28% 3% 0%
1991 147 13% 42% 18% 0% 26% <1% 0%
1992 196 16% 38% 16% 0% 28% 1% <1%
1993 188 10% 54% 17% <1% 16% 1% 2%
1994 187 12% 48% 15% <1% 22% <1% 1%
1995 177 10% 54% 9% 8% 14% 5% <1%
1996 202 15% 54% 9% 17% 5% 1% 0%
1997 202 12% 47% 15% 12% 10% 3% <1%
1998 273 14% 55% 13% 8% 5% 4% 0%
1999 217 10% 53% 18% 13% 2% 4% 0%
2000 250 15% 52% 10% 14% 5% 4% 0%
2001 281 10% 53% 11% 18% 3% 4% <1%
2002 217 14% 47% 13% 24% 0% 2% 0%
186. Percentages rounded up or down using a standard .5 rounding scheme. Thus, per-
centage totals may add up to more than 100%.
[Vol. 28:3:669
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Table 8: Disciplines, Behavior and Year 187
1988 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations or Conviction
Disbarment 6 8 1 11
Suspension 25 10 5 29
Resigned 2 3 3 2
Probation I I 0 0
Reprimand/ 20 9 6 2
Public Reprimand
1989 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act
Misconduct t Regulating FL Bar Violations or Conviction
Disbarment 4 3 2 12
Suspension 15 12 9 31
Resigned 6 0 5 6
Probation n/a n/a n/a n/a
Reprimand/ 14 6 1 5
Public Reprimand
187. In each of these tables, numbers may not add up to totals for a particular year as some
specific behaviors or disciplines were undecipherable from our data.
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1990 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations or Conviction
Disbarment 3 1 9 9
Suspension 24 4 7 19
Resigned 6 5 9 4
Probation 3 0 0 2
Reprimand/ 30 4 4 6
Public Reprimand
1991 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations or Conviction
Disbarment 5 2 2 10
Suspension 20 15 15 12
Resigned 15 1 6 5
Probation I n/a n/a n/a
Reprimand/ 17 13 6 2
Public Reprimand
Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act1992
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations or Conviction
Disbarment 11 6 5 9
Suspension 24 16 14 21
Resigned 14 4 2 12
Probation n/a I I n/a
Reprimand/ 27 21 4 3
Public Reprimand
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1993 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations or Conviction
Disbarment 4 5 5 4
Suspension 36 21 14 30
Resigned 16 7 4 5
Probation I I n/a n/a
Reprimand/ 18 14 0 0
Public Reprimand
1994 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations or Conviction
Disbarment 5 5 4 8
Suspension 20 33 14 20
Resigned 12 2 3 9
Probation n/a n/a n/a I
Reprimand/ 12 28 2 n/a
Public Reprimand
1995 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations or Conviction
Disbarment 4 6 1 6
Suspension 40 22 16 17
Resigned 12 2 1 1
Probation 3 I 2 3
Reprimand/ 19 14 4 1
Public Reprimand
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1996 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act or
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations Conviction
Disbarment 9 9 8 5
Suspension 40 30 19 18
Resigned 8 1 7 2
Probation I 0 1 0
Reprimand/ 25 16 1 1
Public Reprimand
1997 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act or
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations Conviction
Disbarment 12 6 2 4
Suspension 39 19 13 24
Resigned 6 8 12 5
Probation 4 1 1 0
Reprimand/ 35 7 3 0
Public Reprimand
1998 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act or
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations Conviction
Disbarment 8 15 8 7
Suspension 68 21 29 31
Resigned 5 4 16 11
Probation 8 1 1 1
Reprimand/ 25 7 3 2
Public Reprimand
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1999 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act or
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations Conviction
Disbarment 8 8 1 5
Suspension 50 25 15 24
Resigned 7 4 12 16
Probation 7 1 0 0
Reprimand/ 27 1 4 1
Public Reprimand
2000 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act or
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations Conviction
Disbarment 7 14 4 1I
Suspension 42 39 5 42
Resigned 5 I 3 14
Probation 7 1 0 3
Reprimand/ 30 5 2 0
Public Reprimand
2001 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act or
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations Conviction
Disbarment 5 13 6 3
Suspension 53 51 1I 26
Resigned 2 7 6 16
Probation 8 0 1 1
Reprimand/ 53 2 4 4
Public Reprimand
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2002 Professional Violated Rules Trust Account Any Criminal Act or
Misconduct Regulating FL Bar Violations Conviction
Disbarment 9 8 7 3
Suspension 39 15 23 24
Resigned 8 2 9 8
Probation 3 0 0 I
Reprimand/ 50 0 2 0
Public Reprimand
This data reveals several consistencies and inconsistencies in Bar disci-
pline. First, suspensions, the most widely used category of discipline in each
year in total, are generally near the top for each category of misconduct that
we analyzed. This across-the-board use of suspensions may be reassuring to
consumers. It implies that the offense as a whole is considered, rather than
one specific discipline triggering act, and that the appropriate discipline shall
be applied from the appropriate rule regulating the Florida Bar. In addition,
as a whole, more disbarments and fewer reprimands or probation sanctions
were given for more severe types of misbehaviors; while fewer disbarments,
and a greater number of lesser sanctions were given for less severe types of
infractions of inappropriate behavior. 188 Quite simply, overall, the "punish-
ments" seem to fit the "crimes."' 89
It should be noted that the dispensing of some sanctions has not been
consistent. As a consumer might rightly expect, disbarments have been
handed out more often for criminal acts or convictions.'9" However, in some
years, professional misconduct or rule violations were the largest cause of
this severe punishment, while criminal acts or convictions received much
less severe sanctions. 9' As the specific behavior of the attorney may not be
detailed, this apparent disparity between the behavior and the sanction might
give rise to some concern by consumers who expect that any criminal activ-
ity should result in the loss of a professional license. In addition, some years
188. See Table 8: Disciplines, Behavior and Year.
189. It is important to note, of course, that not all behaviors detailed in Table 9 are actually
"crimes" under any definition of that word. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 370 (6th ed.
1990) (defining a "crime" as a positive or a negative act in desecration of the law).
190. See id.
191. Id.
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reported (e.g. 1989, 1994, 1996) very few sanctions (e.g. probation) for at-
torney misbehavior. 9 2 Were the activities of the attorneys truly not condu-
cive to that sanction that year? What about those activities that precluded the
issuance of that sanction? Or were there other forces in those years pushing
for more license-curtailing sanctions? Without the specific files on the mis-
deeds of attorneys, consumers cannot know and we cannot surmise. But the
inconsistent use of sanctions in different calendar years certainly raises some
questions in the minds of those reading the reported disciplines.
1. Trust Accounting-A Detailed Look
Trust Account violations get a lot of press in the Bar media.193 From the
data above, the following synthesis can be made of trust accounting behav-
iors and corresponding discipline for our fifteen-year period. Table 9 shows
the number of total disciplines that were handed out for trust accounting vio-
lations each year, and the percentage of total disciplines that trust accounting
represents. Table 10 breaks the percentages down by the type of discipline
that attorneys received in each year.
192. See Table 6.
193. Barbara Lewis & Dan Otto, Pesky Procedures, L.A. DAILY J., June 21, 2001, avail-
able at http://www.centurionconsultinglaw.com/arp23LAWOCT.html (last visited Mar. 27,
2004).
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Table 9: Trust Account Violations by Discipline Given
[Vol. 28:3:669
Total Total Trust Percentage of
Disciplines that Account Disciplines for
Year Violations of those Trust
Disciplined Accounting
1988 149 15 10%
1989 136 17 12.5%
1990 151 29 19.2%
1991 147 29 19.7%
1992 196 26 13.3%
1993 188 23 12.2%
1994 187 23 12.3%
1995 177 24 13.6%
1996 202 36 17.8%
1997 202 31 15.4%
1998 273 57 20.9%
1999 217 32 14.8%
2000 250 14 5.6%
2001 281 28 10.0%
2002 217 41 18.9%
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Table 10: Trust Accounting Disciplines by Percentage of Penalty Given
194
Total Disbarment Suspension Resigned Probation Reprimand/
Public Reprimand
1988 15 7% 33% 20% 0% 40%
1989 17 12% 53% 29% 0% 6%
1990 29 31% 24% 31% 0% 14%
1991 29 7% 52% 21% 0% 21%
1992 26 19% 54% 8% 4% 15%
1993 23 22% 61% 17% 0% 0%
1994 23 17% 61% 13% 0% 9%
1995 24 4% 67% 4% 8% 17%
1996 36 22% 53% 20% 3% 3%
1997 31 7% 42% 39% 3% 10%
1998 57 14% 51% 28% 2% 5%
1999 32 3% 47% 38% 0% 13%
2000 14 29% 36% 21% 0% 14%
2001 28 21% 39% 21% 4% 14%
2002 41 17% 56% 22% 0% 5%
There are many resources to assist Florida attorneys with trust account-
ing, including The Florida Bar, the rules, the "Practicing with Professional-
ism," and Law Office Management Advisory Service ("LOMAS").'95 This
branch of The Florida Bar provides forms, resources, and in-person consulta-
tions to assist with the running of a trust account.
96
194. Percentages rounded up or down by +/- .5 standard.
195. FLA. BAR ONLINE, MEMBER SERVICES: LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE
SERVICE, at http://www.centurionconsultinglaw.com/arp23LAWOCT.html (last visited Mar.
27, 2004).
196. Id.
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The act of trust accounting by attorneys is at its heart, a fiscal responsi-
bility.197 That makes the information from 1998 particularly troubling to
consumers-more than one-fifth of reported disciplines for attorneys exhib-
ited some breach in this responsibility. However, a mere two years later, less
than six percent of disciplines for that year were for the same category of
misdeed. But the improvement did not last, as two years after that low, the
percentage of disciplines of trust violations rose again, almost matching its
highest point.
A consumer is left with many questions. Why the improvement in be-
havior by attorneys concerning trusts? Was there a backlash following the
1998 high? Was the position taken by The Florida Bar more relaxed follow-
ing the year 2000? The ultimate question, raised at the beginning of this
analysis, takes root here as well: Is it good to have a high percentage of dis-
ciplines for trust accounting because it demonstrates that this egregious prob-
lem is being addressed by The Florida Bar? Or is it bad that there are so
many to begin with? Does a "low" percentage of disciplines in trust account-
ing mean good fiscal sense by attorneys, or are a number of attorneys just
getting away with it?
Finally, for those being caught by The Florida Bar, are the sanctions ap-
propriate? The most widely used sanction for trust accounting problems are
sanctions. Sanctions, which will temporarily halt the attorney from the prac-
tice of law, seems an appropriate remedy for such infractions because it gives
the Bar and the attorney time to work through any trust accounting inconsis-
tencies, and to ensure that all financial responsibilities are in order before the
fiscal practices continue. But is the punishment enough for failure to follow
the rules, which are clearly at the heart of an attorney's responsibility?' 98
Obviously, the number of violations for trust accounting is higher than any
consumer would like to see. On the other hand, reprimands of all types have
declined, which also seems appropriate for the grave nature of trust account-
ing responsibilities.
197. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 5-1.1.
198. This concept is taken directly from, and with thanks to, Professor James Repetti of
Boston College Law School, whom, in a class titled "Taxation I" given in the 1991-92 aca-
demic year, ended the full year, six-credit course by reminding the class, "When you work as
an attorney, you will handle lots of other people's money. It is not yours. Don't take it."
Professor James Repetti, Address at Taxation 1, Boston College Law School (1991-1992).
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2. Specific Thoughts About Criminal Behavior
For purposes of our study, we classified all criminal allegations or con-
victions of any type in the same category, as long as the information pub-
lished about the attorney was considered a conviction or allegation of crimi-
nal activity. This classification precluded Florida Bar rule violations or other
inappropriate behavior. Not all actions by attorneys were prosecuted; how-
ever, they were all the basis for the discipline.
Table 11: Criminal Allegations/Violations as Disciplines Given
Total Total Criminal Percentage of
Disciplines Acts, Disciplines in
that Year Convictions, or Each Year
Violations of Given for
those Criminal
Disciplined Activity
1988 149 44 29.5%
1989 136 54 39.7%
1990 151 40 26.5%
1991 147 29 19.7%
1992 196 45 23.0%
1993 188 39 20.8%
1994 187 38 20.3%
1995 177 28 15.8%
1996 202 26 12.9%
1997 202 33 16.3%
1998 273 52 19.1%
1999 217 46 21.2%
2000 250 70 28.0%
2001 281 50 17.8%
2002 217 36 16.6%
2004]
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Table 12: Criminal Behavior Disciplines by Penalty Given
Reprimand
Total Disbarment Suspension Resigned Probation Public Reprimand
1988 44 25% 66% 5% 0% 5%
1989 54 22% 57% 11% 0% 9%
1990 40 23% 48% 10% 5% 15%
1991 29 35% 41% 17% 0% 7%
1992 45 20% 47% 27% 0% 7%
1993 39 10% 77% 13% 0% 0%
1994 38 21% 53% 24% 3% 0%
1995 28 21% 61% 4% 11% 4%
1996 26 19% 69% 8% 0% 4%
1997 33 12% 73% 15% 0% 0%
1998 52 14% 60% 21% 2% 4%
1999 46 11% 52% 35% 0% 2%
2000 70 16% 60% 20% 4% 0%
2001 50 6% 52% 32% 2% 8%
2002 36 8% 67% 22% 3%
Similar questions arise upon examination of the percentage of annual
disciplines attributable to criminal behavior. Ranging from a high in 1989 of
nearly forty percent of the disciplines being attributable to some type of
criminal behavior, to a low of about thirteen percent in 1996. It is clear that
criminal activity of varying degrees is responsible for discipline actions in
Florida. One question that arose as we reviewed these numbers is, consider-
ing the stringent character and fitness background check that the Bar per-
forms, why are the number of instances of criminal misconduct so high
[Vol. 28:3:669
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among Florida licensed attorneys?.99 Does the fault lie with the screening
process of admitting attorneys to be licensed? Or does the problem come
later, in the legal profession, that is, from the attorney being exposed to
temptations, environments, or incentives that otherwise cause later criminal
behavior? Are the stress levels in the profession so high as to drive attorneys
to varying types of misconduct?
Second, we questioned the connection between sanction and behavior.
We combined all criminal misconduct into one category, (including misde-
meanors and any criminal activity unrelated to an attorney's practice of law).
Some of the sanctions given over the years have changed. However, we do
not know whether the specific underlying behaviors have actually changed.
It seems clear that in the earlier years of our study, disbarment was a more
common sanction in this category of behavior, and resignation less common;
but the two seem to have switched places in terms of frequency. Florida's
discipline system has forced more attorneys, who have engaged in criminal
misbehavior, to take the proactive step of resigning, rather than waiting to
see the outcome of a disbarment proceeding. Other sanctions given in any
year for this type of misbehavior have remained consistently proportional-
they remain consistent as to their relativity of frequency to other sanctions
(i.e., more suspensions, and fewer probations). However, the actual numbers
in any given year stay generally in proportion to the total number of disci-
plines in each year. In our view, this consistency bodes well for The Florida
Bar system of discipline.
IV. CONCLUSION
The public's view of The Florida Bar is likely an overall positive one.
Looking at the overall numbers of disciplines, the percentages of disciplines,
and the process which The Florida Bar has for self-regulation is an encourag-
ing experience for anyone concerned about putting trust into professionals.
The public should be further encouraged by the strides that the Bar has made
in recent years in assisting clients in reporting problems with attorneys,
through programs like the ACAP. Other educational directives, such as in-
creasing the number of hours of ethical training attorneys must take in their
199. See FLA. BAR ADMIss. R. 5-10.
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Continuing Legal Education Credits are also good indicators of the Bar's
drive to succeed in self-regulation.2 0
On the other side, there are some questions about the regulation of at-
torneys. Notwithstanding the most comprehensive character and fitness
screenings in the country, there are still quite a few attorneys disciplined
each year for involvement in criminal and other misbehaviors that consumers
may believe could be "screened out" in the process of admission to The Flor-
ida Bar.20 1 Many attorneys live high-pressure lifestyles, which can result in
these missteps. But those utilizing the legal services of an attorney may be
wondering whether The Florida Bar should be taking more preventative
measures to prevent potentially unfit attorneys from entering this profession
fraught with potential for misstep.
In addition, a review of our data causes us to urge for more practical
education in trust accounting policies and specifically, detailed education
regarding the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.2 °2 The Bar needs to under-
take these education programs, perhaps in conjunction with legal education
institutions.
In addition, while the regulatory process itself seems to be working, is
there another way to handle complaints and cases that would be more effi-
cient, while preserving the rights of all parties involved? Should more non-
lawyers be involved in probable cause hearings? Should more non-lawyers
be involved in the post probable cause hearing stages of discipline? In addi-
tion, we wonder what affect the discipline process has on ultimate sanctions
if it rests in the hands of the Supreme Court of Florida. Considering the
Court already has an over logged docket, combined with the given potential
200. FLA. BAR ONLINE, CENTER FOR PROFESSIONALISM: CLE GUIDELINES, at
http://www.flabar.org/tfb/TFBProfess.nsf/840090c 16eedaf085256b61000928dc/72e302f839
a78f9d85256b2f006ccdcl?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). In 1997 the Florida
Bar instituted the five credit ethics requirement. Id.
201. FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 2-21.
202. Currently, all newly licensed members of The Florida Bar under Rule 6-12.1 (with
some exceptions by employment) are required to complete a continuing legal education course
entitled "Practicing with Professionalism" (formerly known as Bridge-the-Gap) within twelve
months of being admitted. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR. 6-12.3. Purportedly, many of these
issues are being covered in this two day seminar, but it is the belief of many licensed attorneys
that this program does not go deep enough. This requirement has special rules for out-of-
state Florida Bar members under Florida Bar Rules. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 6-12.4.
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for plea bargaining and the large number of probable cause findings through-
out the state, the result is unclear.
The Florida Bar is very open with the public about basic information
regarding its members. A searchable directory is available online, and the
public may contact the "Membership Records" line to inquire about a spe-
cific attorney.20 3 But the information available to the public regarding the
self-regulation process is not as forthcoming. The main source of publica-
tion of the discipline records is a members-purposed newspaper, and a mem-
bers-focused website. While both resources are available to the public-and
in fact, parts of the website are specifically designed for the public-no re-
port is compiled to make this information readily available. In an October 1,
2003 article on the review of the grievance process, The Florida Bar reported
197 more disciplinary sanctions than any source available to the public,
which is a serious problem regarding access to information.204 The public's
evaluation of a profession and the profession's self-evaluation can build trust
and respect between the public and that profession. All attorneys could
benefit from a boost in this relationship.0 5
While there may not be answers to these questions right now, it is im-
portant to note that in our societal time of corporate trouble, the public is
paying attention to the ethical and professional actions of the professionals
who serve them. It is clear from our study that lawyers in Florida are being
watched. The question now becomes: Who does the Bar want watching
them?
203. FLA. BAR ONLINE, ORGANIZATION: ATTORNEY SEARCH, at http://www.flabar.org/
Membership.nsf/MESearch?OpenForm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). The Membership Re-
cords Department for The Florida Bar may be reached at (850) 561-5832. Id.
204. See Blankenship, supra note 18.
205. See Scott Baranick, Respect No Joke for this Lawyer, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 4,
2002, at IA.
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Lawyers are notoriously slow in adapting technology into their practice.
In fact, many technology experts opine that lawyers were never in the race.
Nonetheless, as technology has developed, specifically targeted at the legal
field, many lawyers have begun to incorporate the technology into their daily
activities because it simplifies the practice of law. However, as attorneys
now race to incorporate technology into their legal practice, they must also
confront novel ethical issues that will inevitably arise as lawyers enter cyber-
space. In this regard, technology and ethics have been on a collision course
for several years. This was recognized recently when the American Bar As-
sociation ("ABA") undertook two significant studies aimed to analyze pre-
cisely how technology fits into a lawyer's daily practice.
In an attempt to clarify legal practice in cyberspace, many rules govern-
ing professional conduct have been altered. In 2002, the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct were significantly amended.' Albeit nearly a decade late,
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. The author
wishes to thank David Weiss, a true high tech attorney, for his insightful comments and sug-
gestions.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (amended 2002). In February and August of
2002, the ABA House of Delegates approved many changes to the Model Rules. Inside the
Bar: Wisconsin Influences ABA's MP Position; Provides Diploma Privilege, Sept. 2002, at
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the rules began to address what the practice has long recognized: many law-
yers employ virtual technology to carry out many facets of their legal prac-
tice. Commensurate with this recognition, a separate ABA task force set out
to conduct a legal profession technological survey.2 The apparent goal of
this independent survey was to apprise the overall membership on the spe-
cific technical methodology and tools lawyers use in their daily professional
practices. A comparative analysis of these two important works can allow
lawyers to effectively evaluate the benefits and ethical risks of incorporating
specific technological tools into their daily practice regimen.
The purpose of this article will be to examine many aspects of a typical
lawsuit in the context of the various technology options available to attor-
neys. The 2002 Legal Technology Survey ("Technology Survey") will be
analyzed to aid in determining which technological tools lawyers use in their
daily practice. Next, the article will apply the 2002 Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct ("Model Rules") to many of the technological tools high-
lighted in the Technology Survey, in practicable application, to gauge the
ethical challenges facing the tech-savvy practitioner. Finally, the article will
provide a template setting forth the best outline of conduct for attorneys to
effectively balance the demands of competing in a technology-driven world
against the new Model Rules technology-directed ethical considerations.
1. DOES IT RAIN IN THE WORLD WIDE WEB?
One need not travel far into the World Wide Web before discovering a
plethora of destinations for the tech-savvy rainmaking attorney, aiming to
attract clients through effective web marketing and advertising. Attorneys
seek promotional exposure in sites such as Martindale-Hubbell® and its Law-
yers.com website. This destination initially serves as a link to lawyers in
many different practice specialties throughout many various geographic re-
gions.3 Searching the site, one then discovers direct links to the selected law
firm's site. Martindale-Hubbell® is certainly not alone in this offering. In-
deed, Lawquote.com asks that a potential client fill out a particularized ques-
http://www.wisbar.org/newsletter/2002/09/wiam.html. "Ethics 2000" was the popular name
given to the ABA Commission that proposed the major changes. Margaret Colgate Love,
Update on Ethics 2000 Project and Summary of Recommendations to Date, http://www.abanet
.org/cpr/e2k-mlove article.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
2. ABA, LEGAL TECH. RES. CTR., SURVEY REPORT: LITIGATION AND COURTROOM
TECHNOLOGY (2002), TECHNOLOGY [hereinafter LITIGATION & COURTROOM]. The Legal
Technology survey was a 155 question survey distributed to 17,352 ABA lawyer members in
private practice in the United States. The research center received 3,094 responses. The report
is published in five volumes. Id. at iii.
3. See http://www.lawyers.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
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tionnaire, which then serves as a fundamental search guide to match the ea-
ger client with a suitable law firm.4 Following this link, it is up to the attor-
ney or law firm to then contact the client to meet, discuss the client's needs,
and seal a deal for representationi Lawyersintemetguide.com is a site that
also serves to match a potential client with a lawyer.6 The sweetener in this
arranged match is that the site promises the client seeking representation a
"free consultation" once a match is confirmed.7
By virtue of the offerings found in cyberspace, it is readily apparent that
tech-savvy attorneys know how to design offerings aimed at attracting clients
through impressive and stylistic website design (the lure) combined with
easy linkage opportunities (the catch). Overall, most law firm sites contain
the following: the "law firm contact information; biographical data for each
firm member; profiles of the firm's practice areas; copies of the firm['s]
newsletters" (often uploaded in easy to read Adobe@ pdf format); and "arti-
cles written by firm members." 8 In addition however, today's website design
technology can do more than simply pass on a firm's basic information.
Impressive websites carry a tremendous amount of valuable information to
potential clients. One immigration law firm, Siskind, Susser, Haas & Chang
has reported phenomenal success with its web offering.9 In addition to the
standard attorney biographies, the site holds hyperlinks that instantly trans-
port the reader of the firm's informational page to any one of more than 300
articles written by firm members.'° The dynamic site also provides an online
publicly-available immigration newsletter subscribed to by more than 9,000
people.' The site stores a document collection containing complete texts of
new immigration legislative bills with links to valuable immigration Internet
resources. 2 E-mail contact points are positioned in key locations through the
site.' 3 These points include a consultation questionnaire that allows potential
clients to consult by telephone, internet voice, or video-conference with a
4. See http://www.lawquote.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
5. See id.
6. LawyerslnternetGuide.com: Your Online Source to an Attorney Near You, at
http://www.lawyersintemetguide.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
7. See id.
8. Michael L. Goldblatt, Planning a Successful Law Firm Web Site, 47 LA. B. J. 117
(1999).
9. Greg Siskind, How to Build a 'Virtual' Law Firm, 18 PA. LAW. 14 (1996). Mr.
Siskind is a partner in the above recognized firm which has offices in Knoxville, Memphis,
Nashville, and Toronto. Id. at 17 n. 1.
10. Id. at 14.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 16.
13. Siskind, supra note 9, at 16.
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firm practitioner." Potential clients can also log on for periodic real-time
chats with one of the firm's immigration lawyers.' 5 Harnessed to this in-
credible web offering, from its inception in 1992 to 1998, the firm went from
a little known law firm to a well-known successful firm whose site records
50,000 hits per week.'
6
Websites are not the only virtual tool available to attorneys interested in
employing the Internet to attract clients. E-mail distribution lists or listservs
are another method of effectively marketing a firm.'7 Many lawyers report
joining existing listservs that focus on specific areas of the law while making
valuable contacts. Internet sites such as Yahoo!® Groups are a good exam-
ple of listservs that provide information on a variety of topics and interests. 8
Alternately, many law firms choose to simply set up listservs for their exist-
ing clients, potential clients, and even other lawyers by hiring companies like
Customzines. 9 Customzines inputs listserv data, designs the accompanying
newsletter, and is responsible for e-mailing the offering to each entity/person
on the list.2"
Many law firms report success in the use of one of two listserv types:
announcements only lists or Internet discussion lists.2 ' The announcement
only listserv includes information of interest to a certain group.22 Contrari-
wise, "interactive discussion lists" are designed so that each recipient can
take part in a subsequently-scheduled, interactive discussion.
2 3
Attorneys have made great forays into the virtual marketing world. Ac-
cording to the Technological Survey, a majority of attorneys, 64.39%, have
law firm homepages.24 Even though a majority of lawyers have some form
of a website, the content among legal websites varies tremendously. For
14. Id.
15. Visalaw.com, The Immigration Law Portal of Siskind Susser, at http://www.visalaw.
corn (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
16. Siskind, supra note 9, at 14.
17. Patrick M. Byers, Marketing Gets a Cyber-Boost, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 14, 1998,
http://www6.law.com/ny/tech/091498s4.html.
18. Yahoo!@ Groups, at http://groups.yahoo.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
19. Customzines.com, at http://www.customzines.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
20. Id.
21. Larry Bodine, Listservs Bring Law Firms New Business, LEGAL Biz ONLINE, May
2001, at http://www.martindale.com/xp/Martindale/Professional_Resources/LegalBizOnline/
LegalMarketing/0 1 05 4.xml (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
22. Id. Baker and Mackenzie is an example of a firm with a popular listserv that sends
out information to more than 10,000 recipients, including corporate counsel, CIO, and IT
professions. Id.
23. Id.
24. ABA, LEGAL TECH. RES. CTR., SURVEY REPORT: WEB AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGY, 133 (2002) [hereinafter WEB & COMMUNICATION].
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example, only 4.17% of those lawyers with a website provide an online cli-
ent intake questionnaire, 25 10.13% provide online legal self help guides, 26
1.30% provide real-time consultations with prospective clients,27 and only
6.23% provide online form preparation. 8
In theory, the apparent dearth of advertising in the polled attorneys' web
offerings may be explained as an extreme hesitancy to violate perceived ethi-
cal obligations. The Model Rules addresses some of these perceived con-
cerns. Rule 7.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rule 7.2")
was amended to include electronic communication as an acceptable form of
advertising.29 In clarifying the rule, the comments allow a lawyer to pay for
online directory listings,3" and specifically allow a lawyer to pay for a "quali-
fied lawyer referral service."'" Thus it would appear that Rule 7.2 creates a
safe harbor in which it is ethically permissible for an attorney to use the
online directory vehicle to mine potential business.
Ethical concerns arise when one isolates the specific content in an attor-
ney's website. Those law firm websites that invite people to e-mail them or
even offer an online free consultation may unknowingly create an attorney-
client relationship. Specifically, Rule 1.18 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct ("Rule 1.18"), a new addition to the rules in 2002, serves to
categorize and define a class of prospective clients with a corollary set of
obligations owed by an attorney to a client., 32 Rule 1.18 defines a prospec-
tive client as one who discusses with the lawyer the possibility of forming
an attorney-client relationship. 3  Once a client is deemed a prospective cli-
ent, the lawyer must guard confidential information and make sure the law-
yer does not have an impermissible conflict of interest.34
The comments to Rule 1.18 make it clear that a person who communi-
cates unilaterally with a lawyer has not become a prospective client.35 How-
ever, although Rule 1.18 does not specifically mention cyberspace contact,
25. Id. at 144.
26. Id. at 152.
27. Id. at 146.
28. Id. at 148.
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2 (a) (2003). "Subject to the requirements of
Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through written, recorded or electronic
communication, including public media." Id.
30. Id. at cmt. 5.
3 1. Id. at cmt. 6. A "qualified lawyer referral service" is one that is approved by an ap-
propriate regulatory association, such as the ABA. Id.
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (2003).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18(a).
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 8(b)-(c).
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18 cmt. 2.
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the bright line may be crossed when lawyers issue an invitation for commu-
nication to a potential (virtual) client through the lawyer's website. The
Model Rules encourage the inclusion of specific disclaimers36 for attorney
advertising. Hence, many law firms have followed this caution by promi-
nently displaying disclaimers disavowing any attorney-client relationship.37
While attempting to land a client without creating an unintended attor-
ney-client relationship, some lawyer communications, on their face, are con-
sidered unethical as an improper solicitation. Rule 7.3 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Rule 7.3"), amended in 2002, now includes real-time
electronic contact as a method of improper solicitation, if the significant mo-
tive for the communication is pecuniary gain.3' Thus, lawyers who enter chat
rooms, with the specific intention of obtaining clients through this interac-
tion, would appear to be treated no differently than a lawyers who lurk in
hospital emergency rooms in search of clients, or lawyers who telephone
potential clients' homes and asks if they have been in an accident. All are
subject to ethical violations for solicitation in violation of Rule 7.3.
However, while chat rooms are frowned upon to secure business, Rule
7.3(c) draws distinction when considering e-mails such as those generated by
listservs. 39 Rule 7.3(c), amended in 2002 to allow electronic communica-
tions if the words "Advertising Material" are included in the communication,
is now consistent with the identical requirement as applied to written or re-
corded communication.4° Thus as long as attorneys comply with the adver-
tising designation, e-mail communications to potential clients appear to be
acceptable under Rule 7.3(c)." Of course, attorneys must be careful not to
inundate potential clients with e-mail. Such harassment may not only violate
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 3 (2003). The rules suggest attorneys
use disclaimers as a way to discourage clients from unjustified expectations as the result of
advertising. Id.
37. See also Moskowitz & Moskowitz, at http://www.lawyers.com/mm-law/index.jsp
(last visited Mar. 27, 2004). This is the website address of the law firm of Moskowitz &
Moskowitz. This firm's website contains the following disclaimer: "This web site is designed
for general information only. The information presented at this site should not be construed to
be formal legal advice nor the formation of a lawyer/client relationship." Id.
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2003).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3, cmt. 3.
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(c).
41. Id.
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anti-spam laws,4 2 but can also constitute improper solicitation by harassment
under the Model Rules.43
II. ARE You LISTENING? COMMUNICATING WITH YOUR CLIENT THROUGH
VIRTUAL TECHNOLOGY
Once the client hires the attorney, maintaining contact can constitute a
challenging and often misunderstood task. Many ethical investigations arise
over clients' complaints that their lawyers failed to communicate in an ade-
quate manner concerning their legal representation." The live face-to-face
client meeting is the traditional means of discussing matters with clients.
This tried and true method provides advantages to both lawyer and client.
However, live face-to-face client meetings can be costly and time consum-
ing. With the increased specialization of the legal field, and with the advan-
tage of information gleaned off the internet, it may soon be commonplace for
a client in Florida to discover that the best qualified intellectual property
(patent) attorney is located in McLean, Virginia. An initial virtual meeting
may certainly be preferable and cost effective to the client. Once retained,
many lawyers simply do not set aside time for client chats, which equates to
billing downtime. In those instances, frequent e-mail updates and live online
question/answer sessions serve as a more economical and precise mode to
maintain client contact while assuring that an attorney performs zealously
and economically.
Historically, the telephone served as a traditional alternative to face-to-
face meetings. However, reviewing documents necessitates coordinating the
phone and fax machines. Further, if the client ultimately needs to sign
documents, the documents must be faxed to the client, signed and sent back,
prompting numerous delays.
42. More than half the states regulate spam, albeit with little success. See generally,
Dannielle Cisneros, Do Not Advertise: The Current Fight Against Unsolicited Advertise-
ments, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 10 (2003).
43. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(b)(2) (stating that solicitation involv-
ing harassment is prohibited). See also Gail A. Forman, To Infinity, and Beyond: The ABA
Re-Examines the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Pertaining to Client Development in
Light of Emerging Technologies, 1 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 96 (1999) (stating even though
the Model Rules are not directly responsive to spam e-mail, many Internet service providers
have set up programs to prevent this type of solicitation).
44. See Nancy J. Moore, Revisions, Not Revolution: Targeting Lawyer/Client Relations,
Electronic Communications, Conflicts of Interest, 88 A.B.A. J. 48 (Dec. 2002) (stating that the
most frequent client complaint is lack of communication by lawyers, and the Model Rules
have responded by requiring lawyers put more of their communications in writing).
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Up-to-date technology can provide the benefits of face-to-face meetings
combined with the benefits of telephone and fax machine contact. Inexpen-
sive video cameras adorn many new personal computer packages. The vid-
eoconferencing tool is therefore available to the most enterprising law
firms. 45  Alternatives to videoconferencing include Internet Relay Chat
("IRC"), which allows parties to engage in real-time conversation when typ-
ing over a computer screen.4' Through the use of a chat box, the parties ex-
change text.47 Private conversations may include two or more individuals.
With the inclusion of white-board software, documents can be simultane-
ously viewed and discussed along with typed conversation over the inter-
net.48 Thus, a client meeting, complete with document exchange and review,
can be handled from offices located anywhere internet access is available in
the world.
Assuming the client and attorney agree on a real-time first interview,
once it has occurred, the attorney can send a retainer agreement over the
internet. With the advent of e-signatures,49 the client can review the retainer
agreement, digitally sign it, and return the signed document to his/her attor-
ney.
If an attorney's computer arsenal is not IRC compatible, a client meet-
ing may also be accomplished via e-mail. Documents may be scanned and
attached to e-mail for review. Although the meeting is not conducted in real-
time, the relatively small amount of time it takes to exchange e-mail may
actually result in more thoughtful and efficient communication. In fact, e-
mail is an excellent source of routine attorney-client communication. In
many instances, e-mail can be sent "certified" with a requested return receipt
from the client. E-mail is automatically time and date stamped. Copies of e-
mail should be placed in a client's correspondence file for later reference.
45. See Hugh Calkins, Videoconferencing: When Getting There Isn't Half the Fun,
Now's the Time to Depose, Meet, and Confer on Camera, 17 ME. 133. 6, 7 (2002).
46. See Hon. Jefferson Lankford, Talking Shop: Chat Up Your Practice on the Internet,
38 ARIZ. ATr'Y 12 (2001).
47. Id. at 13.
48. Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., How a Sole Practitioner Uses The "Electronic Office" To
Maintain A Competitive Law Practice, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141,149 (1998).
49. See Bradley J. Hillis, A Review of Electronic Court Filing in the United States, 2 J.
App. PRAc. & PROCESS 319, 324 (2000). Any procedure that associates a document with a
person is considered an e-signature. Id. at 325. An attorney or client may simply type their
names, "preceded by '/s/' denoting 'signed."' Id. Additionally, parties usually sign agree-
ments that e-signed documents are the equivalent to personally signed documents. Id.
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The Technology Survey revealed that most attorneys have not used vid-
eoconferencing.5 ° In fact, most attorneys stated videoconferencing was not
available at their firms." However, for those attorneys that do use videocon-
ferencing, the most popular use of videoconferencing was with their clients.5
While use of videoconferencing is rare, attorneys responded that they
use e-mail quite often. Approximately 97% of attorneys employ e-mail some
of the time, while 80% use e-mail one or more times per day. 3 E-mail is
most often used for routine correspondence with clients.5 4 Sixty-three per-
cent use e-mail to correspond about case status.5 5 Sixteen percent use e-mail
to bill their clients. 6 Attorneys also revealed they felt comfortable sending
attachments with their e-mail, with 91.54% reporting having sent an attach-
ment through e-mail. 7
The most commonly perceived ethical issue associated with e-mail is
the attorney's concern over protecting confidential information. In 1999, the
ABA issued a formal opinion 58 concluding that it was perfectly alright to
send an e-mail over the Internet without taking any extra precautions to pre-
serve confidential information.5 9 The opinion expressed the belief that e-
mail affords a reasonable expectation of privacy, and that it was no different
in terms of protecting confidentiality than a fax or regular mail.6" The new
Model Rules echo the formal opinion, and in the accompanying comments,
states the lawyer does not have to use special security measures or encryptive
devices, if the method of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of
privacy." The comments proceed, however, to caution an attorney that spe-
cial circumstances may warrant more protective measures, such as whether
the e-mail contains sensitive material or whether the information contained
therein is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement.62
Additionally, for the first time, the Model Rules address the ethical con-
sequences arising when a confidential communication finds its way into the
50. WEB & COMMUNICATION, supra note 24, at 195 (finding that 70.36% of attorneys
surveyed have not used videoconferencing).
51. Id. at 193. (76.61%).
52. Id. at 197. (26.1%).
53. Id. at 166. (79.90%).
54. Id. at 168. (96.1%).
55. WEB & COMMUNICATION, supra note 24, at 168.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 169.
58. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Resp., Formal Op. 99-413 (1999).
59. Id. The extra precautions contemplated by the committee would be encryption. Id.
60. Id.
61. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2003).
62. Id.
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wrong e-mail box, along with the resultant effect on lawyer-client confiden-
tiality.63 Rule 4.4(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rule
4.4") generally addresses the consequences that arise when confidential e-
mail information arrives to the wrong in-box.64 Rule 4.4 now mandates that
lawyers who inadvertently receive an e-mail, that they know "was inadver-
tently sent, shall promptly notify the sender. '65 The comments leave open
the question as to whether the pre-existing privileged information loses its
designation due to the inadvertent disclosure.66
The Technology Survey results indicate most attorneys follow the
Model Rule's lack of concern over protecting confidentiality over the Inter-
net.67 Approximately 80% of those attorneys surveyed send confidential
communications to their clients by e-mail.6 s Approximately 51.5% of those
surveyed revealed they sent confidential communicative e-mail on a daily or
weekly basis.69 In order to protect confidentiality, a majority of those sur-
veyed revealed they relied on a confidentiality statement included within the
e-mail.70 Of those responding, only 17.7% employ encryption methods to
protect the e-mail and/or attached documentation content, while 14.3% re-
quire clients to provide oral or written consent.71 Twenty percent of those
surveyed reported using email to transmit confidential communications, yet
took no precautions at all.72
III. DISCOVERY: TECHNOLOGY ALLOWS ONE ATTORNEY TO TAKE THE
PLACE OF AN ENTIRE LITIGATION TEAM, SAVING COSTS TO THE CLIENT
In the area of discovery, technology advanced furthest in the taking of
deposition testimony. For example, assume an attorney represents one of
500 defendants in an asbestos litigation. An exposure witness deposition is
scheduled to occur some 300 miles from the attorney's office. The attorney
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2003).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at cmt. 2.
67. WEB & COMMUNICATION, supra note 24 at 183.
68. Id. at 181 (noting that 20.58% never send confidential communications to clients by
e-mail).
69. Id. (noting that 23.30% of attorneys send confidential communications one to four
times per week, while 28.23% send confidential communications one or more times per day)
Id.
70. Id. at 183 (noting that 54.2% of attorneys responding rely on confidentiality state-
ment accompanying the transmission).
71. Id.
72. WEB & COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 24 at 183.
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doubts there will be any testimony obtained that would pertain to his client's
defense, yet he is reluctant to abstain from attending. Enter I-Dep, LLC, an
Illinois-based enterprise hosting the www.i-dep.com website." I-Dep's help-
ful technology allows attorneys to attend and participate in depositions
online.74 The service allows attorneys, who choose to refrain from attending
to view a deposition online via live streaming video which may be seen on
the attorneys' personal computers.75 I-Dep allows for two-way audio feeds
in order to permit the "monitoring" attorney to hear the deponent and attor-
neys present at the discovery proceeding.76 The technology also allows the
"monitoring" attorney to pose questions to the witness.7 7 The I-Dep technol-
ogy also sustains a private text messaging sector, so that monitoring lawyers
may type private questions and comments to the lead attorney at the deposi-
tion.78 Not only is the private text messaging an advantage to attorneys, but
this feature also permits clients and experts to monitor a deposition online,
without the expense of traveling to the deposition. 79 Online users are pro-
vided with a password to log into the deposition, but no additional software
is needed to run I-Dep's program.8"
While online depositions are extremely efficient for multiparty litiga-
tion, the technology may exceed the small firm or solo practitioner's budget.
Attorneys who do attend live depositions still have some high-tech options
that may increase the efficiency and quality of the deposition process. For
example, the attending lawyer can benefit from multimedia depositions.8'
Multimedia depositions combine digital audio and video with a computer
assisted transcript. 82 Thus, an attorney may view the transcript during the
deposition on his laptop, and make notes as the transcript is being pro-
duced.83 While an attorney reviewing and making notes during an ongoing
deposition has the potential to become as annoying as the mistimed cell
phone ring, t The process still should save the attorney review time and make
73. See http://www.i-dep.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) [hereinafter l-Dep.].
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See 1-Dep.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Julie K. Plowman, Multimedia in the Courtroom: A Valuable Tool or Smoke and
Mirrors?, 15 REV. LITIG. 415,417 (1996).
82. See generally id. Multimedia refers to systems that integrate onto a computer base
two or more types of media, such as video and digital audio. Id. at 416.
83. See generally id.
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for a more thorough deposition."4 Of course, a multimedia deposition is also
preserved for trial, complete with testimony scrolling features.85
A less technical alternative to the multimedia format is the videotaped
deposition. As attorneys and courts have come to rely on the videographer
and videotape deposition format to preserve discovery testimony, it has be-
come as commonplace as the written transcript and court reporter.86
The Technology Survey reflects 94.59% of the polled bar members
have never participated in an online deposition.87 Of the attorneys who have
participated in an online deposition, only 1.08% do so with any type of fre-
quency.88 The main reasons cited for not participating in online depositions
were lack of knowledge about the technology, and lack of knowledge about
the process.89 Only approximately 5% reported court and financial con-
straints as the reasons for nonparticipation in online depositions.9"
The Model Rules do not specifically address online depositions. This
omission is probably because the technological procedure is rarely used, and
undoubtedly courts will structure their own rules of procedure governing the
virtual discovery mechanism. Despite the omission, online depositions can
present ethical concerns. 9' For example, would all individuals "attending"
the deposition need to be listed?92 If not, would the failure to list all "attend-
ing" individuals be viewed as an ethical violation of candor toward the tribu-
nal.93 By failing to disclose all those present, the party harboring undisclosed
attendees may have withheld information from the court. Additionally, if an
expert is online providing input to an attorney taking part in the deposition,
would that online communication between the expert and the attorney be
discoverable as information imparted in the company of third parties beyond
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See generally Donald F. Parsons, Jr. & Lisa K.W. Crossland, Technological Tools for
Civil Litigation, 14 DEL. LAW. 33 (1996). Even with a videotaped deposition, many courts
still require an "official" court reporter and transcript. Id.
87. WEB & COMMUNICATION, supra note 24, at 130.
88. Id. at 130. Only 1.08% of attorneys participate in an online deposition one to three
times per month) Id.
89. Id. at 132. Showing a reported 52.1% nonparticipation due to lack of knowledge
about the technology, while 55.5% reported lack of knowledge about the process Id.
90. WEB & COMMUNICATION, supra note 24, at 132. With 5.5% reporting firm financial
constraints while 5.0% reported court constraints. Id.
91. See Hope Viner Samborn, Click Onto World Wide Web Deps: Services Offer Real -
Time Advantages, But They're Tempered by Ethics Issues, 86 A.B.A. J. 72, 73 (Oct. 2000).
92. Id.
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 3 (2003) (noting "[t]here are circum-
stances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresenta-
tion").
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the typical work product privilege? If so, failure to disclose may constitute a
concealment of evidence in violation Rule 3.4 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, as being unfair to opposing counsel.94 Online depositions
may also provide the opportunity for virtual "attending" witnesses to listen
into other deponent's (another witnesses) testimony without disclosing the
"attending" witness' presence to the other side.95 If not a violation of spe-
cific rules, it would appear that failing to disclose all those virtual attendees
would at least constitute a violation of Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, as conduct that is misleading and dishonest.96
IV. LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING: BRINGING THE LAW LIBRARY TO THE
DESKTOP PC AND BEYOND
Legal research on the internet is a high techies' paradise. Unfortu-
nately, the volume of material attorneys can research is so overwhelming that
it may in fact be over productive. Lawyers have three basic options in using
on line research: 1) general Internet research; 2) CD-ROM data-based re-
search; and 3) LexisNexisTM and Westlaw@ thin client-based research.
Free general Internet research may translate to initial money savings,
but it also may be the most frustrating exercise, equivalent to finding the
proverbial "pin in the haystack." By choosing a search engine such as the
ever popular GoogleT" you simply type in search terms and voila your search
has probably resulted in 350,000 items which must be culled over.97 Law-
yers may opt to enter chat rooms or discussion groups looking for legal ex-
pertise. 98 Alternatively, intrepid researchers might narrow the search by em-
ploying a law-based search engine such as FindLawO, 99 one of the most ex-
pansive law-based search engines on the Internet. Using FindLaw, a lawyer
is able to search all court systems and retrieve most major statutory codes,
making the search engine a good general legal search mechanism.' 00 Missing
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d) (2003) (stating that a lawyer shall make
a reasonably diligent effort to comply with discovery requests). See also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 2 (noting that evidentiary material includes computerized infor-
mation).
95. Samborn, supra note 91, at 72.
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2003).
97. See http://www.google.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
98. See http://www.abanet.org/discussions (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). The ABA web
site entertains many discussion groups and listservs. Id.
99. See http://findlaw.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
100. Id.
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of course from FindLaw@ are research specific directories and citator ser-
vices. "0
As a viable alternative to the legal search engine, one might simply re-
sort to searches conducted within an ever-expanding list of court specific
sites created to aid legal researchers. For example, the United States Su-
preme Court maintains a website where one can access Supreme Court deci-
sions dating back to 1980.102 Most United States Courts of Appeal and
United States District Courts maintain similar sites.0 3 Some of these federal
court sites contain references to unpublished slip opinions not readily avail-
able on any other legal search engine, (including Westlaw@ and Lex-
isNexisTM).
Attorneys may choose to conduct research using CD-ROMs. CD-ROM
virtual library products are usually purchased and updated for a monthly
maintenance or license fee. CD-ROM virtual libraries exist for most subject
matter specialties and for many state practice guides. CD-ROM virtual li-
braries are especially beneficial for the small law firm, enabling them to have
access to the same traditional library sources carried by large law firms,
though due to space and budgetary constraints, such smaller firms in past
history were forced to abstain from carrying.
LexisNexisTM and Westlaw® online research mega-centers continue to
advance research capabilities. Both companies feature readily accessible
online libraries along with intuitive search engines providing access to an
extraordinary amount of information through navigable menus, directories,
and logical search methodology."" Although both services charge access
fees, these two entities have made efforts to establish parity in pricing,
thereby designing programs which are affordable to the large, medium and
small practice lawyer alike.' °5 Westlaw@ offers options, such as package
rates, for the small firm along with affordable monthly payment plans.'0 6
The company has designed pay-as-you-go programs, such as the single docu-
ment pay plan and other cost saving methods, which place lawyers from all
regions and firms (large, medium and small) on equal footing in the online
research industry.'
101. Id. However, FindLaw® does provide a link to http://www.westlaw.com. See id. For
twelve dollars, an attorney is able to retrieve a case by its cite and Shepardize it. Id.
102. See http://www.supremecourt.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
103. See http://www.uscourts.gov (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
104. See Lexis, at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2004); see also Westlaw, at
http://www.Westlaw.com(last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
105. See id.
106. Westlaw®, at http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
107. Id.
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LexisNexisTM and Westlaw@ have been forced to adopt more affordable
cost programs as a result of healthy competition. For example, Versuslaw is
a new fee-based service that retrieves appellate court cases from all fifty
states. 0 8 One may sign up for the program on a monthly basis or a per pro-
ject basis (one opinion at a time).'0 9 Other fee base services will come to you
instead of you signing onto them. For example, Lois Law Watch TM monitors
Federal District Courts in your designated area of interest and alerts you by
e-mail of significant decisions in those areas." 0
The Technology Survey concludes that most attorneys use both free
online resources for legal research as well as fee-based resources. Approxi-
mately 80% of those polled reported using some form of fee-based legal re-
search."' Similarly, 71% of those surveyed revealed they also use free re-
search web sites. 12 Attorneys most often start research projects with a fee
based service. 113 Attorneys practically never use chat rooms" 4 and rarely use
e-mail discussion lists'.. as sources for legal research. Other more advanced
research options were used sparingly. Approximately 50% never use e-mail
case alert services" 6 (e.g, www.loislawwatch.com), and 58% never use
online advance sheet services. 117
Although the use of online research has greatly increased, attorneys
have not abandoned researching the old fashioned way, by using books.
According to the Technology Survey, lawyers spend practically the same
amount of time using print resources as they do with online resources." 8
Also, given the proliferation of CD-ROM products, it is somewhat surprising
that relatively few lawyers spend much research time using them.' 9
Online research is perhaps the only area where failure to use the most
efficient methods of research may actually cause ethical concerns. The
Model Rules governing competence 20 and fees' 2 ' however, raise potential
108. See http://www.versuslaw.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
109. Id.
110. See Loislaw, at http://www.loislaw.com/info/content/global.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2004). Lois Law Watch is a service provided by fee based Loislaw, a competitor of Lex-
isNexisTM and Westlaw®. Id.
111. ABA, LEGAL TECH. RES. CTR., SURVEY REPORT: ONLINE RESEARCH 169 (2002) [here-
inafter ONLINE RESEARCH].
112. Id. at 164(71.54%).
113. Id. at 149 (46.01%).
114. Idat 152 (95.30%).
115. Id. at 154 (67.27%).
116. ONLINE RESEARCH, supra note 107, at 160 (50.70%).
117. Id. at 162 (58.15%).
118. Id. at 174 (noting 34% of their research time is spent with print materials).
119. Id. (noting 12% of their research time is spent with CD-ROM materials).
120. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003).
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ethical issues concerning online research. Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct is a general rule requiring lawyers to be competent in
their legal knowledge, thoroughness, and preparation. 12 2 Although this rule
and comments are devoid of any mention of technology, an issue may arise
whether thoroughness and preparation standards are best served by book or
online research. For example, if an attorney has an issue concerning the in-
terpretation of a federal rule of evidence, Westlaw@ would be able to provide
the attorney in a matter of seconds with every state's analysis of the issue, as
well as law reviews and legislative history. 123 While that same attorney
could conduct the same research through book research, it's unlikely an at-
torney would have the time or inclination to access all of the hard copy li-
brary volumes necessary to produce the same results as that rendered
online. 124  Thus, an attorney's thoroughness and ultimate preparation is
greatly enhanced through online research.
A more immediate concern in the area of competence may be the avail-
ability of recent court decisions online that are not available as quickly in
hard copy. 125 If an attorney is filing a brief, and a decision was available
online before the filing date, but was not available in print, would an attorney
be deemed incompetent for not citing that online decision? 26 While courts
may adopt rules governing the duty to report decisions available online be-
fore becoming available in print, there would certainly appear to be a compe-
tence issue that bar associations may have to confront.
Another related ethical concern would be fee related research costs.
Rule 1.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that fees and
expenses must be reasonable.' 27 As the costs of computerized research de-
clines and most lawyers use online research, a lawyer may have an ethical
obligation to use computerized research or cut his billing time for manual
research. 28 For example, in researching the federal evidence problem, if an
attorney conducts the research online, he may complete his research in a half
hour.'29 The same research may take four hours by reviewing a collection of
books. "30 If the attorney bills $200.00 per hour, that would be an $800.00 fee
121. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2003).
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003).
123. See Diane Karpman, Not Using New Technology: Ethical and Liability Risks? Keep
Up or Face Peril GPSOLO, June 2003, at 23.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2003).
128. See Karpman, supra note 123, at 24.
129. See id.
130. Id.
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for research using books versus a $100.00 ($200/2) fee for electronic re-
search.' While the expense of online research would need to be factored
into the equation, it is doubtful that the expense would match the $700.00
difference.3 2 Thus, if the average attorney would use online research and
charge $100.00, the attorney charging $800.00 may be deemed to have
charged an unreasonable fee.'33
V. FILING DOCUMENTS ELECTRONICALLY WITH THE COURT: THE RACE TO
THE COURTHOUSE JUST BECAME A BLIP ON YOUR SCREEN
Electronic filing of court documents is an extremely efficient and cost-
effective method of getting documents from the law office to the court-
house.'34 When the IRS began to permit electronic filing of tax returns, it
paved the way for other governmental offices to use e-mail as a means of
receiving documents.'35 The court system, while initially slow to respond,
has begun to make real progress in this area, especially in the federal court
system.'36 Twenty-nine United States District Courts now accept electronic
filing to varying degrees.' Fifty-seven United States Bankruptcy Courts
allow electronic filing.'38 All ninety-four United States District Courts plan
to allow electronic filing by 2005."9
Electronic filing has numerous advantages, including simplifying and
standardizing the filing process, and reducing errors in copying and tran-
scription. 4° However, the biggest advantage in electronic filing lies in re-
ducing the costs of printing, copying, and mailing associated with paper
documents.' When courts take that extra step of setting up systems that
allow the entire file to be viewed electronically, it enables more people to
have access to the system. 4
2
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Karpman, supra note 123, at 24.
134. See Bradley J. Hillis, The Digital Record: A Review of Electronic Court Filing in the
United States, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 319 (2000).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 321.
137. CM/ECF, at http://www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/cmecfcourt.html (last visited Mar. 27,
2004).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Robert Plotkin, Electronic Court Filing: Past, Present, and Future, 44 BOSTON B. J. 4
(2000).
141. Id. at 16.
142. Id.
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State and federal rules of civil procedure have also paved the way for
electronic filing. Many of the federal rules of procedure have been amended
to allow courts to permit electronic filing if provided by local rule.143 Most
jurisdictions have set up technology committees to study the most effective
way for courts to implement electronic filing.
However, electronic filing may not be as simple as a click of the mouse.
Courts must grapple with specific court rules as to format, font, and type
sizes in electronic format.' 44 Also, courts must deal with the variety of for-
mats used to convert print images into digital format for a variety of docu-
ments. 45 Courts must develop systems that enable a lawyer to easily convert
their software programs to court systems. 46 Additionally, as courts adopt
electronic filing, most still retain the ability for lawyers to file paper.
47
Dealing with two different filing systems can be complicated and unwieldy.
Ultimately, a court may decide to go entirely electronic. If so, either the
lawyer must have online capabilities or the court needs to take the time to
convert paper to paperless.'48 Both options appear fraught with complica-
tions. Thus, with electronic filing, the courts may have to work out the kinks
before large scale implementation is possible.
Attorneys are beginning to take advantage of electronic filing. One in
five lawyers engaged in electronic document filing at some time. 49 For
those attorneys that have filed documents electronically, approximately 95%
have been satisfied with the experience. 150 Motions were the most frequently
filed documents,' followed by pleadings. 52 However, the majority of law-
yers still delivered documents in person to the courthouse.'53
The reluctance to file documents electronically would seem to have lit-
tle to do with impediments with ethical rules. Since electronic filing is con-
trolled by the court system, there is little possibility that lawyers would be
143. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D); FED. R. App. P. 25(a)(2)(D).
144. Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Electronic Court Filing Presents Both Challenges and
Benefits, http://www.icle.org/connection/julyaug/celect.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
145. Id.
146. See generally id.
147. Id.
148. Michael E. Heintz, Note, The Digital Divide and Courtroom Technology: Can David
Keep up With Goliath? 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 567, 573 (2002).
149. ABA, LEGAL RES. CTR., SURVEY REPORT: LITIGATION AND COURTROOM
TECHNOLOGY 176 (2002). The number of attorneys filing documents electronically has almost
doubled since the 2001 Survey. Id. at xiv.
150. Id. at 180 (stating 50.44% reported they were somewhat satisfied with the experience
while 44.25% reported they were very satisfied with the experience).
151. Id. at 179 (noting that 66.7% of motions were filed electronically).
152. Id. (noting that 61.4% of pleadings were filed electronically).
153. LITIGATION & COURTROOM, supra note 2, at 172 (71.50%).
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able to act unethically in this area. Local court rules are very specific as to
the process and specifications required for electronic filing, thus eliminating
competency concerns that may encompass ethical considerations.1
5 4
However, as most courts move towards electronic transmission of
documents, lawyers should likewise move toward using this method of
transmission. It will no doubt be consistent with the Model Rules, goal of
lawyers expediting litigation,'55 by allowing parties to access documents in-
stantaneously. It will also aid the court with an efficient method that elimi-
nates volumes of paper and storage problems.'56 No longer will attorneys
race to the courthouse drop box, or search for inventive and creative ways of
adding mail days to the due date of their documents. In fact, if lawyers do
not at least begin to adopt the process of filing documents electronically, they
may find themselves left behind when courts permit only electronic filing.'57
VI. VIRTUAL SHOWCASE: TRIALS AND TECHNOLOGY
Since the vast majority of cases settle before trial, it is possible that an
attorney involved in litigation will never have to confront an actual trial and
the technology now associated with trying a case. However, given the slim
chance an attorney actually has to try a case, technology abounds. First, a
few courts have become cutting edge electronic courtrooms, equipped with
state of the art technology that aids attorneys, judges, and jurors in the trial
process.'58 A wired courtroom includes flat plasma screens, multi-media
presentation capabilities, video cameras, real time trial transcript capabilities
that will send transcripts to lawyers and judges during a trial, along with
video conferencing technology for virtual courtroom testimony and viewing
of pre-recorded depositions.'59
Of course, a wired courtroom cannot be appreciated by the sophisticat-
edly "wireless" counsel. Even when the courtroom does not contain the
technological bells and whistles, an attorney can still make good use of ad-
vances in technology to present his case. If the courtroom is not wired, many
comparable technological tools and display mechanisms can be obtained
154. See e.g., Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF),
http://www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/cmecf court.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) (providing court
instructions for electronic filing for the Northern District of Florida).
155. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2003). Although the focus of this rule is
to prevent dilatory practices in litigation, the availability of electronic filing would certainly
aid efficiency. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. 1.
156. Shelton, supra note 144.
157. See id.
158. Heintz, supra note 148, at 570.
159. Id.
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through equipment rental facilities, who are in the business of helping attor-
neys effectively present their cases. 0
If high tech is not in the courtroom or in a lawyer's budget, a basic lap-
top computer may provide many benefits for a trial attorney. First, through
the use of litigation support software, a trial attorney is able to store an entire
trial file on a couple CD-ROM discs to be accessed through his/her laptop. 61
Moreover, a lawyer may be able to provide everyone in the courtroom with
visual access to exhibits, pleadings, or deposition testimony. 162 Laptops also
enable attorneys to present exhibits through PowerPoint@ presentations, com-
plete with graphics and dazzling effects. 1
63
In addition to laptops, attorneys may use other types of technology to
effectively present their cases. Deposition testimony can be shown through
high powered monitors."6 A full multimedia presentation would include not
only the monitor, but also the transcript that scrolls down alongside the depo-
sition video. 65 The transcript can be highlighted, enlarged, and otherwise
enhanced for the important testimony.166
Computer animation and computer simulations are becoming standard
in the courtroom. Whether used by experts to explain their theory of a case,
or to aid a witnesses' testimony as to how an accident occurred, these com-
puter generated programs bring cases to life. 167 DVD and/or CD-ROM discs
are becoming standard fare, replacing the need for traditional video cassette
recorders ("VCR") or the old standby poster board. 68 New trial technology
can turn any trial into a razzle dazzle high-tech show. The possibilities are
endless in using technology for trials. Attorneys need only be careful in their
choice and selection from an array of diverse products. 169 While too little
technology makes for a sleepy jury, too much technology may mesmerize the
jury with the equipment, and ultimately lose their interest in the subject-the
actual case at hand.170
160. Stephen G. Norten, The Electronic Courtroom Revolution: The Right Stuff, 26 VT. B.
J. & L. DIG. 47, 48 (March 2000).
161. Id. at 47.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 48.
164. Id.
165. Norten, supra note 160.
166. Id.
167. Donald F. Parsons, Jr. & Lisa K.W. Crossland, Technological Tools for Civil Litiga-
tion, 14 DEL. LAW. 33, 38-39 (1996).
168. Id. at 39.
169. Id. at 37-38.
170. See id. at 38.
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The Technology Survey reports that most attorneys do not use litigation
support software,' 7' and only a few attorneys use trial presentation soft-
ware. 7 2 However, many attorneys stated they would be likely to purchase
litigation support software if their opponent was using it,'73 or if their firm
had a policy or recommendation regarding use.'74
Approximately 72% of lawyers surveyed have had no training in court-
room technologies. 75 Therefore most attorneys are unaware of the technol-
ogy available to them. 76 For those attorneys who reported using technology,
the most readily available device used was the laptop with presentation soft-
ware. 177 Lawyers rarely use more advanced litigation tools, especially those
tools available for annotation or evidence presentation, like color video
printers, light pens, and touch screens.'78
The Model Rules do not need to address ethical concerns in relation to
technological use in the courtroom, mainly due to the judge's ability to con-
trol its use. Nonetheless, razzle-dazzle technology can carry potential ethical
issues. High tech courtroom equipment may help attorneys create mislead-
ing arguments by misrepresenting evidence. For example, a lawyer may
recreate an accident using technology with overly dramatic overtones and
graphics, thus distorting the relevant evidence. Even highlighted transcripts
through multimedia presentation may tend to mislead by overemphasizing
some testimony while distorting others. Of course, these tactics would most
likely be corrected through effective cross examination. If so outrageous, it
would likely be stopped before ever reaching the courtroom floor by a
judge. 79 In any event, as more attorneys become familiar with courtroom
technology, future changes to the Model Rules may be required to tackle the
ethical concerns relating to courtroom presentation of evidence.
171. LITIGATION & COURTROOM, supra note 2, at 63 (finding 89.59% of attorneys sur-
veyed did not use litigation support software).
172. Id. at 71 (4.46%).
173. Id. at 162 (38.1%).
174. Id. (56.5%).
175. Id. at 163 (71.88%).
176. LITIGATION & COURTROOM, supra note 2, at xiii.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (stating that it would likely disallow the demonstrative evi-
dence if the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of
misleading the jury).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the results of the
2002 ABA Technological Survey, a technologically proficient and ethically
sound lawyer should follow these guidelines:
1. A lawyer should have a website. While the website does not need
bells and whistles, which can be expensive and high maintenance, it should
provide adequate information to attract clients. It also should provide an
easy method of contact. If you want to have an online free consultation,
make sure you display prominent disclaimers about forming an attorney-
client relationship. Joining or participating in listservs may also be a method
of attracting clients, and e-mail is a good advertising method as long as it is
properly designated as such. Be aware of real- time electronic contact, as
those chat rooms may be construed as solicitation.
2. E-mail is an effective and efficient way for attorneys to communi-
cate with clients. When e-mailing confidential information, it is best to high-
light on your e-mail that the communication is confidential. Also, make your
client fully aware of its confidentiality. For highly sensitive information,
some form of encryption may be necessary. Also, check and double check
the e-mail address of the receiver. If an e-mail is misdirected, its confidenti-
ality may be lost.
3. Lawyers should connect to fee based legal research services like
Westlaw and Lexis. CD-ROM's are an inexpensive and efficient method for
specialized or state research topics. The day may be coming where clients
will not pay bills for book research that may have been accomplished less
expensively through online research.
4. Lawyers should begin to file court documents electronically where
available. Courts will begin to prefer this method of filing, and learning the
system while it is still optional will reduce the panic when it becomes man-
datory. It also expedites litigation, a goal of the ethical rules.
5. A lawyer going to the courthouse to try a case should have a laptop
and some basic litigation support software programs installed on it. Through
software, a lawyer will be able to review documents, court files, and notes
efficiently. Also with a laptop, a lawyer can use PowerPoint@, an inexpen-
sive, but effective way of presenting evidence. The days of easels and
handwritten diagrams are beginning to wane. Although there are many com-
panies that will aid lawyers in presenting evidence with the dramatic flair of
a Hollywood production, be wary of creating an overly dramatic effect. This
result may be an actual misrepresentation of the evidence, along with an un-
impressed and annoyed judge.
The goal of incorporating state-of-the-art technology into all facets of
an attorney's practice may be commendable, but, given ethical concerns, it
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may be impractical. Despite this proviso, most lawyers are successfully in-
corporating many variants of helpful and time saving technology into their
law practices. If these lawyers are careful to keep their technology practices
keep in line with governing ethical requirements, they can begin to take ad-
vantage of the numerous technological advances in the practice of law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A frequently employed technique for those parents, grandparents, and
others desiring to make completed, irrevocable transfers to minors, without
engaging in complicated transactions or incurring legal fees, is to transfer
wealth to a Uniform Transfers to Minors Act ("UTMA") account. This arti-
cle discusses the general provisions of the Florida UTMA, noting why such
accounts may be attractive to clients. Of equal importance, this article ex-
plores several pitfalls of which the creator of a UTMA account may not be
aware. Clients may create UTMA accounts without advice, assistance of
counsel, or other knowledgeable professional advisors. This presents a
unique challenge to attorneys to raise the subject of UTMA accounts, and to
provide at least general information to enable a client to determine if a
UTMA account is an appropriate vehicle to accomplish the client's aims; and
if it is, how it should be established and administered properly.
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. J.D. New York Law School 1998, cum laude. Professor Maurer is a
member in good standing of the New York and Florida Bars.
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Use of such accounts has become increasingly popular since changes to
applicable law in 1985.' These changes expanded the uses of UTMA ac-
counts, and the types of property which could be owned in a custodianship
for a minor.2 As general market conditions and investments increased in
value, so did the balances in UTMA accounts. In light of the enhanced
wealth, which may now be found in these accounts, the rules applicable to
administration and restrictions on these accounts warrant a review. The
popularity of UTMA accounts nationwide has also resulted in increased liti-
gation involving them. Both the creator of a UTMA account and the custo-
dian should be aware of the possibility of litigation before the account is cre-
ated.
While UTMA accounts serve valuable purposes and may be appropriate
in some instances, if a creator of a UTMA account is fully informed about
the account and the pitfalls mentioned in this article prior to its creation,
three advantageous consequences might result. First, certain actions and
precautions suggested in this article might be taken by the creator, decreasing
the possibility of future problems, unintended results, and the need for future
legal action. Second, some persons contemplating creation of UTMA ac-
counts may select a different vehicle as more appropriate to accomplish their
aims. Third, where a UTMA account is created, the informed custodian may
be in a better position to avoid certain hazards.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
UTMA accounts are opened to accomplish a variety of purposes. Life-
time gifts to minors are often driven by the donor's desire to minimize in-
come, gift, estate, and generation-skipping transfer taxes, as well as, motives
to benefit the donee. The donor may seek to shift income from the donor in
the higher tax bracket to the minor, who may be in a lower tax bracket and
taxed at a lower income tax rate. The donor frequently also desires to elimi-
nate the asset from donor's probate and taxable estates, and to part with the
asset on a gift-tax-free basis.
The simplest form of gift is a direct outright gift of the property to the
minor. However, the outright gift vests full title in the minor on completion
of the gift. One drawback to an outright gift is the immediate and permanent
loss of donor's control over the gifted property. Furthermore, state laws treat
minors as legally incompetent persons, thus requiring guardianships or trusts
1. Florida Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, Ch. 1985-95, 1985 Fla. Laws 599 (codified
as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 710.101 -. 126 (2003)).
2. Compare id., with FLA. STAT. § 710.11 (2003).
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to be created for the property until the minor reaches the age of majority.
Institution of a court guardianship proceeding or creation of an express trust
entails legal fees and costs a client may be attempting to avoid. One way to
transfer legal ownership of property from a grantor to a minor and yet allow
the grantor or another adult selected by the grantor to retain control of the
property, and to keep the control temporarily out of the hands of the minor
for a period of time, is through a custodianship under the UTMA.
Florida adopted its version of the UTMA in 1985. 3 Every American ju-
risdiction has adopted a version of the UTMA. 4 "The Uniform Transfers To
Minors Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1983."' The UTMA revises and restates its predeces-
sor, the Uniform Gifts To Minors Act ("UGMA").6
UGMA was developed as a simple and inexpensive alternative to estab-
lishing a guardianship or trust for making lifetime gifts of property to a mi-
nor.7 UGMA was originally proposed by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws in 1956.8 The Conference revised
UGMA in 1965 and 1966 "to expand the types of financial institutions which
could serve as depositories of custodial funds, to facilitate the designation of
successor custodians, and to add life insurance policies and annuity contracts
to the types of property ([formerly limited to] cash and securities) that could
be made the subject of a gift under the" UGMA.9
Uniformity in the area of gifts to minors is important because the person
making the gift, the custodian, and the minor, who benefits from the gift,
may all reside in different states, and may change their residences after the
gift is completed.' ° The original UGMA was "designed to avoid conflicts of
law when the laws of more than one state might apply to a transaction or a
series of transactions."" However, many states substantially revised their
versions of UGMA "to expand the kinds of property that may [b]e made the
3. See § 710.101.
4. Prefatory Notes to UNIF. TRANSFERS To MINORS ACT, 8C U.L.A. 3 (1983).
5. Historical Notes to UNIF. TRANSFERS To MINORS ACT, 8C U.L.A. 3 (1983).
6. Id.
7. Thomas E. Allison, The Florida Uniform Transfers to Minor Act-A Viable Alterna-
tive, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1986, at 49. In Estate of Cardulla v. Commissioner, the court stated in
respect to New York UGMA accounts that "[t]he Uniform Gifts to Minors Act was enacted in
New York to provide an alternative for people who wished to make gifts to their young prog-
eny without placing the gifted property directly into the hands of the unwitting minor." 51
T.C.M (CCH) 1511, 1520 (1986).
8. Thomas E. Allison, The Uniform Transfers to Minors Act-New and Improved, But
Shortcomings Still Exist, 10 U. ARK. LTTLE ROCK L. REv. 339 (1987-88).
9. Prefatory Notes to 8C U.L.A. 3.
10. See id.
11. Id.
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subject of a gift under [UGMA]., , 12 As a result, non-uniformity arose among
the states. 3 As discussed later in this article, the result is that problems may
arise when UTMA accounts opened in one state are moved to another state.
1 4
UTMA restates and rearranges the UGMA of 1966. 5 It was hoped that
UTMA would improve clarity, uniformity among the state jurisdictions, and
expand the types of assets covered.1 6 UTMA "follows the . . . approach
taken by several states and allows [many types] of property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, to be made the subject of a transfer to a custodian for
the benefit of a minor."'' Additionally, it permits transfers by trusts, estates,
and guardianships to UTMA accounts, not just gifts from individuals;
"whether or not [such transfers are] specifically authorized in the governing
instrument." 8 Once assets are transferred to a UTMA account from a trust,
they are thereafter governed by UTMA statutes and not by the terms of the
trust from which they were derived.' 9 Transfers from "[a] third part[y] in-
debted to a minor who does not have a conservator, such as [a] part[y]
against whom a minor has a tort claim or judgment, and depository institu-
tions holding deposits or insurance companies issuing policies payable.., to
a minor," may also be made to a UTMA account.2" Even with these changes,
many states have made further revisions when adopting UTMA to govern
transfers to minors in their jurisdictions; Florida is one such state. The Flor-
ida UTMA 21 applies to transfers of property to minors22 through custodians.23
Under the UTMA the custodianship generally terminates when the minor
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Prefatory Notes to UNIF. TRANSFERS To MINORS ACT, 8C U.L.A. 3 (1983).
15. Id. at4.
16. See Prefatory Notes to 8C U.L.A. 3.
17. Id.; see also UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MrNORS ACT § 1(6), 8C U.L.A. 14 (1983).
18. Prefatory Notes to 8C U.L.A. 3. Because of these enlargements, the name of the act
was changed from "Gifts" to "Transfers." Id.
19. See In re Merrill, 246 B.R. 906, 913 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2000).
20. Id. "[A] custodianship is not a separate legal entity or taxpayer." Prefatory Notes to
8C U.L.A. 3. The custodianship does not file a federal tax return or pay taxes. See id. "[T]he
custodial property is indefeasibly vested in the minor, not the custodian, and thus any income
received is attributable to and reportable by the minor, whether or not actually distributed to
the minor" Prefatory Notes to UNIF. TRANSFERS To MINORS ACT, 8C U.L.A. 3 (1983); §
1 l(b), 8C U.L.A. 73.
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 710.101-.126 (2003).
22. "'Minor' means an individual who has not attained the age of 21 years."
§ 710.102(11).
23. A "custodian" is defined as "a person so designated under § 710.111 or a successor or
substitute custodian designated under § 710.121." § 710.102(7).
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reaches the age of twenty-one regardless of Florida's majority age of eight-
een.
24
The balance of this article examines the benefits of UTMA accounts
and hazards to guard against in selection, creation, and administration of the
accounts. As relatively few Florida reported court decisions exist, cases
from other jurisdiction with similar statutes are frequently cited.
III. IRREVOCABLE TRANSFER
To create a Florida UTMA account is there must be a transfer from a
donor to a custodian for a minor, and that the transfer be irrevocable.2 1
Whether or not the custodian of the account is the transferor, the custodian
must be informed that the custodianship assets may not be returned to the
transferor, nor may the transferor thereafter direct how the UTMA assets are
to be invested or expended. 26 This is true even if, due to an unanticipated
change in circumstances, the transferor develops a dire need for the assets, or
if the transferor did not understand that a UTMA account was being created
and the restrictions on such an account.27 If the grantor is also the custodian,
and after the transfer to a UTMA account the transferor improperly uses the
account assets as his own, for his personal benefit or retitling them in his
own name, adverse consequences may result.28 The grantor/custodian may
be liable to the beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duties, 29 and may be sub-
24. § 710.123(1); UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT § 20(1), 8C U.L.A. 73 (1983).
25. §§ 710.113(2), .108(1). Other jurisdictions have also recognized that a transfer of
property made to a custodianship account irrevocably vests legal title in the minor beneficiary.
See Roman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2375 (1997) (referencing New Mexico
UGMA); Gordon v. Gordon, 419 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (App. Div. 1979).
26. Cf § 710.113(3).
27. See Florida Bar v. Rose, 607 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1992). In Rose a husband and wife,
who were both attorneys, were divorced. Id. Stock was owned in the name of the wife as
custodian for the parties' minor children, under the Florida UGMA. Id. Years after the di-
vorce, the father directed the sale of the stock. Id. The broker with whom the account was
maintained sold the shares and issued checks to the former wife as custodian. Id. However,
the checks were physically secured by the former husband. Rose, 607 So. 2d at 394. The
former husband endorsed the checks with the wife's name and used the proceeds for his own
personal purposes. Id. at 394-95. In disciplinary proceedings before the Florida Bar, the
father contended he thought the trust created was revocable, or that a Totten Trust was cre-
ated. Id. at 394. Not only was the father disciplined by the Florida Bar, but the brokerage
firm replaced all funds misappropriated by the husband. Id. at 395. The claim of the creator
of the account that he did not understand the restriction on the account did not alter the out-
come. Id.
28. See Gray v. United States, 738 F. Supp. 453, 456 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
29. See infra Part VII.
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ject to tax on income and gains earned on the assets.3" The actions of a gran-
tor/custodian in dealing with assets for his personal benefit may justify a
court in concluding that the grantor lacked donative intent, and the UTMA
account was not validly created.31
After the transfer to a UTMA account, the use of the assets is limited.
Hence, the custodian, even if he or she is the transferor, may not use the ac-
count assets for unlimited purposes, even if the purposes directly or indi-
rectly benefit the designated minor beneficiary.
The transferor may not, after creation of a UTMA account, alter the des-
ignation of beneficiary or change the time at which the beneficiary receives
the assets in the account.3" For example, if the transferor created a UTMA
account for grandchild A, and grandchild B is thereafter born, grandchild B
may not be named a beneficiary of grandchild A's UTMA account. Statute
mandates that there be only one beneficiary of each UTMA account.3 3 Nor
may the transferor direct on creation of a UTMA account for A that on the
birth of B, A's UTMA account be divided into two separate accounts to
benefit A and B equally. Similarly, if the transferor created and funded a
UTMA account for A as an inter vivos gift, when A is twenty-one-years-old,
A must receive the assets remaining in the account,34 notwithstanding that A
is a spendthrift, using illegal substances, or the existence of other reasons
which would cause the transferor to prefer postponement of delivery of ac-
count assets to the beneficiary. The flexibility available in a trust to address
such issues is lacking with UTMA assets.
The Florida Statutes provide substantial direction about the mechanics
of creating a custodianship.35 Stocks are transferred to a custodianship by
titling the security in the name of the custodian as custodian for a named
minor beneficiary under the Florida UTMA.36 Similarly, monies may be de-
livered to a financial institution to open an account in the name of the custo-
30. Gray, 738 F. Supp. at 458.
31. Dubisky v. United States, 62 F.3d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Jacobs, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 234, 242 (Ct. App. 1982); see also State v. Keith, 610 N.E.2d 1017, 1018 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991) (finding that the UGMA assets should be forfeited pursuant to Ohio RICO Statutes). In
Keith, a mother opened an UGMA account for her daughter, thereafter continued to spend the
funds as if they were the mother's sole property, and after her arrest for prostitution agreed to
forfeiture of the account. Id. The child's father failed to prove donative intent or a legal
source of the funds. Id. at 1019.
32. See §§ 710.112,.113(2).
33. § 710.112.
34. § 710.123(1).
35. See§710.111.
36. § 710.111(1)(a).
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dian, as custodian for the named beneficiary under the Florida UTMA.37 Life
insurance, an annuity, real estate, tangible personal property, and other assets
susceptible to custodianship ownership may be similarly titled.38 The proper
titling of an asset in a UTMA account gives rise to a rebuttable presumption
of donative intent.39 The argument that this presumption is conclusive has
been rejected.4' Extrinsic evidence of fraud, mistake or other facts to estab-
lish that the grantor did not intend to create a UTMA account, despite the
titling of the account or asset, is admissible to rebut the presumption. 41 The
signed documents creating the UTMA account at a financial institution may
constitute prima facie evidence of donative intent.42 Failure to maintain ade-
quate records reflects lack of donative intent.43
Questions may arise about whether certain assets are capable of being
transferred to a custodianship. Florida Statutes define custodial property
generically, as "any interest in property transferred to a custodian under [the]
act and the income from and proceeds of that interest in property." 44 Section
7 10.111 of the Florida Statutes, in providing instructions for the mechanics
of titling property in a custodianship, refers to securities, money, life insur-
ance policies, endowment policies, annuity contracts, irrevocable powers of
appointment, rights to payments under contract and interests in real property
as all qualifying as custodianship property.45 What constitutes a security is
not defined.46 Although no Florida appellate court has ruled on this question,
37. § 710.11l(1)(b).
38. § 710.111.
39. Golden v. Golden, 500 So. 2d 260, 261 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986). "An allegation
and showing that the funds were expended for the named child's education, maintenance or
rehabilitation may rebut the presumption." Id. In Golden, a father created a UTMA account
in Florida for his son, and claimed that he spent the monies for rehabilitation, education and
maintenance for his son. Id.; see Dubisky v. United States, 62 F.3d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1995);
see also Gordon v. Gordon, 419 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (App. Div. 1979).
40. Golden v. Golden, 434 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Gordon, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 688.
41. Golden, 434 So. 2d at 978. In this case the court found the testimony of the grantor
alone insufficient to rebut the presumption. Id. at 979. Where a transferor disputes the con-
tention that he intended to make an irrevocable transfer to a custodianship account, this argu-
ment must be raised at trial or it is waived. See Tritter v. Corry, No. 95-1406, 1995 WL
648252, at *1 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1995).
42. Heath v. Heath, 493 N.E.2d 97, 100 (111. App. Ct. 1986). There the court stated that
the party disputing the existence of donative intent has the burden of overcoming "the pre-
sumption of donative intent by clear, convincing, unequivocal, and unmistakable evidence".
Id. at 101.
43. Dubisky, 1994 WL 861127, at * 1.
44. § 710.102(6).
45. § 710.111(1)(a)(2),(l)(b)-(e).
46. See § 710.102.
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other jurisdictions have held that a promissory note from grantor payable to
the custodian is not a security, and the signing by grantor of a promissory
note in favor of the custodian, where no consideration is received by grantor
in exchange, is not a valid transfer to a custodianship.47 Other jurisdictions
have recognized partnership interests as assets capable of custodianship
ownership.48
Where the transfer of funds or other assets is properly and directly ac-
complished by the donor to a custodian, and the assets are immediately titled
in custodianship name, there may be little reason to question either the do-
nor's intent or whether the applicable statutes were complied with when cre-
ating the UTMA account.49 However, where a transfer is made by a donor to
another, and thereafter a UTMA account is opened by the recipient of the
asset, or where the account is improperly titled, or where other irregularities
exist and the statute has not been strictly complied with, questions may arise
concerning the donor's intent to make an irrevocable gift to the minor.5° The
failure to sufficiently comply with the statutory formalities may prevent crea-
tion of a UTMA account." Donative intent must exist at the time the transfer
of assets to the custodian occurs.52
47. Crosby v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1401, 1403 (1977). Taxpayers opened
savings accounts in their names as custodians for their minor children under California
UGMA. Id. at 1402. They then signed promissory notes payable to themselves as custodians.
Id. The taxpayers received no monies or other consideration in exchange for the promissory
notes. Id. Grantors paid interest due on the promissory notes to the UGMA accounts, and
claimed deductions for the interest expenses. Id. The applicable California UGMA defined
security to include any note, other than one of which donor was the issuer. Crosby, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 1403 n.3. California law also provided that a gift of donor's promissory note, with-
out consideration, did not create a legally enforceable obligation to repay under California
law. Id. at 1403. Hence, the court concluded that the purported transfers of promissory notes
to UGMA accounts were of no effect, there was no legally enforceable obligation by grantors
to pay interest, and grantors could not deduct interest paid under I.R.C. § 163. Id.; see also
Karlin v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1381, 1383 (1987) (involving Kansas UGMA
statutes); In re Jacobs, 180 Cal. Rptr. 234, 242 (Ct. App. 1982) (involving California UGMA
statutes).
48. Garcia v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 425,437 (1984).
49. See Marshall v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 988, 1002 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
50. See id.
51. Id. In Marshall, a grandmother transferred funds annually for the benefit of her
grandchildren. Id. at 992. The checks delivered by grandmother to her daughter (the minor
beneficiary's parent) were mostly payable to the grandchild, and did not indicate on their face
a custodianship arrangement. See id. at 993. Some, but not all, of the checks were deposited
by the daughter in custodianship accounts for her children. Marshall, 831 F. Supp. at 993-95.
The court made an independent finding based on the grandmother's testimony that, since she
transferred the funds solely to benefit her grandchildren and did not expect to ever receive the
funds back, she had the donative intent required to make an irrevocable transfer under
UGMA. 1d. at 1002. The court recognized that, although the formalities of the New York
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Where the transfer by a donor is not made directly to a custodian for the
minor, questions may arise conceming whether there was effective delivery
of the gift to the donee. 5' Failure to literally comply with all statutory re-
quirements does not necessarily compel a court to decide that delivery failed
or that a UTMA account was not created.
5 4
There must be a bona fide transfer of an asset to create a UTMA rela-
tionship. 5 Where a donor owned 100% of the stock in a closely held corpo-
ration, issued stock certificates purporting to transfer half of the shares to his
wife as custodian for their two sons, thereafter retained full control of opera-
UGMA were not literally complied with, as checks were delivered to donor's daughter pay-
able to the grandchildren, to the extent the daughter deposited them in UGMA accounts there
was sufficient compliance with the statute. Id. But see Thompson v. Sundholm, 726 F. Supp.
147, 150 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (stating that the donor failed to create a UGMA account when he
endorsed a cashiers check with the notation that it was to be deposited into the account of two
named minors.); § 710.111. The Texas statute, like the Florida statute, required certain lan-
guage to be used to create a custodianship. Thompson, 726 F. Supp. at 150. Both states pre-
cluded a gift to two minors in one custodianship. Id.; see also § 710.112. As the donor in
Thompson failed to adhere to the statutory language, there was no gift to the minor, and no
effective transfer under UGMA occurred. Thompson, 726 F. Supp. at 150.
52. Marshall v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 988, 1002 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Gordon v.
Gordon, 419 N.Y.S. 2d 684, 688 (App. Div. 1979).
53. See Marshall, 831 F. Supp. at 1002; Driscoll v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 418
(1972) (example of how a grantor may fail to effectively make a transfer to a custodianship).
In Driscoll, the grantor was a married father of nine minor children, all residing in California.
31 T.C.M. (CCH) at 419. The taxpayer initially conducted a business as a sole proprietorship.
Id. He then signed a partnership agreement, purporting to cause his children to own fifty-
percent of the business, and to have a fifty percent interest in capital and profits. Id. The
taxpayer's wife signed the partnership agreement as trustee for the minor children, and a
document appended to the partnership agreement stated that the taxpayer transferred a security
interest in the business to his wife as custodian under the UGMA for the minor children. Id. at
420. The following year, bank accounts were opened in the name of the taxpayer and his wife
as trustees for each child. Id. A year later, new bank accounts were opened in the name of the
taxpayer's wife as custodian under the UGMA. Driscoll, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) at 420. In the
following year, court proceedings were instituted to have taxpayer's wife appointed guardian
of each minor child. Id. When faced with these facts, the court held that intent by a grantor to
make a gift in a custodianship was missing, and no valid custodianship was established. Id. at
422.
54. Marshall, 831 F. Supp. at 1002. "The case law is clear that the protection of UGMA
will extend to gift giving even when the precise requirements of the statute are not followed."
Id. However, when accounts are titled in the names of donors "as trustees" for the minor, and
evidence reflects that the transfers were revocable by donors, the court will not deem the
transfers to be irrevocable transfers under the UGMA. Heintz v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M.
(CCH) 429, 430-31 (1980).
55. See generally Duarte v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 193 (1965). Where a donor signed a
document reflecting an intent to make gifts in the future of stock proceeds, but never actually
transferred the stock or the proceeds to the custodianship account, no gift occurred. Sussman
v. Sussman, 402 N.Y.S.2d 421,423 (App. Div. 1978).
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tions of the corporation, made an S election, never delivered the certificates
or any income earned to the custodian, and no custodianship accounts were
opened, no bona fide transfer had occurred. 6 The facts that the donor filed
income tax returns for the minors, reported their share of the S corporation
income, and paid the tax owed by the minors did not change the court's con-
clusion. 7 Creation and transfer to a custodianship account cannot be used to
defraud creditors.58
Although the UTMA statutes typically refer to intentional transfers
made by a grantor, UTMA accounts may arise as a result of other laws. For
example, lottery statutes may specify that lottery winnings are to be paid to a
custodian for a minor who wins the lottery. 9
The irrevocability of the transfer, combined with the restrictions on and
inflexibility of UTMA accounts, may lead transferors to conclude that other
vehicles would be more responsive to their needs. This is particularly true if
the UTMA account is expected to own considerable wealth when distribution
to the beneficiary is required.
IV. MANDATORY DISTRIBUTION
As alluded to above, section 710 of the Florida Statutes requires man-
datory distribution to the beneficiary of a UTMA account.60 When the distri-
bution of all remaining account assets is required depends upon how the ac-
count was initially created. Perhaps the most common occurrence is the
creation of a UTMA account by inter vivos gift from the transferor pursuant
56. See Duarte, 44 T.C. at 193.
57. Id. at 195-96. But see Kirkpatrick v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1122 (1977)
(stating the Tax Court recognized the validity of transfers of closely held stock from both
parents to one parent as custodian for their minor children). Many factors influenced the court
to recognize the validity of the transfers, even though corporate profits were not distributed to
the minors. Id. at 1126. First, shares were actually titled in custodianship name. Id. at 1123.
Second, the custodian played an active role in the business, safeguarding the minors' invest-
ments. Id. at 1126. Third, when corporate funds were spent to purchase assets for the corpo-
ration and expand the business, the custodian was involved in the decision making. Id.
Fourth, when sums were borrowed by the grantor-shareholder, there was adequate interest and
security provided. Kirkpatrick, 36 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) at 1128. The borrower even took a bank
loan personally, to enable him to pay interest to the custodianship accounts. Id. at 1124.
58. See Dubisky v. United States, 62 F.3d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1995). The taxpayer created
UGMA accounts while he was being investigated by the I.R.S., at a time when the taxpayer
had reason to believe he had engaged in illegal tax shelters. Id. These transfers did not create
valid custodianship accounts. Id.
59. N.Y. STATE LOTTERY FOR EDUC. LAW § 9553(b) (McKinney 2003); N.Y. TAX LAW §
1613(b) (McKinney 2003); Anastasio v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814 (1977).
60. § 710.123.
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to section 710.105 of the Florida Statutes. In that instance, distribution of
remaining account assets to the beneficiary is required on the beneficiary's
twenty-first birthday.6 The same result follows if the account was created as
a consequence of a gift to a minor made in a decedent's last will and testa-
ment, or a gift emanating from a trust which directs delivery to a custodian.62
While the above may reflect the more common means of creating a
UTMA account, such accounts may arise in other circumstances. Where a
will or trust agreement makes a gift to a minor but does not designate a cus-
todian to receive the gift for the minor, or if a gift arises to a minor in intes-
tacy, the personal representative or trustee may nevertheless deliver the gift
to a custodian of a UTMA account, if certain requirements are met.63 A con-
servator may likewise have power to create a UTMA account for a minor.'
In these less prevalent circumstances, mandatory distribution of the UTMA
account occurs when the minor attains age eighteen.65
Clients appreciative of the possibility of changes in circumstances may
not wish to guarantee that distributions will occur at the ages set by statute.
The beneficiary may not be sufficiently mature to manage the assets, or may
be a spendthrift, or may suffer from other vices or disabilities causing distri-
bution to be unwise. At the least, if clients are informed of the mandatory
distribution requirements of the statutes, they may limit the funding of the
UTMA accounts.
61. § 710.123(1). In Borbonus v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 983, 992 (1964), the Tax Court
recognized the pervasive uniformity of this requirement in the vast majority of states.
62. §§ 710.106-.123(1).
63. § 710.107(1). Section 710.107(3) allows such a transfer only if:
(a) The personal representative, trustee or conservator considers the transfer to be in the best
interest of the minor;
(b) The transfer is not prohibited by or inconsistent with provisions of the applicable will, trust
agreement, or other governing instrument; and
(c) The transfer is authorized by the court if it exceeds $10,000 in value.
§ 710.107(3). Furthermore, sections 744.301(2) and (4) limit the ability of the parents of a
minor, as natural guardians, to take certain actions on behalf of the minor child when the
amount involved exceeds $15,000.00, absent court authorization or approval. This restriction
applies where the minor has a claim for damages to person or property or for wrongful death,
which is proposed to be settled. § 744.301(2).
64. § 710.107(2). A conservator includes "a person appointed or qualified by a court to
act as general, limited, or temporary guardian of a minor's property or a person legally author-
ized to perform substantially the same functions." § 710.102(4).
65. § 710.123(2). Were this not the case an inequity could result. Absent this rule,
where a UTMA account was created in circumstances that could otherwise warrant guardian-
ship, distribution to the minor would be delayed to age twenty-one, whereas if guardianship
option had been selected or continued, distribution would occur at age eighteen. Cf id
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Mandatory distribution of UTMA accounts also occurs on the death of
the minor prior to the minor attaining the age set forth in the statute.66 The
possible consequences of this requirement are discussed below.
V. PREMATURE DEATH OF MINOR
Section 710.123(3) of the Florida Statutes requires that the assets re-
maining in a UTMA account be distributed to the minor's estate immediately
upon the minor's death occurring before he or she attains the age otherwise
applicable for distribution.67 While this provision may not deter transferors
from creating UTMA accounts, two principal consequences flowing from
this statute are worthy of consideration by the transferor prior to creation of
the account.
The first consequence is that the statute is likely to cause a need for a
probate of the minor's estate. While various short forms of probate may be
available if the account is not substantial in value and the minor does not
own significant other assets, the need for any court probate proceeding nev-
ertheless depletes remaining account assets.68 There is neither a mechanism
in the applicable statutes to provide for an alternative beneficiary in the event
of the minor's untimely demise, nor to avoid the need for court probate pro-
ceedings on the minor's death, as would be possible in a trust.
The second consequence which may be viewed as adverse by the trans-
feror involves who becomes entitled to the account assets in the event of the
minor's death. Assuming that the UTMA account was created under section
710.105 by inter vivos gift, or section 710.106 by will or trust agreement, and
the account beneficiary dies after attaining age eighteen, it is possible that the
beneficiary will die testate, stating in his or her will who receives the UTMA
account assets. 69 However, in the majority of cases this is unlikely to occur.
Hence, the beneficiary's estate is more likely to be distributed through intes-
tacy. It may thus be in-laws of the transferor, former in-laws of the trans-
feror, or others whom the transferor does not wish to benefit who receive
part or all of the remaining UTMA account assets.7 °
66. § 710.123(3).
67. Id.
68. § 735.201(2) (permitting summary administration to occur when the decedent's entire
estate subject to probate is worth no more than $75,000.00).
69. Even in this situation, the transferor has little control over who the UTMA account
beneficiary names as beneficiary under his or her Last Will and Testament. It is suggested
that beneficiaries of UTMA accounts over age eighteen be encouraged to execute Wills, thus
exercising control over who receives account assets in the event of their untimely demise.
70. See generally §§ 732.102-. 103. To illustrate, assume that grandpa created and funded
a UTMA account, with inter vivos gifts, for the benefit of his granddaughter. Grandpa's son
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It is suggested that the transferor be informed of these potential conse-
quences, however remote or infrequent, before the creation of a UTMA ac-
count or funding it with substantial assets.
VI. EXPENDITURES FROM UTMA ACCOUNTS
While the Florida Statutes are detailed in their coverage of the mechan-
ics and logistics governing creation of a UTMA account, no similar thorough
guidance is provided with respect to the custodian's obligations. One of the
most important obligations of a custodian is to expend account principal and
income appropriately.7 The custodian may only spend for the benefit of the
minor."
Directions afforded the custodian are principally generic. The custodian
is given "all the rights, powers, duties, and authority provided in this act.,
73
The custodian is directed to "observe the standard of care that would be ob-
served by a prudent person dealing with property of another. '74 Although the
custodian is given "all the rights, powers, and authority over custodial prop-
erty that unmarried adult owners have over their own property, 75 this clearly
does not include unrestricted spending power.
The primary direction to the custodian about proper spending is set
forth in section 710.116 of the Florida Statutes.76 It purports to allow the
custodian discretion to spend, without court order, "so much of the custodial
property as the custodian considers advisable for the use and benefit of the
minor., 77 In determining what sums are to be expended, the custodian need
not be mindful of the minor's other assets or income, or the obligation or
ability of any person to support the minor.7' Finally, the Florida Statutes
served as custodian and wisely invested the account assets. When granddaughter is age six-
teen and the UTMA account is worth $150,000.00, granddaughter dies. Her death occurs one
year after the dissolution of her parents' marriage. Under Florida intestacy law, each parent of
the deceased beneficiary receives $75,000.00. See § 732.103(2). Grandpa may not be pleased
with this outcome.
71. See§710.114.
72. See generally id.
73. § 710.113(2).
74. See § 710.114(2) (discussing investments).
75. § 710.115(1).
76. § 710.116.
77. See generally § 710.116(1).
78. Id.; see also Weiss v. Weiss, No. 91CIV.5115(KMW)(MHD), 1996 WL 91641, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1996) (discussing whether, under New Jersey statutes, a custodian should
use custodianship assets to pay bills which are normally a parental obligation of support).
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authorize the expenditure of UTMA account assets to pay the custodian's
reasonable expenses and compensation.79
What constitutes spending for the minor's benefit is not clearly defined.
Courts recognize that the custodian may use account assets for the minor's
maintenance, education, and benefit, decide to spend or refuse to spend ac-
count assets, and even terminate the account by spending all assets for or
distributing them to the minor beneficiary. s° Once the beneficiary is an adult,
the beneficiary may sue the custodian if the beneficiary contends expendi-
tures were improper.8 '
In other jurisdictions, where one parent of the minor beneficiary was the
custodian of an account, and funds from the account were loaned to the bene-
ficiary's other parent for use in his business, the court held that this loan was
for the benefit of the minor.82 However, where the custodian loaned funds
from a UGMA account to her friend, without obtaining a signed promissory
note, security agreement or other proper documentation; without setting due
dates for repayment or an interest rate; and without keeping proper records of
the loan or its repayment, or assuring that it was repaid, the loan was not for
the benefit of the minor.s3 "Loans from a custodia[n] to an individual outside
the family are subject to a high degree of scrutiny." 4 Use by a custodian,
who is grantor of the account and the parent of the minor beneficiary, to pay
79. § 710.117.
80. Exch. Bank & Trust Co. of Fla. v. United States, 694 F.2d 1261, 1263 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
81. See Weiss, 1996 WL 91641, at *1. This case presents an example of a situation in
which a son, who was the beneficiary of a UGMA account, sued his father who was both
donor and custodian. Id. The father created and funded UGMA accounts, intending to use the
assets for his son's education and related expenses. Id. at *3. The father actually used his
own monies to pay these charges, and reimbursed himself from UGMA assets. Id. at *3-5.
On attaining the age of majority, the son claimed that the reimbursement was improper and
the father, as custodian, should have distributed all remaining UGMA assets to the son.
Id. at *5-6.
82. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 988, 1005 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). In this
case the custodian was the mother of the minor beneficiaries, and custodianship assets were
received from the custodian's mother. Id. at 992. The custodian loaned funds from the
UGMA account to her husband, the father of the minor beneficiaries, for use in his law prac-
tice. Id. at 995. The loans were made without proper documentation, and without setting due
dates or interest rates. Id. Despite these facts, since the borrower had a legal and moral obli-
gation to repay the loans and to support his minor children, the court held that it was in the
best interests of the children that he be provided with needed funds for his business. Id. at
1005.
83. Marshall, 831 F. Supp. at 1005-06.
84. Id. at 1005.
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the custodian's legal fees to litigate custody or visitation issues, is not proper
spending for a minor from a UTMA account.85
In addition to the potential liability of the custodian to the minor for
breach of fiduciary duties if the custodian improperly expends UTMA ac-
count assets,86 other adverse consequences may flow from the custodian's
wrongful expenditure.87 To the extent that a custodian uses or expends assets
owned by a UTMA account for purposes other than for the benefit of the
minor, the assets may lose their protection from claims of the custodian's
creditors.88 This is true even if the custodian was not the donor of the
UTMA account.89
Any interested person may request a court to order the custodian to
spend additional sums for the minor, and the UTMA account beneficiary
may personally seek such a court order after the beneficiary is fourteen-
years-old. 90 Due to the need for the custodian to expend sums properly from
the account, and the custodian's potential liability for improper spending, the
lack of direction in the statutes about what constitutes proper spending is
particularly distressing. This lack of direction has been recognized by at
least one Florida court.9' The vague standard set forth in the statutes leaves
the custodian exposed to potential liability.
85. Tritter v. Corry, No. 95-1406, 1995 WL 648252, at *2 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1995).
86. See Marshall, 831 F. Supp. at 1006. In that case the court found that the custodian
of a UGMA account created by the custodian's mother for the custodian's minor children
violated her fiduciary duties by failing to account for all monies contributed by donor and by
failing to place them beyond the reach of the custodian's creditors. Id. The lack of proper
records from the custodian to establish that all sums received from donor were properly de-
posited in custodianship accounts and expended for the benefit of the minor beneficiary con-
stituted a breach. Id. The custodian in that case could not prove where certain monies given
to her were deposited and where other monies were spent. Marshall v. United States, 831 F.
Supp. 988, 1005 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); see discussion infra Part VII (discussing breach of fiduci-
ary duties by the custodian).
87. Marshall, 831 F. Supp. at 1002. In Marshall, both the inability of the custodian to
explain how certain contributed funds were spent and the custodian's improper expenditure of
funds for purposes other than the benefit of the minor caused those amounts to be available for
seizure by the custodian's creditor. Id. at 1006.
88. Dubisky v. United States, No. 93C 4505, 1994 WL 861127, at *1 (N.D. 111. Sept. 13,
1994); Marshall, 831 F. Supp. at 1002.
89. Marshall, 831 F. Supp. at 988.
90. § 710.116(1)-(2). This section uses the term interested person, but fails to define it.
See generally id. One might conclude in light of analogous probate law, that this term in-
cludes any person who could be impacted by the outcome of the proceeding. See §
731.201(21).
91. See Irvin v. Seals, 676 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). That case involved a
paternity suit, in which the father of the child admitted paternity. Id. at 437. The child's
mother was a full time student, and the father was a professional football player earning a
substantial income of over $800,000.00 annually. Id. The court ordered the father to pay
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A related concern is when and whether the custodian should distribute
property in a UTMA account to the minor beneficiary prior to the time man-
dated by statute.92 The Florida Statutes allow the custodian to do so when-
ever the custodian considers distribution advisable for the use and benefit of
the minor beneficiary.93 Courts have opined that, as a custodianship account
has only one beneficiary, it is unlikely that a custodian would be restrained
from distributing all custodianship property early.94 This may lead a grantor
to question what assurance he really has that the assets will be preserved and
protected for the minor before the beneficiary attains the age of majority.
VII. SELECTION OF CUSTODIAN AND SUCCESSOR
The applicable statute requires a custodian to be named for a UTMA
account to be created.95 The custodian named may be the transferor or an-
other qualified person.96 Care should be exercised in selecting the initial
custodian and alternates. The custodian has legal obligations and needs to
carefully guard the account against the wrongdoing of others. 97 Unantici-
pated complications may arise if the transferor is the custodian or if the ini-
tial custodian nominated becomes unable to serve.
A transferor creating a UTMA account will frequently desire to be the
custodian and to retain control over investments in the account, perhaps for
lack of other trustworthy persons to nominate, in an effort to regulate spend-
child support. Id. However, as the court found that only part of the sum paid monthly would
be needed for the current support of the child, the excess was directed to be deposited in a
UTMA account. Id. Judge Parker expressed discomfort with the absence of statutory guid-
ance about, among other things, how the account would be administered, expended, and dis-
tributed. Irvin, 676 So. 2d at 437.
92. See § 710.116(1).
93. Id.
94. Stuit v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 580, 583 (1970).
95. § 710.104.
96. §§ 710.104, .11 (1)(a)(1). Any adult or trust company may be the designated custo-
dian when the creator of the account names the custodian. § 710.111(1)(a)(1).
97. Others, including the creator of the account, may improperly attempt to secure con-
trol of assets in the account. In Snow v. Byron, a husband created a UTMA account for his
wife's son born of a prior marriage and named his wife as custodian. 580 So. 2d 238, 239
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). After dissolution of their marriage, the former husband tried to
get UTMA assets. Id. To accomplish this, the husband closed the account by forging his
former wife's signature. Id. After the wrongdoing was discovered, and the wrongdoer-former
husband had used all funds from the UTMA account for his own personal purposes, the custo-
dian sued the brokerage firm in which the account was invested for breach of contract. Id. at
239-40. Since the opening of a UTMA account entails a contract between the financial insti-
tution and the custodian, an action for breach of contract may arise when the financial institu-
tion allows someone other than the custodian to withdraw sums from the account. Id. at 240.
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ing from the account or due to other motivations.9" Although ownership of
the account assets is by law vested in the minor beneficiary once the account
is created and funded, the account may, as a practical matter, remain subject
to seizure by.the transferor's creditors if the transferor is also the custodian.99
In one case where a transferor created a UTMA account in Florida for her
daughter and the transferor was the custodian, the UTMA account was there-
after seized by the Internal Revenue Service to pay deficiencies in the trans-
feror's income taxes.1 00 The transferee was deemed to be merely a nominee
for the transferor-custodian.' 0 ' The possibility of such an outcome resulting
may be diminished (although not eliminated) if the transferor providing the
funding for the account is not the custodian." 2 Furthermore, adverse estate
tax consequences may follow to the donor's estate if the transferor is the
custodian.103
Adverse consequences may result from the failure to account for future
circumstances and from the transferor's failure to select a sufficient number
of alternate custodians.'" The Florida Statutes expressly allow the transferor
to name not only an initial custodian, but also alternates to serve if the initial
custodian becomes unable or unwilling to serve. 105 Florida law only allows
one custodian to serve at a time.0 6 While there is admittedly no guaranty
that any one of multiple successor custodians will remain willing and able to
98. See e.g. Marshall v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 988 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that
the custodian misappropriated some of the funds).
99. See Ryiz v. First Bankers, N.A., 516 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987); see
also Dubinsky v. United States, No. 93C 4505, 1994 WL 861127, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13,
1994).
100. Ryiz, 516 So. 2d at 1069-70. The I.R.S. levied on the UTMA account. Id. Nor-
mally, a defense to such a levy could have been that the bank was not in possession of funds
belonging to the taxpayer-custodian, as she was not the account owner. Id. at 1071. The
minor beneficiary was the owner of the account. Id. at 1070. However, in this case the I.R.S.
levy served named the child as nominee for the parent-custodian-taxpayer. Id.
101. Ryiz, 516So. 2dat 1070.
102. See Marshall, 831 F. Supp. at 988. In that case a grandmother gave cash to her
grandchildren which was deposited in UGMA accounts. Id. at 993. The mother of the minor
grandchildren was the custodian. Marshall v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 988, 997 (E.D.N.Y.
1993). The custodian and her spouse owed substantial income taxes. Id. at 996. The income
tax liability arose after the grandmother made some gifts, but before she made other. Id. at
993. The court held the I.R.S. was entitled to levy on
a portion of the UGMA account assets. Id. at 1003.
103. See discussion infra Part XII (discussing tax consequences); see also Exch. Bank &
Trust Co. of Fla. v. United States, 694 F. 2d. 1261, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
104. See § 710.104(1) (providing for substitute custodians in the event the first named
custodian dies before the transfer, among other circumstances).
105. Id.
106. § 710.112.
2004]
292
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/1
NOVA LA WREVIEW
serve in the future, designation of alternates at the outset is wise. If the one
or more persons named as the custodian or substitute custodian die or cease
serving as custodian of a UTMA account, prior to the time set for distribu-
tion of assets to the beneficiary, and no successor custodian was named, the
statutes allow replacement of the custodian without court action in only lim-
ited circumstances. 
107
Where the transferor is alive or in existence (in the case of transfers
from estates or trusts), if all persons designated custodian become unwilling
or unable to serve, or continue to serve in this capacity, the transferor may
designate a substitute custodian,0'0 and no disruption to the account should
occur. If the transferor is deceased, or the transferor entity no longer exists,
this is not an option. 1"9 Court action may then be required to designate a
successor custodian. 10
If the initial custodian named declines to serve at the time of creation of
the UTMA account, statute provides that the transferor or the transferor's
legal representative may designate a new custodian.111 The term "legal rep-
resentative" for this purpose is narrow, and includes only the transferor's
personal representative or conservator.'12  Since this provision allowing a
personal representative to act applies only on creation of the account, it ap-
plies solely to UTMA accounts created in wills. If a transferor attempts to
create an inter vivos UTMA account and thereafter becomes incompetent or
dies, and the initially named custodian declines to serve and there are no
willing alternates, no other person is authorized to name a substitute custo-
dian to cause the account to be effectively established.
Statute also allows one who is serving as custodian to name his or her
own successor; provided that the transferor may not be named in this fash-
ion."' Where the transferor neglected to name alternate custodians, the act-
ing custodian should consider promptly doing so to avoid the problems dis-
cussed below which result when no successor is named. This is true even if
the acting custodian does not intend to immediately resign, as the designation
of substitute may be effective on the death, resignation or incapacity of the
acting custodian.' 
14
107. § 710.121(4).
108. § 710.121(1).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. § 710.102(9).
113. § 710.121(2).
114. Id.
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If there is no custodian serving at any time, due to death, disability, re-
moval, or resignation of the custodian, and no successor nominated by the
transferor or the acting custodian is available, or if the transferor and the last
serving custodian are deceased or incompetent and hence unable to appoint a
successor custodian, whether court action will be required depends, in part,
on the age and actions of the minor beneficiary." 5 If the beneficiary is at
least fourteen years old, the beneficiary may name a successor custodian." 6
The successor custodian must be an adult member of the minor's family, a
conservator, or a trust company.' 7 This is a much more limited group of
eligible custodians compared to the options initially available to the creator
of the UTMA account. The minor has up to sixty days after a vacancy exists
in the office of custodian to act." 8
Should the minor beneficiary fail to timely name a new custodian as de-
scribed above, or if the minor is not fourteen and hence is ineligible to do so,
court appointment of a custodian is needed.' If there is already a conserva-
tor in place for the minor, that conservator becomes the custodian of the
UTMA account.12
0
Court action to seek appointment of a successor custodian may be insti-
tuted by any interested person, the transferor,' 2 1 the transferor's legal repre-
sentative, the custodian's legal representative, or an adult member of the
minor's family. 2 2  Where court action is needed to replace a custodian, a
separate action must be instituted for each separate UTMA account created
by a transferor for a different beneficiary. 123 In light of the potential need for
court action to appoint a custodian and the costs of such court action, care
115. §710.121(4).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. § 710.121(4)-(6).
120. § 710.121(4).
121. Id. Although the transferor has the right to institute suit for appointment of a custo-
dian, it is difficult to understand why such action would be warranted. Section 710.104(1) of
the Florida Statutes allows the transferor to name successive custodians. Unless this statute is
interpreted to afford transferor this right only on inception or creation of the UTMA account,
since the statute says that the designation is revocable, the transferor should have a continuing
fight and should not have to resort to court action to nominate a successor when no custodian
is serving. See § 710.104(1).
122. § 710.121(4),(6).
123. See § 710.112. If there are several different UTMA accounts for one beneficiary at
different financial institutions held by one custodian, only one court proceeding should be
needed. Id. Section 710.112 of the Florida Statutes provides that "[aIll custodial property
held under this act by the same custodian for the benefit of the same minor constitutes a single
custodianship." Id.
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should be exercised to assure that alternates are named at all times, and the
likelihood of court action is diminished.
The investments contributed to the UTMA account initially, and the in-
vestments the UTMA account is expected to own in the future, may impact
who is an appropriate custodian. For example, a custodian, who is a director
of a publicly traded company, has certain disclosure and reporting require-
ments to satisfy if he owns stock in a company of which he is a director in a
UTMA account. 1
24
It is also wise to select a solvent, fiscally responsible, diligent person,
who is adept at proper record keeping as the initial custodian. The same
characteristics should be sought in a successor custodian. If not, harm may
occur to the UTMA account if the custodian is indebted and his creditors
seek to recover from the UTMA account.'25 Other problems can arise if
proper records and documentation are not maintained to establish that the
account was properly created, that assets were at all times properly titled in
the custodianship, and that investments and expenditures were in accordance
with the statute. The need for proper record keeping for all custodianship
transactions should be emphasized.
VIII. LIABILITY OF CUSTODIAN
The two major ways in which a custodian of a UTMA account is sub-
ject to liability include: 1) failure to properly spend account assets; and 2)
failure to properly title, account for, protect, preserve, and invest account
assets. 126 As noted previously, a custodian is not given adequate instruction
in the statutes in respect to expending funds from the UTMA account. 27
Custodians are given discretion with respect to management and investment
of UTMA account assets.1
28
The custodian must invest as a reasonable prudent person. 9 The cus-
todian is not generally held to the same standards with respect to investments
124. SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 291 F. Supp. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). That case
involved a director of three publicly traded corporations who traded in stock of those corpora-
tions through Idaho UGMA accounts he created for his minor children, and of which he
served as custodian. Id. Because the beneficiaries of the UGMA accounts were the custo-
dian's immediate family members, he was required to report the purchases and sales. Id.
Legal action ensued against him when he neglected to report these and other stock transac-
tions. Id. at 125.
125. See discussion infra Part VIII.
126. § 710.114.
127. See discussion infra Part VI.
128. §710.114.
129. Id.
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as a trustee.13° Whether the custodian invests prudently is a separate issue
from whether the custodian acts for the benefit of the minor.'3' Unlike other
fiduciaries, the custodian may merely retain assets contributed to the account
by the transferor.132 Hence, the custodian does not appear to have the same
obligation as a trustee or other fiduciary to diversify investments. Where the
custodian has special expertise, such skill must be used for the benefit of the
minor.'33 The UTMA account must be segregated from all other property
owned or held, individually or in a fiduciary capacity, by the custodian.1
34
The custodian must maintain adequate records of all account assets and
transactions.1
35
The custodian is subjected to liability, both to third parties and the mi-
nor. In the event of suit, UTMA account assets may be at risk, and the cus-
todian may be personally liable.'36 The first potential liability considered is
to third parties other than the minor beneficiary.13 1 Where liability to a third
party arises under a contract entered by the custodian in relation to the custo-
dianship, such as an obligation arising from the ownership of custodial prop-
erty or a tort committed by the minor or the custodian during the course of
the custodianship, the third party may recover judgment out of the custodian-
ship assets. 38 In addition, recovery may be available against the custodian
and/or the minor personally. "
Generally, assets in the custodianship account cannot be reached to pay
personal debts of the custodian.' Where an attempt is made by a creditor of
130. See Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Colo. 1989). The court analyzed the
standard of care applicable to a custodian of a Colorado UTMA account, and held that the
custodian was liable for damages resulting from breach of fiduciary duties when he invested
about half of the monies in penny stocks and lost considerable sums. Id. at 1390. Damages
awarded included decline in value of investments, lost income, and attorneys' fees. Id.
131. Marshall v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 988, 1003 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Two separate
inquiries may be needed when the custodian's action is questioned. Id. The first inquiry
questions whether the investment was for the benefit of the minor. Id. The second inquiry is
whether the investment was prudent. Id. Where an investment might be prudent but not be
for the benefit of the minor, the converse is not true. Id.
132. § 710.114(2).
133. Id.
134. § 710.114(4).
135. § 710.114(5).
136. See § 710.119(1)(a)-(c).
137. Id.
138. § 710.119()(a).
139. § 710.119(1)(c).
140. See Friedman v. Mayeroff, 592 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (Civ. Ct. 1992). In that case a
parent served as custodian of bank accounts for her minor children. Id. at 910. After the
accounts were created, the parents of the minor children were sued in a landlord-tenant action,
and a judgment was entered against them. Id. The court held that the judgment creditor could
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the custodian to collect a debt from UTMA assets, the custodian must be
careful to promptly take correct legal steps if seizure of the UTMA assets is
to be avoided. In one case a grantor created a UTMA account for the benefit
of her minor daughter. 14' Grantor named herself the custodian of the ac-
count.1 42 The Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.") determined that the gran-
tor/custodian personally owed delinquent taxes, and levied on the UTMA
account. 43 The financial institution in which the account was invested hon-
ored the levy, despite the custodian's objection.1 44 When the custodian sued
the financial institution in state court for wrongfully honoring the levy, the
action was dismissed. 45 The appellate court based its conclusion on the cus-
todian's failure to follow proper procedures to prevent enforcement of the
levy, which required the custodian to institute suit against the government. 146
The Broward County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute.' 47
The custodian's failure to take proper legal action in a timely manner re-
sulted in the loss of the UTMA assets. 148
At times custodianship assets may be subject to seizure by the creditor
of a custodian, where the underlying liability owed by the custodian person-
ally to the creditor had nothing to do with the UTMA account, and where the
custodian was not the donor of the account. 149 Where a custodian's creditor
attempts to reach assets in a UTMA account to satisfy the custodian's per-
sonal debt, the court faces a dilemma. 5 ° While the court does not wish to
deprive the innocent minor of funds, it also does not wish to afford debtors
an opportunity to deal with assets as if the debtor personally owned them, yet
allow the debtor to shield the assets from the debtor's creditors.' 5
not recover sums due from the custodial accounts, as the minor, rather than the custodian, was
the true owner of the account assets. Id. at 912.
141. Ryiz v. First Bankers, N.A., 516 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Ryiz, 916 So. 2d at 1071.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 1070-71; see also Marshall v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 988, 997-1001
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (explaining the proper procedure to be followed by the custodian when the
I.R.S. levies a UTMA account assets is to collect a tax liability of someone other than the
beneficiary of the account).
149. See Marshall, 831 F. Supp. at 1003.
150. Id.
151. Id. In Marshall, the court recognized this dilemma stating:
If a court condones a delinquent taxpayer's or debtor's use of UGMA custodial funds then the
court creates a means by which a delinquent taxpayer or debtor can improperly shield assets
from the I.R.S. or a creditor and at the same time permit the delinquent taxpayer or debtor to
use those funds as if he/she owned them. On the other hand, if the court fails to honor the
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Where a custodian's creditor attempts to reach the funds to satisfy the
custodian's personal debt, the court may look at various factors as persua-
sive.'52 These include: whether the donor is also the custodian of the ac-
count or if the donor is not the custodian then whether the custodian is a fam-
ily member of donor; whether the donor or the custodian owes the debt for
which collection is sought;5 3 whether the custodian converted funds in the
account for his or her personal use; 54 and other "family circumstances."' 55
Even where the custodian is the debtor, and the separate donor is not in-
debted to the creditor, a creditor of the custodian may be permitted to seize
custodianship assets because the custodian wrongly previously converted
them to the custodian's own personal use.'56 Once the conversion occurs, the
funds are no longer being held for the benefit of the minor. 157
Similarly, where a UTMA account is initially established to defraud do-
nor's creditors and to prevent them from recovering debts owed by the cus-
todian/donor, the assets in the custodianship account will not be protected by
the custodian's creditors. 5 '
There are also situations in which the creation and existence of UTMA
accounts may cause them to be involved in or a subject of litigation, necessi-
tating defensive action by the custodian, although no one is yet attempting to
seize the accounts themselves. In various litigations and contexts an issue
may be raised about whether the custodian holds the assets in the account
UGMA arrangement it will deprive the minor of property intended as a gift under the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act.
Id.
152. Id.
153. Marshall, 831 F. Supp. at 1003. The court favored limiting the creditor's ability to
collect when the custodian is the debtor, but was not the donor, and neither the donor nor the
minor beneficiary were indebted. Id. In contrast, creditors would be afforded more generous
rights where the donor and the custodian are the same person, and it is this individual who is
indebted. Id.
154. Id. at 1003-04.
155. Id. at 1003.
156. Marshall, 831 F. Supp. at 1003-04.
157. Id. By converting the funds to the custodian's own personal use, they are placed
beyond the reach of the minor. Id. at 1004. A rebuttable presumption may arise that such
action was taken to preclude creditors from collecting. Id. The custodian is entitled to rebut
the presumption, by establishing that the action was inadvertent or negligent, and perhaps
preclude the creditor reaching the funds. Id.
158. Friedman v. Mayeroff, 592 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (Civ. Ct. 1992); see also Hall v.
United States, 71 A.F.T.R.2d 93-360 (N.D. Ga. 1992). In Hall, a father owed payroll taxes.
Id. To avoid collection by the I.R.S., he transferred funds to his wife as custodian for their
minor child. Id. at 93-362. The I.R.S. was successful in levying on the custodianship ac-
counts. Id. at 93-364; see also Dubisky v. United States, No. 93C 4505, 1994 WL 861127, at
*1 (N.D. I11. Sept. 13, 1994).
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solely in a fiduciary capacity, or whether the custodian personally has rights
to account assets.159
The second potential liability of the custodian is to the minor for a
breach of fiduciary duties. 6 ' One duty of the custodian is to protect the
UTMA assets. 16' The increased variety of assets which may be titled in
UTMA fashion increases the risks and need for vigilance. If others wrongly
obtain custodianship assets, the custodian has a duty to attempt to recover
those assets from the wrongdoer or a third party. 162 Custodians who received
or made proper investments have needed to institute law suits to protect
UTMA assets in complicated transactions resulting in litigations. 63 The fact
159. See Estate of Cardulla v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1511 (1986) (involving a
dispute about whether decedent and his wife owed income taxes). One issue concerned
whether numerous UGMA accounts the taxpayers created for their minor grandchildren, of
which one taxpayer served as custodian, were assets owned by the taxpayers for purposes of
determining their net worth. Id. at 1515. As the UGMA accounts were opened in compliance
with the New York UGMA, the court held that these were not personal assets of the custodi-
ans and not included in their net worth. Id. at 1521.
160. See Snow v. Byron, 580 So. 2d 238, 240 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
161. See generally id.
162. Id. at 238. The custodian's spouse had created and funded a UTMA account for the
custodian's son. Id. at 239. The parties separated and before their marriage was dissolved,
the creator of the account forged the custodian's signature to recover the account assets for
himself. Id. When the custodian discovered the wrongdoing, she sued the brokerage firm in
which the UTMA account was invested for breach of contract, and sued the bank in which the
wrongdoing grantor deposited the account proceeds by forging the custodian's endorsement.
Snow, 580 So. 2d at 240. Financial institutions are not liable for the improper titling of assets
in a custodianship name or for the improper withdrawal and expenditure by the custodian. Id.
at 243. In Gale v. Harbor Federal Savings & Loan, 571 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990), a guardian titled assets owned by a minor in a custodianship account rather than a
guardianship. The guardian was the minor beneficiary's mother. Id. When it was discovered
that the guardian dissipated the UGMA account for her personal benefit, she was removed as
guardian. Id. The successor guardian unsuccessfully sued the financial institution in which
the UGMA account had been maintained, in an effort to recover the monies lost. Id. Because
the court had not ordered a restricted account in the guardianship, the financial institution was
not liable for the mother's breach of fiduciary duties. Id.
163. See Simon v. New Haven Bd. & Carton Co., 393 F. Supp. 139 (D. Conn. 1974). In
that case, the plaintiff was a custodian of stock under the New York UGMA. Id. When the
corporation whose stock the custodian held became involved in a questionable merger with
several Florida corporations, the custodian instituted a stockholder's derivative suit. Id. at
140.; see also Kahn v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 760 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (custodians
instituted an action for RICO violations against a brokerage firm, its employees and counsel
arising from allegedly fraudulent securities transactions); Rabinowitz v. Cont'l-Wirt Elecs.
Corp., No. 86-1537, 1987 WL 14687, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 1987) (involving disputes
about a stockholders agreement where some shares in the closely held corporation were held
in an UGMA account); Goldstein v. Rusco Indus., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(mother commenced an action as custodian of her son's UGMA account for alleged federal
securities laws violations by a company whose stock was owned in the UGMA account).
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that stock, or other assets, involved in the lawsuits is owned by a UTMA
account frequently has no legal impact on the lawsuit. The point is that by
virtue of asset ownership, the custodian may become involved in litigation."
Cases exist nationwide in which custodians are instituting or otherwise be-
coming parties to suits in connection with the purchase or ownership of secu-
rities in UTMA accounts or the actions of the publicly traded companies
whose stock is owned by UTMA accounts. 65 Institution of, or participation
in these lawsuits by the custodian may be necessary for the custodian to
avoid liability to the beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duties.'66 The custo-
dian may be made a defendant in such a lawsuit.'6 7
One issue which may arise in such litigation is which court has jurisdic-
tion, particularly where the custodian and the asset are located in one state,
but the minor beneficiary resides in another state.'68 While in other contexts,
courts frequently distinguish a custodianship from a trust, in deciding juris-
dictional issues, the court may analogize a custodianship to a trust. 69 Where
a custodian attempted to establish diversity jurisdiction in federal court based
on the minor beneficiary's state of residence, the court determined that it was
the custodian's residence which controlled. 7 ° For this purpose, the court
164. See generally Snow v. Byron, 580 So. 2d 238, 239-40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
165. See Kyung Sup. Ahn M.C., P.C. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 624 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (involving suit against an introducing broker for fraud, in which issues were raised
about whether arbitration was compulsory); A.P.N. Holdings Corp. v. Hart, 615 F. Supp. 1465
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (involving suit by purchasers of stock in an insurance company against sell-
ers of the stock for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and other actions); Johnson &
Staley, Inc. v. Bushan & Levy, P.C., 527 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
166. Knowledge of both the creator of a UTMA account and a custodian about the poten-
tial for lawsuits, may influence decisions about what is a proper asset to contribute to a
UTMA account and whether investments should be made or retained in a UTMA account.
167. See Johnson & Staley, Inc., 527 F. Supp. at 1159.
168. See Von Ritter v. Columbia County Sheriffs Dept., No. 91-CV-612, 1992 WL
175535, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 21, 1992).
169. Id.
170. Id. at *2. A Connecticut UGMA account had been created, under statutes which
provided that legal title to custodianship property was vested in the minor beneficiary. Id. at
* 1. The court stated:
The fact that the beneficiary has indefeasibly vested legal title to the custodial property does
not mean that his title is exclusive or absolute .... [T]he beneficiary is not entitled to have all
of the custodial property released to him until he attains the age of 21. Certainly, therefore, the
beneficiary's title is not absolute. What has been created here is a trust, albeit under a different
name, and the creation of a trust entails the separation of legal and equitable title, and the vest-
ing of legal title in the trustee (custodian).
Id. (citations omitted); see also Thompson v. Sundholm, 726 F. Supp. 147 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
In that case, the plaintiff attempted unsuccessfully to establish diversity jurisdiction premised
on alleged creation of Texas UGMA transfers. Id. at 149. The court held that the plaintiff's
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viewed the custodian as similar to a trustee, and ruled it was the custodian's
residence which was relevant to determining whether diversity jurisdiction
existed.'17
Custodians are, and should be, liable for their improper use of UTMA
assets. Actions have been instituted against custodians for their failure to
account for UTMA assets, improper transfer of UTMA assets into their
names individually, and fraudulent transfer of UTMA assets into the names
of persons other than the minor beneficiary of the account. 72 A custodian is
liable to the minor beneficiary for using funds in the custodianship account
for personal living expenses of the custodian. 73 Such action gives rise to a
debt owed by the custodian to the minor which is not dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy.
174
actions in endorsing a check as payable to two named minors did not comply with Texas
statutory requirements to create a UGMA account. Id. at 150.
171. See generally Von Ritter, 1992 WL 175535, at *1.
172. See Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47 (3d Cir. 1996). In Elliott, prior to his death, a
wealthy father placed his assets in the name of his son, an attorney with a masters in tax law.
Id. at 51. Assets were owned by the son, individually and as custodian for his father's minor
grandchildren. Id. The understanding was that the son would manage the father's wealth for
the benefit of all family members. Id. The son thereafter misappropriated assets and trans-
ferred some of them into his wife's name. Id. at 50. Decedent's other children, for them-
selves and as natural guardians of their minor children, instituted actions for accounting,
breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, unjust enrichment, and violations of the UGMA. Elliott, 98
F.3d at 50. The action was commenced against the son with respect to assets in UGMA ac-
counts and other assets the son held in a fiduciary capacity. Id.
173. See In re Johns, 181 B.R. 965 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1995). In this case, the father estab-
lished UGMA accounts for his minor son, both before and after the father's divorce from the
son's mother. Id. at 967. The father was the custodian of the accounts. Id. Thereafter, the
father withdrew most of the funds in the accounts and spent them for his own benefit. Id.
When the son sought to collect the monies and have the debt owed to him declared nondis-
chargeable in the father's bankruptcy, the father unsuccessfully presented two arguments. Id.
at 969-72. First, the father claimed that Arizona's repeal of UGMA and replacing it with
UTMA somehow canceled UGMA accounts opened prior to the repeal. Johns, 181 B.R. at
972. Second, the father asserted that he only intended the UGMA accounts to be used for the
son's college education, and the son's failure to attend college justified the father's use of
account assets for himself. Id. at 969. The court rejected both arguments. Id. at 969-72.
174. Id. at 975; see also In re Merrill, 246 B.R. 906, 912 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2000) (in-
volving a parent who established a UTMA account in Oklahoma for his minor child, and
thereafter withdrew sums from the account to invest in an oil and gas venture in the father's
name as trustee of another trust). Despite the fact that the funds allegedly initially came from
this other trust, once they were placed in a UTMA account, an irrevocable transfer occurred
which could not be changed. id. at 913. The UTMA statutes, not any separate trust agree-
ment, controlled the ownership, management, investment, and distribution of the funds there-
after. Id. The court further ruled that when a fiduciary, including a custodian of a UTMA
account, breaches a duty imposed by law, the debt that thereby arises is a defalcation which is
not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Id. at 922. A failure to account for funds in a UTMA ac-
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However, where the custodian unwittingly makes unwise investments
of UTMA account assets, the custodian may need to defend her decisions
and even litigate to retain the benefits of them for the minor beneficiary. In
one instance a donor created UGMA accounts in Colorado for her minor
children.'75 She then invested the accounts in what was later disclosed to be
an unlawful Ponzi scheme. 76 Before the discovery was made and before the
entities operating the scheme went bankrupt, the custodian received a return
well in excess of her investment. 177 Once the partnerships filed bankruptcy,
the bankruptcy trustee unsuccessfully attempted to recover the profit from
the custodian.
178
A custodian may be liable to the beneficiary for breaches of other du-
ties. 179 Another duty of a custodian is to segregate the UTMA assets from
other wealth owned by the custodian either personally or in another fiduciary
capacity."' Fulfillment of this duty can be particularly important when the
person serving as custodian owes debts unconnected with the custodianship
or files personal bankruptcy.' 8' Others may also be penalized for wrongful
conduct of a custodian with reference to a minor's funds. 82
count constitutes such a breach. Id.; see also Merrill v. Merrill, No. 00-5201, 2001 WL
909157, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 13, 2001). Actions of a custodian of an Oklahoma UTMA
account were not dischargeable in bankruptcy as the actions constituted "fraud or defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity." Merrill, 246 B.R. at 919 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)
(2003)); accord Tritter v. Corry, 69 F. 3d 531 (1st Cir. 1995).
175. In re Hedged-lnvs. Assoc., Inc., 84 F. 3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1996).
176. Id. at 1282.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1283.
179. See generally In re Dally, 202 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1996).
180. Id.
181. Id. In re Dally, a mother opened and funded UGMA accounts under Illinois law. Id.
at 726. She also served as custodian of the accounts. Id. Thereafter, she personally took a
bank loan from the bank at which the UGMA accounts were invested. Dally, 202 B.R. at 726.
The UGMA accounts were pledged by the custodian as collateral for the bank loan, and the
custodianship nature of the accounts was fully disclosed to the bank in the loan security
documents. Id. When the loan was not paid, the bank obtained a judgment against the debtor,
after which she filed personal bankruptcy. Id. The court held that the debtor claimed no per-
sonal interest in the UGMA accounts and that they were not part of the bankrupt's estate. Id.
at 728. However, the court recognized that a controversy existed concerning whether the
minor children or the bank-creditor had better right to the UGMA accounts, as they were
pledged as collateral for the loan. Id. at 727. The court ruled that the Bankruptcy Court
lacked jurisdiction over that issue. Dally, 202 B.R. at 728.
182. See Warren v. SEC, No. 94-9534, 1995 WL 640359, at *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 23, 1995)
(involving a stock broker who was suspended and fined for failing to open custodianship
accounts, when he knew the owners of the investment were minors, and knew his employer
required opening UGMA accounts). Instead, he put false ages of the owners on the accounts,
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IX. REMOVAL OF CUSTODIAN
While the Florida Statutes address removal of trustees183 and provide
grounds for removal of personal representatives, 84 no statute exists setting
forth grounds for removal of a custodian. Section 710.121 of the Florida
Statutes references removal of a custodian in its caption, and identifies who
has standing to seek removal of a custodian. 85 What constitutes cause for
removal is not specified by statute. Breach of the custodian's fiduciary du-
ties should constitute ground for removal. Clients should be informed of the
uncertainty in the law regarding the basis and procedures for seeking re-
moval of a custodian.
X. RELOCATION OF UTMA ACCOUNTS
For a UTMA account to be initially created in Florida, the transferor,
the minor, or the custodian must be a Florida resident. 86 If a UTMA account
is initially created in another jurisdiction, the account may be moved to Flor-
ida.'87 If it was created under a similar law, its terms may be enforced in
Florida. 88 If the account was initially established in another jurisdiction in
which the statutes governing UTMA accounts differ from those in Florida,
the account remains subject to the statutes under which it was initially cre-
ated. 89 A practical problem which arises is whether the brokerage firms,
banks, or other financial institutions in Florida to which the account is trans-
ferred, note the differences or adhere to the applicable foreign law. How-
ever, other issues exist. To illustrate, as the standard of care to which a cus-
todian is held in investing assets may differ from one state to another, confu-
and allowed the parent of the minors to liquidate assets, withdraw sums from the accounts,
and trade on margin, without the parent having legal authority to do so. Id
183. §§ 737.201(1)(a), 737.205. Section 737.201(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes grants the
circuit court jurisdiction in actions to remove a trustee, and section 737.205 of the Florida
Statutes governs institution of such proceedings.
184. Sections 733.504 and 733.505 of the Florida Statutes grant the circuit court in the
pending probate jurisdiction in the removal action, and section 733.506 governs institution of
such proceedings. Florida Probate Rule 5.440 provides further procedures applicable to
removal of a personal representative.
185. The creator of the UTMA account, his or her legal representative, an adult member of
the minor beneficiary's family, the guardian or conservator of the minor beneficiary, or the
minor beneficiary if he or she is over the age fourteen, may institute suit to remove and re-
place a custodian. § 710.12 1.
186. § 710.103(1); 28 FLA. JUR. 2D Gifts § 24 (1998).
187. § 710.103(3).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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sion may occur if attention is not paid to the standard set by the state of the
account's creation after the account is moved to a new state. In addition,
some states preclude or limit spending from UTMA accounts to discharge a
parental obligation of support when the minor beneficiary's parents have
sufficient assets to meet these obligations, while other states do not. Care
must be taken to assure that, if a UTMA account is relocated, the laws appli-
cable in the state of its creation are still applied adhered to and to the ac-
count.
If a UTMA account is initially established in Florida, although the mi-
nor beneficiary and the custodian thereafter leave the state and move the
account to another state, Florida law states the custodianship will survive.19 °
When a UTMA account is relocated to another state, the custodian remains
subject to personal jurisdiction in the state in which the account was cre-
ated.1 91
XI. TERMINATION OF CUSTODIANSHIP
Just as questions may arise about whether a transfer under UTMA was
intended and in fact occurred, issues may arise concerning whether the cus-
todianship assets were distributed and the custodianship was terminated.' 92
Florida Statutes are silent about the procedures for terminating a UTMA
account, the documents to be executed, and what constitutes termination. In
another state, where a grandmother purchased stock and titled it in her name
as custodian for her minor grandchildren; forwarded all original stock certifi-
cates she received to the grandchild's parent; endorsed and forwarded divi-
dend checks to the grandchild's parent; and forwarded stock dividends to the
grandchild's parent until shortly before the grantor's death when she was too
ill to forward documents; the court held that the grantor manifested an intent
to relinquish all of her rights as custodian during her life. 93
To avoid such complications and the litigation they generate, when a
custodian resigns or intends to distribute custodianship assets, it is advisable
for the assets to be promptly retitled and a clear written record created.
190. James R. Ledwith & Mary Ann Robinson, Expanded Opportunities Available Under
Unifonn Transfers To Minors Act, 13 EST. PLAN. 258, 260 (1986).
191. Id.
192. Estate of Vogel v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 875 (1977).
193. Id. at 876-77. That case involved Minnesota UGMA accounts for a minor benefici-
ary residing in Oklahoma. Id. at 876. The Minnesota UCC allowed a transfer by gift of a
security to be completed on delivery without endorsement by the donor. Id.
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XII. TAx CONCERNS
There are income tax, estate tax, and gift tax consequences to creation
and ownership of UTMA accounts. The grantor of a UTMA account is fre-
quently attempting to diminish his or her taxable estate by making annual tax
free transfers for younger family members to UTMA accounts. Thus, the
first concern becomes whether the transfers to the UTMA accounts are free
of gift tax. A transfer of assets to a UTMA account is a completed gift for
federal gift tax purposes. 194 If the transfers to a UTMA account in any given
year per grantor do not exceed the $10,000.00 limit, transfers may qualify for
the annual gift tax exclusion under section 2503 of the Internal Revenue
Code.195 The value of the gift is the fair market value of the asset transferred
to the UTMA account at the time of the transfer.' 96 However, the fact that a
transfer to a UTMA account is a completed gift for federal gift tax purposes
does not mean that the UTMA account assets are excluded from the taxable
estate of grantor. 197
The fact that a completed gift has occurred for federal tax purposes also
does not mean that there are no income tax consequences flowing from the
194. Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 C.B. 212. A bona fide transfer with economic substance
must have occurred for the creation of a custodianship arrangement to be recognized for fed-
eral income tax purposes. Duarte v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 193, 197 (1965). In that case the
taxpayer was the sole owner of all stock in a corporation. Id. at 193. He issued stock certifi-
cates reflecting that he transferred half of his stock to his spouse as custodian for his two
minor sons. Id. at 194. Taxpayer filed a federal gift tax return reflecting the transfers, al-
though no gift tax was due. Id. at 195. He then made an S election for the corporation, and
otherwise continued to solely operate the corporation's business. Id. However, he reported
one-fourth of the profits as income to each of his minor sons, despite the fact that no distribu-
tions were ever made. Duarte, 44 T.C. at 195. The court determined that the purported trans-
fers lacked economic reality. Id. at 196. As such, donor owed income tax on all profits of the
corporation. Id.; see also Beime v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 210, 220 (1969).
195. Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-C.B.212. If the value of assets transferred to the UTMA
account results in the payment of gift tax, and the UTMA account is included in donor's tax-
able estate, section 2012 of the Internal Revenue Code may allow a credit for gift tax paid
against federal estate tax owed by a donor's estate. Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 C.B. 212.
196. Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956-1 C.B. 449.
197. See, e.g., Ritter v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 n.l (S.D. W. Va. 1968)
(citing Estate of Varian v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 34 (1966)). This case involved a grantor
who created irrevocable inter vivos trusts for his minor children, of which he was the trustee,
rather than UTMA accounts. Id. at 1260. However, grantor retained for himself trustee pow-
ers and discretions strikingly similar to those a custodian of a UTMA account would have. Id.
at 1262.
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transfer. 98  Once a UTMA account is created and funded, a change in the
custodian is not a taxable event and does not result in a taxable gift.' 99
The next concern is whether the UTMA account is included in the tax-
able estate of grantor or the custodian under sections 2036 or 2038 of the
Internal Revenue Code. Section 2036(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code
generally provides that a decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax pur-
poses includes any assets transferred by decedent, other than transfers for full
and adequate consideration, in which decedent retained the right to determine
alone or with another, who shall possess or enjoy the property gifted or the
income thereon.2 °° Similarly, under section 2038(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code, a decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes includes assets
transferred during life by decedent, other than for full and adequate consid-
eration, if decedent retained the right, alone or with another, "to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate" enjoyment of the asset.20'
If the custodian of the UTMA account is not the grantor or the spouse of
the grantor of the account, then assets in the UTMA account are not gener-
ally included in either the grantor's or the custodian's taxable estate for fed-
eral estate tax purposes. If the grantor serves as custodian of the account, the
balance in the account is included in grantor's gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes.20 2 The broad powers of a custodian to use and spend assets, as
198. Basis issues and assignment of income issues can arise with respect to gifts to UTMA
accounts, just as they arise with other inter vivos gifts. To illustrate, in Peterson Irrevocable
Trust #2 v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1300 (1986), a taxpayer transferred stock in a
corporation by whom he was employed to his wife as custodian for his minor children. Id. at
1301. The transfers were made immediately prior to the sale of the corporation's stock to a
third party, and before the contract for that sale was signed. Id. at 1311-12. The court deter-
mined that at the time of the transfer the taxpayer had reason to know that the stock would
shortly be sold. Id. at 1319. Hence, the taxpayer-transferor was responsible for reporting and
paying income tax on the gain realized on the stock sale. Id. Similarly, where a father was
custodian for his minor children and regularly traded their custodianship brokerage accounts,
the father rather than the children had to report and pay income tax on gains where he trans-
ferred stock to his children after he knew a merger could occur. Estate of Applestein v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 331, 342 (1983). The court stated that:
where the right to income has matured at the time of the transfer, the transferor will be taxed
notwithstanding the technical transfer of the income-producing property. However, the mere
anticipation or expectation of income at the time of the assignment is insufficient to give rise to
a fixed right to earned income.
Id. at 345. The court did not alter its conclusion because the custodian sold the stock to the
children at a bargain price as opposed to gifting it for no consideration. Id. at 346.
199. Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 C.B. 212.
200. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) (2000).
201. § 2038(a)(1).
202. §§ 2036(a)(1), 2038(a)(1). In Revenue Ruling 57-366, 1957-2 C.B. 618, the I.R.S.
analogized the UTMA account to a trust, and stated:
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well as invest and distribute, cause the account assets to be included in a cus-
todian's estate when the custodian is the creator of the account.23 Where the
grantor/custodian is the parent of the minor beneficiary, this conclusion has
been based at times on the fact that UTMA account assets may be expended
to satisfy the custodian's obligation to support the minor beneficiary. 2°' It is
irrelevant that the parent who creates the account and serves as UTMA ac-
count custodian never uses account assets to discharge the parent's legal
support obligation to the minor beneficiary. The mere power to use assets in
this fashion results in inclusion of the entire account balance in the parent-
Where a donor transfers property to himself as trustee and retains the right as trustee to pay the
income and the principal to a designated beneficiary or to withhold enjoyment of the property
from the beneficiary until the beneficiary attains a certain age, the value of the transferred
property is includible in the decedent-trustee's gross estate under section 2038(a)(1) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 as a transfer in respect of which he retained a power to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate. The fact that the beneficiary may have a vested interest in the
property which would pass to his heirs in the event of his death before attaining the specified
age is immaterial. The result is the same where a donor transfers property to himself as custo-
dian pursuant to the provisions of the model custodian act and retains substantially the same
powers....
Id. (citations omitted). In Revenue Ruling 70-348, 1970-2 C.B. 193, the I.R.S. further ruled
that even if powers to alter, amend, revoke or terminate enjoyment of custodianship property
are not retained by the grantor/custodian at his death, the mere possession by grantor of the
custodianship assets causes inclusion in his taxable estate. This rule applies even if the bene-
ficiary of the account has been emancipated by marriage and is no longer a minor for state law
purposes. Eichstedt v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 484, 487 (N.D. Cal. 1972); see also Stuit v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 580, 582 (1970); Estate of Jacoby v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH)
737 (1970). In Estate ofJacoby a grandfather titled shares of stock in a closely held corpora-
tion in his name as custodian for his minor grandchild. Id. All dividends thereafter on the
shares owned in custodianship were deposited in a bank account in the name of the grantor as
custodian for the minor grandchild. Id. at 738. On the grantor's death, the Tax Court held
that both the value of the stock and the UGMA bank account were included in grantor's tax-
able estate under section 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 740. Revenue Ruling 70-
348, 1970-2 C.B. 193 likewise stated that where the donor of assets to a UGMA account was
the successor custodian of the account for his minor children, his wife having been the initial
custodian who resigned, the value of the account was included in the donor's estate at his
death under section 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code.
203. Exch. Bank & Trust Co. of Fla. v. United States, 694 F.2d 1261, 1264 (Fed. Cir.
1982); Estate of Carpousis v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1143, 1146 (1974).
204. See Estate of Chrysler v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 55 (1965), rev'd on other grounds,
361 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966); Estate of Carpousis, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1143. Similarly, in
Estate of Prudowsky v. Commissioner, a father opened UGMA accounts for his three minor
children and titled securities in his name as custodian for his minor children. 55 T.C. 890, 892
(1971). On his death the court held that the custodianship assets were included in his federal
taxable estate. Id. at 895. The court stated that "where one who has a legal obligation of
support transfers property to himself as custodian under a Uniform Gifts to Minors Act... he
thereby retains the power to apply said assets in satisfaction of his legal obligation" to support
the minor beneficiary. Id. at 894. As such, section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
mandates inclusion of custodianship assets in the custodian's taxable estate.
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custodian's estate at the parent's death, when the parent was both grantor and
custodian of the account. °5 Where grantor is the custodian, inclusion of
UTMA assets in grantor's estate may also be based on the custodian's power
to terminate and distribute the assets.206
The same conclusion is reached that the UTMA account assets are in-
cluded in the grantor/custodian's taxable estate where the grantor is not the
beneficiary's parent and has no legal obligation to support the beneficiary. °7
As the custodian of a UTMA account controls when principal and income
are enjoyed by the beneficiary, on the custodian-grantor's death prior to full
distribution of the UTMA account, the value of the account may be included
in the custodian/grantor's taxable estate.2"8
To avoid inclusion in the grantor's estate of UTMA account assets, a
parent might attempt to create UTMA accounts for her children, naming her
spouse as custodian. If only one parent creates a UTMA account for the par-
ties' minor child and names the other parent as custodian, the UTMA ac-
count may escape inclusion in the grantor's estate. However, where both
parents of the minor simultaneously engage in similar transactions, each cre-
ating a UTMA account for the minor child, and each naming the other parent
as custodian, the reciprocal trust doctrine precludes exclusion of the UTMA
account assets from the deceased grantor's estate.0 9 Where such tactics were
205. See Exch. Bank & Trust Co. of Fla., 694 F.2d at 1264; Estate of Carpousis, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1143; Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23.
206. See Estate of Prudowsky, 55 T.C.M (CCH) at 890, in which the grantor/custodian
was the father of the minor beneficiaries of custodianship assets. Because he at all times
retained the power under applicable state law to terminate and distribute assets to the minor
beneficiaries, at his death the custodianship assets were included in his taxable estate under
section 2038(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 893.
207. Stuit v. Commissioner, 54 T.C 580 (1970). In Stuit a grandmother transferred pub-
licly traded stock she owned into her name as custodian for her minor grandchildren. Id.
Under section 2038(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, the value of the stock at her death was
included in her taxable estate, because under the applicable Illinois statute, the custodian at all
times retained the power to distribute UGMA assets to the minor beneficiaries. Id. at 582.
The argument made by the estate, that the UGMA stock should be excluded from the custo-
dian's estate, because she had to act for the minor's benefit, and that constituted an ascertain-
able stand and limiting her distributions, was rejected. Id. at 584.
208. Exch. Bank & Trust Co. of Fla. v. United States, 694 F.2d 1261, 1263 (Fed. Cir.
1982). The court noted that:
the custodian is vested with broad discretionary authority over the assets held. The custodian
may (1) use income or principal for the minor's support, maintenance, education or benefit; (2)
control the timing of the enjoyment of the gift through the power to withhold or advance in-
come and principal; and (3) terminate the relationship by distributing all the assets to the mi-
nor.
Id.
209. Id. The reciprocal trust doctrine allows inclusion in a decedent's estate of assets in an
irrevocable trust, where decedent was not the trustee or beneficiary of the trust, but decedent's
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tried, the court recognized that each parent could just have easily created a
UTMA account of which he or she was the custodian. Had that been done,
upon the death of the grantor-parent while serving as custodian, the UTMA
account value would have been included in the deceased custodian's estate.
There was no reason to alter the estate tax outcome merely because each
grantor named his spouse as custodian rather than himself."' This conclu-
sion follows even if estate tax avoidance was not the factor motivating crea-
tion of the reciprocal UTMA accounts.21' In light of the foregoing, at a
minimum both parents of the minor should not be creating UTMA accounts
for their children on which their spouse is the custodian. A more conserva-
tive approach to avoid adverse estate tax consequences to the parent-grantor
would be to have someone other than the minor beneficiary's parent or the
grantor serve as custodian.
When the grantor/custodian dies, further inquiry may be warranted to
determine if there is a basis for excluding the assets titled in grantor's name
as custodian from grantor's taxable estate. If grantor, during grantor's life,
took action reflecting intent to resign as custodian, relinquish grantor's rights
as custodian, or distribute the custodianship assets to the minor beneficiary,
the custodianship assets may avoid inclusion in grantor's taxable estate.1 2
spouse is a life beneficiary and decedent's issue or other beneficiaries are designated, and
decedent's spouse created an identical trust. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316,
325 (1969). In Estate of Grace, the trusts were interrelated, being part of a mutual scheme or
plan of grantors to benefit each other and the same remainder beneficiaries. Id. The arrange-
ment left the grantors in essentially the same position as they would have been in had they
each created a trust for their own benefit as opposed to their spouse's benefit. Id. The out-
come where irrevocable trusts were created was that the assets in the trust created by decedent
were included in the grantor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. Id.
210. See Exch. Bank & Trust Co. of Fla. 694 F.2d at 1261. A husband and wife both
purchased and inherited real property. Id. at 1262. They formed a corporation of which they
were both shareholders, and then each gifted shares of stock in the closely held corporation to
their spouse as custodian for the couple's minor children. Exch. Bank & Trust Co. of Fla. v.
United States, 694 F.2d 1261, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 1982). The couple repeated these gifts to
UGMA accounts four different times between 1960-1962. Id. When the husband died he was
custodian of UGMA accounts for his two minor children. Id. His surviving spouse was like-
wise custodian of two UGMA accounts for the same minor children. Id. The I.R.S. success-
fully claimed that the UGMA accounts of which decedent was custodian for his minor chil-
dren were included in his taxable gross estate. Id. at 1263.
211. Id. at 1266 n.9. Nor does it matter that each parent funded the UTMA account with
his or her separately owned earned assets. See id. at 1266.
212. Estate of Vogel v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 875, 877-78 (1977). In Estate
of Vogel, a grandmother titled stock in her name as custodian for her minor grandchildren
under Minnesota UGMA. Id. at 876. She thereafter forwarded the original stock certificates
to the minors' parent. Id. When stock dividends or cash were received, they too were sent by
grantor to the beneficiaries' parent. Id. Shortly before grantor's death a stock dividend was
received by grantor. Id. Due to advanced age and illness, these last shares were not for-
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Furthermore, if the decedent was custodian for his minor child at the dece-
dent's death, but the decedent was not the grantor or transferor of the assets,
the UTMA assets may be excluded from the decedent's taxable estate.213
If a grantor desires to avoid inclusion in assets gifted during life in his
taxable estate, grantor's purpose may be accomplished by selection of a
proper custodian or by creation of an irrevocable trust for the minor.214
The final tax question is who is responsible for reporting and paying in-
come tax on the income earned in the UTMA account. Income earned on a
UTMA account is generally taxable income to the minor beneficiary,
whether or not income is distributed to or expended for the minor, or retained
in the account and accumulated." 5 The minor beneficiary, not the gran-
warded and remained in the custodian's possession at her death. Estate of Vogel, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 877. The I.R.S. argued that all shares were included in the grantor's taxable estate,
because they were all titled in her name as custodian at her demise. Id. at 876. The court
agreed with the taxpayer's position that the grantor had effectively distributed all custodian-
ship assets and her actions evidenced intent to release all custodianship powers. Id. at 877. In
light of these distributions, the stock certificates titled in custodianship name but delivered to
the beneficiaries' parent were not included in decedent's taxable estate. Id. at 877-78.
213. Estate of Folks v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 427, 436 (1982). In Estate of
Folks, Mr. Folks, at his death, owned stock in a closely held corporation in his name as custo-
dian for his minor child. Id. That custodianship was established pursuant to a contract under
which decedent's mother transferred the shares to decedent as custodian in exchange for valu-
able consideration. Id. at 430. Because the stock was transferred from decedent's mother
rather than from decedent, the shares were not included in decedent's taxable estate. Id. at
436.
214. See Estate of Chrysler v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 55 (1965). In that case assets in
irrevocable trusts created by decedent for the benefit of his minor children remaining in the
trusts at grantor's death were not included in his taxable estate. Id. However, the securities
titled in decedent's name as custodian for his minor children, located in a safe deposit box
jointly rented by decedent and his spouse, were included. See id. No other documents were in
the safe deposit box. Id. at 58. Both sections 2036 and 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code
justified the court's conclusion. Id. at 68-69.
215. Anastasio v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814, 818 (1977). In that case a twenty-year-old
purchased a lottery ticket and won $100,000.00 from the New York State lottery. Id. at 815.
As he was a minor, under applicable law, the lottery winnings were paid to his parents as
custodians and deposited in a UGMA account. Id. For the following year, when the child
attained age twenty-one, the parents filed a fiduciary federal income tax return reporting the
lottery winnings and interest earned thereon, as well as the distribution of all sums to the
lottery winner. Id. Taxpayer's argument that he should not be liable for income tax on the
winnings until they were distributed to him from the UGMA account was rejected. Id. at 815-
16. As the taxpayer had all economic benefits of his winnings in the year he won the lottery,
subject only to the UGMA requirements that his parents invest the monies until the taxpayer
was age twenty-one, the economic benefit theory justified requiring the minor to report and
pay income tax on his winnings and the interest thereon in the year he won the lottery and the
winnings were deposited into a UGMA account for his benefit. Anastasio, 67 T.C. at 817-18.
The court declined to treat the UGMA account as if it were a trust, hence tax alternatives
2004]
310
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/1
NOVA LAWREVIEW
tor/custodian, is entitled to deductions for any losses suffered on invest-
ments.216
However, if the grantor is custodian of the UTMA account, and after its
creation and funding, he uses account assets for personal investments titled
in his name individually; the court may find that a completed gift to the
UTMA account did not occur for federal income tax purposes.1 7 Where
after a transfer of title of an asset from grantor to grantor as custodian, gran-
tor has not relinquished dominion and control over the asset, but instead re-
tains dominion, control, and the economic benefit of the asset for himself
personally, a completed gift for federal income tax purposes has not oc-
curred .2 " This could result in all income and gains on the UTMA account
being taxable to grantor personally.
219
available with a trust were not available to custodians of a New York UGMA account. Id. at
818. The so-called "kiddie tax" may lessen the income tax benefits of transfers to UTMA
accounts. I.R.C. § 1(g) (2000).
216. Roman v. Commissioner, No. 4370-95, 1997 WL 122832, at *8 (T.C. Mar. 19, 1997).
In Roman, the father of a child contributed assets to a UGMA account of which the father
served as custodian and his minor child was a beneficiary. id. The account was opened and
maintained at a discount broker, and funds in the account were used to purchase securities. Id.
When the securities declined in value, the custodian sold them at a loss. Id. The sale occurred
after the date on which the son was entitled to receive the account under applicable law. Id.
The custodian's attempt to claim the loss on his personal income tax return was unsuccessful.
Roman, 1997 WL 122832, at *8. The account was properly titled in the father's name as
custodian for his son, the son's social security number was on the account, and all brokerage
statements were issued to the father as custodian. Id. The son, rather than the gran-
tor/custodian, was to report any income and was entitled to deductions for losses. Id.
217. Gray v. United States, 738 F. Supp. 453, 458 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
218. See id. at457.
219. Id. at 458. In Gray, a donor owned a substantial number of shares of stock in a
closely held bank corporation, and was a member of the Board of Directors of the bank. Id. at
454-55. At a time when he claimed to have no knowledge of a proposed merger of that bank
with another financial institution, and as part of his estate plan, he transferred shares of bank
stock to himself as "guardian" (rather than custodian) for his minor children. Id. at 455.
While the donor may have been unaware of the proposed merger, information about it was
available. Gray, 738 F. Supp. at 455. The donor failed to file gift tax returns reflecting the
transfers, although his accountant informed him that they were due. Id. Donor retained pos-
session of the stock certificates after the alleged transfers to his minor children. Id. at 457.
When the merger occurred and the shares were redeemed, he accepted checks for all shares,
and although three checks were payable to him as custodian, he deposited all funds in his
personal account. Id. at 455. He then used the funds to purchase certificates of deposit, one
of which was titled solely in his name, and thereafter continued investing the funds for him-
self. Id. at 455-56. As donor commingled the funds with his own after the alleged gifts to his
UTMA accounts, and at all times retained dominion, control and economic benefit of the
stocks transferred and their proceeds, the court held that an irrevocable transfer to UTMA
accounts had not occurred for federal gift tax purposes. Gray, 738 F. Supp. at 457. The court
held that the grantor was subject to tax on the gains on the stock sales and interest income
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Owners of stock in closely held corporations, at times, have attempted
to shift income and profits of the corporation to minors in a lower income tax
bracket with mixed results. Merely titling the stock in custodianship name
and delivering the stock to the custodian, combined with filing income tax
returns for the minor reflecting receipt of income from the corporation, will
not suffice to shift the income tax burden to the minor.220 However, where
the facts indicate that the grantor relinquished control over the gifted shares
and the custodian took action to protect the shares gifted and the minor's
beneficiary interest in the corporation, the transfer may be respected for in-
come tax purposes.22'
Similarly, where a grantor transfers assets to a custodianship account
for his children, he continues to manage the accounts, solely directs all trades
in the accounts, personally provides loans to the custodianship account to
make further investments without promissory notes or definite interest rates
or repayment dates, and repays the loans with profits from trades at his own
discretion, the grantor is liable for income tax on all gains realized on the
custodianship accounts.222 Because the grantor/custodian continued to per-
sonally use the custodianship assets, retained total control over them, and the
minor beneficiaries received no present benefit, the income tax burden was
not shifted to the children. 2 3
However, where a grantor transferred limited partnership interests to his
wife, as custodian for the couple's minor children, in exchange for considera-
tion gifted by the grantor to the minors, the court upheld the children's liabil-
ity for income tax on partnership income. 224 The court reached this conclu-
sion despite the facts that the grantor continued to operate the business as
general partner, and the custodian was not sufficiently educated or informed
to protect the interests of the minor beneficiaries.225
As noted above, income earned on a UTMA account is generally re-
quired to be reported for federal income tax purposes by the minor benefici-
ary, and it is this beneficiary who pays any income tax due. An exception
earned. Id. His failure to inquire about his rights and responsibilities and to correctly report
the transactions on his returns lead to imposition of a negligence penalty. Id. at 458.
220. See Duarte v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 193, 197 (1965).
221. Kirkpatrick v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1122, 1126 (1977).
222. Estate of Applestein v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 331, 349-50 (1983).
223. Id. at 351.
224. Sharon v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1562, 1563 (1989) (providing an exam-
ple of real estate and partnership interests owned by a father/donor/custodian and managed in
UGMA accounts for his daughters); Garcia v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 425, 427, 437
(1984). The UGMA accounts were upheld for income tax purposes. Sharon, 57 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 1568.
225. Garcia, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 436.
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exists if the income is used for the support of the minor. In that situation the
person legally obligated to support the minor must report the income and pay
any tax due.226 This is true regardless of the relationship between the grantor
or custodian and the beneficiary. 27
While the minor is taxed on the income earned by the UTMA account,
there are situations under the federal tax law where the grantor/custodian
may be treated as owning the assets in the account. For example, in
Robishaw v. United States,228 a question arose concerning whether a taxpayer
owned more than eighty percent of the outstanding stock of a corporation.229
If he did, capital gain treatment of a sale could be denied.23" The shares in
the corporation held by the grantor/custodian in a UGMA account for his
minor child were, for the purpose of the litigation in Robishaw, treated as
owned by the taxpayer.23'
Questions concerning the validity and effectiveness for federal tax pur-
poses of purported transfers of assets to custodianship accounts arise in con-
nection with other tax issues, such as whether the payor of sums to a UGMA
account is entitled to a deduction for interest expense,232 and the proper basis
233of assets for depreciation purposes. The outcome frequently depends on
the extent of control retained by a grantor after the transfers to custodian-
ships.234 Where the transfer to the minor was not to a UTMA account, but
226. Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23; Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 C.B. 212; Rev. Rul. 70-
348, 1970-2 C.B. 193; Estate of Cardulla v. Commissioner, 591 T.C.M. 1512 n.8 (1986); see
also T.J. Henry Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 886, 889 (1983); Garriss Inv. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 396 (1980). Garriss involved a situation in which a mother
opened joint bank accounts with her children, deposited monies in the accounts, and used
monies in the accounts for the support of her children. Garriss, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) at 400. The
court referenced the North Carolina UGMA, and noted that "[w]hen a parent makes a gift to a
child under [UGMA], income from the gift that is used to support the child is taxable to the
person who is legally liable for such support." Id. at 405-06.
227. Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23.
228. 616 F.2d 507 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
229. Id. at 510.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 511.
232. Trans-Atlantic Co. v. Commissioner, 1970 WL 1834, at *15 (Nov. 3, 1970). In that
case, shareholders in a corporation assigned debentures owed by the corporation to trusts for
the benefit of their minor children. Id. at *3. The trusts permitted payments to UGMA ac-
counts for the minor trust beneficiaries. Id. at *4. The court held that the payments on the
debentures were not interest deductible by the corporation. Id. at * 15.
233. D'Angelo Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 121, 128 (1978).
234. Id. at 132. In D'Angelo an important issue was whether section 351 of the Internal
Revenue Code applied to a series of transactions engaged in by the taxpayer. Id. at 128. The
court found that grantor remained in control of the corporation after the transfers to minors
and throughout the series of transactions in question. Id. at 131. Hence, section 351 of the
[Vol. 28:3:745
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was to a trustee, and was revocable, the grantor remains liable for income tax
on income earned on the account.235
Similarly, where taxpayers own several corporations, transfer shares of
stock in one corporation to family members in an effort to shift income to
them, and the corporation which the taxpayers continue to own pays income
to the corporation owned by the taxpayers' relative; the transferring taxpay-
ers remain liable for income tax on dividends paid to the taxpayers' rela-
tives. 236 The court stated that "the shifting of funds between corporations for
the purpose of directing income to children of the common, controlling
shareholder provides a direct, personal benefit to the shareholder, which
gives rise to constructive dividend treatment. '2 37
Cases arise concerning the transfer of closely held corporate stock to
UTMA accounts. Where the stock is in an electing S-corporation, care must
be taken to timely file a new selection. Failure to do so after a transfer to a
custodianship results in a loss of the S-corporation status of the business. 38
XIII. EXPENSES AND FEES
Although, as a practical matter, custodians may not charge a fee for
their services or incur any substantial expenses, a custodian of a UTMA ac-
count has a right to receive reasonable compensation for services performed
during the year. 239 The custodian is also entitled to reimbursement for ex-
penses reasonably incurred in managing the account.240
Internal Revenue Code applied to the transaction as contended by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice. Id. at 136.
235. Heintz v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 429, 430-31 (1980). In that case parents
deposited funds in bank accounts in their names "as joint trustees" for their minor children.
Id. at 430. Documentation to open several of the accounts did not expressly indicate that the
transfers were revocable, but since it was expressly stated that several of the trusts were revo-
cable, and the other trusts did not say the trusts were irrevocable, they were also deemed to be
revocable. Id. at 430-31. Because the parents had not complied with California UGMA in
opening the accounts, the parents owed income tax on the interest earned on the accounts. Id.
at 431.
236. See generally Bell v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 97 (1982). In that case three
physicians owned a medical practice and formed a separate corporation to operate an X-ray
business. Id. at 99. Shareholders transferred stock in the X-ray corporation to family mem-
bers. ld. at 102.
237. Id. at 111; see Horn v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 413 (1982).
238. T.J. Henry Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 886, 891 (1983).
239. FLA. STAT. § 710.117(2) (2003).
240. §710.117(1).
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XIV. OTHER IMPACTS AND RISKS OF UTMA ACCOUNTS
A minor's UTMA account may impact other legal matters. Minors are
generally entitled to be supported by one or both of their parents.24" ' In a dis-
solution of marriage, a court may consider the assets owned by or available
to a child in determining the parents' obligations to pay child support.242
Courts may also consider the existence of custodianship accounts, the earn-
ings thereon and distributions there from in determining the support provided
by divorced parents for their child, the support contributed by the child, and
who is entitled to a dependency exemption for the child.243 Courts, in the
context of a divorce, may need to determine if custodianship accounts were
effectively created, or if the assets in them belong to the parents as marital
property or community property.2" Hence, the existence of a UTMA ac-
count available to a minor whose parents' marriage is dissolved may affect
the child support that either or both parents are obligated to pay. The exis-
tence of a custodianship account should also be considered in terms of poten-
tial impact on a disabled beneficiary's eligibility for government benefits.245
XV. CONCLUSION
Due to the frequent use of UTMA accounts nationwide and the benefits
they may offer to donors, they warrant closer scrutiny by attorneys and more
elucidation by the legislatures facilitating their operation. Attorneys, stock-
brokers, accountants, bankers, and financial advisors perform a valuable ser-
241. § 61.13(l)(a).
242. § 61.30(11)(a)(2), ( l1)(a)(7).
243. See generally Muraca v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1762 (1984). The parents
in that case were divorced, and each contributed sums for the support of their minor son. Id.
at 1765. The father contributed sums to a Pennsylvania UGMA account of which he was
custodian. Id. at 1768. Stocks in the account were sold, and some of the proceeds were dis-
tributed to the son for his support. Id. at 1768. Although the father established the account,
the distributions were not considered support paid by him. Id. However, additional contribu-
tions to the account provided by the father, which were subsequently withdrawn and used for
the son's support were considered payments by the father for dependency exemption pur-
poses. Muraca, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1768.
244. See Allen v. Allen, 301 So. 2d 417, 419-20 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (rejecting the posi-
tion that assets in an UGMA account were community property, due to the parties failure to
comply with certain statutory formalities); see also In re Jacobs, 180 Cal. Rptr. 234, 242 (Ct.
App. 1982) (finding that donative intent to create custodianship accounts was lacking when
the question arose in a divorce case).
245. See Cruz v. Apfel, 48 F. Supp. 2d 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). In that case the minor
was already the owner of the asset, hence the attempt to transfer to an UGMA account was
invalid. Id. The transfer attempt was an effort to render the minor eligible for government
benefits. Id. at 376.
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vice for customers if they are knowledgeable about UTMA accounts and take
the initiative to provide relevant information and guidance to their customers.
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A TAX PROFESSOR'S JOURNEY INTO LAW AND
POPULAR CULTURE
GAIL LEVIN RICHMOND*
On December 28, 1999, Bankruptcy Judge A. Jay Cristol issued an "or-
der determining that the Internal Revenue Service is still naughty and not
nice."' Perhaps the holiday season,2 coupled with popular perceptions of the
IRS,3 occasioned this choice of language. But perhaps it merely reflected the
judge's literary sensibilities. As a law professor, I'm not surprised when a
judge cites a work of fiction.4 Faculty members have done it for years. If
law school professors draw from popular culture in their teaching and writ-
ing, why shouldn't judges? Or is it the fact that the case involved tax that
surprises non-tax lawyers?
Many tax professors remember a time when it was fun to be a tax pro-
fessor, a time when colleagues conversed with us in months other than April,
a time when we weren't shunned for being ignorant of semiotics.' Some of
* Professor of Law & Associate Dean-Academic Affairs, Nova Southeastern Univer-
sity Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
1. In re Cohen, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 489, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,161 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999).
2. See HAVEN GILLESPIE & J. FRED COOTS, SANTA CLAUS IS COMING TO TOwN (1934).
3. E.g., DR. SEUSS, HOW THE GRINCH STOLE CHRISTMAS (1957).
4. References to fictional works can be divided into two categories. The larger category
includes any reference to a fictional work. The second category, a subset of the first, covers
those works that actually revolve around lawyers and their clients. Fictional works in this
category represent the intersection of law and popular culture. Judicial opinions include both
types of reference. See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 185 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1999) ("This
divergence is so out of the ordinary that, upon an initial reading of§ 1256, a person might feel
like Dorothy did upon finding herself transported to the Land of Oz, and, speaking to her dog,
said: 'Toto, I've a feeling we're not in Kansas anymore."'); United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d
490, 493 (1 st Cir. 1997) ("Noah insists, in a mien reminiscent of the legendary Perry Mason,
that the evidence produced at his trial actually establishes the guilt of a third person."); Brown
v. United States, 74 A.F.T.R.2d 5096, 5098 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1994) ("While this court expresses
no opinion as to the issue of whether or how much taxes are owed, the court is reminded of an
excerpt from Charles Dickens'David Copperfield: 'It was as true ... as turnips is. It was as
true... as taxes is. And nothing' truer than them."').
5. See Erik M. Jensen, Critical Theory and the Loneliness of the Tax Prof, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1753, 1753-54 (1998) (footnote omitted):
Tax professors are the air-fresheners of the American law school. If a tax prof tries to talk
about serious tax research with a bunch of law school generalists, the room clears out instantly.
We tax law types are expected to sit, without nodding off, through interminable discussions on
Satanism and the First Amendment. But raise one tax question with a con law person, and he's
gone: "Sorry. I just remembered I have to meet with a student."
Id. See generally Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to
Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517 (1994).
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us strive to reconnect by teaching non-tax subjects, showing movies in class,
writing about fictional lawyers, publishing in journals that omit "tax" from
their titles,6 and creating titles that illustrate how truly creative a group we
are.7
If my experiences during the 1999-2000 academic year are typical,
popular culture can lead to unexpected behavior. That year, I showed a
movie segment in class for the first time and passed up a college basketball
game to watch the opening and closing credits of Air Force One.' The
events that prompted a classroom traditionalist9 and basketball fanatic'" to
take these actions were totally attributable to law and popular culture. Al-
though I committed these transgressions, I'm not planning to don a Scarlet R
(for relevance) yet. As the saga below illustrates, popular culture led me to
linkages I might never have made when I was a "pure" tax professor. Al-
though I remain primarily a traditionalist, I believe my diversion that year
continues to have value.
6. Although student-edited journals that include tax in their titles can be counted on the
fingers of one hand, environmental law journals abound. Aren't their statutes and regulations
as challenging as ours? I quickly ran out of digits while counting the number of international
law reviews. See generally On-Line Directory of Law Reviews and Scholarly Legal Periodi-
cals (Michael H. Hoffheimer, compiler), http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/faculty/
lawreviews (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
7. See, e.g., James Edward Maule, Instant Replay, Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls: An
Empirical Study of Alleged Tax Court Judge Bias, 66 TENN. L. REV. 351 (1999); William J.
Turnier, The Pink Panther Meets the Grim Reaper: Estate Taxation of the Fruits of Crime, 72
N.C. L. REV. 163 (1993); Gwen T. Handelman, Zen and the Art of Statutory Construction: A
Tax Lawyer's Account of Enlightenment, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 611 (1991).
8. AIR FORCE ONE (Columbia/Tristar Studios 1997). Don't ask why I didn't tape the
game. I'm a tax professor, not an engineer, and neither of my VCR-savvy children was home
that night. Being technologically challenged, I had to watch the entire movie to ensure that I
didn't miss any of the relevant credits.
9. But I do teach a summer course entitled "Income Tax for the Uninterested," using
non-tax cases, such as defamation suits involving famous individuals, to introduce the relevant
tax consequences. See, e.g., Faigin v. Kelly, 978 F. Supp. 420 (D.N.H. 1997).
10. Basketball is a way of life in my home state of Indiana. Remember the movie Hoo-
siers? A few facts were changed, but the passion trumps Hollywood hyperbole. Indeed, nine
of the top ten high school gyms in terms of seating capacity are in Indiana. See Sal Ruibal,
Fieldhouse a cathedral to high school hoops, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2004, at 3C.
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PRELIMINARY HISTORY
The saga actually begins in 1992, when I co-authored a moderately
frivolous article/play geared to law librarians." My co-author and I made
another foray into "play-writing" in a 1993 symposium on legal humor. 2
She moved to another law school in 1994, and I returned to more serious
work.
In late 1996, two of my colleagues, knowing that I was an avid fan of
Law & Order, 3 asked me to write a chapter for a book on television law-
yers.' 4 Although they offered me Matlock instead of Law & Order, I consid-
ered it my duty to accept and begin field work back in North Carolina, where
Andy Griffith grew up.' 5 Along the way I learned a lot about sports fran-
chises in the South, Southern mystery writers, and race relations. Based on
that chapter and the work mentioned above, I "joined" my school's popular
culture faculty.'6
FROM LOUIS AUCHINCLOSS TO PAUL NEWMAN
The previous section sets the background; my real immersion into popu-
lar culture began a few years later. On July 1, 1999, one of the Prime Time
Law co-editors e-mailed a call for papers for an admiralty popular culture
symposium. He planned "to show how often maritime law and lawyers have
been presented in works of popular culture."' 7 I answered quickly and flip-
11. Carol A. Roehrenbeck & Gail Levin Richmond, Three Researchers in Search of an
Alcove: A Play in Six Acts, 84 LAW LIBR. J. 13 (1992). We had a serious purpose-
proselytizing for tax alcoves-and reported on our survey of law school law librarians.
12. Gail Levin Richmond & Carol A. Roehrenbeck, From Tedious to Trendy: A Tax
Teacher's Triumph, 17 NOVA L. REV. 739 (1993).
13. Law & Order (NBC television broadcast, since 1990). My law school transcript
indicates that I know virtually nothing about Criminal Law, but basketball isn't on every
night.
14. PRIME TIME LAW: FICTIONAL TELEVISION As LEGAL NARRATIVE (Robert M. Jarvis &
Paul R Joseph, eds., 1998).
15. 1 acknowledge Professor Joseph J. Kalo of the University of North Carolina-Chapel
Hill School of Law for giving up his ticket so that I could attend a UNC-Wake Forest basket-
ball game during one of my research visits.
16. Several members of my faculty are known for their involvement in law and popular
culture scholarship. See, e.g., Anthony Chase, Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of
Mass Media Portrayals of American Attorneys, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 281; Robert M.
Jarvis, Legal Tales from Gilligan 's Island, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 185 (1998); Paul R Jo-
seph & Sharon Carton, The Law of the Federation: Images of Law, Lawyers, and the Legal
System in "Star Trek: The Next Generation, " 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 (1992).
17. E-mail from Robert M. Jarvis to Prime Time Law contributors (July 1, 1999) (on file
with author).
20041
319
: Nova Law Review 28, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LA WREVIEW
pantly: "Of course I'd be interested-it was too bad that no fictional mate-
rial linking tax and admiralty existed." Soon thereafter he called my bluff
and produced a volume of short stories by Louis Auchincloss. " That collec-
tion of works, about the fictional firm of Tower, Tilney & Webb, included a
story entitled "The Deductible Yacht." In that instant I became a symposium
contributor for the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce. 9
The story's protagonist was an associate, Bayard Kip, who determined
that his client was not entitled to deduct entertainment expenses associated
with his yacht because the guests were not sufficiently related to his trade or
business activities.20 The story included Kip's family background, the possi-
bility that he wouldn't be considered for partnership when he refused to sign
the tax return, and words of advice from a cynical revenue agent."
After beginning an outline of topics to pursue, I read the other stories to
find additional instances of tax or admiralty being important to the firm.22 I
struck out with admiralty but tax turned out to be the mother lode that would
lead me, ultimately, to Air Force One.
The Deductible Yacht was not Kip's only appearance in this book. Ap-
pearing at a partners' lunch, he was asked to report on a conference with
Commissioner Caplin regarding the elimination of tax deductions for busi-
ness entertainment.23 Eureka! I'm old enough to know that there really was
a Commissioner Caplin, and a web search yielded an article by him on that
very same topic. 2' Now I was in business. I could devote space to the
changes in I.R.C. section 274 between 1961 and 1999, detail other problems
18. See Louis AUCHINCLOSS, POWERS OF ATTORNEY (1963).
19. Gail Levin Richmond, The (Once) Deductible Yacht, 31 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 593
(2000).
20. Interested readers will find my descriptive limerick in The (Once) Deductible Yacht.
Id.
21. Id.
22. Remember, I had "joined" the law and popular culture group in 1996, so this was
serious research and not merely time spent away from class preparation or other writing.
23. AUCHINCLOSS, supra note 18, at 176.
24. Mortimer M. Caplin, The Travel and Entertainment Expense Problem, 39 TAXES 947
(1961). My visit to Caplin & Drysdale's web site (www.caplindrysdale.com) establishes my
willingness (although not necessarily my eagerness) to use alternative research tools. Fortu-
nately, I was able to read the Caplin article in hard copy (a hearty thanks to all previous NSU
law library directors for collecting all these old volumes), for it led to a discovery I would not
have made online. Once I had the volume of Taxes in my hands, I did what every self-
respecting book lover does; I leafed through it to see what else might be there. Double
Eureka! I found articles by an attorney named Victor R. Wolder. See, Victor R. Wolder, How
the Tax Court Treats Reasonable Compensation, 39 TAXES 473 (1961). When my class
reached Wolder v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1974), in the casebook, they were
amazed to learn that Mr. Wolder was a tax lawyer.
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that might have tempted high-income taxpayers in the early 1960S,25 and
report on the real-world aspect of Auchincloss's text.
The Deductible Yacht ends with information about the client stinging
another company for the yacht, which turned out to have a split main shaft.
My symposium editor wondered whether the other company was a buyer, a
creditor, or an insurer and suggested I ask Mr. Auchincloss. Taking advan-
tage of my opportunity, I not only asked Mr. Auchincloss about the company
that was stung and the fictional law firm, I also mentioned that I enjoyed his
mention of Commissioner Caplin. In his response, Mr. Auchincloss noted
that he and Caplin were old friends.26
That was just the beginning. At the back of my mind was The Heroic
Nature of Tax Lawyers, 7 a review of The Firm whose title I liked. Bayard
Kip may not have faced as dangerous a group as did Mitch McDeere, but he
still acted heroically in refusing to sign the client's return.28 If Tom Cruise
could play McDeere, who might have played Kip in the early 1960s? From
the dim recesses of my mind, I remembered The Young Philadelphians, a
1959 movie starring Paul Newman as a tax attorney.29 If you've played a tax
lawyer once, why not a second time?
After "nominating" Paul Newman for the Kip role in the movie that was
not made of this book, I decided to watch The Young Philadelphians to see
what the tax issue was. Imagine this scene-a wealthy, and somewhat ditzy,
older woman who sounds remarkably like Glinda the Good Witch ° sits
across from Paul Newman and holds a Chihuahua named Carlos. Newman
dispatches his secretary to learn who the client is. A call from the senior
partner explaining that she was worth at least $50 million causes Newman to
25. E.g., high marginal tax rates, limited marital deduction, and modest gift and estate tax
exemptions.
26. Response from Louis Auchincloss to Gail Levin Richmond (postmarked Oct. 6,
1999) (on file with author). Both earned their law degrees at the University of Virginia, Cap-
lin in 1940 and Auchincloss in 1941. University of Virginia, Notable Alumni: Literature, at
http://www.virginia.edu/notablealumni/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
27. Erik M. Jensen, The Heroic Nature of Tax Lawyers, 140U. PA. L. REv. 367 (1991).
28. Although Jensen insists that big-firm tax lawyers do not spend most of their time
filling out hundreds of individual tax returns, tax lawyers at Tower, Tilney & Webb definitely
prepared returns. Id. at 376; AUCHINCLOSS, supra note 18, at 88-89. In his autobiography,
Auchincloss laments seeing the merger of corporate and personal work into "the great sea of
taxation and the practice of law evolve into something more like accounting." Louis
AUCHINCLOSS, A WRITER'S CAPITAL 89 (1974).
29. THE YOUNG PHILADELPHIANS (Warner Brothers 1959). 1 am not making this up.
Although I didn't recall exactly what it was, I really remembered there was something about
tax in the movie. Perhaps my adolescent brain filed it away because it knew I was destined to
be a tax lawyer.
30. Of course she sounded like Glinda. Billie Burke played both roles.
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reach for Carlos. The ensuing dialogue begins with Burke lamenting how
many dogs aren't loved. Thank goodness for the SPCA, to which she gives
$5,000 per year.
Newman: "In cash?"
Burke: "Well, of course. How else?",
31
Eventually Newman explains the advantage of making the gift with ap-
preciated securities and avoiding the capital gains tax. A few scenes later,
Burke leaves her old firm and becomes Newman's client.
Obviously, I had to play this scene for my income tax class. And, as
Paul Newman was the star, I had to watch the entire movie myself. That led
me to Air Force One.
FROM PAUL NEWMAN TO JEROME SHESTACK AND AIR FORCE ONE
Newman's character, Anthony Lawrence, joined a fictional Philadelphia
law firm, Wharton, Biddle & Clayton. As Lawrence climbed in the firm,
passing his less-talented peers, his name moved up on the lobby listing.
Wait, freeze the frame!32 One of the listed lawyers, Jerome J. Shestack,
wasn't fictional. A Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen LLP partner, Mr.
Shestack served as American Bar Association President in 1997-1998. I
could not rest without knowing why his name appears in the movie and
asked him about this in an e-mail.33
Mr. Shestack called back to explain his role as a technical advisor and
the director's insertion of his name. He added that his son produced movies,
including Air Force One, and had cast Mr. Shestack's wife in them. After
that, how could I not watch the movie?34
31. THE YOUNG PHILADELPHIANS, supra note 29.
32. Had I not watched the movie on a VCR, I probably would never have even noticed
this listing.
33. In a twist of "six degrees of Kevin Bacon," I was not being totally presumptuous. I
actually knew Jerome Shestack. We'd served together on an ABA site inspection team a few
years earlier.
34. The two movies have another commonality. Harrison Ford, the star of Air Force
One, and Paul Newman have been recognized for both their looks and their acting. See, e.g.,
Paul Newman Voted Greatest Actor, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/SHOWB1Z/
Movies/01/16/Newman/ (Apr. 6, 2004). The article, which ranked Ford fourth, noted that its
rankings included "box office success, Oscar nominations, acting range and marriage ap-
peal ......
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CONCLUSION
Actually, there is no conclusion. I put popular culture on hold for
awhile because Foundation Press thought I should finish the sixth edition of
Federal Tax Research. Although I realized their idea of camera-ready copy
didn't include Paul Newman, I didn't regret for a moment a scholarly detour
that led to correspondence with both Louis Auchincloss and Jerry Shestack
and a few good nights watching movies.
Now I'm back with a vengeance. My Tax and Wills classes watch The
Young Philadelphians (the tax scene does begin with Billie Burke's desire to
change her will), my Accounting class has viewed The Producers, and
there's a tax scene in Giant I'll be adding next year. 3 I'm now editing a
humor column for the ABA Section of Taxation newsletter. It includes more
judicial quotations and my most recent ditty, "Hummer, 1- Section 280F, 0:
A Scorekeeper's Limerick."36
35. Is there a "back to my childhood theme" here? The young Elizabeth Taylor and Rock
Hudson certainly complement the young Paul Newman.
36. Tax Bites, NEWSQUARTERLY, Winter 2004, at 28.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, MCI International, Inc. ("MCI") laid off ninety-four employ-
ees, seventy-seven percent of whom were over the age of forty.' The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") sued MCI on behalf of
thirty-nine of the laid-off employees, arguing that the layoff violated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").2 The court refused to con-
* Special thanks to Richard A. Bales, Associate Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase
College of Law, Northern Kentucky University, and Gail M. Langendorf.
1. EEOC v. MCI Int'l, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 1438, 1479-80 (D.N.J. 1993).
2. Id. at 1444.
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sider the case as a class action, and instead treated it as thirty-nine separate
disparate treatment cases.
3
One of the laid-off employees was Donald Lee.4 MCI argued that it had
fired Lee because of poor performance, but the EEOC refuted this argument
by presenting a positive letter of recommendation from Lee's second-level
supervisor, which recommended Lee's re-hiring and stated that Lee's layoff
was not a reflection of his performance.' The district court, however, dis-
missed the claim, finding that Lee could not show a prima facie case of age
discrimination because he could not point to a similarly situated individual
who was treated differently.
6
If this case had been brought as a single pattern-and-practice class ac-
tion instead of as a group of individual disparate treatment claims, the out-
come likely would have been different. The statistical evidence that a large
proportion of the laid-off employees were over the age of forty (and there-
fore protected by the ADEA) would have shifted the burden of persuasion to
MCI to prove that it had not discriminated against Lee.7 However, because
the court followed the approach that most circuits have taken, that the pat-
tern-and-practice approach to proving discrimination is not available to
plaintiffs bringing individual disparate treatment cases, this route was not
available to Lee, and his case was dismissed
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,9 the United
States Supreme Court held that evidence of pattern-and-practice can be used
in class actions to shift the burden of proof to the employer.' ° However, the
Court did not address whether pattern-and-practice can be used to shift the
burden of proof in individual, non-class action lawsuits." The circuit courts
are divided on this issue.
Five federal circuits have held that an individual, non-class plaintiff
may not shift the burden of proof by demonstrating solely a pattern-and-
practice of discrimination.' 2  These courts have found that the burden-
3. Id. at 1446.
4. Id. at 1455.
5. Id.
6. MCI Int'l, Inc., 829 F. Supp. at 1455.
7. Id. at 1479.
8. Id. at 1455.
9. 431 U.S. 324(1977).
10. Id. at 360.
11. See id.
12. Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2001);
Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106 (10th Cir. 2001); Lowery v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760-61 (4th Cir. 1998); Gilty v. Viii. of Oak Park, 919 F.2d
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shifting method adopted by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green3 is more suited for individual, non-class claims of discrimination,
and that the pattern-and-practice approach, therefore, is not applicable to
these types of cases.' 4 However, two federal circuits have found that the
language in Teamsters and other Supreme Court cases indicate a willingness
to allow the use of pattern-and-practice evidence to shift the burden of proof
in individual, non-class actions.' 5 These courts have reasoned that evidence
of a pattern-and-practice can change the position of the employer to that of a
proved wrongdoer as effectively as the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
method. 6
This article agrees with the minority of circuits that have held that indi-
viduals can bring pattern-and-practice cases. The traditional disparate treat-
ment model of proof, i.e., the McDonnell Douglas approach, works well for a
plaintiff who has strong circumstantial evidence that the employer has dis-
criminated against the particular plaintiff' 7 However, problems arise when
the plaintiff has overwhelming evidence that the employer engaged in a
broad pattern of discrimination, but little evidence of individual discrimina-
tion. Where the plaintiff already has proven a broad pattern of intentional
discrimination, the burden of persuasion should be on the employer to show
that that pattern did not adversely affect the plaintiff.
Part II of this article analyzes the current types of employment dis-
crimination under Title VII. It begins by explaining disparate impact and
disparate treatment. It then analyzes the methods to prove disparate treat-
ment, including the pattern-and-practice method, which is the subject of this
article.
Part III explains the two different views on whether evidence of pattern-
and-practice discrimination shifts the burden of proof to the employer. Cur-
rently, the majority of courts have held that pattern-and-practice cannot shift
the burden of proof to the employer. On the other hand, a minority of courts
have held that the Teamsters approach should be extended to include indi-
vidual, non-class plaintiffs.
1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1990); Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 469-70 (8th Cir.
1984).
13. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
14. See Celestine, 266 F.3d at 355-56; Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1095; Lowery, 158 F.3d at
760-61; Gilty, 919 F.2d at 1252; Craik, 731 F.2d at 469-70.
15. Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1559 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Cali-
fano, 613 F.2d 957, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
16. Cox, 784 F.2d at 1559; Davis, 613 F.2d at 961-62.
17. Davis, 613 F.2d at 961-62.
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Part IV provides a detailed analysis of the competing views. This sec-
tion explains how the use of pattern-and-practice by individuals to shift the
burden is consistent with past Supreme Court cases, why pattern-and-
practice proves discrimination in individual, non-class actions, and how the
Teamsters method promotes the anti-discrimination policy of Title VII.
Part V recommends that courts adopt the Teamsters approach in indi-
vidual, non-class actions because this approach will afford the plaintiff an-
other option when the McDonnell Douglas method will likely prevent the
plaintiff from succeeding in an otherwise-valid discrimination claim.
II. TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION
There are two types of discrimination in the workplace: disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment. This article focuses on pattern-and-practice
evidence in disparate treatment cases. However, in order to fully understand
disparate treatment cases, it is important to know how they are different from
disparate impact cases. To provide this information, this article begins by
analyzing disparate impact actions, and then discusses disparate treatment
actions.
A. Disparate Impact
Disparate impact claims focus on whether employment policies or prac-
tices that are facially neutral and not intended to discriminate nevertheless
have a disparate effect on the protected group. 8 Disparate impact "seeks the
removal of employment obstacles, not required by business necessity, which
... freeze out protected groups from job opportunities and advancement."' 9
With this type of discrimination, the Supreme Court has ruled that a plaintiff
is relieved of proving that the employer had a discriminatory motive.2 ° Prior
to Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2' proof of discriminatory motive was critical to
the plaintiff's case, as the plaintiff was required to prove that his or her em-
ployer treated the plaintiff less favorably because of his or her race.22
Disparate impact claims involve three stages of proof.23 First, the plain-
tiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer
18. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1274 (11 th Cir. 2000).
19. Id.
20. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977).
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34
STAN. L. REV. 837, 838-39 (1982).
23. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982).
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"uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 24 Once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the
defendant, who may either discredit the plaintiffs statistics or proffer statis-
tics of his own which show that no disparity exists. 25 The employer may also
produce evidence that its disparate employment practices are based on le-
gitimate business reasons, such as job-relatedness or business necessity. 26 If
the defendant fails to show either, the plaintiff prevails, but if the defendant
succeeds in showing a business justification, the burden of production shifts
back to the plaintiff.27 When this occurs, the plaintiff has the duty to show
the existence of an alternative nondiscriminatory practice or policy that
would also satisfy the asserted business necessity.28
B. Disparate Treatment
The second type of discrimination, and perhaps the easiest to under-
stand, is disparate treatment. Disparate treatment occurs where an "employer
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.' '29 However, while the inquiry in dis-
parate impact is not focused on discriminatory motive, proof of discrimina-
tory motive is critical to claims of disparate treatment.30 Fortunately for the
plaintiff, discriminatory intent "can in some situations be inferred from the
mere fact of differences in treatment."'', The ultimate question in every dis-
parate treatment case is whether the plaintiff was intentionally discriminated
against.32 A plaintiff subjected to this type of discrimination has three ways
to prove discrimination: proof of intent through direct evidence, the
McDonnell Douglas approach, or pattern-and-practice.
1. Proof of Intent Through Direct Evidence
The first method a plaintiff may use to prove disparate treatment dis-
crimination is through direct evidence. Under this theory, the plaintiff offers
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000); Tex. Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981).
25. Davis v. Califano, 613 F.3d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
26. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
27. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660-61 (1989).
28. Id. at 661.
29. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
30. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
31. Id.
32. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).
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"[e]vidence, which if believed, proves existence of fact in issue without in-
ference or presumption. 33 The burden of production then shifts to the em-
ployer to show that it would have made the same employment decision ab-
sent its consideration of the illegal criterion.34 Examples include epithets or
slurs uttered by an authorized agent of the employer, a decision-maker's ad-
mission that he or she would or did act against the plaintiff because of the
plaintiffs protected characteristic, or an employer policy framed squarely in
terms of race, sex, religion, or national origin.35 The Civil Rights Act of
1991 clarified the requirements of using direct evidence of discrimination.3 6
According to the 1991 Act, the plaintiff must show that an illegitimate crite-
rion was a "motivating factor" in the employment decision.37 Additionally,
the 1991 Act stated that the employer can escape damages and orders of rein-
statement, hiring, and promotion by demonstrating that qualification was
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.38 However, an employer making this showing will still be liable
for attorney's fees and injunctive or declaratory relief.39
2. The McDonnell Douglas Method
In 1973, when faced with the fact that employers seldom provide the
plaintiff with direct evidence of discrimination, the Supreme Court devel-
oped a burden-shifting pattern of proof, commonly referred to as the
McDonnell Douglas test. 40 The function of the McDonnell Douglas method
of proof is to allow the plaintiff to raise an inference of discriminatory intent
indirectly.4 ' It serves to eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for the employer's action,42 e.g., lack of qualifications or the absence of
an available job.
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court created a three-step process
intended to create a level playing field for both the plaintiff and defendant.43
The plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of dis-
33. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 460 (6th ed. 1990).
34. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
35. See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1134 (10th Cir. 1999); see also
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).
36. § 2000e-2(m).
37. Id.
38. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
39. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i)(ii).
40. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
41. Tex. Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
42. Id.
43. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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crimination.4 This prima facie case may be proved by showing: 1) that the
plaintiff belongs to a protected class; 2) that the plaintiff "applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;" 3) that
the plaintiff was rejected; and 4) that, after the plaintiffs rejection, the posi-
tion remained open and the "employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of [plaintiffs] qualifications., 45 If proven, these facts give rise to an
inference that the plaintiff was rejected for discriminatory reasons, creating a
mandatory, but legally rebuttable, presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated.46
Once the plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, "[t]he burden then... shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. 4 7 The em-
ployer's burden is one of production only, not persuasion as in disparate im-
pact claims. 4' This means the defendant must adduce evidence sufficient to
allow the fact-finder to reasonably conclude that the employment decision
was not motivated by discrimination.49 If the jury believes the plaintiffs
evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, judg-
ment must be in favor of the plaintiff.5" However, if the employer has articu-
lated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff is afforded a fair
opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively
valid reasons for the rejection were pretext,51 e.g., a cover-up for a racially
discriminatory decision. Often, the plaintiff will attempt to present statistical
evidence of discrimination to demonstrate pretext, as discussed in the next
section.
3. Pattern-and-Practice
A third way of proving disparate treatment is by demonstrating a pat-
tern-and-practice of discrimination. "When Title VII was enacted in 1964, it
authorized private actions by individual employees and public actions by the
Attorney General in cases involving a 'pattern[-and-]practice' of discrimina-
tion.,52 "In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to authorize the EEOC to
44. Id. at 802.
45. Id.
46. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
47. Green, 411 U.S. at 802.
48. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 255-56.
52. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 286 (2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
6(a) (1994)).
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bring its own enforcement actions" on behalf of the Attorney General.5 3 "In
1991, Congress again amended Title VII to allow the recovery of compensa-
tory and punitive damages by a 'complaining party."' 5 4 This "term includes
both private plaintiffs and the EEOC., 55  To bring a pattern-and-practice
claim, most courts hold that the individual or agency bringing the suit must
bring it as a class action. Some courts, however, hold that an individual
plaintiff may bring a pattern-and-practice suit.
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,56 a civil action may be brought if
there is reasonable cause to believe that any person or group is engaged in a
pattern-and-practice of discrimination. 7 When alleging that an employer's
policies exhibited a pattern-and-practice, the plaintiff must show that there
was a system-wide pattern-and-practice to deny the plaintiff "the full enjoy-
ment of Title VII rights."5 8 The plaintiff must "prove more than the mere
occurrence of isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts. '59
Senator Hubert Humphrey, during congressional debates on Section
707(a) of Title VII, explained the concept of pattern-and-practice:
a pattern or practice would be present only when the denial of rights con-
sists of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is re-
peated, routine, or of a generalized nature. There would be a pattern or
practice if, for example, a number of companies or persons in the same in-
dustry or line of business discriminated, if a chain of motels or restaurants
practiced racial discrimination throughout all or a significant part of its
system, or if a company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohib-
ited by the statute.
The point is that single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a
single business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice .... 60
The plaintiff must establish by "preponderance of the evidence that...
discrimination was the.., standard operating procedure., 61
53. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 286 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Northwest v. EEOC,
446 U.S. 318, 325 (1980)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (2000). For a discussion of the
EEOC's history, see Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC,
27 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 3-9 (1999).
54. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 287 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (a)(1) (1994)).
55. Id.
56. § 706(a).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (2000).
58. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
59. Id.
60. 110 CONG. REC. 14, 270 (1964).
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A pattern-and-practice suit is divided into two phases: liability and
remedy.62 During the liability stage, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie
case of a policy, pattern, or practice of intentional discrimination against a
protected group. 63 The prima facie case may be demonstrated either by sta-
tistical evidence aimed at establishing the defendant's past treatment of the
protected group, or testimony from protected class members detailing spe-
cific instances of discrimination.' If the plaintiff satisfies this prima facie
requirement, "[t]he burden [of production] then shifts to the employer to
defeat [it] ... by demonstrating that the . . . proof is either inaccurate or in-
significant., 65 To challenge the plaintiffs proof, employers usually attack
the source, accuracy, or probative force of the plaintiffs statistics.
66
Once the defendant introduces evidence satisfying its burden of produc-
tion, the jury must then consider the evidence introduced by both sides to
determine whether the plaintiffs have established by preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant engaged in a pattern-and-practice of intentional
discrimination. 61 If the jury finds that the plaintiff has proved a pattern-and-
practice of discrimination, the case may move on to the remedial phase, de-
pending on the remedy sought by the plaintiffs.
If injunctive relief is the only relief appropriate based on the evidence
presented by both sides, an injunction should be awarded. This ends the in-
quiry and the case does not move on to the remedial phase.68 On the other
hand, if relief such as back pay, front pay, or compensatory recovery is re-
quested in the pleadings' in addition to injunctive relief, the court must con-
duct the remedial phase of the trial. 69 The plaintiffs enter this second phase
with a presumption "that any particular employment decision, during the
period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit
of that policy."7 This means that each plaintiff must now show only that she
suffered an adverse employment decision and, therefore, was a potential vic-
tim of the proved class-wide discrimination.7 The burden of persuasion then
shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the individual was subjected to the
61. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.
62. Id. at 360-61.
63. Id. at 360.
64. Id. at 339.
65. Id. at 360.
66. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340.
67. See id.
68. ld. at 361.
69. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361 (1997).
70. Jd. at 362.
71. ld. at 361-62.
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72
adverse employment decision for lawful reasons. If the employer cannot
meet this burden, the plaintiff is entitled to individualized relief.
73
In sum, a plaintiff attempting to prove disparate treatment is afforded
three ways to prove discrimination. First, the plaintiff can present direct
evidence including admissions by the employer or documents depicting dis-
criminatory actions. Second, the plaintiff can use the McDonnell Douglas
method of proof.74 This test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
plaintiff belongs to a protected class, "was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants," that the plaintiff was rejected, and that
"after [plaintiffs] rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of [plaintiffs] qualifications."75
Third, the plaintiff can present evidence of a system-wide, pattern-and-
practice of discrimination.
III. USING PATTERN-AND-PRACTICE TO SHIFT THE BURDEN IN INDIVIDUAL
DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES
In class actions and actions brought by the EEOC, the burden of persua-
sion can be shifted to the employer by demonstrating a pattern-and-practice
of discrimination by the employer. 76 Additionally, pattern-and-practice can
be used to prove pretext in the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas
method.77 However, the circuits are split on whether pattern-and-practice can
be used by an individual plaintiff to shift the burden to the employer in an
individual claim of disparate treatment. Most circuits do not allow an indi-
vidual plaintiff to shift the burden by demonstrating a pattern-and-practice,
but a minority of circuits have recognized a plaintiffs right to present such
proof.
A. Rationale Used by Courts That Do Not Allow Burden to Be Shifted
The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that
pattern-and-practice cannot be used to shift the burden of proof in individual
claims.78 These courts focused on the fundamental differences between class
72. Id. at 362.
73. Id. at 361.
74. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
75. Id. at 802.
76. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.
77. Green, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
78. Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2001);
Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106 (10th Cir. 2001); Lowery v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760-61 (4th Cir. 1998); Gilty v. Vill. of Oak Park, 919 F.2d
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actions and individual claims, and held that an inference of discrimination
will not arise in an individual case until the plaintiff has proved all the ele-
ments of a prima facie case.7 9 As a result of these differences, these courts
held that the McDonnell Douglas method is better suited to prove individual
disparate treatment claims.8"
In Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,8" the Fourth Circuit held "that in-
dividuals do not have a private, non-class cause of action for pattern or prac-
tice discrimination under § 1981 or Title VII. ' 82 The plaintiffs, eleven Afri-
can-American current and former employees of Circuit City, brought suit
alleging that Circuit City had a "corporate culture of racial animus toward
African-Americans" mainly because of a group of "white senior managers.""
The plaintiffs asserted that the
all-white management intentionally [demonstrated] racial animus . . .
through discriminatory promotion policies and practices that included,
among other things: (1) excessively subjective procedures and criteria
used to deny opportunities for promotion to qualified African-Americans;
(2) making the existence of job promotion vacancies known only through
informal networks of white employees rather than through formal job
posting procedures; (3) requiring African-American employees to satisfy
more onerous requirements for promotion than those required for white
employees; and (4) maintaining more onerous performance standards for
African-American employees than for similarly situated white employ-
84
ees.
The district court entered judgment in favor of the employees on their
claim that the employer engaged in a pattern-and-practice of discrimination.
Both the employer and employees appealed. 6
The Fourth Circuit framed the issue as "whether individuals have a pri-
vate, non-class cause of action for pattem[-and-]practice discrimination and,
thus, may ... [use] . . . the Teamsters method of proof."87 The court con-
cluded that "although such plaintiffs... [can] use evidence of a pattern[-and-
]practice of discrimination to help prove claims of individual discrimination
1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1990); Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 469-70 (8th Cir.
1984).
79. See, e.g., Lowery, 158 F.3d at 760-61.
80. Id.
81. 1d. at 742.
82. Id. at 759.
83. Id. at 749.
84. Lowery, 158 F.3d at 749.
85. Id. at 755-56.
86. Id. at 756-57.
87. Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760 (4th Cir. 1998).
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within the McDonnell Douglas framework, individual plaintiffs are not enti-
tled to the benefit of the Teamsters method of proof. '88 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Fourth Circuit noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has never applied
the Teamsters method of proof in a private, non-class suit charging employ-
ment discrimination. 89
The Fourth Circuit articulated two reasons why the pattern-and-practice
framework is inapplicable to individual disparate treatment cases. First, the
court held that the "manifest" and "crucial" differences between an individ-
ual's claim of discrimination and class actions prevent an individual plaintiff
from shifting the burden solely with evidence of a pattern-and-practice. 90
Second, the court stated that because the remedies sought in individual, non-
class actions are different than the remedies sought in class actions, an indi-
vidual plaintiff should not be allowed to shift the burden of proof through
evidence of a pattem-and-practice.9'
1. "Manifest" and "Crucial" Difference
Focusing on this "manifest" and "crucial" difference, the Lowery court
noted that in class actions, "the plaintiffs first litigate the common question
of fact, i.e., whether the employer utilized a pattern[-and-]practice which
discriminated against the class." 92 Class actions are different from individual
actions because in individual actions, common questions of fact are not liti-
gated, but a specific instance of discrimination is the sole question that must
be answered. 93 Thus, the fundamental difference is that in the individual,
non-class actions, the main inquiry is a particular employment decision,
whereas in class actions, the liability phase focuses not on individual deci-
sions, but on the existence of a pattern of discriminatory conduct.94 How-
ever, the Fourth Circuit stated that evidence of a pattern-and-practice can be
a useful tool in demonstrating that the adverse employment action occurred
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination,
or that the employer's articulated reasons for the adverse action was pre-
text.95
88. Id. at 760-61.
89. Id. at 761.
90. Id. at 760-61.
91. ld. at 761.
92. Lowery, 158 F.3d at 761.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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2. Difference in Remedies Sought
The Lowery court also focused on the difference in remedies sought in
class actions and individual actions.96 In class actions, plaintiffs "primarily
seek to redress widespread discrimination." 97 Accordingly, the Fourth Cir-
cuit concluded that the relief typically sought is injunctive and may include
requiring the defendant to adopt affirmative action plans or altering a senior-
ity system.98 "On the other hand, in a private, non-class .. .[action], the
plaintiff seeks to remedy individual harm" and seeks remedies such as back-
pay, front-pay, reinstatement, hiring, or damages. 99 The difference between
the two remedies is that the remedies sought in individual cases "require [an]
examination of the circumstances surrounding a single employment action
involving the plaintiff," whereas the class action requires an examination of
the entire class. l00
B. Rationale Used by Courts That Allow the Burden to Be Shifted
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that pattern-and-
practice can be used to prove a prima facie case and shift the burden to the
defendant in private, non-class suits, the Eleventh and District of Columbia
Circuits ("D.C. Circuits") have allowed proof of pattern-and-practice to shift
the burden.'0 1 These courts borrow language from the leading Supreme
Court cases allowing pattern-and-practice in class actions and apply this lan-
guage to individual claims.
An example is the D.C. Circuit case of Davis v. Califano.10 2 In Davis,
Dr. Barbara Davis, a white female employee, "alleged unlawful discrimina-
tion.., based on her sex, in hiring, promotions, and other conditions of em-
ployment, in violation of Title VII."' 3 Dr. Davis provided statistical evi-
dence showing that she was not promoted as quickly as other males with the
same qualifications." She presented data showing: 1) a "disparity in grade
and salary structure between male and female employees;" 2) a "disparity in
promotion rates of men and women employees;" and 3) a "disparity in grade
96. Id.
97. Lowery, 158 F.3d at 761.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1559 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Cali-
fano, 613 F.2d 957, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
102. 613 F.2d at 957.
103. Id. at 958.
104. Id. at 960.
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and salary structure of male and female employees ... with regard to their
education."' 5 The district court dismissed the complaint, and Dr. Davis ap-
pealed. 0
6
The D.C. Circuit Court framed the issue as whether statistics alone
could prove a prima facie case in an individual discrimination. 7 The D.C.
Circuit Court, quoting the United States Supreme Court, stated that "statisti-
cal proof of a 'broad-based policy of employment discrimination 'provides'
reasonable grounds to infer that individual 'employment' decisions were
made in pursuit of the discriminatory policy and.., require 's' the employer
to come forth with evidence dispelling that inference. ' ' '"8 As a result, the
D.C. Circuit Court concluded that equal force and effect must be given to the
use of statistical evidence regardless of whether the case is brought as an
individual, non-class action or as a class action.'0 9
The Davis court then adopted the same rationale adopted by the Su-
preme Court in Teamsters and applied it to individual, non-class actions."0
The D.C. Circuit Court found that the purpose of a prima facie case is to
"create a greater likelihood that any single [employment] decision was a
component of the overall pattern.' It does not, nor is it expected to, "con-
clusively demonstrate that all of the employer's decisions were part of the
proved discriminatory pattern and practice. '  Proof of a pattern-and-
practice of discrimination "creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of indi-
vidual relief [which] is consistent with the manner in which presumptions are
created generally.""' 3  "Moreover, the finding of a pattern[-and-]practice
change[s] the position of the employer to that of a... wrongdoer [and] ...
the employer [is] in the best position to show why any individual employee
was denied an employment opportunity."' '14 The Davis court concluded that
because proof of a pattern-and-practice of discrimination accomplishes the
objective of the prima facie case, the Teamsters rationale should be applied
to individual actions.'
105. Id.
106. Id. at 958.
107. Davis, 613 F.2d at 961.
108. Id. at 963 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359
(1977)).
109. Davis, 613 F.2d at 963.
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n.45).
112. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n.45.
113. Id.
114. Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S.
359 n.45).
115. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE METHODS
There are three reasons why individual plaintiffs in Title VII actions for
disparate treatment should be able to shift the burden of production by dem-
onstrating the defendant had a pattern-and-practice of discrimination. First,
allowing individuals to use the Teamsters approach is consistent with exist-
ing case precedent. Second, use of pattern-and-practice by individuals is
effective proof of discrimination in individual, non-class actions. Third, the
Teamsters approach promotes the anti-discrimination policy of Title VII.
A. Consistent With Case Precedent
The first reason why plaintiffs should be afforded the right to shift the
burden of proof by using evidence of a pattern-and-practice of discrimination
is that it is consistent with past case law. In Teamsters, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that past cases have made it "unmistakably clear that 'statisti-
cal [evidence has] served ... an important role' .. . in which the existence of
discrimination is a disputed issue"'"16 and is "competent in proving employ-
ment discrimination [cases].""' 7  Furthermore, "[i]n many cases the only
available avenue of proof is the use of ... statistics to uncover clandestine
and covert discrimination by the employer.""' 8 In a footnote, the Supreme
Court explained that, "absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or
less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in
the community from which employees are hired."" 9 "Statistics showing [a
distinct] racial ... imbalance ... [provide] a telltale sign of purposeful dis-
crimination.'
' 20
Case law has supported the fact that the significance of the McDonnell
Douglas method does not lie in its "specification of the discrete elements"
required to prove a prima facie case.' 2' McDonnell Douglas indicates "that
any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence ade-
quate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a
116. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 (quoting Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educ. Equal. League,
415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 340 n.20 (quoting United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551
(9th Cir. 1971)); see also Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382
(4th Cir. 1972).
119. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977).
120. Id.
121. ld.at358.
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discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act."' 122 Thus, "[a]s in any lawsuit,
the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence,"'123 as
long as the evidence creates an inference of discrimination. As stated in
Teamsters, statistics can "create a greater likelihood that any single decision
was a component of the overall pattern"'' 24 and are a "telltale sign of purpose-
ful discrimination."'125 Furthermore, "proof of a discriminatory pattern and
practice creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of individual relief [which]
is consistent with the manner in which presumptions are [normally] cre-
ated." 26 As a result, the plaintiff should not be denied the ability to demon-
strate a prima facie case solely through evidence of a pattern-and-practice.
B. Pattern-and-Practice Does Work in Individual, Non-Class Actions
The second reason why individual plaintiffs should be afforded an op-
portunity to use the Teamsters approach is because it is suitable to be used in
individual, non-class actions. In Lowery, the Fourth Circuit stated "that there
is a 'manifest' ... difference between an individual's claim of discrimination
and a class action alleging a general pattern[-and-]practice of discrimina-
tion.'"127 The court determined that in a non-class action, the question of
whether the employer discriminated against the plaintiff in one particular
instance is litigated, whereas in a class action, the question of whether a dis-
criminatory policy existed is litigated.' Therefore, proof of a pattern-and-
practice answers the question of discrimination in the workplace, but not for
that individual plaintiff. Although this difference is clear, it does not justify
prohibiting individual plaintiffs from using evidence of a pattern-and-
practice to shift the burden, for three reasons.
First, the two-phase trial created by the Supreme Court in Teamsters de-
feats this theory.'2 9 During the first stage, the plaintiff demonstrates that "the
employer has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination."' 30
If the employer cannot rebut this evidence by clear and convincing evidence,
liability is established and the case moves on to the remedial phase. 3 ' Dur-
122. Id.
123. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983).
124. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n.45.
125. Id. at 340 n.20.
126. Id. at 359 n.45.
127. Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 761 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Cooper
v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876 (1984)).
128. Id.
129. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360-61.
130. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361 (1977).
131. Id.
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ing the remedial phase, the plaintiff proves that he was, in fact, discriminated
against. 112
Second, to shift the burden, the plaintiff must show that discrimination
more likely than not played a role in the employment decision affecting the
plaintiff.'33 Evidence demonstrating a pattern-and-practice of discrimination
throughout the company or corporation adequately meets this burden.'3 4
Evidence of a pattern-and-practice creates the likelihood that any single deci-
sion was in furtherance of the discriminatory policy. 35 Once this is shown,
the employer becomes a wrongdoer and is in the best position to demonstrate
that the employment actions were taken for legitimate reasons.'36
Third, the evidentiary value of demonstrating a pattern-and-practice of
discrimination should not be, and is not, any less valuable because there are
not multiple parties. Regardless of whether or not evidence of a pattern-and-
practice is brought in an individual, non-class action, or in a class action, its
importance in proving discrimination is the same.
C. Promotes Anti-Discrimination Policy of Title VII
The third reason why individual plaintiffs should be afforded the Team-
sters approach is that it promotes the anti-discrimination policy and goals of
Title VII. 137 "The primary purpose of Title VII [is] 'to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate ... discriminatory practices and
devices ... .""" Under Title VII, practices and procedures "'cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices."",139 Unfortunately, by only affording an individual
plaintiff the use of the McDonnell Douglas approach, employers get away
with intentional discrimination. 40
Forcing the plaintiff to prove discrimination through the McDonnell
Douglas method presents the employer with an advantage."' McDonnell
Douglas works well for a plaintiff with strong circumstantial evidence that
the employer has discriminated against the particular plaintiff. 42 However,
132. Id.
133. Id. at 359 n.45.
134. Id.
135. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n.45.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 348.
138. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
139. Id. at 358 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).
140. See Green, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
141. See id.
142. Id.
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problems with McDonnell Douglas arise when the plaintiff has overwhelm-
ing evidence that the employer has a broad pattern of discrimination, but no
evidence that the particular plaintiff was discriminated against.143 In this
situation, the burden should be on the employer to demonstrate that it did not
discriminate against the individual plaintiff. By affording the plaintiff the
option of shifting the burden through evidence of a pattern-and-practice of
discrimination, the purpose of Title VII will be met.
Past cases have demonstrated the difficulties plaintiffs have when they
have strong statistical evidence, but not enough evidence to prove a prima
facie case under McDonnell Douglas.'44 In Victory v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 45 the plaintiffs' suit for gender discrimination was dismissed for failure
to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, despite the fact that the
plaintiff submitted evidence of a pattern-and-practice of discrimination. 146 In
that case, plaintiff alleged that the employer "paid her less than comparably
trained and qualified men, failed to promote her to management positions for
which she was qualified, and failed to equalize the terms and conditions of
her employment."'147 Convincing statistical evidence was presented to dem-
onstrate her claim. 48 First, between the years of 1986 and 1989, twelve male
sales representatives were promoted out of a pool of ninety-five male sales
representatives.149 On the other hand, during this same time frame, out of the
twenty-five female sales representatives, not a single female was pro-
moted. 5° The statistical expert explained that there was a "one in twenty
chance that this outcome could have occurred randomly... [and that] 'there
is no explanation for the fact that women received lower promotion rating
than men."""' Furthermore, a review of salaries showed that women re-
ceived around $7500 per year less than comparably trained and qualified
men. 1
52
In dismissing plaintiffs claim, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York found several problems with the prima facie
case presented by the plaintiff.'53 First, the "plaintiff never applied for a spe-
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 34 F. Supp. 2d 809 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
146. Id. at 821.
147. Id. at 813.
148. Id. at 815.
149. Id.
150. Victory, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 815.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 818-19.
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cific position."' 54 Although this was true, "Hewlett-Packard did not have a
uniform practice of posting openings for management positions or a stan-
dardized written application procedure."' 55 However, the plaintiff had in-
formed her district managers on several occasions of her interest in obtaining
a management position. 5 6 Second, the "[p]laintiff failed to articulate a spe-
cific promotion for which she was denied."'' 57
Victory demonstrates the problems a plaintiff has with the McDonnell
Douglas approach.' 58 Although the plaintiff did not have clear-cut evidence
that she was discriminated against, she did present evidence sufficient to
show that there was a great likelihood that she was discriminated against.'59
It is in this type of case where the Teamsters approach would be advanta-
geous to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that evidence
of a pattern-and-practice is important evidence. 60  Evidence of this type
changes the position of the employer to that of a proved wrongdoer and
forces the employer to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
employment action was made for legitimate reasons. 6' The Teamsters ap-
proach solves the problem of dismissing cases where there is clear evidence
of discrimination, but not enough to prove the prima facie case."' Addition-
ally, affording this method to individuals is consistent with Title VII's pur-
pose of eliminating all discriminatory policies.
V. RECOMMENDATION
By adopting the use of pattern-and-practice in individual, non-class ac-
tions to prove discrimination, plaintiffs will be afforded multiple options in
proving discrimination in violation of Title VII. Although the Supreme
Court has never specifically held that individuals can use evidence of a pat-
tern-and-practice of discrimination to shift the burden, past Supreme Court
decisions make it clear that the McDonnell Douglas method was not meant
to be the sole method of proving discrimination for an individual.'63
154. /d. at 819.
155. Victory, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Seeid. at816-17.
159. Id. at 815-16.
160. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
161. Id. at 359-61.
162. Id.
163. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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In Teamsters, the Defendants argued that the McDonnell Douglas pat-
tern of proof was the only means of establishing a prima facie case of indi-
vidual discrimination."6 The Court responded by stating that:
[t]he importance of McDonnell Douglas lies, not in its specification of the
discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the gen-
eral principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of
offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment de-
cision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act.1
65
Furthermore, the Supreme Court also stated in United States Postal Ser-
vice Board of Governors v. Aikens, ' that a "plaintiff may prove his case by
direct or circumstantial evidence.' 67  These statements by the Supreme
Court indicate that there is more than just one method by which the plaintiff
may shift the burden to the defendant. 168 These statements also demonstrate
that one of the rationales behind not allowing pattern-and-practice to be used
by individual plaintiffs, which the Supreme Court has never officially al-
lowed, is without merit.
169
As noted above, the Teamsters approach can be applied to individu-
als. 70 Courts should permit individual plaintiffs to demonstrate that adverse
employment decisions were part of a discriminatory policy followed by the
employer. Proof of a discriminatory policy may not be enough to prove that
the individual plaintiff was discriminated against, but it does provide strong
evidence and "create[s] a greater likelihood that any single decision" by the
employer was based on that policy.' 7 ' The Supreme Court has stated that
"proof of the pattem[-and-]practice supports an inference that any particular
employment decision, during the period in which the discriminatory policy
was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy."'
' 72
Once a pattern-and-practice is established, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiffs proof is
inaccurate or insignificant."' If the employer cannot meet this burden, the
164. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358.
165. Id.
166. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
167. Id. at 714 n.3.
168. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
169. id.
170. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 328.
171. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977).
172. Id. at 362.
173. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1287 n.22 (I 1th Cir. 2000) (citing
Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1559 (1 th Cir. 1986)); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
362.
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jury may conclude that a violation has occurred. 7 4 At this point, the case
moves onto the liability phase.'75 During this phase, the plaintiff must dem-
onstrate that she "was a potential victim of the proved discrimination."' 76
The concerns over the differences of proof between class actions and
individual, non-class action lawsuits are solved at the liability phase. During
this phase, the individual plaintiff demonstrates that he or she was in fact
discriminated against in a specific instance.177 The proof of an overall policy
of discrimination is merely used to get to this point and to demonstrate that
the employer has a history of discrimination.'78
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has stated that the McDonnell Douglas pattern of
proof is not the sole method of proof available to individual plaintiffs. As a
result, plaintiffs should be afforded the option of demonstrating discrimina-
tion through the use of pattern-and-practice as set out by the Court in Team-
sters.'79 This approach offers three important advantages to an individual
plaintiff. First, the plaintiff can avoid the rigid and sometimes unfair
McDonnell Douglas approach. The pattern-and-practice approach allows the
plaintiff-employee, who has evidence that the employer discriminated, but no
evidence that the employer discriminated against that particular plaintiff-
employee, to shift the burden of proof. Unfortunately, under the McDonnell
Douglas approach, the plaintiff's claim would be dismissed. Second, the
two-phase pattern-and-practice trial shifts the burden of persuasion to the
employer, which is entirely appropriate since the plaintiff already has proven
that the employer engaged in systematic intentional discrimination. Third, in
cases where cladstone proof of discrimination is not available, proof of a
pattern-and-practice of discrimination can provide the plaintiff with a pre-
sumption of discrimination. As a result of these important advantages to the
plaintiff, plaintiffs should be afforded the right to use proof of a pattern-and-
practice of discrimination to shift the burden in individual, non-class actions.
174. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 362.
177. Id. at 361.
178. Id.
179. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA") is a
consumer protection law based upon the Federal Trade Commission Act.' It
is designed to govern consumer protection by prohibiting "unfair methods of
competition, or unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce."2 It is used by the Office of the State
Attorney and the Department of Legal Affairs to prosecute violators, and it
also provides a private cause of action to individuals and businesses.3 This
Act does not contain express language restricting its protection to Florida
residents only.4 Courts in Florida, both federal and state, have addressed
matters involving the application of the FDUTPA to out-of-state and even
international parties.' The issue of the use of the FDUTPA by non-residents
of the state has not been consistently settled as of today and in fact, a recent
decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal may have further compli-
cated the matter.6
The extraterritorial use of this law is an important issue for individuals
and businesses that reside in and out of the State of Florida. The amount of
international and interstate trade that is performed in and involves Florida
makes it important to highlight the history and current status of court opin-
1. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000); FLA. STAT. § 501.201-.213 (2002); David J. Federbush, The
Unexplored Territory of Unfairness in Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act,
73 FLA. B.J. 26, 28 (1999) [hereinafter Federbush 1].
2. § 501.202(2).
3. § 501.203(2), .211(1). The Department of Legal Affairs is headed-up by the Attorney
General of the State of Florida. § 20.11.
4. See § 501.201-.213.
5. See, e.g., Guyana Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Melbourne Int'l Communications, Ltd., 329 F.3d
1241, 1243 (1ith Cir. 2003); Nieman v. Dryclean U.S.A. Franchise Co., 178 F.3d 1126,
1128-29 (11 th Cir. 1999); Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1090, 1093 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Dep't of Legal
Affairs, 761 So. 2d 1256, 1257 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v.
Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Coastal Physician Servs. of
Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
6. See Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1093-94 (explaining the court's decision in Glassman four
years earlier).
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ions to determine the effective scope of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act.
This article provides a summary of the Act by describing its purposes,
types of violations, enforcement power, and available remedies. The perti-
nent state appellate case history is then explored, including a discussion of
two Fourth District Court of Appeal cases, which examine why the court
held it was appropriate for the Act to extend to non-residents of Florida in
one case, while not in the other.7 The court's rationale in each case, and an
analysis of factors to be considered in determining if the FDUTPA would
apply in future cases, is analyzed.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FLORIDA DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR
TRADE PRACTICES ACT
A. Purposes of the Act
As its name suggests, the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act is a Florida Statute intended to provide a means of protection against
unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable trade practices.8 Specifically, the law
states its purposes as:
(1) To simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing con-
sumer protection, unfair methods of competition, and unconscion-
able, deceptive, and unfair trade practices. (2) To protect the con-
suming public and legitimate business enterprises from those who
engage in unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable, de-
ceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce. (3) To make state consumer protection and enforce-
ment consistent with established policies of federal law relating to
consumer protection. 9
By its definition under the FDUTPA, "'[c]onsumer' means an individ-
ual; child, by and through its parent or legal guardian; business; firm; asso-
ciation; joint venture; partnership; estate; trust; business trust; syndicate;
fiduciary; corporation; any commercial entity, however denominated; or any
other group or combination."' 0 Thus, through its definition of "consumer"
7. Id. at 1094 (distinguishing the facts of this case from those in Glassman in support of
the court's determination that the FDUTPA should not apply to all claims in a national class
action).
8. § 501.202(1)-(3).
9. Id.
10. § 501.203(7).
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which includes business entities, and by its stated goal of shielding business
enterprises from unfair competition, this statute extends beyond the protec-
tion of the mere individual consumer and into the area of civil antitrust as
well."
B. Violations of the FDUTPA
The FDUTPA is known as a "little FTC act" because it is the State of
Florida's version of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"). 12 As
such, the Florida Legislature intended that "due consideration and great
weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission
and the federal courts" in determining the types of conduct that constitute
violations of the FDUTPA. 13 On its face, the statute prohibits "[u]nfair
methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."' 4 The
Supreme Court of Florida upheld the constitutionality of the FDUTPA, de-
spite its lack of specificity as to the types of conduct that are considered to be
violations, in Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers. 5
The statute allows for, but does not require, the adoption of rules that
specify violating practices by the Department of Legal Affairs. 6 All sub-
stantive rules created by the Department of Legal Affairs must be consistent
with those created by the FTC and the federal courts in their interpretations
of the FTC Act. 7 Supplementing the holding in Rogers, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal held in Department of Legal Affairs v. Father & Son Mov-
ing & Storage, Inc.8 that "a specific rule or regulation is not necessary to the
determination of what constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice."' 9 Subse-
quent to the decision in Father & Son, the Department of Legal Affairs re-
pealed rules that it had previously adopted and cited this case as the justifica-
tion for its repeal.2"
11. Id.; § 501.202(2); see David J. Federbush, FDUTPA for Civil Antitrust: Additional
Conduct, Party, and Geographic Coverage; State Actions for Consumer Restitution, 76 FLA.
B.J. 52, 53 (2002) [hereinafter Federbush Il].
12. Federbush I, supra note 1; 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
13. FLA. STAT. § 501.204(2) (2003).
14. § 501.204(1).
15. 329 So. 2d 257, 267 (Fla. 1976).
16. §§ 501.203(4),.205(1).
17. § 501.205(2).
18. 643 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
19. Id. at 24.
20. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 2-2.001 (2000) (stating "[i]t is neither possible nor neces-
sary to codify every conceivable deceptive and unfair trade practice prohibited by Part 11,
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While the FDUTPA does not contain a list of practices that are consid-
ered to be violations, it does provide some broad guidelines in its definitions:
"Violation of this part" means any violation of this act or the rules
adopted under this act and may be based upon any of the following
as of July 1, 2001: (a) Any rules promulgated pursuant to the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ss. 41 et seq.; (b) The stan-
dards of unfairness and deception set forth and interpreted by the
Federal Trade Commission or the federal courts; (c) Any law, stat-
ute, rule, regulation, or ordinance which proscribes unfair methods
of competition, or unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable acts or
21practices.
The last category of "per se violations" potentially provides wide lati-
tude as a basis for FDUTPA violations, because the statutes, rules, or ordi-
nances breached do not need to contain definite references to the FDUTPA,
but rather, need only prohibit conduct that is deceptive, unfair, or uncon-
scionable.2 The type of practices that the FDUTPA seeks to regulate are
also quite broad, as demonstrated by its definition:
"Trade or commerce" means the advertising, soliciting, providing,
offering, or distributing, whether by sale, rental, or otherwise of
any good or service, or any property, whether tangible or intangi-
ble, or any other article, commodity, or thing of value, wherever
situated. "Trade or commerce" shall include the conduct of any
trade or commerce, however denominated, including any nonprofit
or not-for-profit person or activity.23
Judging by the language used on its face, the intended scope of the
FDUTPA is therefore far-reaching.24
C. Enforcement of the FDUTPA and Allowable Remedies
The Office of the State Attorney and the Department of Legal Affairs
have power to uphold the FDUTPA. 25 The statute reads:
Chapter 501, Florida Statutes." (citation omitted)). The Florida Administrative Code Anno-
tated also states that the repeal does not modify or restrict the application of Chapter 501 of
the Florida Statutes, to deceptive and unfair trade practices. Id.
21. § 501.203(3)(a)-(c).
22. Mark S. Fistos, Per Se Violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act, 76 FLA. B.J. 62, 63-64 (2002).
23. § 501.203(8) (emphasis added).
24. See id.
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"[e]nforcing authority" means the office of the state attorney if a
violation of this part occurs in or affects the judicial circuit under
the office's jurisdiction. "Enforcing authority" means the Depart-
ment of Legal Affairs if the violation occurs in or affects more
than one judicial circuit or if the office of the state attorney defers
to the department in writing, or fails to act upon a violation within
90 days after a written complaint has been filed with the state at-
torney. 6
The "enforcing authority" can bring an action against a willful violator
of the Act for a civil penalty of up to $10,000, and may also seek a declara-
tory judgment, enjoin a violator, or pursue actual damages on behalf of con-
sumers or governmental entities.27
A private cause of action is also provided for by the Act.28 The
FDUTPA states "anyone aggrieved by a violation of this part may bring an
action to obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this
part and to enjoin a person who has violated, is violating, or is otherwise
likely to violate this part. ' 29 Additionally, "[i]n any action brought by a per-
son who has suffered a loss as a result of a violation of this part, such person
may recover actual damages, plus attorney's fees and court costs."30 The
relaxed threshold of "anyone aggrieved" allows for the use of the FDUTPA
by business entities for unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable practices of
competitors.3
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION IN PERTINENT CASES
One aspect of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act that
has been debated in the courts is the issue of its extraterritorial application.32
The FDUTPA does not contain express language limiting its reach within the
25. § 501.203(2).
26. Id.
27. § 501.2075; § 501.207(1)(a)-(c).
28. §501.211(1).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. § 501.211(2).
31. See § 501.211 (l); Federbush 11, supra note 11, at 52.
32. See, e.g., Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2003); Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Dep't of Legal Affairs, 761
So. 2d 1256, 1260 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738
So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Coastal Physician Servs. of Broward County,
Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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State of Florida, as opposed to the Florida Antitrust Act, for example.33
There are various scenarios in which the FDUTPA could potentially apply,
for example: an out-of-state plaintiff (alleged victim) versus an in-state de-
fendant (alleged violator), or an in-state plaintiff (alleged victim) versus an
out-of-state defendant (alleged violator).34 The situation becomes more
complicated when there are plaintiffs from both within and outside the state,
as well as when the violative conduct occurs solely within the state or both
within and outside the state.35 Court decisions have swayed back and forth
between allowing the application of the FDUTPA to cases involving out-of-
state parties and not doing so, because of the need for other states' consumer
protection laws to govern instead.36 A careful review of relevant cases may
shed some light on the factors that the courts have considered when deter-
mining whether or not to allow the application of the FDUTPA to litigation
involving non-resident parties. This Note reviews relevant appellate level
cases that decided the issue of whether the FDUTPA may be used as the ba-
sis of a cause of action by non-resident plaintiffs.
A. FDUTPA Not Applied Extraterritorially in Coastal Physician Services of
Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz
The 1999 case of Coastal Physician Services of Broward County, Inc. v.
Ortiz7 involved a claim by a patient against a physician staffing service for
alleged violations of the FDUTPA incurred in the collection of medical
bills.38 A discovery order was entered by the circuit court, instructing the
physician staffing service to provide documents naming all people to whom
the service sent a certain form bill.39 The staffing service petitioned for a
writ of certiorari, arguing that the information they were required to provide
33. Federbush 11, supra note 11, at 60. Compare § 501.201-.213, with § 542.18 (stating
"[e]very contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in this state is
unlawful.") (emphasis added);.
34. See, e.g., Fendrich v. RBF, L.L.C., 842 So. 2d 1076, 1079 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (out-of-state plaintiffs v. in-state defendants); Execu-Tech Bus. Sys. Inc. v. New Oji
Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 583 (Fla. 2000) (in-state-plaintiffs v. out-of-state defendants).
35. See, e.g., Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1094; Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 437.
36. Compare Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1094 (holding that class certification in Florida was
not appropriate because the alleged wrong took place in all fifty states and therefore, Florida
law would not apply to all claims), with Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 439 (finding that although a
majority of plaintiffs were not residents of Florida, the FDUTPA applied to all members of the
class).
37. 764 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id.
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under the discovery request should be limited to Florida residents only.4°
Their initial attempt to limit discovery was unsuccessful; however, on motion
for rehearing, the Fourth District Court of Appeal granted Coastal's petition
for certiorari of the discovery order, limited to the names of those recipients
outside the State of Florida.4 In granting certiorari, the court agreed with the
staffing service that non-Florida residents could not make claims under the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.42 The court concluded
that together with another state law at issue, the FDUTPA is "for the protec-
tion of in-state consumers from either in-state or out-of-state debt collectors.
Other states can protect their own residents, as Florida itself does with regard
to out-of-state collectors. 43
In Ortiz, the Fourth District Court of Appeal was therefore quite limit-
ing in its determination of who can utilize the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act, holding that non-residents of the state were not entitled
to benefit from its protections, but rather, must rely on the laws of their re-
spective states."4 The court's holding may, or may not, still stand, as shall be
discussed below.
45
B. FDUTPA Applied in Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman
The next relevant case at the state appellate level was Renaissance
Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman,46 also decided in 1999. 4' Here, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal upheld a class certification by travelers against a cruise line
for claims of deceptive trade practices under the FDUTPA, even though
many class members were not residents of Florida.48 The conduct in ques-
tion was the collection by the cruise line of a "port charge" which was sup-
plemental to the cost of the cruise itself.49 The alleged deceptive conduct
was the representation by the cruise line that the entire port charges were
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d at 8.
43. Id. (citations omitted).
44. See id.
45. Compare Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Dep't of Legal Affairs,
761 So. 2d 1256, 1262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (characterizing the subsequent Fourth
District Court of Appeal decision in Glassman as a rescission of its previous holding in Ortiz),
with Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1090, 1094 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(clarifying that its holding in Ortiz was not superceded by its holding in Glassman, but rather,
both opinions stand and the cases are distinguishable).
46. 738 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 439.
49. Id. at 437.
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paid to the ports, when actually an amount less than that collected was paid
out and the cruise line kept the difference.50 The plaintiffs commenced an
action for what they deemed to be a deceptive trade practice and sought class
certification of "'[a]ll U.S. residents who traveled upon any vessel owned or
operated by Renaissance on or after April 22, 1992, and paid port charges to
Renaissance in connection with such cruise."' 5'
1. Requirements for Certification of the Class
In order to certify a class, it must meet the requirements of rule 1.220(a)
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:
(1) the members of the class are so numerous that separate joinder
of each member is impracticable, (2) the claim or defense of the
representative party raises questions of law or fact common to the
questions of law or fact raised by the claim or defense of each
member of the class, (3) the claim or defense of the representative
party is typical of the claim or defense of each member of the
class, and (4) the representative party can fairly and adequately
protect and represent the interests of each member of the class.
52
In addition to meeting those elements, a claim can only be maintained
on behalf of the class if,
individual adjudications for proposed class members would be in-
consistent; or the defendant's actions make injunctive or declara-
tory relief as a whole appropriate; or the common questions of law
or fact "predominate over any question of law or fact affecting
only individual members of the class, and class representation is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adju-
dication of the controversy.53
2. Application of Florida Law to All Members of the Class
In Glassman, based on data provided by the cruise line, ninety-two per-
cent of tickets were sold to non-residents of the State of Florida. 4 The cruise
line argued against class certification on the basis of the inapplicability of
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. FLA. R. Cv. P. 1.220(a); Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438.
53. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438 (quoting FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)).
54. Id. at 437.
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Florida law to every proposed class member, as so many were non-residents
of Florida who purchased their tickets outside of the state.55 If Florida law
did not pertain to their claims, then the "commonality" and "predominance"
requirements of rules 1.220(a)(2) and (b)(3) would not be met and the class
could not be certified.56
The travelers, however, demonstrated that while not in the majority, still
over 6000 potential class members were residents of the State of Florida.
57
Numerous other factors helped to establish that the use of Florida law for all
claims would be proper: the location of Renaissance's principal place of
business and site of most of its business operations being in Florida; the trav-
eler's ultimate payment being made to the cruise line in Florida; and a forum
selection clause in the terms of each cruise ticket, specifying Broward
County, Florida as having jurisdiction over claims arising out of the ticket
sale.58
Here on appeal, the "significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts" test developed in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts59 was relied upon
by the cruise line as the standard that needed to be met in order "to apply a
state's substantive law to a class action without offending the Due Process or
Full Faith and Credit Clauses. '60 The cruise line contended that "there were
insufficient contacts with Florida to warrant application of Florida law to
apply to the entire class so that common questions of law and fact would not
predominate over individual claims."'" For the reasons mentioned above that
were asserted by the travelers, and other reasons as well, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal found that there were significant contacts with the State of
Florida to warrant the application of its law to claims by the class members,
55. Id.
56. Renaissance Cruise, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(2), (b)(3).
57. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 437.
58. Id. at 438. While the claim under the FDUTPA that was asserted by the class did not
arise under the ticket sale transaction, the presence of the forum selection clause was argued
by the potential class members to be additional justification for applying Florida law, since the
cruise line had chosen to avail itself of the jurisdiction for those disputes which did originate
under the ticket transaction, and so should be held for this action. Id.
59. 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985).
60. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 439 (referencing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818-19). The Court in
Shutts quoted its plurality opinion in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), "for a
State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818;
Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13.
61. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438-39 (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818-19).
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so "[t]here [was] nothing arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair in applying the
law of Florida to all of the members of the class."6
The cruise line asserted two other reasons that class certification was
not proper: based on Florida choice of law standards, Florida substantive
law would not apply; and the statute of limitations varied between states and
thus, it would be unmanageable to apply to individual class members.63
These claims were both denied by the court, which found that the significant
relationship test to determine which state's substantive law applies.' 4 The
test, as outlined in Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co.,65 was met here and
so Florida substantive law applies to all claims.66 With respect to the varying
statutes of limitation issue, the court cited Bates v. Cook, Inc. ,67 in which the
significant relationship test in Bishop was used to determine which state's
statute of limitation applies, and since here that test allowed for the use of
Florida substantive law, Florida's statute of limitation would apply to all
class members as well.
68
One note that becomes important in the later discussion of the Hutson
case, 69 is that in Glassman, the Fourth District Court of Appeal mentioned in
its account of the trial court's opinion that the common injury occurred in
Florida because all cruise payments were made to the cruise line in Florida.70
There was no further discussion of this determination in the Fourth District
Court of Appeal's opinion as it was not specifically an issue raised by
Glassman on appeal.7 In Hutson, the court refers to the place of injury as a
determining factor as to whether the FDUTPA applies to a class action in-
volving non-residents of Florida.1
2
62. Id. at 439. Other factors that the court considered in determining that there were
significant contacts between Florida and the litigation included: the port charges in question
were paid by the cruise line by checks issued from Fort Lauderdale; overages above the port
charges paid out were kept by the cruise line in Fort Lauderdale; the cruise ticket contract and
marketing material were from Broward County, and included the cruise line's Fort Lauderdale
address. Id.
63. Renaissance Cruise, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 439-40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
64. Id. at 439.
65. 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980).
66. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 439.
67. 509 So. 2d 1112, 1114-15 (Fla. 1987).
68. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 440.
69. Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
70. Id. at 438.
71. See id. at 436-40.
72. See Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1094.
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3. Conclusion: Application of the FDUTPA to Non-Resident Class
Members
In Glassman, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the Seven-
teenth Judicial Circuit Court's "well-reasoned order., 73 In granting the class
certification, the trial court
concluded that there was sufficient commonality of factual and le-
gal issues and that Florida had sufficient contacts, creating state in-
terest, such that application of Florida law to the entire class was
not arbitrary or unfair. The court noted that Florida has a great in-
terest in protecting people dealing with corporations doing busi-
ness within Florida.74
The affirmation by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of the lower
court's holding, emphasizing the State of Florida's interest in protecting peo-
ple dealing with Florida businesses, demonstrates a shift in the court's ap-
proach to the use of the FDUTPA from that expressed in Ortiz.75 There, the
court characterized the purpose of the Act as being "for the protection of in-
state consumers" in granting certiorari to limit discovery to only residents of
the state because non-residents were not entitled to make claims under the
FDUTPA.76 Here, the state's interest in "protecting people dealing with cor-
porations doing business within Florida" was applicable to the entire class,
Florida residents and non-residents alike, and their claims under the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act were permitted.77
C. FDUTPA Not Applied Extraterritorially in Oc6 Printing Systems
USA, Inc. v. Mailers Data Services, Inc.75
The Second District Court of Appeal decided Ocd in June of 2000.'9
This case was brought by a group of users, brokers, and servicers of high
speed printers against the company that manufactured, sold, and financed the
73. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 437.
74. Renaissance Cruise, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 438 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (describing the 17th Circuit Court's holding of class certification and the application of
Florida law to all claims) (emphasis added).
75. See id. at 437-38. But see Coastal Physician Servs. of Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz,
764 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
76. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d at 8.
77. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438.
78. 760 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
79. Id.
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printers.80 The complaint alleged violations of both the FDUTPA and the
Florida Antitrust Act for conduct by the defendants involving their mainte-
nance service, replacement parts, and lease financing.8' The plaintiffs sought
nationwide class certification, which was granted by the lower court and
appealed here.82
In determining whether the FDUTPA would apply to the claims of non-
residents, the Second District Court of Appeal acknowledged the lack of
limiting language in the Act itself, but limited the use of the statute to Florida
residents nonetheless. 83 The sole authority that the court cited for justifica-
tion of its decision was Coastal Physician Services of Broward County, Inc.
v. Ortiz."4 Referring to Ortiz, the Second District said "the court concluded
that the Unfair Trade Act was enacted to protect in-state consumers. 'Other
states can protect their own residents.' We agree that only in-state consum-
ers can pursue a valid claim under the Unfair Trade Act., 85 The court re-
jected cases referred to by the proposed class by distinguishing them because
they were based on common law, rather than statutory law.86 In doing so, the
court stated:
The Plaintiffs point to several cases in which nationwide classes
have been certified to argue that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in certifying such a class. However, in those cases, none
of the plaintiffs pursued claims under a state statutory scheme.
Rather, the plaintiffs alleged claims under common law theories
that could be applied nationwide. In contrast, the applicable stat-
utes in this case limit who can bring an action under the statute. A
nationwide class that allows entities to circumvent the express
statutory language is impermissible. Therefore, the trial court's or-
80. Id. at 1039. At least one of the plaintiffs was a Florida corporation, and at least one
contract between plaintiff and defendant was executed in the State of Florida. Id. at 1037,
1040.
81. Id. at 1039-42.
82. Oc. 760 So. 2d at 1040.
83. Id. at 1042.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Coastal Physician Servs. of Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d 7,
8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted)).
86. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Broin v. Philip
Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Cox v. Shell Oil Co., No.
CIV.A.18844, 1995 WL 775363, at *1 (Tenn. Ch. Nov. 17, 1995)).
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der certifying a nationwide class pursuant to the Unfair Trade Act
must be reversed.
87
The result in Oc, the non-application of the FDUTPA to non-residents,
is in agreement with that of Ortiz, but conflicts with that of Glassman.88
D. FDUTPA Applied in Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v.
Department of Legal Affairs
An important decision regarding the extraterritorial application of the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act was Millennium Commu-
nications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Department of Legal Affairs.89 In this July,
2000 case, Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. ("Millennium"),
a Florida corporation, advertised and marketed a credit card program by mail
and phone to residents solely outside the State of Florida.90 Millennium sent
postcards to consumers with poor credit histories to promote a credit card
program that could assist the consumers in rebuilding positive credit re-
ports.9' The wording on the postcard said: "CONGRATULATIONS!
YOU HAVE BEEN SELECTED TO RECEIVE A CREDIT CARD with an
unsecured credit limit of $4,000 Guaranteed regardless of your past credit
history!" as well as other representations.92 Upon receipt of the postcard,
consumers were instructed to call an "800" number for further information
and were then told they could receive an unsecured credit card with a $4000
credit limit that could be used to charge the purchase of goods from catalogs
which would be provided by the company that issued the credit card.93 After
providing information to the phone representatives, including payment of a
$129 fee that was automatically withdrawn from their checking accounts,
consumers would receive an Advantage credit card which could only be used
to order from catalogs that were subsequently sent with the Advantage credit
card.94 Along with the card and catalogs, consumers were given a list of re-
87. Oc4, 760 So. 2d at 1042 (referencing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 797; Brain, 641 So. 2d at
888; Cox, 1995 WL 775363, at *1).
88. Compare Oce, 760 So. 2d at 1042, and Ortiz, 764 So. 2d at 8, with Renaissance
Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 439-40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
89. 761 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
90. Id. at 1257. Millennium was licensed by a Nevada company, Continental Consumer
Credit Corporation ("Continental"), to "promote Continental's Advantage credit card program
in all states except Florida, Kansas, Wisconsin, and North Carolina." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1258 n.2.
93. Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1258 n.3.
94. Id. at 1258.
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quirements that they had to fulfill in order to become eligible to apply for a
Visa or MasterCard credit card.95 The requirements included the down pay-
ment of fifty percent of the total amount of orders, payment of an additional
eight percent charge on orders for shipping and handling, total charges (ex-
cluding down payments) of at least $500 that are then completely paid for,
and six months of timely payments.96 Once a consumer met these require-
ments, the consumer could then apply for a Visa or MasterCard credit card,
and if approved, the consumer would be required to pay an additional fee,
separate from the $129 fee paid to Millennium for the Advantage credit
card.97
The Department of Legal Affairs alleged that the language in the post-
card was likely to mislead consumers reasonably acting under the circum-
stances to believe that they would be receiving a Visa or MasterCard credit
card, and so the mailing was deceptive and a violation of the FDUTPA.9s
The Department also claimed that representations were expressly or impli-
edly made to consumers who called the "800" number that they would re-
ceive a Visa or MasterCard.99 The complaint also alleged that few, if any,
consumers received a Visa or MasterCard through the program touted by
Millennium, because they did not meet the necessary requirements.' 0 The
Department of Legal Affairs sought injunctive relief, namely to enjoin Mil-
lennium from continuing to engage in the alleged deceptive conduct, civil
penalties of $10,000 for each act or practice found to be a violation of the
FDUTPA, and reimbursement to consumers.' 0'
The trial court found the postcard that Millennium sent out to be decep-
tive and granted the motion of the Department of Legal Affairs for a tempo-
rary injunction to enjoin Millennium from continuing to use it."02 The parties
were also ordered, in consultation with a special master, to create a revised
postcard that would include disclosures and disclaimers to consumers on
what they would and would not receive, as well as other changes that the
court ordered. 03 This revised version of Millennium's postcard was to be
95. Id. at 1258-59.
96. Id. at 1258.
97. Id. at 1259.
98. Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1263.
99. Id. at 1258.
100. Id. at 1259.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1259. The trial court ordered the new postcard to have a
street address, rather than the post office box address previously used, and the "sales pitch
script" was to conform to the newly created postcard. Id.
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subject to the approval of the Department of Legal Affairs. °4 Millennium
appealed the trial court's injunctive order.'05
1. Application of the FDUTPA to Conduct Directed to Non-Residents
On appeal, Millennium argued first that the FDUTPA does not apply to
consumers who reside outside of the State of Florida and therefore, the tem-
porary injunction should not have been granted.0 6 Millennium argued in the
alternative that if the FDUTPA does apply to its conduct, the injunctive order
was still improper because its postcard was not deceptive.17 Finally, they
asserted that should the postcard be found deceptive, it was erroneous for the
trial court to have ordered that the Department of Legal Affairs have ap-
proval over the revised postcard because that directive "constituted an im-
proper delegation of judicial authority to the executive branch."'0 8
The Third District Court of Appeal first considered the claim related to
the extraterritorial application of the FDUTPA.'09 To determine the intended
scope of the Act, the court looked to the legislative intent as expressly stated
in the purpose section of the statute, as interpreted by case law, and as ex-
plained in secondary material." 0 The court also took notice of the way that
key terms were defined and the use of certain words throughout the statute,
for example, "'interested party or person' means any person affected by a
violation of this part or any person affected by an order of the enforcing au-
thority."'' . The court also recognized that the statute lacked any expression
of limitation in terms of confining the enforcement power of the Department
of Legal Affairs to only trade conduct that affects Florida residents." 2 The
court stated, "[i]n the absence of any such limiting language, we decline to
construe chapter 501 as limiting the Department's enforcement authority to
commercial transactions involving only Florida."
' 13
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1260.
107. Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1260.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1261 (citing FLA. STAT. § 501.202 (1997); Acosta v. Richter, 671 So. 2d 149,
153 (Fla. 1996); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 609 So. 2d 1315, 1317 (Fla.
1992); Macias v. HBC of Fla., Inc., 694 So. 2d 88, 90 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); David J.
Federbush, The Unclear Scope of Unconscionability in FDUTPA, 74 FLA. B.J. 49, 49 (2000)
[hereinafter Federbush 111]).
111. Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1261 (citing § 501.203(6)).
112. Millenium, 761 So. 2d at 1261.
113. Id. (citing Holly v. Audle, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984); Messmer v. Teacher's
Ins. Co., 588 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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2. Reconciling the Court's Holding with Other Decisions
Millennium referred the court to Coastal Physician Services of Broward
County, Inc. v. Ortiz, discussed above, in which the Fourth District Court of
Appeal granted certiorari to limit discovery to only Florida residents for
claims made under the FDUTPA." 4 In regards to Millennium's citation to
the Fourth District Court of Appeal's opinion in Ortiz, the Third District
Court of Appeal stated:
[w]ith due respect to our sister court, we are not persuaded by this
holding as it applies to FDUTPA because as we have earlier noted,
there are no geographical or residential restrictions contained in
the express language of section 501.202. Moreover, in its later de-
cision of Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436
(Fla. 4th DCA 1999), wherein the same court found that FDUTPA
had applicability to both in-state and out-of-state residents in a
class action, it appears to us that the fourth district has receded,
sub silentio, from its earlier holding in Ortiz.'
In addition to rejecting the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in
Ortiz, the Third District Court of Appeal distinguished decisions from other
state and federal courts that Millennium presented to demonstrate that state
consumer protection statutes were not extended to trade conduct that oc-
curred outside of the state." 6 The reason that the court provided for the dis-
tinction was that the cases that Millennium cited were each based upon a
state consumer protection statute which did contain language limiting its
reach to only conduct within its state."7 The court provided citations to other
cases which held the state consumer protection statutes of Illinois, New
Hampshire, and Ohio were also not restricted to the protection of in-state
residents only." 8
114. Id. at 1261 (citing Coastal Physician Servs. of Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So.
2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
115. Id. at 1261-62 (referring to Ortiz, 764 So. 2d at 8).
116. Id. at 1262 (citing Att'y Gen. of Md. v. Dickson, 717 F. Supp. 1090, 1101 (D. Md.
1989); Bass v. Hendrix, 931 F. Supp. 523, 536 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 542 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1988).
117. Millenium, 761 So. 2d at 1262.
118. Id. at 1262 n.5 (citing Perry v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1370
(M.D. Ala. 1996; Cirone-Shadow v. Union Nissan of Waukegan, No. 94 C 6723, 1995 WL
238680 (N.D. 111. Apr. 20, 1995); Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co., 918 F. Supp. 491,
504 (D.N.H. 1996); Brown v. Mkt. Dev., Inc., 322 N.E.2d 367, 369 (1974).
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3. Conclusion: Justification for the Protection of Non-Residents by the
FDUTPA
By its holding in Millennium, the Third District Court of Appeal al-
lowed the application of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act to a scenario in which the parties injured by the alleged deceptive trade
practices were solely residents outside of the State of Florida. The court ex-
plained its rationale for allowing the FDUTPA to apply:
[a]s we read FDUTPA, it seeks to prohibit unfair, deceptive and/or
unconscionable practices which have transpired within the territo-
rial boundaries of this state without limitation. Therefore, where
the allegations in this case reflect that the offending conduct oc-
curred entirely within this state, we can discern no legislative in-
tent for the Department to be precluded from taking corrective
measures under FDUTPA even where those persons affected by
the conduct reside outside of the state." 9
It is interesting to note that the court characterized the "offending con-
duct" as having occurred entirely within the State of Florida, without speci-
fying which exact act performed by Millennium was the "offending con-
duct," particularly when you consider the fact that the receipt of the post-
cards by the consumers occurred wholly outside the state. 2° Incidentally,
after determining that the FDUTPA applied to the claims of the non-
residents, the court considered the other claims on appeal in Millennium,
found that the postcard that Millennium sent to the non-resident consumers
was not sufficiently deceptive and therefore reversed the injunction that had
been ordered by the circuit court.' 2'
E. FDUPTA Not Applied in Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.
A more recent case, Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.,'22 was decided by
the Fourth District Court of Appeal in February 2003. Similarly to Glass-
man, one aspect of this case involved whether Florida law applied to the
claims of all potential class members, even those who did not reside within
the state, in order to determine if the requirements of class certification were
met. 23 However, unlike the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in
119. Id. at 1262 (emphasis added).
120. See id.
121. ld. at 1264.
122. 837 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
123. Id. at 1093.
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Glassman, here, the court held that the FDUTPA did not apply to the claims
of non-residents of Florida.1
2 4
The facts of Hutson involve the purchase, by nationwide consumers, of
calcium supplements manufactured by Rexall Sundown, Inc. ("Rexall"), a
company headquartered in Florida.12 5 The alleged deceptive trade practice
arose out of the labeling of two particular products as "Calcium 900" and
"Calcium 1200."' 126 The class representatives allege that Rexall's labeling of
these products and their point of purchase marketing and advertising misled
consumers into erroneously believing that they would obtain 900 and 1200
milligrams of calcium by taking one softgel of each respective product, when
in fact it was necessary to take three softgels of the Calcium 900 to obtain
900 milligrams of calcium, and two softgels of the Calcium 1200, in order to
obtain 1200 milligrams of calcium. 27  Hutson alleges that this deceptive
conduct therefore resulted in the cost of a dose being higher than represented
and the consumers receiving less than the amount of calcium they believed
they were consuming.
2 8
1. Certification of the Class
As in Glassman, rule 1.220(a) and (b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure needed to be met in order to grant class certification.2 9 The trial
court found that "the typicality, adequacy, predominance, superiority, and
manageability requirements" of these rules were not met and therefore, de-
nied Hutson's motion to certify the class. 3 ' The predominance element of
rule 1.220(b) involved a question of whether Florida law applied to the entire
class; it states: "the questions of law or fact common to the claim or defense
of the representative party and the claim or defense of each member of the
class predominate over any question of law or fact affecting only individual
124. Id. at 1094.
125. Id. at 1091. The case opinion does not provide the reason the FDUTPA is used as a
basis for the claims, the business location of Rexall Sundown, Inc., its principal place of busi-
ness, or the state in which it is in incorporated; however, the company maintains a website on
the internet which states that it is "one of South Florida's leading businesses" and that its
headquarters are located in Boca Raton, Florida. See id. at 1090-95; Company Profile of
Rexall Sundown, Inc., available at http://www.rexallsundown.com/pages/locations.aspx (last
visited Apr. 1, 2004).
126. Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1091.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)-(b).
130. Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1091.
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members of the class."'13' If it was determined that the laws of their respec-
tive states would apply to the non-resident class members, rather than Florida
law, then common questions of law would not predominate and the class
could not be certified.'32 The class representatives appealed the decision of
the lower court which found the laws of other states did apply to those non-
resident class members and therefore rejected class certification.'33
2. Hutson in Relation to Glassman, Ortiz, and Oc6
The appellants in Hutson argued that the holding of Glassman, in which
the FDUTPA applied to the claims of non-residents of Florida, applied to
their case as well.'34 The Fourth District Court of Appeal distinguished
Glassman from Hutson on the grounds that sufficient contacts with Florida
existed in Glassman to warrant the application of Florida law to the whole
class and because in Glassman, "the common injury occurred in Florida."'135
The appellants referred the court to the statement by the Third District Court
of Appeal in Millennium which recognized the apparent overruling of Ortiz,
the case now being relied upon by the court. 36 In response, the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal proclaimed their disagreement with their sister court's
assessment of their holding in Glassman as superceding their decision in
Ortiz.'37 The court went on to distinguish Glassman from Ortiz based upon
the location of the claimed injuries.' The court said that the injuries in
Ortiz occurred inside and outside the State of Florida, preventing the use of
Florida law for all claims, and analogized Oc6 in this regard, as well. 39 The
injuries claimed in Glassman, on the other hand, occurred only in Florida,
per the trial court's determination in that case. 40
131. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(3); Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1090, 1092
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
132. Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1093.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1093-94 (citing Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 438-39
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
136. Id. at 1094 (citing Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Dep't of Legal
Affairs, 761 So. 2d 1256, 1262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing Coastal Physician
Servs., Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
137. Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1094.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Ortiz, 764 So. 2d at 8; Oc6 Printing Sys. USA, Inc. v. Mailers Data Servs.,
Inc., 760 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
140. Id. (citing Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438).
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In Hutson, the Fourth District Court of Appeal discussed the extraterri-
torial location of the injuries claimed and resulting non-application of the
FDUTPA:
[h]ere, the alleged deceptive unfair trade practice involved the na-
tionwide sale of products with a misleading label and with mis-
leading point of purchase marketing techniques. The claims as-
serted in the national class action occurred both in the state of
Florida and in 49 other states. The alleged wrong was committed,
and the damage done, at the site of the sale of appellees' products;
that is, in the various states where members of the purported class
made their purchases. We hold that the trial court correctly con-
cluded that common issues of law do not predominate because the
claims of non-resident consumers would require the application of
consumer protection laws from each of the states where the decep-
tive trade practice occurred and the non-resident claimants suf-
fered injury.' 41
3. Hutson Analogized to Stone v. CompuServe Interactive Services, Inc. 1
42
The court cited their decision in Stone as applying similar reasoning to a
similar set of facts. 4 3 There, an attempt was made at class certification for
plaintiffs who alleged breach of contract as a result of not receiving, or not
timely receiving, a rebate offered by CompuServe to purchasers of particular
computers who also selected internet service with CompuServe.14 The class
was not certified by the Circuit Court because of the failure to meet all
needed requirements of Rule 1.220 of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 45 The lower court's decision not to certify the class was affirmed by
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which stated, "Florida has insufficient
contacts with the purported class members of other states to justify the appli-
cation of Florida's contract law to a nationwide class."' 146
In Stone, the Court distinguished the matter from Glassman, because
there, Florida had significant contacts to the case to justify the use of Florida
law. 14 By then applying Florida law, namely, the FDUTPA, "a single statute
141. id.
142. 804 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
143. See id. at 385, 389-90; Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1090, 1094 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
144. Stone, 804 So. 2d at 385.
145. Id. at 387.
146. Id. at 389.
147. Id. (discussing its decision in Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436,
439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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applied to all claims, so there was a predominance of common legal is-
sues."'' 48 In Stone, however, the Court found that the various states repre-
sented by the potential class members would apply varying standards to de-
termine if there was a breach of contract. The difference between the state
laws eliminated the presence of common issues of law that would predomi-
nate in a nationwide class, as required for class certification. 149 Though the
Fourth District Court of Appeal referred to Stone in its Hutson decision, per-
haps an important difference between Hutson and Stone is that in Hutson, all
claims were based upon the FDUTPA as opposed to Stone, where the claims
were made for breach of contract, a common law basis. 50 According to Flor-
ida's conflict of law rules, the determination of a breach of contract is gov-
erned by the state's law where the contract was made or performed. 5 '
Therefore, in Stone, the use of each consumer's state law was appropriate,
and the differences between the state laws eliminated the presence of com-
mon issues of law that would predominate and allow class certification.'
The FDUTPA, however, has been applied to cases where non-residents of
the state of Florida commenced action against Florida companies and it was
determined that the "offending conduct" or the "common injury" occurred
within the state.5 3 The court in Hutson decided that the "common injury"
had not occurred within the State, because its determination of the place of
injury was at the place of purchase in each of the fifty states."'
4. Significance of the Court's Decision
Hutson is important for its clarification by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal that it did not intend for its holding in Glassman (allowing the
FDUTPA to apply to claims made by non-residents of Florida), to supercede
its earlier decision in Ortiz, where discovery was limited to the alleged
FDUTPA violations of Florida residents only.' Additionally, it raises is-
sues about what factors the courts should consider when faced with claims
148. Id.
149. Stone, 804 So. 2d at 389.
150. Compare Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1091, with Stone v. CompuServe Interactive Servs.,
Inc., 804 So. 2d 383, 389 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
151. Stone, 804 So. 2d at 389.
152. Id.
153. See Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 439; Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v.
Dep't of Legal Affairs, 761 So. 2d 1256, 1262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
154. Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1094.
155. Id.
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based upon the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act by non-
residents of the state.'56
IV. CONCLUSION: COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS DECISIONS
Both Glassman and Millennium held that the protection offered by the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act is available to consumers
who are not residents of the State of Florida.5 7 While the Third District
Court of Appeal in Millennium determined that the "offending conduct" or
practices must have occurred within the state in order for the FDUTPA to
provide a claim to injured persons, regardless of their residency status, other
decisions have relied on seemingly different factors.'58
In Glassman, the Fourth District Court of Appeal mentioned the deter-
mination by the Seventeenth Circuit Court that the "common injury" oc-
curred in Florida as one reason for allowing the application of the FDUTPA
to claims of out-of-state residents. 59 The Fourth District Court of Appeal,
however, applied a "significant contact" test as developed in Shutts to decide
the issue of whether common questions of law existed such that class certifi-
cation should have been granted. 60
Hutson seemed to consider both the "offending conduct", like in Mil-
lennium, and the "place of injury" as in Glassman, evidenced by the court's
statement that "[t]he alleged wrong was committed, and the damage done, at
the site of the sale of appellees' products."' 6' In Hutson, the court explained
156. See id. (determining that the alleged wrong took place in all fifty states, and so the
various states' laws should apply); Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438 (considering the "common
injury" took place in Florida and also applying a "significant contact" test to determine that
state interest was created, allowing the application of Florida law); Millennium, 761 So. 2d at
1262 (finding that the "offending conduct" occurred within the state by a Florida corporation,
and so the application of the FDUTPA was appropriate to claims made entirely by non-
residents of the state).
157. Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999); Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1262.
158. Compare Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1262, with Coastal Physician Servs. of Broward
County, Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding the availability of
the FDUTPA as a statutory basis for a consumer's claim is determined by whether the con-
sumer is a Florida resident), and Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438, 439-40 (noting that the com-
mon injury to all potential class members occurred in Florida, and holding that Florida had
sufficient contacts and state interest in the claims of the entire class, such that the application
of its law was proper to all potential class members, both residents and non-residents).
159. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438.
160. Id. at 439 (referring to Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19
(1985).
161. Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1094.
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that it was using the place of sale to determine where the "wrong was com-
mitted" and the "damage done."' 62  In Glassman, a similar logic seems to
have been employed, as the site of the "common injury" was the place (Flor-
ida) where payment was made of the port charges in question. 63
But, in Millennium, the Third District Court of Appeal held that the "of-
fending conduct occurred entirely within this state" when the postcards in
question were mailed only to non-residents, and presumably received by
them solely outside of the state. 64 The offending conduct therefore, must
have been some act that Millennium performed prior to receipt by the non-
residents, as its operations were located within Florida.165 If the same analy-
sis were applied to Hutson, it would seem that marketing, manufacturing, or
other operations performed by Rexall Sundown, Inc. at their Florida business
location could have provided the source of "offending conduct" needed to
allow the FDUTPA to apply to the claims of non-residents in that case.
66
Perhaps, based upon the conflicting decisions between the various district
courts of appeal, the time may be ripe for certification to the Supreme Court
of Florida, or legislative amendments to the statute to determine what the
reach of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act should be in
relation to non-residents of the State of Florida.
67
162. Id.
163. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438.
164. Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Dep't of Legal Affairs, 761 So.
2d 1256, 1257, 1262 (emphasis added).
165. See id. at 1262.
166. See id.; Company Profile, Locations & Facilities, available at Corporate Website of
Rexall Sundown, Inc., http://www.rexallsundown.com/ pages/locations.aspx.
167. Compare Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1262 (finding that the "offending conduct" oc-
curred within the state by a Florida corporation, and so the application of the FDUTPA was
appropriate to claims made entirely by non-residents of the state), and Glassman, 738 So. 2d
at 439 (noting that the common injury to all potential class members occurred in Florida, and
holding that Florida had sufficient contacts and state interest in the claims of the entire class,
such that the application of its law was proper to non-residents), with Coastal Physician Servs.
of Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding the
availability of the FDUTPA as a statutory basis for a consumer's claim is determined by
whether the consumer is a Florida resident), and Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d
1090, 1094 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (determining that the alleged wrong took place in all
fifty states, and so the various states' laws should apply).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Attorney's fees are near and dear to the hearts of most lawyers, and an
award of fees by the court is much desired among attorneys. A decision that
awards attorney's fees stipulates that one party will pay the other party's
legal costs and expenses. An award for attorney's fees allows attorneys to
satisfy their clients, and at the same time, ensure their own payment.
A. The American Rule
Prior to the American Revolution, the courts in the American colonies
followed the "'English Rule"' and customarily awarded attorney's fees to the
prevailing party in civil cases.' However, the institution of a new govern-
* Katherine H. Miller, J.D. Candidate 2005, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center; B.A., Oglethorpe University.
1. Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1147-48 (Fla. 1985).
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ment, and new courts in the United States, ended the reliance on this British
tradition.2 The majority of American courts branched off from the traditional
"'English Rule' and ceased in the award of fees to prevailing parties.
3
In Florida, the courts follow the common law "'American Rule"' re-
garding the entitlement to attorney's fees. Usually fees are only awarded if
there is an exception to the common law rule.' An exception can be imposed
by either the judiciary6 or the legislature,7 or by contractual agreement be-
tween the parties.8
B. Section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes and Rule 1.442 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure
The most common exceptions to the "American Rule" are created by
the legislature.9 Section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes is one such legislative
exception that awards fees for offers of judgment.'0 An offer of judgment is
"[a] settlement offer by one party to allow a specified judgment to be taken
against the party, ' ' and the words offer of judgment" are sometimes used
interchangeably with demand for judgment 3 or proposal for settlement. 4
Section 768.79 stipulates that a party is entitled to fees and costs if it serves
an offer of judgment that is not accepted within thirty days, and the resulting
court judgment is either twenty-five percent greater than or less than the of-
fered judgment depending upon the party. 5 This section of the Florida Stat-
utes is applied through the procedural power of rule 1.442 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. 6
2. Id. at 1148.
3. Id.
4. Dade County v. Pefia, 664 So. 2d 959, 960 (Fla. 1995) (citing Rowe, 472 So. 2d at
1148).
5. Id.
6. See Bitterman v. Bitterman, 714 So. 2d 356, 365 (Fla. 1998). The judiciary has im-
posed one small exception to the American Rule, and, in a very narrow scope, judges are
permitted to award fees based on a party's wrongdoing. Id. This rare type of judgment is
called "[t]he inequitable conduct doctrine [and] permits the award of attorney's fees where
one party has exhibited egregious conduct or acted in bad faith." Id.
7. Peha, 664 So. 2d at 960.
8. Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1148.
9. See Peha, 664 So. 2d at 960.
10. See FLA. STAT. § 768.79(1) (2002).
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1112 (7th ed. 1999).
12. § 768.79.
13. Id.
14. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
15. See § 768.79(1).
16. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
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APPORTIONING JOINT OFFERS OF JUDGMENT
The award of attorney's fees becomes a penalty for a party who neglects
to accept the offer of judgment to end the case. 7 However, offers of judg-
ment were not designed as devices of intimidation. 8 Their purpose is "as a
tool of encourage[ment]" to persuade the parties to settle. 9 It is beneficial to
all parties to "terminate all claims, end disputes, and obviate the need for
further intervention of the judicial process."2° Costs, attorney's fees, and
extensive time can all be saved with a resolution through an offer of judg-
ment. Thus, there is quite a bit of persuasion for all parties involved to at-
tempt to settle a dispute before actually progressing with litigation.
This article will discuss awards of attorney's fees for offers of judgment
in Florida. Although there have been various notes of contention about this
type of award, this piece will focus primarily on the conflict of apportioning
the offer of judgment among all parties. Part I1 of this article separately ana-
lyzes the history of section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes and rule 1.442 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and then studies how the two function
together for an award of attorney's fees. Part III specifically focuses on ap-
portioning offers of judgment among multiple parties. It looks at the treat-
ment of the issue by various District Courts of Appeal, focusing on whether
they strictly construed the apportionment requirement, or found an exception.
Part IV will discuss Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc.,2' the case
in which the Supreme Court of Florida attempted to finally resolve the ap-
portionment issue. It will also analyze lingering questions that are evident
among the Florida District Courts of Appeal after the Willis Shaw Express,
Inc. (" Willis Shaw") decision.
II. COMBINING THE STATUTE AND THE RULE
While section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes provides the substantive
law for offers of judgment, rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure presents the means of properly applying the statute.22 Because rule
1.442 supplements section 768.79, the two function mutually, and when pro-
17. Julie H. Littky-Rubin, Proposals for Settlement: Minding Your P's and Q's Under
Rule 1.442, 75 FLA. B.J. 12 (Feb. 2001) (citing Abbott & Purdy Group Inc. v. Bell, 738 So. 2d
1024, 1026 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
18. Kaufman v. Smith, 693 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (Hazouri, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the statute should do more to clarify the purpose of the rule).
19. Id.
20. Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989).
21. 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003), reh'g denied, No. SC02-1521, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 1168, at
* I (Fla. June 26, 2003).
22. Gary M. Pappas & Joye B. Walford, Trial Lawyers Forum, Proposals for Settlement
- More Traps for the Unwary, 76 FLA. B.J. 69 (Dec. 2002).
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posing an offer of judgment, it is always best to use them together, and refer
to both, to prevent any mistakes or unnecessary misunderstandings.23
A. Section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes
Through section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes, the Florida Legislature
implemented a compulsory right to attorney's fees, if the requirements of the
statute have been fulfilled.24 Although section 768.79 is found in the negli-
gence section, in Title XLV, of the Florida Statutes, there is no uncertainty
in the language of section 768.79, which declares it applicable "[i]n any civil
action for damages filed in the courts of this state ....""
The Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed this language in Beyel
Bros. Crane & Rigging Co. of South Florida v. Ace Transportation, Inc.,26
and found section 768.79 unambiguous and comprehensive in scope, holding
it applicable to all civil actions in Florida where one party claims damages
from another.27 In Beyel Bros., the district court overruled the circuit court's
holding that section 768.79 was only applicable to negligence, and indicated
the extensive scope of the section. 8 In its decision, the district court noted
that in 1990 the legislature had specifically changed the wording of section
768.79 to include all civil actions, 29 in contrast to the earlier version that only
applied section 768.79 to the negligence part of the Florida Statutes.3"
Section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes applies to all parties, either plain-
tiff or defendant, who file offers of judgment.3' Also, the offer of judgment
will still be valid even if it is a joint offer.3 2 If the defendant in a civil action
files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff
within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover reason-
able costs and attorney's fees incurred by her or him or on the de-
fendant's behalf . . . from the date of filing of the offer if the
23. Littky-Rubin, supra note 17, at 14.
24. See TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995); Schmidt v.
Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
25. § 768.79(l).
26. 664 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
27. Id. at 64.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See § 768.79(1).
32. V.I.P. Real Estate Corp. v. Fla. Executive Realty Mgmt. Corp., 650 So. 2d 199, 201
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam).
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judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the
plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer.33
The same is true for a plaintiff:
[i]f a plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not accepted
by the defendant within 30 days and the plaintiff recovers a judg-
ment in an amount at least 25 percent greater than the offer, she or
he shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees
incurred from the date of the filing of the demand.34
Thus, section 768.79 establishes an "'entitlement' to fees,"' 35 which is
determined by the judgment, subject to any payments received or settlement
amounts.3 6 However, the judgment is not measured by the jury verdict, 37 and
section 768.79 does not apply to a voluntary dismissal where there would be
no finding of liability, unless it is dismissed with prejudice.38
After the basic circumstances of entitlement are established, section
768.79 of the Florida Statutes provides four requirements that an offer must
fulfill in order to be used as the basis for an award of attorney's fees and
costs. 39 First, to be in full compliance, an offer must reference section
768.79, and be in writing.4" Second, it needs to state the names of the offeror
and the offeree.4 ' Also, the offer must "[s]tate with particularity the amount
offered to settle a claim for punitive damages," and finally, to comply with
the section 768.79, an offer has to "[s]tate its total amount., 42 If the offer
complies with the four elements, the statutory requirements are met, and at-
torney's fees should be awarded.
In Schmidt v. Fortner,43 the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed
the basic fulfillment of section 768.79 requirements and found a basis for an
offer of judgment where the amount of the offer was in the general range of
the value of the missing assets.44 The court held that an award of fees only
33. § 768.79(1).
34. Id.
35. Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
36. § 768.79(6)(b).
37. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 707 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (citing
Stewart v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 595 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
38. MX lnvs., Inc. v. Crawford, 700 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 1997).
39. See § 768.79(2)(a)-(d).
40. § 768.79(2)(a).
41. § 768.79(2)(b).
42. § 768.79(2)(c)-(d).
43. 629 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
44. Id. at 1039.
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hinges on the amount offered and the amount of the judgment, not on the
reasonableness of the offer.45 Two years later, the Supreme Court of Florida
followed the holding in Schmidt, and upheld the constitutionality of section
768.79 in TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak.46 In Dvorak, the Supreme Court of
Florida ruled that the only way a court could refuse to award fees under sec-
tion 768.79 was if the offeror did not make the offer in good faith.47
However, good faith is not an easy determination, and each case must
be examined in depth, on its own merits.48 In Fox v. McCaw Cellular
Communications of Florida, Inc.," the defendants gave the plaintiffs an offer
of judgment for $100, which strictly followed the statutory requirements of
section 768.79.50 The plaintiffs argued that the offer was not made in good
faith because of the proposal's nominal amount, but the Fourth District Court
of Appeal disagreed." The court reasoned that if the offeror "had a reason-
able basis at the time of the offer to conclude that their exposure was nomi-
nal," the offer was in good faith." Because the offer of $100 was in good
faith, with a reasonable basis, the court in Fox agreed that the defendant was
entitled to fees.13  Accordingly, awards for offers of judgment, pursuant to
section 768.69, are based solely on the statutory requirements, without room
for judges' discretion. 4
45. Id. at 1039-40. The district court stated:
To require the exacting proof that a prima facie case entails would be both contrary to the text
and quite antithetical to the purpose and intent of the statute. It would clearly discourage mak-
ing good faith offers of seulement early in a case, i.e. before the parties have expended sub-
stantial sums in attorney's fees and costs for discovery and preparation for trial.
id. at 1039.
46. 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995).
47. Id. (citing Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
The Supreme Court of Florida reasoned "the statute as a whole leaves no doubt that the rea-
sonableness of the rejection is irrelevant to the question of entitlement. However, it is equally
clear that these enumerated factors are intended to be considered in the determination of the
amount of the fee to be awarded." Id. at 613.
48. Fox v. McCaw Cellular Communications of Fla., Inc., 745 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam).
49. Jd. at 330.
50. Id. at 333.
51. Id.
52. Id.; accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marko, 695 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam).
53. Fox, 745 So. 2d at 333.
54. David L. Kian, The 1996 Amendments to the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442
- Reconciling a Decade of Confusion, 71 FLA. B.J. 32, 35 (July/Aug. 1997).
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B. Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is in place for the
same purpose as section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes, which "is to encour-
age settlements and eliminate trials whenever possible by imposing cost
sanctions against an offeree who fails to accept a timely offer which equals
or exceeds the amount of the offeree's ultimate recovery."" However, be-
cause of discrepancies between the provisions in rule 1.442 and section
768.79, there has always been conflict among litigants and courts regarding
offers of judgment.5 6 As a result, rule 1.442 does not fulfill its intended pur-
pose to alleviate the judicial system of its burdensome caseload; instead, it
adds to it.57
Consequently, in 1988, the Supreme Court of Florida noted the continu-
ing conflict and asked "the Civil Procedure Rules Committee (the 'Commit-
tee') to examine" the problem.58 When the court did not think that the
Committee had come up with a satisfactory decision in 1989, the court sub-
stituted its own method, which combined parts of section 768.79 with rule
1.442, resulting in a custom tailored provision.59 At the same time, the court
ensured the support of its new rule and held "[t]o the extent the procedural
aspects of new rule 1.442 are inconsistent with sections 768.79 and 45.061,
the rule shall supersede the statutes. '60 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of
Florida was not specific enough and much of the conflict continued.6'
In 1992, attempting to put an end to the confusion that continued in the
trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Timmons v.
Combs.62 In Timmons, rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
and section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes were procedurally in conflict, and
55. Cheek v. McGowan Elec. Supply Co., 511 So. 2d 977, 981 (Fla. 1987) (per curiam);
see also Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989) (reasoning
that rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is in place to prevent necessity of judi-
cial interaction).
56. Littky-Rubin, supra note 17, at 12 (citing Sec. Prof'Is, Inc. v. Segall, 685 So. 2d
1381, 1384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)); see also Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1, 1-2
(Fla. 1992) (clarifying that section 45.061 and section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes are also
similar because both allow awards of attorney's fees, but under section 45.061 the award is
granted only if the settlement is unreasonably rejected). See generally Kian, supra note 54, at
36 n.2 (explaining section 45.061 not applicable to claims arising after October 1, 1990).
57. Littky-Rubin, supra note 17, at 12.
58. Fla. Bar Re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442, 550 So. 2d 442
(Fla. 1989) (per curiam).
59. Kian, supra note 54, at 34.
60. Fla. Bar Re: Amendment, 550 So. 2d at 443.
61. Kian,supra note 54, at 34.
62. 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992).
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caused the court to address the proper process for obtaining attorney's fees
by using offers of judgment.63 In its opinion, the court repealed rule 1.442,
and stated that because section 768.79 was the only current statute on offers
of judgment, the court would use its procedural powers to implement the
procedural aspects of section 768.79 as its own rule 1.442.64
Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, as adopted in
Timmons, continued to be the standard until 1996, when it was once again
amended, and changed to include the supreme court's decision in Timmons.65
The committee in charge of analyzing the needed amendments to rule 1.442
noted that the new rule was an attempt to resolve the continuing problems the
courts had construing the rule.6 6 They added that the new rule 1.442 "super-
sedes those sections of the Florida Statutes and the prior decisions of the
court, where reconciliation is impossible, in order to provide a workable
structure for proposing settlements in civil actions. 67
After being amended once more in 2000, rule 1.442 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure still reflects the recommendations of the committee
in 1996.61 It is valid for all offers or proposals for settlement, "and super-
sedes all other provisions of the rules and statutes that may be inconsistent
with this rule."6 9 Among its various provisions, the rule lists procedural re-
quirements that an offer of judgment must satisfy.7° The specific language of
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id.
65. In re Amendments to Fla. Rules, 682 So. 2d 105, 125-26 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam)
(underlining omitted). The "rule was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections ...
768.79, [of the] Florida Statutes, and the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court in... TGI
Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995), and Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d I
(Fla. 1992)." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 126 (underlining omitted).
68. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(a).
69. Id.
70. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c). The requirements for offers of judgment under rule
1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are as follows:
(c) Form and Content of Proposal for Settlement.
(I) A proposal shall be in writing and shall identify the applicable Florida law under which it is
being made.
(2) A proposal shall:
(A) name the party or parties making the proposal and the party or parties to whom the pro-
posal is being made;
(B) identify the claim or claims the proposal is attempting to resolve;
(C) state with particularity any relevant conditions;
(D) state the total amount of the proposal and state with particularity all nonmonetary terms
of the proposal;
(E) state with particularity the amount proposed to settle a claim for punitive damages, if
any;
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rule 1.442 allows joint offers by noting, "[a] proposal may be made by or to
any party or parties and by or to any combination of parties properly identi-
fied in the proposal."'" Also, rule 1.442 delves further into the specificities
of joint proposals with a provision that is in the middle of most of the con-
flict and insists "[a] joint proposal shall state the amount and terms attribut-
able to each party. '72
C. The Statute and Rule in Conflict
Presently, section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes is the only statute that
governs offers of judgment. After years of revising and amending rule 1.442
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, it would seem that the statute and
rule should be in complete accord; however, there is still a problem when
using section 768.79 and rule 1.442. The problem stems from the 1996
amendment of rule 1.442 that was partially implemented to correspond with
the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Fabre v. Marin,73 which required
the comparison of fault among all defendants. 74  As a result, even though
section 768.79 has no such requirement, 75 rule 1.442 differs, and specifically
requires that offers of judgment be apportioned among multiple parties.76
Clearly, the difference in the requirements of rule 1.442 and section
768.79 cause difficulties since the rule requires something that the statute
makes no mention of. The inconsistency makes it difficult for attorneys to
serve legally sufficient offers of judgment when there is a conflict in the law.
Usually, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide attorneys with clear
procedural requirements, but when substantive law conflicts with a rule, in-
terpretation tends to vary among attorneys and judges. The requirement of
apportionment in offers of judgment is found in the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.77 However, the provision must be analyzed to see if it is truly
(F) state whether the proposal includes attorneys' fees and whether attorneys' fees are part
of the legal claim; and
(G) include a certificate of service in the form required by rule 1.080(f).
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(l)-(2).
71. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(3).
72. Id.
73. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993). The court held joint and several liability applicable to
economic damages, and required the jury to apportion fault among the parties who contributed
to the injury. Id. at 1185.
74. Littky-Rubin, supra note 17, at 14.
75. See § 768.79(2002).
76. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(3).
77. See id.
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procedural, and thus controlling, since many areas of substantive and proce-
dural law overlap or conflict.78
A test cited by the Supreme Court of Florida is that "[p]ractice and pro-
cedure encompass the course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order,
process or steps by which a party enforces substantive rights or obtains re-
dress for their invasion. 'Practice and procedure' may be described as the
machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the product thereof."79 The
requirement to include specific apportionments in an offer of judgment is a
method or step to enforce substantive rights and, therefore, it is a procedural
requirement.
The Florida Constitution addresses the power of the courts over proce-
dure. o Article V, § 2 states: "The supreme court shall adopt rules for the
practice and procedure in all courts .... 8' Article V, § 2, does give the leg-
islature the power to retract procedural rules; however, nowhere in Article V,
or the rest of the Florida Constitution, does the legislature have procedural
rulemaking power.82
Since the Supreme Court of Florida has the ultimate procedural power,
when a statute attempts to control procedure in a way that conflicts with, or
encroaches on, the power of the court to create rules, the legislature's statute
is required to acquiesce to the court's rule.83 A case on point is Leapai v.
Milton,8 4 where section 45.061 of the Florida Statutes was found to be in
conflict with rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. In its
holding, the Supreme Court of Florida was able to filter out the substantive
law in the statute, allowing rule 1.442 to control the procedure and act in
conjunction with only the substantive aspects of section 45.06 1.86
78. In re Clarification of Fla. Rules of Practice & Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973)
(per curiam).
79. In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972) (per curiam).
80. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (1885).
81. Id.
82. Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So. 2d 9, 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (per curiam). The
legislature required awards of attorneys' fees to be remanded, but the Third District Court of
Appeal found the law was beyond legislative powers and invalid because it was a procedural
rule. Id. The district court stated:
while the legislature could, pursuant to the Constitution, repeal a rule of practice adopted by
the Supreme Court, it was without constitutional authority to promulgate a rule of practice or
procedure for the appellate or trial courts, to operate as a substitute or an alternative to the rule
thus repealed, or otherwise.
Id.
83. Ong v. Mike Guido Props., 668 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla. 1992)).
84. 595 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1992).
85. Id. at 15.
86. Id.
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That same reasoning is found in the supreme court's opinion regarding
the 1989 amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, where the
court held that rule 1.442 would supercede any conflicting provisions in sec-
tion 768.79 of the Florida Statutes.87 The actual language of the rule follows
the same train of thought and provides for its own superiority.88
Thus, the fact that section 768.79 does not address apportioning offers
of judgment among multiple parties is of no consequence. As a procedural
rule implementing section 768.79, rule 1.442 has priority and requires that
any offers of judgment "state the amount and terms attributable to each
party."s9
III. JOINT OFFERS
As previously noted, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure permit joint
offers of judgment by stating: "[a] proposal may be made by or to any party
or parties and by or to any combination of parties properly identified in the
proposal." 9° While, section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes is silent on this
issue, the case law of this state illustrate that Florida courts have continu-
ously accepted joint offers. 9'
One case that exemplifies the courts' continuing acceptance of joint of-
fers is Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Thompson,92 decided by the
Second District Court of Appeal.93 In Thompson, the court disagreed with
the appellee's argument that the joint offer of judgment, proposed by the two
offerors, was invalid because it was not joint and several.94 The court ration-
alized its decision to permit the joint offer by indicating that they "found no
cases that hold a joint offer invalid per se, while numerous cases have recog-
nized, without comment, the validity of joint offers."95
Similarly, in V.LP. Real Estate Corp. v. Florida Executive Realty Man-
agement Corp.,96 the appellants argued that attorney's fees should not have
been awarded, because the demand for judgment submitted by the appellee
87. Fla. Bar Re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442, 550 So. 2d 442,
443 (Fla. 1989).
88. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(a).
89. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(3).
90. Id.
91. JAMES C. HAUSER, ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FLORIDA 4-52 (2d ed. 2002).
92. 641 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 190.
95. Id. The court further stated that the character of the offer as a joint offer, might be
relevant on remand to the analysis of whether an offer is made in good faith. Id.
96. 650 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam).
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was invalid for being a joint offer.97 Denying the appellants' argument, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal found that on other occasions, Florida courts
recognized joint offers and that in the instant case, the joint offer of judgment
was valid.98
Given that cases clearly interpret section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes
and the language of rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to
permit joint offers, under Florida law the use of a joint offer of judgment is
not objectionable.99 However, while there is no question that joint offers are
permitted, confusion arises in the implementation of such offers. Although
rule 1.442 clearly states that joint offers "shall state the amount and terms
attributable to each party,'"' that amended provision requiring apportion-
ment did not become effective until January 1, 1997."1 Thus, there was a
problem of various courts' interpretations of the amendment's retroactive
effect, and the requirement that offers of judgment shall be apportioned
among multiple parties."'
A. Offers to Multiple Offerees
Courts have strictly interpreted the effect that the amended portion of
rule 1.442 has on offers of judgment, served to multiple offerees, after the
amendment became effective in 19 9 7 .103 However, there was a split among
the courts on the issue of whether offers of judgment served prior to the
amendment's effective date had to be apportioned among multiple parties."°
The uncertainty questioned whether the amended provision was retroactively
affective on offers of judgment served prior to 1997; or whether section
768.79, or the former version of rule 1.422, had the same, or similar re-
quirements as the current rule's apportionment specification.'05
97. Id. at 201.
98. Id. (citing Thompson, 641 So. 2d at 190).
99. See Thompson, 641 So. 2d at 190; V.IP. Real Estate, 650 So. 2d at 201.
100. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(3).
101. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Hingson, 808 So. 2d 197, 199 n.2 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
102. Pappas & Walford, supra note 22, at 72. Specifically, multiple decisions have dif-
fered on apportionment among offers from joint offerors. Id.
103. Id. at 69; e.g. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, v. Behar, 752 So. 2d 663, 664 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2000); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Meyers, 771 So. 2d 1202, 1204 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding that offer of judgment to multiple defendants must provide the specific
amount for each party even if there is an indemnification agreement between the defendants).
104. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Hingson, 774 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per
curiam).
105. See id.; see generally HAUSER, supra note 91 (discussing the various decisions of the
Florida District Courts of Appeal).
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Bodek v. Gulliver Academy, Inc., 106 a Third District Court of Appeal
case, addressed the issue and found that apportionment was not required for
offers served prior to the 1997 amendment.'0 7 In Bodek, the plaintiffs were
served with an offer of judgment in 1993.08 In its December 1997 decision,
the court found that the words "'the Plaintiffs' in the offer fulfilled the pro-
visions of section 768.79 as applicable to multiple plaintiffs.'09 The court
went further to deny the Bodeks' contrasting arguments, and found no re-
quirement of apportionment in section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes." °
However, the court did note in dicta that rule 1.442 of the Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure had been amended. "'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal followed the Third District Court
of Appeal's analysis, in Herzog v. K-Mart Corp.," 2 a slip and fall case in
which K-Mart served an offer of judgment on the plaintiffs in 1996."' The
court denied any requirement for apportionment among multiple parties,
stating that before the 1997 amendment to rule 1.442, neither the rule, nor
section 768.79, required that offers of judgment be apportioned among mul-
tiple parties. 114 It further held that K-Mart's "offer of judgment, served prior
to the amendment to the rule, was not rendered ineffective to trigger the
sanctions of the statute merely because it was a joint offer which failed to
specify the amount attributable to each plaintiff.""' 5
Conversely, the Second District Court of Appeal took an entirely differ-
ent approach than the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal."16 In 1996,
before the amendment to rule 1.442 became effective, the Second District
Court of Appeal decided Twiddy v. Guttenplan."7  In Twiddy, an offer of
judgment was filed on behalf of two defendants who agreed to pay the plain-
106. 702 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam).
107. Id. at 1332.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Bodek, 702 So. 2d at 1332. In its note, the Third District Court of Appeal illustrates
how the Bodeks' arguments were in line with the new amendment, but makes no mention of
how, or if, it would retroactively affect this decision. Id. at 1332 n. 1.
112. 760 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000), overruled in part by Allstate Indem.
Co. v. Hingson, 808 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2002).
113. See id. at 1009.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also V.I.P. Real Estate Corp. v. Fla. Executive Realty Mgmt. Corp., 650 So.
2d 199, 200-01 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that single demand for
judgment made to both appellants, was invalid because joint offers were permitted).
116. See Allstate indem. Co. v. Hingson, 774 So. 2d 44, 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
117. 678 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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tiff $5000 in exchange for a release applicable to all defendants.' 8 In render-
ing the decision the court noted that the total offer on behalf of both defen-
dants was for $5000, making it
impossible to determine the amount attributable to each offeree in
order to make a further determination whether the judgment
against only one of the offerees for $2,100 was at least twenty-five
percent less than the offer on her behalf. The fact that the offer
was made on behalf of two defendants who were not joint tortfea-
sors makes the necessary determinations as to the applicability of
section 768.79 impossible to perform with any certainty. "9
Thus, the court denied any entitlement to an award of attorney's fees,
not in reference to rule 1.442, but because it found that the offer of judgment
was not specific enough to comply with the requirements of section 768.79
of the Florida Statutes. 
20
Four years later, in March of 2000, the Second District Court of Appeal
followed its Twiddy judgment with a similar decision in C & S Chemicals,
Inc. v. McDougald.'21 C & S Chemicals relates how in 1996, the plaintiffs
served a joint demand for judgment, but failed to apportion the amount
among the three defendants. 22 Since the failure to apportion the demand
prevented the defendants from applying their "right to evaluate the 1996 de-
mand independently based on their individual liability situations," the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal decided that the demand for judgment was un-
enforceable, and there was no entitlement to attorney's fees. 23 When resolv-
ing the problem, the court mentioned that the 1997 amendment to rule 1.442
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure was not effective in regards to this
demand. 24 The court held that prior cases, such as Twiddy, unmistakably
stood for the same interpretation of section 768.79 and earlier versions of the
rule, which required apportionment.2 5
Later the same year, the conflicts between the district courts came to a
head in Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Hingson 26 At that time, the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court's holding that attorney's fees
118. Id. at 489.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 754 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
122. Id. at 796.
123. Id. at 798.
124. Id. at 797 n.3.
125. Id. at 797-98.
126. 774 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
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could not be awarded for an offer of judgment in which the offeror failed to
apportion the amount offered for two plaintiffs' claims.'27 The district court
of appeal also specifically mentioned the conflict between the courts, citing
the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Herzog v. K-Mart.2 8
Thus, when the Supreme Court of Florida was faced with the appeal of
Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Hingson'29 it cited its jurisdiction from the district
courts' conflict between Hingson and Herzog.130 In the appeal of Hingson,
the question proposed by the court was "whether the former version of Flor-
ida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 required an offer of settlement made by a
defendant to multiple plaintiffs to state the amount and terms attributable to
each plaintiff.' 3' Citing to C & S Chemical and United Services Automobile
Ass 'n v. Behar, 32 the Supreme Court of Florida remarked on the purpose of
section 768.79, and the requirement of apportionment, which promotes the
statutory objective by allowing an offeree to evaluate the specific terms of
the offer personal to that offeree.' 33 Furthering the importance of the point,
the court reasoned that if there is no specific basis to ascertain the exact
amount an individual was offered, there is no way to compare it to see if the
judgment is within twenty-five percent of the offer. 134 The court presented
additional support by interpreting legislative intent in section 768.79, finding
"'party' in the singular . . . [to indicate] intent that an offer specify the
amount attributable to each individual party.' ' 135 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court of Florida followed the reasoning of the Second District Court of Ap-
peal, and held that rule 1.442 and section 768.79, both before, and after the
127. Id.
128. Id.; see Herzog v. K-Mart Corp., 760 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
129. 808 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
130. Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3). The Supreme Court of Florida has the power
to:
review any decision of a district court of appeal that expressly declares valid a state statute, or
that expressly construes a provision of the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects
a class of constitutional or state officers, or that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision
of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law.
Id.
131. Hingson, 808 So. 2d at 199 (footnote omitted).
132. 752 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000). A single defendant served an offer of
judgment after the 1997 amendment became effective. Id. at 664. However, the defendant
failed to fully comply with rule 1.442, and because the offer was served as a "lump sum
amount" that did not provide the necessary specifics as to each of the two plaintiffs, it was
defective, and no attorney's fees were awarded. Id.
133. Hingson, 808 So. 2d at 199. The purpose, or statutory objective, of section 768.79 is
as a "tool to encourage" the parties to settle. Kaufman v. Smith, 693 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (Hazouri, J., concurring).
134. Hingson, 808 So. 2d at 199.
135. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Hingson, 7800 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
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1997 amendment, require that offers of judgment to multiple parties be ap-
portioned to each offeree.1
3 6
After the Hingson decision, and the amendment to rule 1.442 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the courts still found exceptions in wrong-
ful death and vicarious liability cases, and have permitted awards of attor-
ney's fees for undifferentiated offers of judgment served to multiple offerees
in those two circumstances.'37 As discussed in Thompson v. Hodson,'38 in
which the personal representative of an estate received a valid "lump-sum,
non-specific" proposal for settlement, a wrongful death case is atypical under
rule 1.442." 9 Whereas there might be multiple claimants, Florida law re-
quires that one plaintiff bring the action as the decedent's personal represen-
tative, and claim for the estate and all surviviors.' 40 The First District Court
of Appeal addressed this in a similar case, Dudley v. McCormick, 4' and
stated:
[a] defendant in a wrongful death action need not apportion a pro-
posed settlement among the estate and survivors on behalf of
whom the personal representative is acting in order to comply with
the requirements of section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 1.442. No such proposed apportionment would bind the
personal representative in any event.
42
This is because the representative, as a singular party, is authorized to
accept an offer and then later apportion it among the claimants, subject to
court approval if needed. 43 Since multiple parties cannot bring a wrongful
death action, the representative is viewed individually and is excepted from
the apportionment requirement.
The second exception in apportionment among offerees, is vicarious li-
ability, and although it was not addressed in the Supreme Court of Florida's
Hingson opinion, it is questionable after that ruling.'" In Strahan v.
Gauldin,45 the Fifth District Court of Appeal found an undifferentiated offer
136. Id.
137. See 4 HON. DAVID M. GERSTEN, FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE GUIDE 92-14 to 16 (2003).
138. 825 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied, 835 So. 2d 266 (Fla.
2002).
139. See id. at 948-49.
140. Id. at 949 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.20 (1993)).
141. 799 So. 2d 436 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
142. Id. at 441.
143. Hodson, 825 So. 2d at 950.
144. See HAUSER, supra note 91, at 4-55 to 58; GERSTEN, supra note 137, at 92-14 -16.
145. 756 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000), overruled by Matetzschk v. Lamb, 849
So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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of judgment to multiple offerees valid where two of the defendants were
vicariously liable to the third. 46  Holding that apportionment is illogical
when all the offerees are liable for everything, the court rationalized that
"[b]ecause of that joint and several liability, none of the individual defen-
dants were adversely affected by the joint offer."' 47 Following the same line
of reasoning, in Safelite Glass Corp. v. Samuel,148 the Fourth District Court
of Appeal found that a lack of differentiation in an offer was "no[t] harmful
error" and did not inhibit a true assessment of the offer, where one offeree
was vicariously liable for the other offeree's negligence. 49 Later case law
addresses these findings and their viability.
B. Offers from Multiple Offerors: The Divergence
While, with few exceptions, the apportionment rule regarding joint of-
ferees seemed to be clear, until recently the districts were split, with no clear
path to follow, concerning decisions of apportioning offers of judgment
among multiple offerors 5° Much of this disagreement between the district
courts concerns the purpose behind the amendment to rule 1.442 of the Flor-
ida Rules of Civil Procedure and the method of construction that should be
used in the interpretation of the rule.
In Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson,'-' where two defendants made an
offer of judgment for $100 without stating the amount that each would con-
tribute, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the circuit court's denial
of attorney's fees.1 2 The Third District Court of Appeal found that the of-
ferors should not be denied fees because a lack of apportionment among the
offerors would not make a difference on whether the offeree would accept
the proposal, and it "does not, impair the ability of the defendants ... to re-
cover under section 768.79. . . ."' Delving into the intent behind rule 1.442
146. Strahan, 756 So. 2d at 161.
147. Id.; see also Crowley v. Sunny's Plants, Inc., 710 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding a general joint offer to two defendants valid when represented by the
same attorney, with no conflict of interest between defendants and insurance company, and
when one defendant is vicariously liable for the other defendant's liability).
148. 771 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
149. Id. at 46; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Meyers, 771 So. 2d 1202, 1204 n.l (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (supporting vicarious liability exception in Safelite Glass by reference
that current case differed because the indemnification agreement between the parties did not
prevent recovery from a defendant).
150. Pappas & Walford, supra note 22, at 72.
151. 736 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), overruled in part by Willis Shaw Ex-
press, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003).
152. Flight Express, Inc., 736 So. 2d at 797.
153. Id.
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of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the court indicated that the rule was
amended in 1997 to correspond with the decision in Fabre v. Marin.5 4 In
the court's view, the purpose of rule 1.442 is to prevent problems with multi-
ple offerees, and for that reason the failure of offerors to specifically follow
the rule creates no difficulties and "must be considered merely a harmless
technical violation which [does] not affect the rights of the parties." '
Following the Third District Court of Appeal, the Fourth District Courts
of Appeal decided Safelite Glass Corp. v. Samuel, a case where two plain-
tiffs, as offerors, did not indicate any partition in their offer.'56 The offer was
not accepted, but because the failure to apportion among the offerors was not
the reason, the district court affirmed the circuit court's award of attorney's
fees.' 57 Since rule 1.442 was created to protect multiple offerees, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that the failure to divide the damages in the
offer was not in error. 58 Similarly, in Spruce Creek Development Co., of
Ocala v. Drew,59 two plaintiffs did not indicate any differentiation in an
offer of judgment, but the Fifth District Court of Appeal found that the offer
"was not void for having failed to separate the offer... [because] [t]he lack
of apportionment between claimants is a matter of indifference to the defen-
dant.'
160
Again, the Second District Court of Appeal had a more stringent view
of the requirements for multiple offerors, this time for apportionment among
multiple offerors.16' The case of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Materiale162 is
another instance where two plaintiffs offered a proposal for settlement, but
neglected to separately indicate the amount and terms attributable to each
offeror. 163 Referring to United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Behar,"M the
Second District Court of Appeal held that the same requirements, found in
that case for offerees, apply to offerors.165 The court applied the same appor-
tionment requirements because an offeree who receives a proposal from mul-
154. Id. at797n.1;seeFabrev. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
155. Flight Express, Inc., 736 So. 2d at 797 n. 1.
156. Safelite Glass, 771 So. 2d at 45.
157. Id. at 46.
158. Satelite Glass Corp. v. Samuel, 771 So. 2d 44, 46 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
159. 746 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), overruled in part by Willis Shaw
Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003), and overruled in part by
Matetzschk v. Lamb, 849 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
160. Id. at l116.
161. See Pappas & Walford, supra note 22, at 72 (citing Clipper v. Bay Oaks Condo.
Ass'n, 810 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
162. 787 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
163. Id. at 174.
164. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Behar, 752 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
165. Materiale, 787 So. 2d at 174-75.
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tiple offerors "is entitled to know the amount and terms of the offer that are
attributable to each offeror in order to evaluate the offer as it pertains to that
party."'66 The Second District Court of Appeal went even further, and ex-
pressly stated its disagreement with the decisions of the Fifth and Third Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal, certifying a conflict with Spruce Creek and Flight
Express. 167
Another Second District Court of Appeal case, Clipper v. Bay Oaks
Condominium Ass 'n, Inc.,'68 included an undifferentiated offer of judgment
from three offerors to one offeree, which caused the court to deny any enti-
tlement to attorney's fees. 169 The court cited its own strict compliance with
the rule, and found the offer flawed, because the offeree did not know what
particular amounts each of the offerors were presenting.
71
However, while noting that it did not apply in this case, in dicta the
Second District Court of Appeal recognized an exception to its requirement
of strict compliance of apportionment among multiple parties.' Citing a
previously decided case, Danner Construction Co. v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 72 the court stated "a failure to apportion may be harmless error if 'the
theory for the defendant's [sic] joint liability does not allow for apportion-
ment.' 173 In Danner Construction, the Second District Court of Appeal had
specifically stated that in no way should this exception be construed too
broadly, but in cases where there is vicarious liability among the defendant
offerors, there is no way to differentiate the parties' joint liability. 174 Thus,
166. Id. at 175.
167. Id. The Second District Court of Appeal opposed the Fifth District Court of Appeal
by reasoning that even if accepting the proposal would equally release the defendant from
both plaintiffs' claims, that defendant has the right to know how much of the agreement is
attributable to each party. Id. In regards to the Third District Court of Appeal, the Second
District Court of Appeal held that the finding of a "harmless technical violation" was incor-
rect, and the Second District Court of Appeal did "not agree that such failure is harmless. An
offer that requires an offeree to make an all or nothing determination regarding an offer made
by two parties, without permitting it to evaluate each claim separately, does affect the rights of
that party." Id.
168. 810 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 542-43. The court stated:
Only two of the three offerors, the condominium association and Midnight Pass, prevailed
against Clipper. [Since] the proposal did not state the specific amount each defendant was
willing to pay, the circuit court had no way to determine whether the condominium association
and Midnight Pass had offered anything to settle the suit.
Id. at 543.
171. Id.at542.
172. 760 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
173. Clipper, 810 So. 2d at 542 (quoting Danner Constr., 760 So. 2d at 202).
174. Danner Constr., 760 So. 2d at 202.
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an offer of judgment that fails to apportion the amounts among the offerors
may be considered "a harmless violation of the rule."'' 75
Siding with the Second District Court of Appeal, the First District Court
of Appeal favored a strict interpretation of rule 1.442, in Hilyer Sod, Inc. v.
Willis Shaw Express, Inc.,'176 a case that would eventually result in an ulti-
mate decision on the issue from the Supreme Court of Florida. 177 In Hilyer
Sod, two plaintiffs joined their causes of action, and failing to apportion
damages among themselves, offered a joint settlement to the defendant. 178
The court required strict construction of section 768.79 of the Florida Stat-
utes and rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and found that
the plaintiffs offer of settlement was invalid, preventing an award of attor-
ney's fees under section 768.79.179 Accordingly, the First District Court of
Appeal also certified a conflict with Flight Express and Spruce Creek.8'
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA DECIDES WILLIS SHAW
A. Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc.
181
Finally, in March 2003, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the
years of conflict in the district courts and issued the Willis Shaw Express,
Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc. opinion, in which the court endeavored to set forth a
definitive rule regarding apportioning offers of judgment. 182 Like the First
District Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the joint
proposal of settlement that was presented to the defendant Hilyer Sod, Inc.' 83
The proposal was from two plaintiffs to one defendant and pertinent portions
read as follows:
3. The proposal will require plaintiffs, WILLIS SHAW EXPRESS,
INC. and EDWARD McALP1NE, to sign a standard release in fa-
vor of defendant, HILYER SOD, INC., and to file a notice of dis-
missal with prejudice of the claims plaintiffs, WILLIS SHAW
EXPRESS, INC. and EDWARD McALPINE, have filed against
175. Id.
176. 817 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
177. See Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003), reh'g
denied, No. SC02-1521, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 1168, at *1 (Fla. June 26, 2003).
178. Hilyer Sod, 817 So. 2d at 1051-52.
179. Id. at 1054.
180. Id.
181. 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003).
182. See id.
183. Id. at 277.
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defendant, HILYER SOD, INC., in this action.
4. The total amount being offered with this proposal is NINETY-FIVE
THOUSAND ONE AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($95,001.00)." 4
As the plain language of this offer confirms, the offer failed to differen-
tiate terms or amounts between the offerors, and it did not afford the offeree
a chance to evaluate the proposal as it pertained to each plaintiff. In their
briefs to the Supreme Court of Florida, both the petitioners, and the respon-
dent, primarily focused on methods of interpreting section 768.79 of the
Florida Statutes and rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.185
The direct focus on differing methods of interpretation stemmed from the
First District Court of Appeal's ruling that required strict compliance. 186
Whichever method of interpretation the supreme court chose would result in
an absolute decision of the construction of the law governing apportionment
of offers of judgment.187
Petitioners, Willis Shaw Express and Edward McAlpine, argued that
according to section 768.79 and rule 1.442, there was no need to differentiate
between offerors, the offer they served on the defendant was valid, and they
were entitled to attorney's fees. 8s Their brief to the court maintained that
rule 1.442 "should be pragmatically, not strictly construed," and contended
that because it was a procedural rule, it "should be given an interpretation to
further justice not frustrate it.' 8 9
Conversely, the respondent, Hilyer Sod, requested that the supreme
court affirm the First District Court of Appeal's holding, and find the offer
invalid, because it was an undifferentiated offer and did not state the amounts
attributable to each offeror.'90 Further, the respondent claimed that both sec-
tion 768.79 of the Florida Statutes, and rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, should be strictly construed because they "are punitive in
nature and are in derogation of the common law."'19 Then, protecting itself
from any alternative analysis by the court, the petitioner further asserted that
184. Id. at 277-78 (quoting Hilyer Sod, 817 So. 2d at 1051-52).
185. See Petitioners' Initial Brief on the Merits at 28, Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer
Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003) (No. SC02-1521); Respondent's Answer Brief on the
Merits at 6, Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003) (No.
SC02-1521).
186. Hilyer Sod, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Express, Inc., 817 So. 2d 1050, 1054 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2002).
187. See Petitioners' Brief at 28, Willis Shaw (No. SC02-1521); Respondent's Brief at 6,
Willis Shaw (No. SC02-152 1).
188. Petitioners' Brief at 6, Willis Shaw (No. SC02-1521).
189. Id. at 27-28 (emphasis omitted).
190. Respondent's Brief at 6, Willis Shaw (No. SC02-1521).
191. Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted).
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"[i]f statute 768.79 or [rule] 1.442 are not strictly construed, then general
rules of construction would be applied,"'9 2 to give the language of the rule its
"plain and ordinary meaning," which would act to invalidate the offer.'93
Ultimately, the supreme court followed the respondent's reasoning, af-
firming the district court's finding that the proposal for settlement was inva-
lid for failure to follow the requirements of rule 1.442.194 In rendering its
decision, the court cited established case law, and presented two grounds on
which to base its decision that the language in rule 1.442 must be strictly
construed.'95 The first reason the court gave, was that, courts in Florida gen-
erally follow the common law American Rule, which does not allow for
awards of attorney's fees, and because rule 1.442 and section 768.79 are in
conflict with the common law, they have to be strictly construed. 9 6 Sec-
ondly, the court refered to "'a well-established rule in Florida that 'statutes
awarding attorney's fees must be strictly construed.'"'
97
Consequently, with strict construction of the plain language of rule
1.442, the Supreme Court of Florida overruled the decisions in Flight Ex-
press and Spruce Creek, which had assumed that a failure to differentiate
between offerors was of no consequence. 9 s Now, just as amounts of offers
of judgment must be apportioned among offerees, offerors must also allocate
the total among themselves. 99 Accordingly, the Willis Shaw decision clari-
fied the multitude of unreliable interpretations of section 768.79 of the Flor-
ida Statutes and rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.200 The
Supreme Court of Florida conclusively held that the use of section 768.79
and rule 1.442 requires that the "language must be strictly construed.
20
'
192. Id. at 28 (emphasis omitted).
193. Id. at 29 (quoting Castillo v. Vlaminck de Castillo, 771 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2000) (citing In re McCollam, 612 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1993))).
194. See Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 279 (Fla. 2003),
reh 'g denied, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 1168, at *1 (Fla. June 26, 2003).
195. Id. at 278.
196. Id.; see Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1077-78 (Fla. 2001).
"This court has held that a statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be strictly
construed and that, even where the Legislature acts in a particular area, the common law re-
mains in effect in that area unless the statute specifically says otherwise .... Id.
197. Willis Shaw, 849 So. 2d at 278. (quoting Dade County v. Pefia, 664 So. 2d 959, 960
(Fla. 1995) (quoting Gershuny v. Martin McFall Messenger Anesthesia Prof I Ass'n, 539 So.
2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 1989))); see also Peha, 664 So. 2d at 960 (holding that Florida courts
must heed the "plain and unambiguous language" in the law) (citing Citizens of State v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 425 So. 2d 534, 541-42 (Fla. 1982)).
198. Willis Shaw, 849 So. 2d at 279.
199. Id. at 278.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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B. Is There Still a Vicarious Liability Exception?
The Supreme Court of Florida intended Willis Shaw to be the final deci-
sion on apportioning offers of judgment. Nevertheless, in the two months
that followed the court's decision, cases emerged that suggest there still may
be an exception to Willis Shaw. No exceptions were addressed anywhere in
the supreme court's opinion, but it would seem that the court's designation
requiring strict interpretation of section 768.79 and rule 1.442 was an all-
encompassing decision. °2
The Fifth District Court of Appeal did follow Willis Shaw, strictly inter-
preting section 768.79 and rule 1.442 in Matetzschk v. Lamb, °3 where the
plaintiff had failed to apportion an offer of judgment between two defendants
on the basis of vicarious liability.2° In its decision, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal applied the strict construction demanded in Willis Shaw and re-
versed the trial judge's award of attorney's fees. 25 The court expressly de-
nied any vicarious liability exception, and stated that the court's previous
decision in Strahan, which allowed an exception, had been "implicitly re-
ject[ed]" by Willis Shaw.2 0 6
However, the Second District Court of Appeal followed a different line
of reasoning in Barnes v. Kellogg Co.20 7 and Crespo v. Woodland Lakes
Creative Retirement Concepts, Inc.20 8 Each case was decided in the two
months following the Willis Shaw decision, and in both the Second District
Court of Appeal found an exception to the rule of strict interpretation.2 9
In Barnes, two defendants, one of whom was strictly liable for the
other's error, served a joint proposal for settlement on the plaintiff, without
apportioning terms or amounts.2 '0 The Second District Court of Appeal re-
lated this situation in Barnes to the vicarious liability exception previously
established in Danner Construction, and held that because the defendants in
Barnes were joint and severally liable, the proposal was valid.21 ' Justifying
202. See Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 279 (Fla. 2003).
203. 28 Fla. L. Weekly DI 148 (5th Dist. Ct. App. May 9, 2003), opinion corrected and
superceded by No. 5D02-455, 2003 WL 21672984, at *1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. July 18,
2003) (re-emphasizing the holding of the Fifth District Court of Appeal and rejecting the
Second District Court of Appeal's analysis).
204. Id.
205. Id. at D1149.
206. Id.
207. 846 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
208. 845 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
209. See id. at 343; Barnes, 846 So. 2d at 571.
210. Barnes, 846 So. 2d at 569.
211. ld. at 571-72.
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its decision, the court noted that the purpose of section 768.79 is to act as a
catalyst towards settlement, and reasoned that unified joint offers in cases,
like Barnes, should be permitted in order to further that goal.212 The court
did not ignore Willis Shaw; instead, the court claimed that Willis Shaw had
been thoroughly considered in the Second District Court of Appeal's deci-
sion that it did not overturn Danner Construction.213 The court said, "we do
not interpret that opinion [Willis Shaw] ... as prohibiting the offer made in
this case under these circumstances., ,2 4 Thus, through its decision, not only
did the Second District Court of Appeal uphold a vicarious liability excep-
tion, but it broadened that exception to all circumstances of joint and several
liability.215
Less than a month later, the Second District Court of Appeal supported
a vicarious liability exception in Crespo.21 6 Without mentioning the Willis
Shaw decision, the court found an offer of judgment invalid because the pro-
posal to two plaintiffs did not apportion the total between the plaintiffs.1 7
However, in dicta, the court noted the validity of the vicarious liability ex-
ception to rule 1.442, found in Danner Construction, and explained,
"[b]ecause apportionment is considered impossible in a vicarious liability
case, the courts have relieved the parties of the requirement to apportion the
offer in that type of case. 218
Therefore, once again there are conflicting decisions among the District
Courts of Appeal. It remains to be seen if the rest of the district courts will
follow the Fifth District Court of Appeal and strictly interpret the Willis
Shaw decision as all-encompassing, or if they will follow the Second District
Court of Appeal and the liberal construction of the holding that allows for an
exception.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida meant for Willis Shaw to be the final rul-
ing regarding apportioning offers of judgment. The court clearly required
strict interpretation of section 768.89 of the Florida Statutes and rule 1.442
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Strict interpretation of the plain
language results in the requirement that all offerees, and all offerors, appor-
212. ld. at 572.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Barnes, 846 So. 2d at 571-72.
216. Crespo, 845 So. 2d at 343-44.
217. Id. at 343.
218. Id. at 344.
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tion offers of judgment among multiple parties. Joint offers are common,
and the requirement that offerors differentiate among multiple parties pro-
tects everyone involved, especially the offerees. No matter if the offeree is a
plaintiff or defendant, the offeree must be able to inspect the offer as it per-
tains to him personally. Otherwise, the offer is not clearly defined in regards
to each party involved. This results in a multitude of problems, including
further litigation, especially if judgment is not rendered on all of the parties.
A strict construction of the law allows no exceptions, and acts to protect
every party, which is what the supreme court intended with its Willis Shaw
decision.
However, within two months of the supreme court's decision, the Sec-
ond and Fifth District Courts of Appeal issued different decisions on the ap-
plicability of the rule on undifferentiated offers pertaining to joint and sev-
eral liability. With a disagreement so soon after Willis Shaw, more are sure
to follow. Most likely, the Supreme Court of Florida will have to make an-
other decision on this issue that appears so frequently throughout the Florida
courts.
In fact, because of the of the extensive conflict, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal sought to strengthen its viewpoint and issued a corrected opinion
of Matetzschk v. Lamb.219 In the new opinion, the court criticized the Barnes
and Crespo decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal. The Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal maintained that "the language of Willis Shaw is appli-
cable whether the offer emanates from joint plaintiffs or is directed to joint
defendants," and the supreme court decision unquestionably requires appor-
tionment for every joint offer.220 The Fifth District Court of Appeal also
reasoned that the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal were "in-
consistent with the purpose and language of the rule," especially since vi-
carious liability is such a disputed issue in most cases.22'
As the Fifth District Court of Appeal remarked, vicarious liability is a
frequently litigated issue. Since, in many cases, liability is not established
until the final judgment, the allegedly vicariously liable party may not even
be part of the case when attorney's fees are awarded. If attorney's fees are
awarded as a result of a lump-sum, joint offer, there is no way to tell what
amount each party is responsible for. The confusion over responsibility is
very likely to lead to judicial intervention, which is in complete degradation
of the purpose of both, rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
and section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes. Therefore, the strict construction
219. 849 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
220. Id. at 1144.
221. Id.
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of rule 1.442 and section 768.79, required by the Supreme Court of Florida,
in Willis Shaw, does not allow for any exceptions, not even if it is only a
harmless technical error. Offers of judgment must be apportioned among
every party.
This frequently litigated area will continue to confuse attorneys and
courts alike. Attorneys repeatedly use offers of judgment to protect their
own liability, to ensure that they are paid, and to safeguard their clients' in-
terests. Attorneys cannot afford to lose an award of fees for failing to follow
the rules concerning offers of judgment. Therefore, they must apportion the
terms and amounts of an offer to each party, no matter if offeror, offeree,
plaintiff, or defendant. Using such a strict construction, and following every
letter of the rule, is the only way to ensure that the courts will not invalidate
an offer of judgment.
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THE FLAT LEARNING CURVE
PHYLLIS COLEMAN*
If you've ever thought that some students just don't seem to get it, the
following e-mail exchange should be of interest.
From: Paul Nonothin
Sent: Monday, January 5, 2004 2:00 PM
To: Professor Snodgrass
Subject: Sales Grades
Dear Professor Snodgrass:
Grades for your class have just been posted. What did I get?
Paul Nonothin
From: Professor Hiram Snodgrass
Sent: Monday, January 5, 2004 2:30 PM
To: Paul Nonothin
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Dear Mr. Nonothin:
As you know, exams are graded anonymously. Consequently, I cannot tell
you the grade you received because I do not know your number.
Professor Hiram Snodgrass
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University. B.S., M.Ed., J.D., University of
Florida.
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From: Paul Nonothin
Sent: Monday, January 5, 2004 5:00 PM
To: Professor Snodgrass
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Professor Snodgrass:
My number is 0. What did I get?
Paul Nonothin
From: Professor Hiram Snodgrass
Sent: Monday, January 5, 2004 5:15 PM
To: Paul Nonothin
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Dear Mr. Nonothin:
Zero is not a valid exam number. Please check with Student Services to get
your actual number.
Professor Hiram Snodgrass
From: Paul Nonothin
Sent: Tuesday, January 6, 2004 2:30 PM
To: Professor Snodgrass
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Professor Snodgrass:
I went to Student Services. They told me my number and said you had given
me an "F." Obviously you made a mistake. Please correct it immediately.
Paul Nonothin
[Vol. 28:3:867
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From: Professor Hiram Snodgrass
Sent: Tuesday, January 6, 2004 4:15 PM
To: Paul Nonothin
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Dear Mr. Nonothin:
I repeat, I cannot check unless you give me your exam number.
Professor Hiram Snodgrass
From: Paul Nonothin
Sent: Tuesday, January 6, 2004 4:30 PM
To: Professor Snodgrass
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Professor Snodgrass:
I forgot my number. Call Student Services. I know they have it.
Paul Nonothin
From: Professor Hiram Snodgrass
Sent: Tuesday, January 6, 2004 4:35 PM
To: Paul Nonothin
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Dear Mr. Nonothin:
I will not check with Student Services. If you wish me to review your exam,
you must give me your number.
Professor Hiram Snodgrass
2004]
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From: Paul Nonothin
Sent: Tuesday, January 6, 2004 5:30 PM
To: Professor Snodgrass
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Professor Snodgrass:
My number is 1.
Paul Nonothin
From: Professor Hiram Snodgrass
Sent: Wednesday, January 7, 2004 9:15 AM
To: Paul Nonothin
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Dear Mr. Nonothin:
I checked and there is no mistake. You missed every multiple choice ques-
tion and failed to discuss any of the relevant issues in the two essays.
Professor Hiram Snodgrass
From: Paul Nonothin
Sent: Wednesday, January 7, 2004 9:30 AM
To: Professor Snodgrass
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Dear Professor Snodgrass:
First let me say I am very mad that it took you so long to respond.
As for the exam itself, I never do well on multiple choice questions and don't
think it was nice of you to point it out. Further, check and you will see I
carefully filled in the machine-graded card. At least you should give me
points for neatness.
[Vol. 28:3:867
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In addition, while I understand I didn't hit any of the issues on the essays, it
was not fair to give me an "F." Don't you know what that does to a person's
self-esteem--to say nothing of his GPA?
I attended almost half the classes. I admit I was surfing the web most of the
time but I kept my instant messaging to a minimum. Indeed, I told all my
friends to only send emergency e-mails during your lectures.
By the way, I was very confused by the language in that U.C.C. thing you
kept referring to. Just a friendly suggestion: You should eliminate that from
the course the next time you teach it.
I also want you to know that I had to teach the course to many of the students
in the class (because they couldn't understand you either). Inexplicably, they
all got better grades than I did.
Paul Nonothin
From: Professor Hiram Snodgrass
Sent: Wednesday, January 7, 2004 10:15 AM
To: Paul Nonothin
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Dear Mr. Nonothin:
Your grade will not be changed.
Professor Hiram Snodgrass
2004]
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From: Paul Nonothin
Sent: Wednesday, January 7, 2004 4:00 PM
To: Professor Snodgrass
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Dear Professor Snodgrass:
I just checked with Student Services and they have not yet received your
grade change. When will you submit it?
Paul Nonothin
From: Professor Hiram Snodgrass
Sent: Thursday, January 8, 2004 10:15 AM
To: Paul Nonothin
Subject: Re: Sales Grades
Dear Mr. Nonothin:
As I said in my previous e-mail, there will be no grade change.
Professor Hiram Snodgrass
From: Paul Nonothin
Sent: Thursday, January 8, 2004 2:00 PM
To: Professor Howitzer
Subject: Family Law Grades
Dear Professor Howitzer:
Grades for your class have just been posted. What did I get?
Paul Nonothin
[Vol. 28:3:867
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ONE FINE NOVEMBER
ROBERT M. JARVIS*
Like other law schools, East Overshoe State University provides its fac-
ulty and staff with a state-of-the-art e-mail system. This has greatly in-
creased productivity and institutional camaraderie, as witnessed by the fol-
lowing recent exchange of messages.
To: Lisa Sheintag
From: Quentin Pomerantz
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 3, 2003 - 9:06 a.m.
L - I was in over the weekend and noticed that the fax machine in the Faculty
Copy Room is broken again. Can we get someone in to fix it?
Thanks,
Q.
To: Recipient
From: Lisa Sheintag
Re: Automatic Reply
Date: November 3, 2003 - 9:07 a.m.
I will be out of the office for the next two weeks. In my absence, please di-
rect any concerns to Betty Pantow.
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University (jarvisb@nsu.Iaw.nova.edu).
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To: Betty Pantow
From: Quentin Pomerantz
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 3, 2003 - 9:12 a.m.
B - I understand that you're covering for Lisa while she's out. The faculty
fax machine is broken again and I was wondering if you could get someone
in to fix it.
Thanks,
Q.
To: Quentin Pomerantz
From: Betty Pantow
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 3, 2003 - 11:31 a.m.
Prof. P:
Jane-Marie handles service calls - I'll let her know when I see her - she took
an early lunch.
Betty
To: Betty Pantow
From: Quentin Pomerantz
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 3, 2003 - 2:34 p.m.
B - Did you have a chance to talk to Jane-Marie about the fax machine?
Thanks,
[Vol. 28:3:873
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To: Quentin Pomerantz
From: Betty Pantow
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 5, 2003 - 3:15 p.m.
Prof. P:
I left her a note a couple of days ago - I'll ask her to e-mail you.
Betty
To: Quentin Pomerantz
From: Jane-Marie Silverlow
Re: Faculty Coffee Machine
Date: November 6, 2003 - 10:13 a.m.
Hi Prof - Betty told me that you were having trouble with the coffee ma-
chine, but I just made myself an espresso and it worked great. So I think
everything is okay.
JM
To: Jane-Marie Silverlow
From: Quentin Pomerantz
Re: Faculty Coffee Machine
Date: November 6, 2003 - 10:16 a.m.
JM - Actually, I was trying to get the fax machine to work (but I'm glad to
hear the coffee machine is working).
2004]
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To: Quentin Pomerantz
From: Jane-Marie Silverlow
Re: Faculty Coffee Machine
Date: November 6, 2003 - 2:00 p.m.
Hi Prof - You need to push the green button on the fax machine - on the cof-
fee machine, it's the red button (I always get those two confused).
JM
To: Jane-Marie Silverlow
From: Quentin Pomerantz
Re: Faculty Coffee Machine
Date: November 6, 2003 - 2:06 p.m.
JM - Yes, I know about the green button (but you're right - it can be tricky).
Actually, the fax machine is not working at all and I was hoping you could
put in a service call.
Q.
To: Quentin Pomerantz
From: Jane-Marie Silverlow
Re: Faculty Coffee Machine
Date: November 6, 2003 - 4:17 p.m.
Oh, I haven't handled service calls since Rhoda left. Velma in the library is
in charge of service calls.
[Vol. 28:3:873
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To: Velma Flinmeister
From: Quentin Pomerantz
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 7, 2003 - 9:26 a.m.
V - I understand that you are in charge of service calls. The faculty fax ma-
chine has been broken since Saturday. Could you please have someone
come look at it?
Thanks,
Q.
To: Quentin Pomerantz
From: Velma Flinmeister
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 10, 2003 - 7:44 a.m.
Dear Prof. Pomerantz:
Sorry I didn't respond to your e-mail on Friday - I took a personal day. We
no longer have a service contract for that machine. But I'll ask Marty in the
A/V Dep't to take a look at it.
Velma
To: Quentin Pomerantz
From: Martin Lasker
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 11, 2003 - 1:32 p.m.
Professor P.: Velma told me you're having a problem operating the faculty
fax machine. You have to push the green button to get it to send (it's right
next to the on/off switch on the side).
-- Marty
2004]
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To: Martin Lasker
From: Quentin Pomerantz
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 11, 2003 - 1:34 p.m.
M - Thanks, I know about the green button. But the problem is, the
machine's broken.
Q.
To: Quentin Pomerantz
From: Martin Lasker
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 12, 2003 - 11:01 a.m.
Professor P.: Have you put in a service call?
-- Marty
To: Sandra LeBeau
From: Quentin Pomerantz
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 12, 2003 - 3:56 p.m.
S - The faculty fax machine has been broken for nearly two weeks, and I'm
told that we no longer have a service contract for it (I guess because it's so
old). We really need a fax machine ASAP. Any chance we can go buy one?
[Vol. 28:3:873
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To: Quentin Pomerantz
From: Sandra LeBeau
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 13, 2003 - 8:23 a.m.
Quentin: The Dean and I were just talking about what we should ask for
from the Central Administration in next year's budget. He's currently on a
fund-raising trip but I'll definitely recommend that this be looked into when
he gets back.
Thanks for the suggestion,
Sandra LeBeau
Business Manager
EOSU Law School
To: Faculty
From: Quentin T. Pomerantz
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 13, 2003 - 10:14 a.m.
Friends: For the past two weeks (give or take), the faculty fax machine has
been out of order. I've tried to get it repaired or replaced but haven't had any
luck. I think we should demand a new machine at next month's faculty
meeting. What do you think?
Q.
To: Quentin T. Pomerantz
cc: Faculty
From: Diana Morris
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 13, 2003 - 10:19 a.m.
Have you put in a service call?
2004]
407
: Nova Law Review 28, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LA WREVIEW
To: Quentin Pomerantz
cc: Faculty
From: Richard Hightower
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 13, 2003 - 10:22 a.m.
Q - You have to push the green button - it's tricky.
-- Rich
To: Quentin Pomerantz
cc: Faculty
From: Rachel Val-Krugel
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 13, 2003 - 10:23 a.m.
Quent: Talk to Betty - she's in charge of service calls.
To: Quentin Pomerantz
cc: Faculty
From: Bob McArthur
Re: Faculty Fax Machine
Date: November 13, 2003 - 10:25 a.m.
While we're at it, how about a new microwave for the faculty kitchen - the
current one is pretty gross!
B.
* * ** *
[Vol. 28:3:873
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To: Quentin Pomerantz
cc: Faculty
From: Joe Featherstock
Re: Faculty Microwave
Date: November 13, 2003 - 10:27 a.m.
I just got a Whirlpool 6600 at home - works great. Can make a 20 pound
turkey in under 10 minutes - truly awesome.
-- Joe F.
To: Quentin T. Pomerantz
cc: Faculty
From: Elizabeth Shoemaker
Re: Thanksgiving (Was Faculty Microwave)
Date: November 13, 2003 - 10:32 a.m.
Speaking of turkey, does anyone have a good, fat-free gravy recipe? My in-
laws are coming over this year and they're both on calorie-restricted diets.
Lizzy
To: Elizabeth Shoemaker
cc: Faculty
From: Sam Willmot
Re: Turkey Gravy Recipe
Date: November 13, 2003 - 10:34 a.m.
E - I've got a great recipe. You take two cups flour (preferably brown) and
one cup water, add a pinch of nutmeg, and bring to a boil. Serves 4.
2004]
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To: Faculty
From: Nancy Holt-Franken
Re: Holiday Party?
Date: November 13, 2003 - 10:37 a.m.
Hey guys - Sam's recipe sounds great. Why don't we cancel next month's
Faculty meeting and have a pot luck Holidays get-together? We could all
show off our favorite recipes!
Nancy
To: Nancy Holt-Franken
cc: Faculty
From: Harold Gunderson
Re: Holiday Party?
Date: November 13, 2003 - 10:41 a.m.
N - Terrific idea! Anyone who wants to help plan next month's Holiday
Party, let's meet for lunch at 12:15 p.m. at Ciero's. This is going to be fun!!
HG
To: Harold Gunderson
cc: Faculty
From: Alice Potterson
Re: Holiday Party?
Date: November 13, 2003 - 10:44 a.m.
Count me in - I make a mean cheese casserole.
[Vol. 28:3:873
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To: Faculty
From: Cy Snodgrass
Re: Quentin Pomerantz
Date: November 19, 2003 - 9:59 a.m.
Colleagues:
Upon my return today from my fund-raising trip I learned that we have a
new faculty fax machine. Many thanks to Quentin, who generously donated
it to the law school. It's this kind of spirit that makes EOSL the great place it
is. Keep up the good work!
Cyril J. Snodgrass
Dean
East Overshoe State University Law School
"Preparing Tomorrow's Leaders Today"
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